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THE CONSUMMATION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT IN JESUS CHRIST.

The question of the relation of the Old Testament to the New is many centuries old. In every age of the Christian era it has been raised afresh, and it has often occasioned vehement discussion. Our thoughts turn at once to Marcion in the second century and to Agricola in the Reformation age. But we may safely say that this question has never been agitated more frequently than during the past decade. For an explanation of this fact we may look partly to Harnack's Lectures, "What is Christianity?" (1900), and partly to Delitzsch's Lectures on "Babel and Bible" (1902 ff.). Both speakers criticised from various points of view the significance of the Old Testament in the sphere of religion and morals, and especially the position of Judaism. As a result of these criticisms we have witnessed since 1901 an unwontedly keen literary activity on the part of Jewish scholars, who have sought to defend the lofty place assigned to the Jewish religion in the spiritual history of mankind.[1]

Readers will remember that at the congress on the science of religions held at Berlin in 1910, the importance of the Jewish religion was prominently brought forward. It may be further noted that a certain section of Protestant theologians and many recent writers in the general field of literature, interpret the New Testament on such de-

[1] Leo Bäck, *Harnack's Vorlesungen über das Wesen des Christentums* (1901); M. Güdemann, *Das Judentum* (1902); Leo Bäck, *Das Wesen des Judentums* (1905); Eschelbacher, *Das Judentum* (1907), etc.

structive lines that it is emptied of its content and deprived of its dignity. It seems to follow then, as a matter of course, that we must seek a different point of view for the treatment of the Old Testament from that of earlier centuries.

With these brief prefatory remarks, I pass at once from the historical aspects of the question. Interesting as it may be to chronicle such records, it is of more importance to answer the question itself. I have offered my contribution because I believe I have found a clear path towards the solution of the problem. The point of departure and the first stages of the way lead us into an inquiry as to whether the Old Testament points to a consummation of itself in later times. It would be unnatural, if not actually impossible, to talk of a consummation in the future of any historical institution which presents itself to our view as finished and perfected. The second part of the road I have indicated will include an examination of the question whether the work of Jesus assigns to itself as its definite goal the culmination of a movement lying behind it in past history. I ask our readers to accept me as their guide in traversing both sections of this way.

I.

Indications given in the Old Testament as to its own culmination in the future.

Many characteristics of Old Testament religion may be cited in order to prove that in its fundamental ideas and main principles it occupied a unique position in the religious history of mankind. The first of these facts is the exceptional consciousness of the true prophets of the Old Testament, for, as my investigations have shown, it will always be futile to attempt to explain that consciousness as derived from psychological sources, or as resting on self-deception.

I may recall the words of Isaiah v. 20 f.; Jeremiah xxiii. 26; Ezekiel xiii. 3.[1]

The second noteworthy fact is the peculiarity of the teaching of the Old Testament with regard to God's relation to the world. For, according to the Old Testament, in contrast to the Babylonian Creation-Epos, or Hesiod's *θεογονία*, God did not emerge from the cosmogonic process. According to the Old Testament there is no sexual differentiation in God,[2] and there also the Godhead is raised far above the possibility of being displayed or illustrated in a visible object.[3] A third proof of the lofty character of the Old Testament lies in the circumstance that there, as in no other literature of antiquity, the harmony of man with God is closely associated with the cancelling of human guilt.[4] But I need not say more as to the characteristics by which Old Testament religion, in its fundamental and permanent features, is distinguished from the other religions of the ancient world. For even if I were to set out every one of these points, as I have attempted to do in my *Geschichte* (pp. 36–41), I should have failed to exhaust all the statements made in the Old Testament as to its own position in the history of human salvation. There would still remain to be mentioned all those parts of the religious content of the Old Testament, in which it suggests a completion of itself. These indications form a larger total than is usually supposed. We must divide them into two main groups.

1. In the department of the *Law* and in relation to the Law we discover traces which suggest its mutability, inadequacy, and destination to future development.

[1] Compare my *Geschichte der alttestamentlichen Religion kritisch dargestellt* (1912), pp. 106–118.

[2] The Old Testament possesses no word for "goddess."

[3] Exod. xx. 22; Deut. iv. 12, etc.; (my *Geschichte*, p. 204 ff.).

[4] Even the Babylonian literature possesses no parallels to Gen. iii. Cf. Micah vii. 19; Jer. xxxi. 34, etc.

(*a*) In the Law itself, we see (1) that many changes of earlier regulations are notified; and (2) the limited field within which the appointed sin-offerings were efficacious must suggest to us that there would one day be a wholly exceptional offering for sin, and in consequence an abolition of the Old Testament method of salvation.

Let us note to begin with the following instances of a progressive development of the Law: in the Elohistic decalogue of Exodus xx. 2–17, the commandment on the Sabbath is introduced with the word "Remember!" and finds its motive power in religion and metaphysics (in the memory of the Creator's Sabbath rest); but the decalogue of Deuteronomy (v. 6–18) begins the Sabbath-commandment with the word, "Keep!" and is rooted in the social and historic life of the people (in the remembrance of the servitude of Israel in Egypt). In the ninth commandment the words "lying witness" (Exod. xx. 16) receive a wider application in the "false witness" of Deuteronomy v. 17, so that equivocating excuses may be prevented, etc.

According to Exodus xxi. 2 the Hebrew servant is to be set free in the seventh year. In Deuteronomy xv. 12 the same rule is extended to the Hebrew maid. By the regulation of Exodus xxi. 16 the kidnapping of a human being is to be punished with death, but in Deuteronomy xxiv. 7 the command is so far limited that the person thus stolen away must be an Israelite. Leviticus xvii. 3 orders that an animal of the class destined for sacrifice must be slaughtered only beside the tabernacle, but Deuteronomy xii. 15 allows slaughtering for household necessity to be done "in all thy gates." We may note further among the laws for worship that the ancient regulation that an altar might be built of earth or of unhewn stone in all places where the Eternal had recorded His name (Exod. xx. 24–26),

was changed by the institution of the brazen altar for burnt-offerings (xxvii. 1 f.), and by the requirement that the people should sacrifice in one place (Deut. xii. 1 ff.). To mention only one further point, we see from Deuteronomy xviii. 6–8 that all members of the tribe of Levi possess the same right of exercising the priestly functions, but according to Numbers iii. 32, etc., the sons of Aaron are the overseers of the "Levites." [1]

We observe also that the sin-offerings appointed under the Law are intended only (1) for cases in which the sin has been committed through error or oversight (Lev. iv. 2, etc.; Num. xv. 24, etc.), and (2) for minor omissions connected with the so-called Levitical uncleanness (Lev. v. 1–6, etc., in my *Geschichte*, 1912, p. 517 f.). These sin-offerings have no efficacy if the sin has been committed in conscious rebellion against the Divine ordinance (Num. xv. 30); and they are insufficient to gain pardon for infringements of the religious and moral codes. In these two cases there is rather the threat that the evil-doer should be rooted out. The punishment of stoning is attached, for instance, to the crime of the false prophets (Deut. xiii. 6–11), or of soothsayers or wizards (Lev. xx. 27), who imitate the functions of the true prophets; to the crime of trespassing on the place where Jahve reveals Himself (Exod. xix. 12 f.), or of blaspheming Jahve's Name (Lev. xxiv. 16), or desecrating His day (Num. xv. 32–35). Stoning is further threatened in cases where the moral code has been infringed in a very serious way, as for example for the sin of cursing parents, or unfaithfulness to the marriage bond (Lev. xx. 9 f.), etc. It is obvious that individual sinners who had called down upon themselves God's wrath by deliberate rebellion against Him, might be got rid of by the punishment of death; but this was not possible or intended,

[1] Cf. Driver, *An Introduction*, etc., 8th edition (1909), p. 82 f., 137–140.

when the community as a whole or the majority of the people were guilty of rebellion against the Almighty.[1]

In this way the *Law* itself, by its regulations on the sin-offering, pointed indirectly to a future exceptional intervention of the Divine Grace.[2]

(*b*) But, further, *in relation* to the Law we find many passages in the Old Testament which imply a further development. For it was not only the duty of the prophets to guard the Law and condemn those who despised it, but they had the further task of completing and spiritualising the Law. This may be proved from the following facts.

First of all, the prophets in many places defended the duties of religion and morality, showing their supreme importance in relation to divine worship (Amos v. 21–25, etc., in my *Geschichte*, p. 230 f.), and there are passages in the Old Testament which, like gleams of morning sunshine, throw their radiance on the coming time in which the sacrificing of beasts would have lost its value (Ps. xl. 7–10 ; l. 8–15).[3] And secondly let us note the following group of Old Testament passages. In Deuteronomy xxiii. 2 the command is given that eunuchs shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord. But in Isaiah lvi. 3–5 this command is abolished. For thus says the Eternal to the eunuchs who keep His Sabbaths and choose the things that please Him : " Even unto them will I give in My house and within My walls a place and a name better than that of sons and of daughters," than the Children of Israel themselves ! Again, as regards the law of fasting, defined in

[1] This is confirmed by historical facts, for instead of annihilation, exile alone was threatened to the people of Jahve, when a majority of them were guilty of disobedience.

[2] On the other hand the judgment of Heb. x. 1–4, and v. 11 on the inadequacy of the Old Testament sin-offerings, was not expressed in the sense of the Law itself.

[3] Therefore in Hebrews x. 6–10 there is rightly a reference to this Psalm.

Leviticus xvi. 29, we read in Isaiah lviii. 6 ff. : " Is not this the fast that I have chosen (i.e. preferred) to loose the bonds of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens ? " etc. A similar spiritualisation of the old legal regulations is also indicated in the words of Jeremiah iv. 4, " Circumcise yourselves to the Lord " (i.e., to His pleasure) and take away the foreskins of your heart." A passage on the same lines is to be found in Joel ii. 13, where, in allusion to the well-known custom of rending the garments as a symbolical expression of mourning, the prophet says : " Rend your hearts and not your garments." And finally, let us observe that while the law, as we have noted above, ordains that the sinner who has deliberately disobeyed the commandments of God shall be stoned to death, Ezekiel proclaims that " God willeth not the death of the sinner, but rather that he should return from his ways and live " (Ezek. xviii. 23).

2. In the field of prophecy it is yet more apparent that the religion of the Old Testament, as far as its future was concerned, had its gaze directed towards mountain peaks. Evidence for this fact may be found in the following distinct tendencies.

(*a*) It is unveiled in the utterances on the relationship of the Kingdom of God to earthly conditions. In the dawn of the history of God's peculiar Kingdom, Abraham was guided to a particular land. But in the wider narratives about him and the other patriarchs it is an interesting point that the first and permanent piece of property they obtained in Canaan was a burying-ground, as we are told five times over in Genesis (Gen. xxiii. 17 ; xxv. 19 ; xxxv. 27 ; xlix. 30 ; l. 13). What a significant hint as to the true relationshp which exists between the distinctive Kingdom of God and the earth ! During their lifetime the patriarchs were merely strangers and pilgrims in Canaan

(xlvii. 9), and it was only after their death that they found rest in the land of promise. This at least is certain, that the peculiar Kingdom of God, in which the true religion was to be settled, is raised even from its beginning *above* the earth, belongs to a higher realm and is subjected to a heavenly King, as we read in the triumph-song of Israel, "The Lord shall reign." The special character of that Kingdom is made clear to us from the foundation-words (Exod. xix. 5 f.), "Now therefore if ye will obey My voice," etc., "ye shall be unto Me a kingdom of priests," etc. Why else should Gideon, although in other respects ambitious for the glory of his native town Ophrah,[1] have refused to accept the rulership which was offered to him? He was maintaining an ancient ideal when he said: "I will not rule over you, neither shall my son rule over you; the Lord shall rule over you" (Judges viii. 23).

It is true that in later days the divine patience did permit the establishment of a human kingship in Israel (1 Sam. viii. 7–9), and when it had once been accepted among the institutions of the Kingdom of God, the divine faithfulness upheld the kings in the subjugation of the enemies of Israel. But from its very inception this Kingdom was not allowed to pursue a policy of conquest. As soon as David, in arranging for a national census, showed signs that he wished by this numbering of the people to create for himself a standing army, and with its aid to proceed to external conquests, he began to feel pangs of conscience with regard to his new procedure (2 Sam. xxiv. 10); and the prophet Gad was obliged to undertake the task of pointing out to David the limits within which the earthly representative of the heavenly King of Israel must act (v. 11 f.). The prophets were compelled to remind Israel of these limits during that period, especially, in which the Assyrian world-

[1] Judges viii. 27; cf. on this passage my *Geschichte*, pp. 211–214.

power extended its conquests to Palestine (*circa* 740 B.C.). For there was a real danger at that time lest the kings of Israel should be seized with the ambition to put themselves on the same plane as the world-power, by a display of their own military strength, and by forming alliances with their neighbours. But even in those days it was clearly revealed to the prophet Isaiah that the Kingdom of God must guard itself against the ambitions and efforts we have mentioned. From his lips, accordingly, sounded forth that sublime utterance, "In quietness and in confidence shall be *your* strength" (xxx. 15) (German rendering: "eure Heldenhaftigkeit"); and at the same time, along with another contemporary prophet[1] he laid the strongest emphasis (v. 16) on the fact that the people of the eternal God must not compete with human kingdoms in the accumulation of the materials of earthly power. The task allotted to God's Kingdom is rather that of being a source of light and salvation to mankind (Isa. xlii. 6; xlix. 6). How distinct an indication as to the *non*-political nature of the Israelitish commonwealth appears also in the fact that the throne of David was cast down in the Babylonian captivity, and was not re-erected when the penal age was ended! We see, then, from indisputable evidence that the peculiar Kingdom chosen for Himself by God on earth was meant, alike in its fundamental principles and in its ultimate goal, to possess a supernatural character.

(*b*) Let us next consider how the line of prophetic evolution unrolls itself with respect to the future Saviour or Mediator. From the beginning the eyes of the patriarchs and of Israel were naturally directed towards such an one. For the hope of salvation in manifold forms had been established in close association with that special relationship to God in which consisted the peculiar religion of Abraham

[1] Zech. ix. 10. Cf. my *Einleitung ins A. T.*, pp. 368–372.

and Israel. The greatness of the race, the celebrity of its name, a blessing for other nations through the posterity of Abraham, were elements in the future salvation which were indicated as early as Genesis xii. 2 f. (Jahvist). And was not the victorious position of this people of the divinely-revealed religion included as a natural consequence in its covenant with the true God of the world ? But in its concrete position, this people was from the first a commonwealth existing within narrow limits, and it was often sorely pressed by powerful enemies. Therefore the idea of a *helper* must from an early date have linked itself with the hopes of victory cherished by the covenanted people of God. In what detailed form do we find specific allusions to this mediator of salvation ?

As regards his *office*, we observe first that he is designated in the beginning in a general way as a victor or hero. It is thus that he appears in the promise of " Shiloh " (Gen. xlix. 10), in which word we have a reference to pacification,[1] and at the same time to a bringer-in of peace. The same general character of the Saviour lies in the words, " There shall come a Star out of Jacob " (Num. xxiv. 1). For with the Romans and other nations [2] the word " star " is a symbolic expression for a victorious hero or ruler, and the succeeding words of the passage in Numbers interpret the expression in this sense. After the monarchy had been accepted among the institutions of the special Kingdom of God, the future Saviour appears adorned with the royal dignity. In Nathan's prophecy (2 Sam. vii. 11–16) there is, along with the reference to David's son there spoken of, who is a man subjected to sin, at least an indirect allusion to a greater son of David who should one day come. In Psalm ii. 7–9 the future Saviour is imagined as a victorious

[1] See my *Hebräisches Wörterbuch zum A. T.* (1910), p. 496.
[2] See my *Stilistik, Rhetorik, Poetik* (1900), p. 98.

King, and he is often announced as a ruler, as e.g. in the words, " Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder " (Isa. ix. 6) ; or in the exhortation, " Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion ; thy King cometh unto thee " (Zech. ix. 9) ; or in the verse, " Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise unto David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper," etc. (Jer. xxiii. 5). Even the tender twig, which according to Ezekiel xvii. 22–24 is to shoot forth from the family of David, is imagined as a King, as we see from ch. xliii. 7. But with the regal office of the perfect descendant of David the *priestly* office was also combined. This is made clear to us in Psalm cx. which in my opinion was actually composed by David after the anointing of Solomon, and with special reference to him. For the king is there ranked as on the same plane with Melchisedek, the king and priest. We find another example of this association of royal and priestly dignity in Zechariah vi. 13. For the Hebrew words of this passage mean : " And he shall sit down and rule upon his throne " (established by the everlasting God),[1] " and shall be a priest upon his throne ; and the counsel of peace " (i.e. a harmonious unity of effort) " shall be between them both " (between the descendant of David and the everlasting God who has already been mentioned several times in the chapter.) [2]

At the same time the eye of prophecy was opened ever more clearly to perceive the equipment and the Divinely appointed destiny of the future Saviour. For in contrast to 2 Samuel vii. 14 (see above), it is announced of the Son

[1] Cf. Ps. xlv. 7 ; 1 Chron. xxviii. 5 ; xxix. 23, " Solomon sat on the throne of Jahve."

[2] The interpretation at present in favour takes the priest to be a second person ; but in that case the reference to his throne is very striking, and the possessive pronoun " his " would on this assumption be quite superfluous.

whose birth is foretold in Isaiah ix. 5 f., that because of his mighty deeds as ruler he is to be named " a marvel of counsel " (i.e. " Counsellor "), an actual God and hero, etc.; i.e. in the realm of intellect and will-power he shall far excel the ordinary rulers of earth. The reason is that this descendant of David, as we learn from Isaiah xi. 2, will be perpetually endowed with the spirit of Jahve. That spirit will reveal itself as a source of the highest intelligence and the strongest will, in a lofty degree of religious knowledge and of piety. And in Malachi iii. 1 all this is summed up in the declaration that the coming one whose appearance is to take place in the decisive epoch of the history of redemption, is none other than God Himself. A mysterious veil hangs over the nature of the coming Redeemer—but our gaze is directed upwards.

We note, further, the disclosure of an ever-fuller knowledge as to the redemptive *acts* of the future Saviour. In the earlier literature his achievements had consisted in successful political contests (Gen. xlix. 10 f.; Num. xxiv. 17, etc.), in wise government and the impartial administration of justice (Isa. ix. 5 f.; xi. 3–5; Zech. ix. 9, etc.), but later on it is the *suffering* of the Saviour which occupies the foreground as the rock on which salvation is founded. We observe to begin with that the Immanuel who is proclaimed as the symbol of the relationship which existed between God and the prophet Isaiah and his community, had himself a share in the privations of the calamity which fell on Ahaz and the godless majority of Israel (Isa. vii. 15). We note also that the perfect descendant of David whose advent is foretold, was not to come forth from the summit, but from the roots of the tree which represents the family of David (xi. 1), and was not to be born in the capital city of Jerusalem, but in the humble town where David's line originated (Micah v. 2). He was therefore to have His

share in the suffering which was decreed for the royal house. This suffering was recognised, more distinctly in later writings, as of such a nature that it was borne by an innocent victim for others as an atonement for their sins. For of the Servant of Jahve (Isa. lii. 13–liii. 12) who represents Israel no doubt, more directly, but who also indirectly typifies the mediator, we read these heart-stirring words :—

" Surely he hath borne *our* griefs and carried *our* sorrows ; the chastisement of our peace was upon him and with *his* stripes *we* are healed." The thought of *vicarious suffering*, as we see from other passages of the Old Testament, was grasped ever more clearly in Israel (Lev. xxvi. 39 ; Jer. xvi. 11, etc. ; my *Geschichte*, p. 576).

(*c*) Further, we remark that the nature of the salvation and the means of attaining it advance in the course of prophetic history ever further into the realm of moral and spiritual life.

Taking a hasty survey of the literature, we find that the promised salvation consists at first in the greatness of the people, the celebrity of its name and other earthly values (Gen. xii. 2 f.), or in rest as the outcome of political contests (xlix. 10, etc.), or in a splendid dynastic sovereignty (2 Sam. vii. 11–16 ; Amos ix. 12 ff.). It is true, indeed, that the spiritual aspects of the promised salvation were never entirely ignored, for these are clearly indicated in the words —repeated five times over in the first book of the Bible— " In thy seed shall all nations of the earth be blessed,[1] or in the sigh of prayer breathed by Jacob as he drew near to death, " I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord " (xlix. 18). The religious and moral side of Israel's prerogatives was emphasised even in the foundational words of Exodus xix. 5 f. In later days, on the other hand, the material side was never wholly lacking from the total sum of blessings

[1] Gen. xii. 3, J. ; xviii. 18, J. ; xxii. 18 ; xxvi. 4 ; xxviii. 14, J.

promised along with the future salvation, for even Malachi promises to those who observe the law of their God that He will open the windows of heaven and pour out an abundance of blessing (iii. 10 f.). But none the less we may observe that in later times the inward aspect of salvation is kept more distinctly in the forefront. For redemption from moral guilt is mentioned as a leading element of the coming salvation.[1] In the later period, also, much stress is often laid on the bestowal of the divine spirit as the source of power for new moral endeavour (Isa. xxxii. 15 ; Joel ii. 28 ; Zech. xii. 10 ; Isa. xliv. 3 ; Ezek. xxxvi. 26 ; xxxix. 29).

Side by side with this we observe the fact that an ever stronger emphasis is laid on the necessity for a change of heart as the means of obtaining salvation. It is true that in the early ages of Israel a deep consciousness of sin was already in existence.[2] We remember, for instance, Nathan's summons to repentance and David's deep penitential sorrow (2 Sam. xii. 1–4 ; 13 ff. ; Ps. li.). But on the other hand it is a fact that in the later Old Testament writings a change of heart as the fundamental means of obtaining salvation is much more frequently mentioned. We find it so, for instance, in the exhortation : " Seek good and not evil, that ye may live " (Amos v. 14). From the time of Isaiah onwards the idea of the " remnant that should return " (vii. 3, etc. ; my *Geschichte*, p. 339 f., 341), became a fundamental idea. The later writers dwell in language of heart-stirring earnestness on the necessity for conversion ; cf. for instance, " Return ye now every one from his evil way " (Jer. xviii. 11 ; xxv. 5 ; xxxv. 15), or, " If the wicked will turn from all his sins that he hath committed,"

[1] Micah vii. 19, " He will subdue our iniquities and thou wilt cast all their sins into the depths of the sea ; Jer. xxxi. 34 b ; Ezek. xxxvi. 25, etc.

[2] The modern dogma, which maintains the contrary, is elucidated and refuted in my *Geschichte*, p. 252 f.

etc., " he shall surely live, he shall not die " (Ezek. xviii. 21), and the books of the prophetic writers of the Old Testament close with the assertion that the Elijah who was to come again should turn the hearts of the children to their fathers, i.e. he should turn the later generations to apply the principles of their ancestors.[1]

(*d*) This further fact is unmistakably evident, that the extent of the circle of those who should be partakers of salvation is ever more fully unfolded. I do not mean to suggest, as has been widely maintained of late, that in the earlier ages of Israel's history there was a wholly particularistic teaching about the circle of the saved. Such teaching does not actually exist in Old Testament literature, nor does it correspond to the nature of Old Testament religion. We do not find it, I say, in the literature, for the promise to Abraham (already mentioned several times), " In thy seed shall all families of the earth be blessed," is found even in that source of the Pentateuch which many scholars consider the oldest, and which in my judgment is at least the second oldest source. Strangers also are treated in the ancient book of the covenant in a spirit of goodwill (Exod. xxii. 21) in which the Old Testament far outshines the other literatures of antiquity.

Elijah, too, honoured a widow of the Phoenician town of Zarephath not only with his presence as a guest, but also with his miracles (1 Kings xvii. 9 ff.), and the Syrian Naaman also was healed by Elisha, and was thus made a worshipper of the true God (2 Kings v. 15, 17). In the second place it was in full accordance with the nature of the true religion of Israel that the whole human race did from the first belong in principle to the circle of its confessors. For the true God of the world could strive for no lesser purpose than that

[1] The reasons for this interpretation of Mal. iii. 24 (English version, iv. 6), may be found in my *Geschichte*, p. 414 f.

all the children of men should be enclosed within the commonwealth of His grace. In the fundamental monotheism of Old Testament religion there was enclosed as in an actively germinating seed the universality of its impulse towards development. But the progressive evolution we have already observed in reference to many points within the history of Old Testament religion, shows itself also in the truths unveiled about the extent of the circle of the citizens of the divine Kingdom. For if we study the writings of the prophets according to their chronological succession, we hear, sounding ever more frequently and more clearly, the tidings that this circle is to be extended far beyond the boundaries of Israel. The words of Amos ix. 12,[1] certainly do not refer merely to the political subjugation of the peoples there referred to. But the expression, "the Gojîm, which are called by my name," indicates, according to the general connexion of the passage, only a group of neighbouring tribes of Israel. How much louder and fuller is the music of the great prophecy which declares that all peoples shall go up to the temple-mountain, that they may receive from the eternal God guidance as to their conduct and may derive from His righteous judgments the fundamental principle of an all-embracing realm of peace (Isa. ii. 2–4; Micah iv. 1–3). Moreover, the eternal God, who has already proclaimed to all peoples the glory of the Lord from the firmament (Ps. xix. 1), will in later times convey to them a perfectly distinct message (Zeph. iii. 9); and according to Zechariah viii. 23 it should come to pass in the latter days that ten men belonging to all nations should "take hold of the skirt of him that is a Jew," that they might receive from him instruction on the true religion. Finally, what can surpass in definiteness the words which Malachi (i. 11) spoke in the name of his

[1] The genuineness of this passage is discussed in my *Geschichte*, p. 302 f.

God, "From the rising of the sun even unto the going down of the same my name is [1] great among the Gentiles"?

We have seen, then, that prophecy moved by many paths towards a higher goal. And as we watch the course of the history of Old Testament religion, have we not clear evidence for the fact suggested above, that its gaze also was directed towards mountain-peaks? Surely it is so, and yet we have not so far considered the fact that the promises of the Old Testament speak of a new covenant. Do we not at once recall the marvellous words of Jeremiah xxxi. 31–34? The essential points of this passage are as follows: "Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah: not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers," etc.; "but this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel. After these days I will put my law in their inward parts and write it in their hearts, and will be their God and they shall be my people; and they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, saying, know the Lord; for they shall all know me, for I will forgive their iniquity and I will remember their sin no more." As we examine this passage we scarcely know what is its most important characteristic. Is it the *fact*, that a new covenant is proclaimed, or the *mode* of its conclusion and the content of the new provisions of the covenant, along with the conditions upon which in the future each individual in Israel is to enter into communion with his God? Each of these characteristics is undoubtedly of equal importance, and if there is one on which peculiar stress should be laid, it is the promise at the end of the passage that the knowledge of God, which includes love to God, shall flow forth like a spring of living water from the

[1] *Is*—the historic present. A full interpretation of Mal. i. 11 is found in my *Geschichte*, p. 338 note.

hearts of all covenanted members of the human race, *just because* all hearts are to be set free from the crippling pressure of moral guilt. The treading down of sin's consequences is to prepare the ground on which the pillars of the new arch of peace between God and men shall one day rest. Nor can we turn our thoughts from this passage without dwelling for a moment in reverent admiration on the divine love with its constant renewals of mercy. There was a time, indeed, when God proposed to the human race that they should fulfil a law laid down with outward sanctions, and that a lesser benefit, such as the delivery of Israel from Egypt, should suffice to keep them faithful to the covenant. *It was man's fault* that this earlier plan failed. Then God offered a greater benefit, the bringing back from the Babylonian captivity of the Israel which had deserved punishment, that He might stir up their hearts to repentance and gratitude. What a new and sublime advance of divine grace on the pathway of the human race!

We find, then, very many tracks in the history of Old Testament religion which guide us towards the idea of a perfecting of its principles, and even of a new beginning. We can scarcely believe it possible that there have been and still are, people who maintain that the ancient principles of the Mosaic Law are unchangeable! This is the view, for instance, of Moses Maimonides, who died in 1204, and was a leading authority in Rabbinical Judaism; and in later times of B. Fischer in his *Hebräischen Unterrichtsbriefen*, p. 211. But this view is in such startling contradiction to the history of the development of Old Testament religion as set forth in this article, that we can scarcely be surprised to find that Rabbinical Judaism itself is divided on the subject. For among its most learned scribes we note, for example, that the famous Rabbi Hillel brought about the

actual abolition of the law of the so-called release from debt [1] in the Sabbatic year (Deut. xv. 1–11). He established the rule that the creditor should be permitted to state before the court: "Every debt which is owing to me by others, may be recovered by me at any time when I choose to claim it." [2] There are other illustrations of the fact that regulations of the Mosaic law were abolished by the Scribes, and moreover these learned men assigned a higher place to their own statutes than to the written law. A Talmudic sentence reads, "The words of the elders are more beloved, or dearer, than the words of the law." [3] Rabbi Isaak Albo, for instance, was therefore quite right in opposing the assertion of Moses Maimonides.

The Law itself, in its actual content, as described above, and many prophetic utterances about the law and the future characteristics of the Kingdom of God prove beyond all doubt that the Mosaic and prophetic plan of salvation aimed at extension and at a higher spiritual development. Rightly, therefore, did Lessing accept this theory in his *Education of the Human Race*, and a later author has said with perfect truth, "The Old Testament religion is the religion of hope." [4]

But did the future development, towards which so many traces guide us in the history of Old Testament religion, ever actually occur, and if so, where and how did this happen? In the second half of this paper I propose to answer these questions.

Ed. König.

(*To be concluded.*)

[1] The text probably means the right to leave or prolong a debt outstanding.

[2] Mischna. Treatise, *Schebi'ith* 10 § 3 f.

[3] Jerus. Talmud, Berakhôth, fol. 3a. For other proofs see my *Geschichte*, pp. 455, 577.

[4] Wernle, *Die Anfänge unserer Religion*, 2nd edition (1905), p. 5.

THE LEVITICAL CODE AND THE TABLE OF KINDRED AND AFFINITY.

THE Table of prohibited degrees printed at the end of the Book of Common Prayer, within which members of the Anglican Church are forbidden by Church Law to marry is as follows :—

A TABLE OF KINDRED AND AFFINITY, WHEREIN WHOSOEVER ARE RELATED ARE FORBIDDEN IN SCRIPTURE AND OUR LAWS TO MARRY TOGETHER.

A Man may not marry his	*A Woman may not marry with her*
1 GRANDMOTHER.	1 GRANDFATHER [Lev. xviii. 10].
2 Grandfather's Wife.	2 Grandmother's Husband [Lev. xviii. 17].
3 Wife's Grandmother.	3 Husband's Grandfather.
4 Father's Sister [Lev. xviii. 12, xx. 19].	4 Father's Brother.
5 Mother's Sister [Lev. xviii. 13, xx. 19].	5 Mother's Brother.
6 Father's Brother's Wife [Lev. xviii. 14].	6 Father's Sister's Husband.
7 Mother's Brother's Wife,	7 Mother's Sister's Husband.
8 Wife's Father's Sister.	8 Husband's Father's Brother.
9 Wife's Mother's Sister.	9 Husband's Mother's Brother.
10 Mother [Lev. xviii. 7].	10 Father.
11 Step-Mother [Lev. xviii. 8, xx. 11 ; Deut. xxii. 30, xxvii. 20].	11 Step-Father.
12 Wife's Mother [Lev. xviii. 17, xx. 14 ; Deut. xxvii. 23].	12 Husband's Father.
13 Daughter,	13 Son [Lev. xviii. 7].
14 Wife's Daughter [Lev. xviii. 17].	14 Husband's Son.
15 Son's Wife [Lev. xviii. 15, xx. 12].	15 Daughter's Husband.

16 Sister [Lev. xviii. 9, 11, xx. 17; Deut. xxvii. 22].	16 Brother.
17. Wife's Sister.	17 Husband's Brother [Lev. xviii. 16].
18 Brother's Wife [Lev. xviii. 16, xx. 21].	18 Sister's Husband.
19 Son's Daughter [Lev. xviii. 10].	19 Son's Son.
20 Daughter's Daughter [Lev. xviii. 10].	20 Daughter's Son.
21 Son's Son's Wife.	21 Son's Daughter's Husband.
22 Daughter's Son's Wife.	22 Daughter's Daughter's Husband.
23 Wife's Son's Daughter [Lev. xviii. 17].	23 Husband's Son's Son.
24 Wife's Daughter's Daughter [Lev. xviii. 17].	24 Husband's Daughter's Son.
25 Brother's Daughter.	25 Brother's Son [Lev. xviii. 12].
26 Sister's Daughter.	26 Sister's Son [Lev. xviii. 13].
27. Brother's Son's Wife.	27 Brother's Daughter's Husband.
28 Sister's Son's Wife.	28 Sister's Daughter's Husband.
29 Wife's Brother's Daughter.	29 Husband's Brother's Son [Lev. xviii. 14].
30 Wife's Sister's Daughter.	30 Husband's Sister's Son.

The basis of this Table is the Levitical Law, as set forth in Leviticus xviii., with certain additions and amplifications. It will be seen that of the thirty prohibited unions, ten are unions of persons related by kindred or consanguinity, while twenty relate to persons only connected by affinity, who have no common ancestor.

An inspection of the Table shows that the two columns are identical in the rules laid down, i.e., every case in either column is identical with some other case in the other column, as will be seen by setting out the equivalents, thus :

No.	1	in	Column	I	=	Nos.	19 and 20	in	Column	II.
„	2	„	„	„	=	„	23 and 24	„	„	„
„	3	„	„	„	=	„	21 and 22	„	„	„
„	4	„	„	„	=	„	25	„	„	„
„	5	„	„	„	=	„	26	„	„	„
„	6	„	„	„	=	„	29	„	„	„
„	7	„	„	„	=	„	30	„	„	„
„	8	„	„	„	=	„	27	„	„	„
„	9	„	„	„	=	„	28	„	„	„
„	10	„	„	„	=	„	13	„	„	„
„	11	„	„	„	=	„	14	„	„	„
„	12	„	„	„	=	„	15	„	„	„
„	13	„	„	„	=	„	10	„	„	„
„	14	„	„	„	=	„	11	„	„	„
„	15	„	„	„	=	„	12	„	„	„
„	16[1]	„	„	„	=	„	16	„	„	„
„	17	„	„	„	=	„	18	„	„	„
„	18	„	„	„	=	„	17	„	„	„
„	19	„	„	„	=	„	1	„	„	„
„	20	„	„	„	=	„	1	„	„	„
„	21	„	„	„	=	„	3	„	„	„
„	22	„	„	„	=	„	3	„	„	„
„	23	„	„	„	=	„	2	„	„	„
„	24	„	„	„	=	„	2	„	„	„
„	25	„	„	„	=	„	4	„	„	„
„	26	„	„	„	=	„	5	„	„	„
„	27	„	„	„	=	„	8	„	„	„
„	28	„	„	„	=	„	9	„	„	„
„	29	„	„	„	=	„	6	„	„	„
„	30	„	„	„	=	„	7	„	„	„

We need, therefore, attend only to column I. for the sake of clearness.

Of these thirty prohibited unions, fourteen are explicitly set out in Leviticus xviii. as forbidden, namely :

Nos. 4, 5, 10, 16, 19, 20, being marriages of *kindred* ; and Nos. 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 23, 24, being marriages of *affinity*.[2]

[1] The table does not expressly mention a half-sister, although such a union is forbidden in Lev. xviii. 9, xx. 17. But the civil and canon law interprets the relationship of the *half blood* to be of the same effect as the relationship of the *whole blood*. Note too that the table applies to illegitimate as well as to legitimate relations.

[2] No. 17 (the wife's sister) is not reckoned here, as it is counted on both sides ; it is discussed at the end of this paper.

(Some references to Leviticus and Deuteronomy are marked in the Table.)

It is plain that Leviticus xviii. is not meant to give, in terms, a complete and exhaustive list, for explicitly it does not forbid a man to marry his grandmother (No. 1), his daughter (No. 13), or his niece (Nos. 25 and 26). But it cannot be doubted that, at least, the legislation meant to prohibit Nos. 1 and 13.

However, we may reasonably assume that if a particular marriage of *kindred* is forbidden to a woman, the *corresponding* union of kindred is forbidden to a man. Hence the Levitical code may be taken to forbid Nos. 1, 13, 25, 26, for the corresponding unions are forbidden to women (Lev. xviii. 10, 7, 12, 13).

We have, then, to consider only the following marriages of *affinity* which are forbidden in the Table, although not forbidden explicitly in the Levitical Code, viz., Nos. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 17, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30; and we ask, Is there any difference between *these* marriages of affinity and *those* which are forbidden in the Code, viz., Nos. 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 23, 24?

No assumption of any kind has yet been made about marriages of affinity. If we could assume that affinity is a bar exactly as kindred is, i.e. that a man and his wife are to be regarded as "one flesh" for the purpose of this legislation, so that his relations are her relations in the same degree, and without any difference, then *all* the marriages in the Table are forbidden, for

No.	2	is ruled by	No.	1.
„	3	„	„	„	1.
„	6	„	„	„	4.
„	7	„	„	„	5.
„	8	„	„	„	4.
„	9	„	„	„	5.
„	11	„	„	„	10.

No. 12 is ruled by No. 10.
, 14 ,, ,, ,, 13.
,, 15 ,, ,, ,, 13.
,, 17 ,, ,, ,, 16.
,, 18 ,, ,, ,, 16.
,, 21 ,, ,, ,, 19.
,, 22 ,, ,, ,, 20.
,, 23 ,, ,, ,, 19.
,, 24 ,, ,, ,, 20.
,, 27 ,, ,, ,, 25.
,, 28 ,, ,, ,, 26.
,, 29 ,, ,, ,, 25.
,, 30 ,, ,, ,, 26.

And this is really the principle on which the Table was based when it was first promulgated by Archbishop Parker in 1563, as it had for many centuries been the principle recognised by the Church's Canon Law. But it remains a question whether such a principle lies behind the Levitical Code, and this is not to be assumed without investigation. We ask, then, again, can we find any distinction between (A) the marriages of affinity excluded in terms in Leviticus xviii., and (B) those included in the Table but not mentioned in Leviticus ?

We write them down accordingly. Class A includes :

No. 6. Father's brother's wife.
No. 11. Stepmother.
No. 12. Mother-in-law.
No. 14. Stepdaughter.
No. 15. Daughter-in-law.
No. 18. Brother's wife.
No. 23. Stepson's daughter.
No. 24. Stepdaughter's daughter.

Class B includes :

No. 2. Grandfather's wife.
No. 3. Wife's grandmother.
No. 7. Mother's brother's wife.
No. 8. Wife's father's sister.
No. 9. Wife's mother's sister.
No. 17. Wife's sister (?)

No. 21. Son's son's wife.
No. 22. Daughter's son's wife.
No. 27. Brother's son's wife.
No. 28. Sister's son's wife.
No. 29. Wife's brother's daughter.
No. 30. Wife's sister's daughter.

Now it will be observed that four out of the eight prohibited unions in Class A are unions with persons who would normally or frequently be members of the household of the man whose marriage is in question, viz., his stepmother, mother-in-law, stepdaughter, and daughter-in-law. On the other hand, eight of the twelve unions in Class B, i.e. those forbidden in the Table but unnoticed in Leviticus, are unions with persons who would normally be members of *another* household, viz., mother's brother's wife, wife's aunt (2 cases), wife's sister (?), nephew's wife (2 cases), and wife's niece (2 cases). Why the grandson's wife (21 and 22) should not be excluded, while the stepson's daughter and step-daughter's daughter are excluded, is a problem; but probably the Code is not drawn very strictly for these remote contingencies. But, on the whole, there seems to be a distinction between Class A and Class B, which is of real significance. There is a danger of proximity in the case of persons coming under Class A, while no such danger normally exists in Class B, and therefore prohibition was not equally necessary.

As to the other two exceptional cases in Class A (Nos. 6 and 18), the father's brother's wife and the brother's wife, it is to be observed that such unions are not forbidden by the earlier Deuteronomic legislation; and the law of the Levirate Marriage set down in Deuteronomy xxv. 5 f. commanded, in certain circumstances, marriages coming under No. 18. This custom of the Levirate marriage, the Levitical Code attempted to proscribe; but despite the prohibition it continued throughout Jewish history (Matt.

xxii. 24). The reason for such marriages was that the "name" of the brother might be preserved, and it may be that a similar desire to perpetuate the memory of an uncle accounts for the absence of any prohibition of No. 6 in Deuteronomy. It would seem, then, that the inclusion of Nos. 6 and 18 among excluded marriages in Leviticus xviii. and xx. was due to a desire to introduce greater strictness; it was a new marriage law, which was not observed. Hence these prohibitions stand in a different category from the others in Class A.

We cannot assert, therefore, that marriages of affinity of the B class were unlawful under the Levitical legislation or under the Deuteronomic, or that the Divine Law forbids them. We are not entitled to assume the principle that the bar of affinity is exactly parallel to the bar of kindred; no such principle lies behind any ancient code, and the particular marriages of affinity which are excluded in Leviticus are excluded because they are such as society specially needed to protect itself against. Such unions would have led to disorder in a household, and it is precisely on this ground that they were forbidden.

The case of the wife's sister (No. 17) is now explicable. It is not forbidden in the code, for normally a wife's sister would not be an inmate of the husband's home; and if a man's wife died it would be lawful for him to marry her sister, despite the relationship by affinity. But so long as the wife lived the man is expressly forbidden to unite himself with her sister (Lev. xviii. 18): for this would introduce that disorder into a household which the legislation is careful to guard against. The words are plain: "Thou shalt not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her, to uncover her nakedness, beside the other in her lifetime," the limiting words at the end showing that it is not the "affinity" that is the difficulty, and constitutes

the bar, but the confusion and rivalry which such a union would provoke.[1]

It is further to be noticed that Leviticus xviii. 18, the clause which forbids union with two sisters who are both living, is the first of six supplementary prohibitions appended to the list of forbidden unions. It does not belong to the list, but stands in a different category, as the Hebrew shows. *All* the clauses of the code about prohibited marriages, eleven in number (Lev. xviii. 7–17 incl.) begin with the word עֶרְוַת "nakedness of . . . ": they are similar in structure, and form a uniformly worded table. But *vv.* 18–23 begin with different words, and in no case with עֶרְוַת. This comes out clearly in the Latin version, which preserves the Hebrew structure here better than the English does. The Vulgate has, beginning at *v.* 7 :

V. 7. Turpitudinem patris tui et turpitudinem matris tuae non discooperies . . .
V. 8. Turpitudinem uxoris patris tui . . .
V. 9. Turpitudinem sororis tuae . . .
V. 10. Turpitudinem filiae filii tui . . .
V. 11. Turpitudinem filiae uxoris patris tui . . .
V. 12. Turpitudinem sororis patris tui . . .
V. 13. Turpitudinem sororis matris tuae . . .
V. 14. Turpitudinem patrui tui . . .
V. 15. Turpitudinem nurus tuae . . .
V. 16. Turpitudinem uxoris fratris tui . . . .
V. 17. Turpitudinem uxoris tuae et filiae eius . .

This is the Code of forbidden degrees, and then follow a quite differently phrased set of injunctions, the first of which is

V. 18. Sororem uxoris tuae in pellicatum illius non accipies, nec revelabis turpitudinem eius adhuc illa vivente.

It is quite plain that *vv.* 18–23 are supplementary, and

[1] This is the interpretation of Lev. xviii. 18 favoured by Philo (*de special. legibus* iii. 5); the Talmudists took the same line, no difference of opinion emerging among Jews until the eighth century, when the Karaites put forward the view that marriage with a deceased wife's sister is wholly unlawful.

this is suggested (though not fully exhibited) even in the English versions which begin each of them with "and," following the Hebrew ו. Thus while the unions forbidden in *vv.* 7–17 (incl.) are always unlawful, the Code places union with a wife's sister in a different category; it is not unlawful, as the other unions in the Code are, but it is specially forbidden while the wife is living, that the peace of a household may not be disturbed. So, too, other shameful things are forbidden; but none of these six supplementary prohibitions belongs to the Levitical list of "prohibited degrees."

There is nothing about the wife's sister in the earlier and laxer Deuteronomic laws; and the story of Jacob's union with Leah and Rachel shows that in primitive times a marriage with a wife's sister while the wife was living was not looked on with any disfavour. But the Levitical Law, as has been said already, aimed at a greater strictness than had hitherto prevailed. Thus a marriage with an aunt is not forbidden in Deuteronomy; Moses and Aaron are said to have been the sons of such a marriage, for Amram, their father, married his father's sister, Jochebed (Exod. vi. 20). The story of Tamar and Amnon (2 Sam. xiii.) shows that to marry a half-sister was not reckoned unlawful in the Davidic period, although forbidden in Deut. xxvii. 22), for Tamar says, "Speak unto the king; he will not withhold me from thee."[1] The Levirate marriages, already mentioned, are illustrated by Genesis xxxviii. 8. That is to say, unions which come under Nos. 4, 16, 17, 18 are mentioned without blame in the earlier history of Israel, while such as violate Nos. 10 and 11 of the Table were always matter of reproach (cf. Gen. xix. 36, xlix. 4 and 1 Cor. v. 1).

It is interesting to notice the scale of penalties laid down

[1] Cp. also Gen. xx. 2.

in Leviticus for union within the prohibited degrees. *Death* is prescribed in four cases, viz., that of union with a step-mother (11), a mother-in-law (12), a step-daughter (14) and a daughter-in-law (15), in Leviticus xx. 11, 12, 14; union with a sister or a half-sister (16) is to be punished with *excommunication* (Lev. xx. 17). Of these, 11, 12 and 16 are pronounced "cursed" in Deuteronomy xxvii. 20, 22, 23 although no definite penalty is attached to them. Union with a father's brother's wife (6) or a brother's wife (18) is to be *childless* (Lev. xx. 20, 21); it will be seen that these are unions, as remarked before, which are not forbidden by the older law, and of which No. 6 was practised, under the Levirate regulations, all through Hebrew history. If the Levitical penalty had been realised in fact, and no children had been born from such unions, the purpose of Levirate marriages would have been entirely frustrated. And, finally, union with an aunt (4 and 5), such as the marriage of Amram with Jochebed, is assigned no definite punishment; *they shall bear their iniquity* is the only judgment of the Priestly Code (Lev. xx. 19).

Thus, while the priestly legislation of Leviticus goes far beyond anything recognised before, it does not suggest that affinity *of itself* is a bar to marriage, as near kinship or consanguinity is.[1]

The tradition of the Koran as to prohibited degrees is noteworthy, as it follows closely the Levitical Code, with certain interesting exceptions. Of marriages of kindred it prohibits (c. 4) Nos. 4, 5, 10, 13, 16, 25, 26 and of marriages of affinity 11, 12, 14, 15. It also prohibits 17 the marriage with a wife's sister, but quite clearly the reference is to the case of a man being married to two sisters *at the same time*, as in Leviticus xviii. 18. All these marriages are

[1] The provisions of Lev. xxi. 1–3 indicate a clear difference between the ties of kindred and those of affinity.

prohibited in Leviticus xviii. The Koran does not forbid, of marriages of kindred, 1, 19, 20, i.e., marriage with a granddaughter or a grandmother, probably because it was deemed unnecessary. Of marriages of affinity, it does not forbid 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30. Now of these only four are forbidden in Leviticus, viz., 6 and 18 (which, as we have seen, were allowed by the older legislation and by the later practice), and 23 and 24, the wife's grandchildren, who may have been omitted by Mohammed as too distant to be worth noticing. The omissions of the Koran agreeing in the main, as they do, with the omissions in Leviticus, confirm the conclusion that no such principle as that *affinity = consanguinity* lies behind the legislation.

This principle, on the other hand, was avowed by the Christian Church, at any rate from the fourth century onward, and it lies behind the Canon Law. An early indication of the growing feeling that marriage with a deceased wife's sister is blameworthy is to be found in a reading (perhaps as old as the third century) in some LXX MSS. of Deuteronomy xxvii. 23, viz., *ἐπικατάρατος ὁ κοιμώμενος μετὰ ἀδελφῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ*. This is not the true text of the LXX, but the existence of such a variant shows the direction which opinion was taking. And there is no doubt this prohibition was based, for Christians, on the principle that affinity operates as consanguinity does, and in the same degree, when the validity of the marriage tie is in question.

No attempt has been made here to discuss the question of social ethics, viz., whether marriage with a deceased wife's sister is desirable in the interests of public morals, or whether the state is wise in regarding it as legitimate. I have been engaged with a less complex question, namely, that of the interpretation of the Levitical Code. But I may be allowed to add that, although the argument against such marriages which has in the past been based on that

Code may be invalid (as I believe it to be), it does not follow that the Christan Church is not justified in declining to bless such unions. The Levitical law was stricter than the laws which preceded it; but in its turn the Levitical law was surpassed by the law of Christ. Christian legislation has annulled none of the prohibitions of Judaism in the matter of marriage; it has added to them. Polygamy was lawful for a Jew; it is not lawful for a Christian. Marriage with a deceased brother's wife (in certain cases) and with a deceased wife's sister was lawful for a Jew; it does not follow that either is lawful for a Christian. From the beginning Christian teachers have proclaimed that marriage has assumed a new sanctity, since Christ reiterated with emphasis the old saying that man and wife are one flesh. And the Christian Church has always taken the line that since this is so, affinity must be regarded as a bar to marriage just as consanguinity is. This view may have been (and in fact was) supported from time to time by a faulty exegesis of Leviticus xviii.; but it does not rest on the Old Testament. It is derived from the application of our Lord's teaching about wedlock to the circumstances of modern society, and it is best that its true source should be frankly recognised. But the Expositor is the place for exposition of Scripture, and not for the elaboration or defence of the Church's law, so that more on this head would be here out of place.

John Ossory.

SELF-DENIAL AND SELF-COMMITTAL.

THERE are several practical difficulties which embarrass not only Christian learners but Christian teachers in connexion with the "following of Christ." Some of these, it is thought, might disappear, and others be eased, by such considerations as are here offered about what Christ Himself meant by the phrase—especially as He was understood to mean it by those who heard it first, and who were acted upon most mightily by Him. I have called my subject Self-denial and Self-committal. I might have called it Following Christ and Trusting Christ.

Two things should be remembered about Christ's precepts, and especially those concerning self-denial. They were never the results of His mere observation or meditation on moral problems. They were not part of a new doctrine of morals, nor the results of any ethical theory at all.

(1) They were transcripts from His own personal experience. He Himself had left everything, and turned His back on the world and its wages for the Father. We can go far in constructing the inner life of Christ by remembering this, that all His person was involved in every word He said. He was all of a piece. It was the Christ with the Cross latent in Him that was able to speak the parable of the Prodigal or depict the Last Judgment. We cannot indeed reconstruct His most personal religion, His immediate dealings with God How can we conceive the inmost relation to God of the Son whom no man knoweth but only the Father? Or of one who knew Himself sent from God to be all men's king, and therefore no man's peer? We have neither the data nor the courage to rebuild one of His prayers, even to surmise it. But we can get much insight into His consciousness in relation to His work and His entourage by remembering that all

He said and did was minted from His own personal experience. We can follow His psychology, the pragmatism of His thought, so far at least.

(2) These precepts were also parts and aspects of His grand central call of His public to repentance and change of life. They were not only a part of His personality, but also of His vocation and preaching; and His preaching, His gospel, was one long and varied call upon the world for the faith that works by repentance or newness of life. "Deny thyself" was but another form of saying "repent." Self-denial, even in its now current sense, is but breaking with our natural self and its past in detail.

Two corrections are required of our current ideas in connexion with such passages, for instance as "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me."

I. As to following Him, Christianity is not sectary.

II. As to self-denial, Christianity is not merely altruistic.

I. Did He expect all, who believed in Him, to follow Him? Surely, no. There were some whom He did not allow to follow Him; and some, like the family of Bethany, were never asked. The followers or disciples, therefore, were a group within the believers, who left all, at a special call, for a special mode of life. All were called to believe, to "deny self," but few chosen to be apostles, to "follow." All were called to trust Christ, confess Him, live in Him; but few to imitate His homeless way of life. It is well to be sure that we believe in Christ before we offer to be His conspicuous followers and take up His cross. Some try His cross without Himself. To-day many good men follow in the hope of believing; but *then* they believed with the possible result of following.

We may note also that the gathering of the disciples was not the founding of the Church—which came only by the

Spirit when He was glorified. We of the Church are now confessors rather than disciples. We are learning the Cross indeed, but only because it has made us. We are learning *in* it, not *of* it. We are seekers of what we have found. These words were said originally not to the Church, but to the future Apostolate and ministry of the Church—to the spiritual aristocracy selected and ennobled by Christ as His gift to the Church next in value to the Spirit. If Christ's demands on His "*followers*" were for all *believers*, His Church could only obey Him by entire separation from the world; which would be mere imitation rather than appropriation of Christ.

In this matter of imitation we may note: (1) The Apostles, through imitating Christ in leaving natural ties, never show signs of imitating His behaviour as the essence of their religion. They leave all in obedience rather than imitation. They give no sign of copying His example, or of doing as He would do in their place. He would not be Christ if He were in their place. They could not imitate Him, they were absolutely dependent on Him—as dependent on Him as on God. And He could be in the place of no mere individual; nor could any such be in His. The question, what Christ would do in my place, is an absurd and impossible one. The Christian lives in Christ, rather than like Christ. Not a word of the Gospels has this note of copying Christ, or of the casuistry that goes with the effort. To follow Christ is to be in His closer communion, not in His footsteps. None can tread in His steps. His work was absolutely unique. We cannot imitate our Redeemer, only worship Him. It was the Christ, not the Jesus, that the Apostles had in their eye. But if we take that redeeming Christ of the Cross out of the story, we cannot explain why they did not copy Him in the small things instead of worshipping Him for the great.

(2) The Apostles do not even imitate each other. Faith

was a new life which expressed itself according to each man's idiosyncrasy. Common faith is the best soil of individual liberty. Jesus made His disciples independent of each other because all were equally dependent on Him. Only not in an isolated dependence ; but in such a social and complementary way that questions about relative greatness should not arise. There are many religious types awakened by Him both in character and belief, and all are given their true and native life by faith. It is not as if Christ carefully and deliberately made it His chief task to adapt His methods to character, like a great educator (though, of course, we cannot say He never did) ; but His person acted upon each according to his kind, apart from design of His. What He gave them was not so much treatment as life—the common life of repentance and faith. His pastorate (like all God's providence) was founded in His redemption of them.

Therefore, as the disciples did not imitate each other, any more than they imitated Jesus, we are not bound to imitate them ; whose *faith* it is we follow, and their inspiration, rather than their example.

II. As to Self-denial, that was a demand upon all.

Theological Liberalism does not grasp the Evangelical idea of faith in Christ, therefore it preaches self-sacrifice as Christianity, the imitation of Christ's manner, or the cultivation of Christ's spirit of life. It would be a valuable thing if we could have a perfectly frank account, from candid and experienced ministers who have followed this line, as to its effect on their people. Has the world really been renounced and overcome by it ? It is an ethic (and in so far a self-salvation) ; and a religion which is only ethical ends for the generations in illusion or in despair. In the middle passage it is sadness or regret. Has the note been one of joyful victory or one of subdued service and shy goodness ? Has the self-sacrifice been produced in satisfactory

amount? Has it lasted? What has been its effect on the religion, on the spiritual note, of the community—crucifixion to the world or genial benevolence? Is it not often a self-regarding ethic? Is our eye not too often on our moral profit? Is the work really done, does it tend to be done, out of self-forgetful love of Christ and His souls?

Christ did not think of life as an ethical chain, a series of small sacrifices. The apostles did not. The New Testament did not. Faith was for them a life-disposal—one act as large as life itself, answering an act of love as large and eternal as God. It was the self-committal of the whole soul and person to the whole Christ. It was the decisive act, swift or long, which gave a man to Christ, placed him in Christ, and then let the Spirit of the new creation shape the precise form which the new life should take. Some have instructions to remain in their place in life ("study to be quiet, and do your own business"), only taking care that business do not blot out Christ, or blind them to the near kingdom. To the simple believer, the babe in Christ, the words under discussion mean this: So live in the world and its egoisms that they shall not capture and enslave you. So live in Christ there that, when the call comes to a great and reasoned decision, you let the world go for Christ, business for the kingdom, economics for ethics, ethics for faith. But others are called to come out of the current of natural life and its prizes, and to devote themselves to what brings no worldly reward; they may even set the world against them. Such is the idea of the ministry. But in any case we are not to be fidgetty devotees of self-denial, we are not to fuss about unselfishness. To cease to live to self is for the Christian much more than the negative thing, unselfishness. That is a mere formal and ethical definition. It needs a real content and goal of good. We cease living *to self* because we live *to God—because*, not *that we may*, live to

God. To cease living to self is not to take up unselfishness as a profession. That might be an attempt to make an eternal living, so to say, rather than laying hold of eternal life. The sin we must shun is something more than selfishness. There are people who become more concerned about being unselfish than about being of real use. Their unselfishness really has an eye on self and its excellence. It is egoistic unselfishness. It is self-seeking self-sacrifice. It is moral subjectivism. It is the work of people who are trying harder to be good than to be right and do their duty. Or it may be the rarefied self-interest of craving morbidly for the higher spiritual life, or the cult of their own personality. But the essential thing is so to live in Christ that we become just as selfless as He makes us. No man who is really living in Christ will be without guidance as to his course.

"Deny yourself," in Christ's mouth, was a religious call, and not an ethical precept. It concerned more the disposal of the soul than of the conduct. And it is only half the idea, and the negative half: the positive is, "Follow me." And even when that meant, "Come into my wandering company," it did not mean, "Come into my calling, take up my vocation." It meant attachment, devotion, to Him, disposing of the soul to Him. Read in the commentary of the spirit, it means, "Come *into* me, and thereby reach the true renunciation of the world." The idea rises through the three stages: (1) Deny yourself, go back on yourself, round on yourself, your instinctive, natural self, (2) as thoroughly as a man sentenced to death, (3) by dying for good unto the world and into Me. The Christian ideal is thus not following Christ by taking up the odd and homeless life of wandering saints, or peculiar people; but, in the full light of the Christian revelation and Gospel, it means first communion with Christ. We cannot have that without denying ourselves to the world, and such self-denial means much more than setting

our face against self-indulgence. It is really another form of Christ's great and standing call to repent—to change our attitude not only to our past but to the natural world. It is a strong and pointed expression of Christ's for that new life of repentance and faith in Himself which He was always preaching. To deny self is to make the sweeping, compendious, final, and permanent repentance. It means turning our back in principle and motive (whatever the form of practice) upon the natural man, on the universal ways of the world, on the decent goodness of society, it might be, no less than on the selfishness of individuals. It means rupture *in principle* with the natural man and the natural order—conversion, therefore, rather than what we mean by self-sacrifice. It implies a totally changed current and colour of life; not simply a new principle applied to life, but life in a new movement, a new direction, a new note. It means living in another world, to the oblivion often of this; turning thoroughly and permanently, in tone and principle, from the world of Egoism, however lawful and respectable; becoming, at the central point or the last dread pinch, a stranger to the natural self and the very friends round us, as Christ did to His family; living to unseen reality as the nearest and absorbing thing. Look at the man condemned to death and carrying his cross through the street, said Christ; or, as we should say, in the condemned cell [1]; or, as we might farther say, look at the man told by his doctor that his heart gives him but a few weeks to live. He moves to his end as in a dream. He no more belongs to the things around him. The jeers of foes or the surprise of friends he hardly notes. He is loose to one life, and dazed with the

[1] Taking up the Cross is not an act of self-denial, any more than the culprit's procession to the scaffold is. It is the badge of a life done with, branded and ear-marked for a doom, staked out for another owner and purpose.

dawn of another. He is in a distrait and unearthly frame of mind. Such a man is not practising self-denial in the poor and common sense that we give to Christ's phrase ; he is not practising the laborious, scrupulous type of religion we often associate with it. But he turns his soul's back upon all the natural order of things. His heart at least is no longer wedded to it—bravely as he may do his duty in it. He is already living in the precincts, the shadow, the spell of a life beyond. That is the idea—not careful and laborious self-sacrifice, but detachment from the world—even while obeying its law, doing its duties, loving its loves, and making due provision for them when we are gone—detachment from one world and absorption in another. Taking up the Cross does not mean doing devoted and disagreeable things in conscientious detail, nor even applying a great moral principle to life's behaviour—that would be reducing the Cross to a new legalism—but, putting our shoulders in a love passion under the Cross, having on us the mystic badge and seal of the unworldly Christ, becoming as a weaned child, bearing about a deep death to the world. It is the true other-worldliness. It is the inner-worldliness. Denying self does not mean the spiting of this or that desire, or the mortifying of this or that passion, or even the doing of this or that service. Our self is more fontal than all its thoughts, interests, passions, actions, or sacrifices. It is our whole personality, our soul, our egotism and all its connexions with a world of egotists. That self is to be denied by a new assignment of it for life and eternity. Yet it is not to be killed or eradicated, but subdued to its place—as we deny ourselves to the call of an obtrusive bore who would concuss and manage us, and whom we must not indulge ourselves so far as to kill. The egoist self is such a shameless bore. And this denial is done by the assertion of Christ in the self, His possession of it, by a self-assignment to Him and to the principles of His world, which turn the natural world upside down.

This is the badge of that inmost circle into which all believers have slowly, but not equally, to move. 'If any man drawn to me is to join my chosen, my ministry, my apostolate, my inner circle,' says Christ, 'let him lose to Me his egoism and his egotist interests; as a man loses them who is done with the world, and has the mark of death on him and the doom of greatness. Let him die unto Me. He can then be no self-seeker. He will totally change his attitude to self and self's world.' That is repentance in man or nation. It is more than a grand refusal; it is the grand reversal. It is not misery about sin, but a new principle of life, and of goodness as a life. "We cannot." No, we cannot, not till the kingdom seize us, not till we are lost in Him. *Christianity is not unselfishness, but faith with its implicates of devotion. It is not our sacrifice but Christ's cross. Our Christianity is not the sacrifice we make but the sacrifice we trust.* It is not losing self in service of the brethren, but losing self to Christ, and to the service of a Master who makes us brethren. Which man makes the deeper impression even on this world? He who is doing a multitude of detached, laborious, and manufactured services to men, or he who is palpably so living in Christ that his faith overflows on each occasion of helping, saving love? Self-devotion is, first, faith, and then service by a moral necessity; first our soul, then our sacrifice. All self-sacrifice is not good; some is quite bad. As Christians we are what our Master makes us, not what our efforts make us. Paul's great words show how deeply he understood Christ, "Through whom I am crucified unto the world, and the world unto me." And this while he was playing a very active part in the world. The perfect in Christianity does not mean the sinless, but those who are in right relation to God with all their sin, as in Judaism it meant relation to the law, and its blamelessness.

And so indeed it was with all the Apostles. How do we

find they denied themselves in following Him? Not by practising assiduous or ascetic self-denial, but by renouncing the whole world they were reared in—relatives, friends, interests, ideas; by learning a new tongue which almost made these sound like a foreign one; "hating father, mother, brother, sister"—even while loving them; leaving the faith they had been trained in; giving themselves to Christ as their ancestral God; losing the sense of fatherland and patriotism, and everything that before made life worth living. And for what? For communion with Christ, for His kingdom, for the Gospel, for the citizenship and realities of another and subversive order of things. Not for the life of sacrifice, but for life in Christ, with such sacrifice as that prescribed; for a life which repudiated the past rather than completed it, a life of repentance and not mere progress, of faith which makes sacrifice, and not sacrifice which replaces faith.

All Christian ethic is the practical expression of such repentance. This will seem a strained thing to those who associate repentance only, or chiefly, with remorseful lamentation and woe, or with passing moods, or with a temperament, or with the first beginnings of the Christian life, before the Gospel has taken over the victim of the law. But it will not so seem to those who recall that it is the standing obverse of faith as a life, that it is based both by the Baptist and by Jesus on the great, constant, and final hope of the near kingdom, that in the Old Testament, as in the New, this hope is a saving judgment, and inseparable from the remembrance of God's changeless holiness, especially in the Cross. The Christian life created there is as surely repentance as it is faith. Such was Christ's opening note; and it is the saint's dying confession, who says that youth hardly knows what repentance means. The place here given to repentance will not seem strange if we

remember that its supreme and positive form, as the abjuring of egoism, is the acceptance of Christ as our *alter ego*, who is God's holy law no less than His holy grace. The acceptance or the rejection of Christ is what John's call to repent historically culminated in for the nation. To have taken Christ for Messiah would have been the grand act of national repentance. His rejection was the height of their deeply religious, reputable and popular impenitence—the confirmed devoted egotism of a people deeply, falsely religious. The self-denial, the martyrdom, of the earnest Pharisee for God's sake but deepened the perdition.

A constant repentance, as our movement to God, and a constant forgiveness, as His movement to us, thus underlie the constant faith and ethic of the Gospel. And self-denial is but one aspect, or sequel, of the genetic, manifold and continual self-committal to Christ which is so much more than self-reference to Him, either as ideal or example, and is the very being of the new life.

It is an extraordinary literalism which besets liberalism in its frequent objection that Christ never spoke of theological subtleties like Atonement or Regeneration. It betrays in some a singular bondage to words, or ineptitude for ideas, when Jesus is thus set in conflict with Paul. Surely these ideas are in the Synoptics and in their Christ, even if the theological terms are not. And our discussion offers a case in point. Jesus never spoke of regeneration in the Synoptics at least; yet is His speech of self-denial anything else? Regeneration is something much more than an ethical change, however thorough. It is not an ascending procession of acts of self-renunciation. Ethical, after all, is a formal idea. What is the content that fills it? Surely the positive good *for* which the man is now moulded, not the negative *from* which he turns away. To be regenerate is not to cease living *for self*, it is to be living *for God*, and not only so but *in*

communion with God. It is not living unselfishly but living to God. It is not in the first place a life of sacrifice (for martyrdom can be, and now often is, quite unholy); it is a life of communion, with such sacrifice as that may entail for the only end that hallows all its means.

P. T. Forsyth.

THE HEBREW FEASTS IN LEVITICUS XXIII.

One of the main points in pentateuchal criticism is the festal calendar appearing in Exodus xxiii. 10–19, xxxiv. 17–26, Leviticus xxiii., Numbers xxviii. and xxix., and Deuteronomy xvi. A comparison between these lists seems exceedingly instructive for showing the date of the various "strata" which the dominating school of higher criticism assumes. I have dealt with some of these feasts, the Days of the Unleavened Bread, the Passover and the Day of Atonement in the Expositor for November, 1909, and June, 1911, and tried to explain the original character of these feasts.

The question remains to be discussed whether the calendar of feasts in the so-called Priestly Code may be assigned to the pre-exilic period or not. It is generally accepted that the Priestly Code is of no value for our knowledge of the real nature of the Hebrew feasts, as it transformed the feasts from nature-festivals into festivals of religious history.

Those who assume that the ancestors of the Israelites were nomads are compelled to suppose that the three annual feasts, the days of the unleavened bread, Pentecost, and the Feast of Tabernacles were adopted by the Israelites from the Canaanite population of Palestine, for it is beyond doubt that these feasts are agricultural festivals. If we must admit that this Nomad-theory is not supported by

the old Israelitic tradition (cf. the EXPOSITOR for August and October, 1908) it becomes probable that these feasts may have been known to the Hebrews in a more remote period. If the Book of the Covenant, therefore, may be assigned to the Mosaic period (cf. EXPOSITOR for August, 1909) the question arises whether it is possible to assume also an older date for the list of feasts in the "Priestly Code."

The common theory is that the Pentateuch clearly shows the development of religious worship, as far as the feasts are concerned, by the fact that these feasts were modified by the exilic and post-exilic scholars. Being agricultural feasts they are supposed originally not to have been celebrated at a fixed date. The time at which the festivals would begin depended upon the ripening of the crops in the various parts of the country. In the oldest law, Exodus xxiii. 10–19, it is only said that every male in Israel shall appear before Jahve three times a year, at the feast of the unleavened bread, at the feast of the harvest, and the feast of the ingathering. But it is not said at which date these feasts are to be celebrated.

In Deuteronomy xvi. no fixed dates are mentioned. The Passover is to be kept in the month of Abib. Pentecost shall be celebrated seven weeks after the opening of the harvest, but for the feast of tabernacles no month or other date is mentioned.

In the original form of Leviticus xxiii. that is assigned to P^1 and is supposed to have been written in the Exile, the feasts were fixed in a general way, the reaping of the crops being the fixed time for the feast of the unleavened bread and the seventh month being the term for the feast of tabernacles.

The later insertions in Leviticus xxiii., however, that are ascribed to P^2 and are supposed to have been written in the post-exilic period, fixed the feast not only by a month

but by month and day, and so are supposed to have deprived them of the last surviving remnant of their original nature. P^2 is said to have transformed the agricultural feasts that were celebrated at home into festivals that were celebrated by feast-offerings in the temple. The fixed date took away the last remnant of the old feasts. The idea of the Sabbath, which was so important to P as a day of rest, was applied to other feasts, and so strict Sabbath rest came more and more to be an essential part of all festivals (*Encycl. Bibl.* p. 1515). The theological system of P would have petrified the feasts. The minute elaboration of the ritual of the feasts was the chief point for P and his pupils. Numbers xxviii. 29, therefore, is regarded as the latest list of feasts that is to be assigned to a priestly writer of the fifth or fourth century before Christ.

It is easily understood that this theory has met with the approval of numerous scholars. It seems to be reasonable to accept the view that an agricultural feast cannot be celebrated at a fixed date, as it must be dependent on the ripening of the crops. It seems also improbable that the offerings in the temple will have been the main point in the celebration of agricultural feasts, which of course kept people at home instead of allowing them to go to a remote sanctuary. The line of development that is traced seems to be in perfect harmony with the evolution of religious thought generally.

If, however, we enter into a careful examination of the details, we find that things are not so easy as they seem to be, and especially the argument of the fixed date and the strict Sabbath rest may be used quite as well in favour of a theory diametrically opposed to that of Wellhausen.

Of the four festal calendars which the Pentateuch contains, Exodus xxiii. 14 ff. and xxxiv. 17–26 were dealt with in the Expositor for September, 1909. There it was

argued that Exodus xxiii. is part of the old words of the Covenant alluded to in Exodus xxiv. 3 f., and the grounds were given for the theory that Exodus xxxiv. 17–26 is a post-exilic correction of the old Mosaic law Exodus xxiii. 14 ff.

For our present purpose it is important to examine the calendars in Leviticus xxiii. and Numbers xxviii. and xxix.

It is obvious that the present form of Leviticus xxiii. contains some insertions of a later date. It follows from verse 38, the colophon of the calendar (these are all the set feasts . . . besides the Sabbaths), that it did not mention the Sabbath. Verse 3, therefore, must be a later insertion (Driver, *Lev.*, p. 93). The chapter contains two ordinances about the feast of tabernacles (vers. 33–38 and vers. 39–43) which cannot have the same origin.

The theory of the school of Wellhausen is that vers. 9–20 22, 39–43 are to be assigned to the Law of Holiness. Some scholars suppose that the vers. 13 and 14 and parts of vers. 39 and 41 are a later insertion (Driver, *Lev.*, p. 94); but if we except these verses we are supposed to possess here a festal calendar, in which the old connexion between the life of the people and the operations of agriculture are still felt. In the vers. 4–8, 21, 23–38, however, we are supposed to find the calendar of the Priestly Code, in which the laws of the successive feasts are all formed on the same type. Mention is made of a holy religious meeting, the abstinence from servile work, and usually of the offering made by fire to Jahve. This calendar is said to show the systematisation of worship and observance which was carried on in priestly circles (Driver, l.c. p. 93).

In connexion with this theory we must draw attention to the following facts.

1. In the so-called Law of Holiness the fundamental part of the text belongs to this legislation. Occasionally

some verses are said to have been added by a later priestly writer, but there is no doubt about the fact that in Leviticus xvii.–xxii. the fundamental part is assigned to H (the author of the Law of Holiness). In Leviticus xxiii., however, it is impossible to apply this theory. Here the fundamental part of the chapter is contained in the legislation of which ver. 38 is the colophon, assigned to the Priestly Code. Ver. 37 says, "These are the set feasts of Jahve, which ye shall proclaim to be 'holy calls,' to offer fire-offerings," etc. The feasts of vers. 4–8, 21, 23–38 are to be celebrated by "holy calls" and fire-offerings and cover the whole year. So there can be no doubt about the fact that the legislation ascribed to the Priestly Code is complete in itself.

But those parts that are assigned to the Law of Holiness obviously depend upon P. For vers. 9–20 and vers. 39–43 are no complete legislation. Ver. 9 f. contains the ordinance about the first sheaf of the harvest that is to be offered to Jahve "on the morrow after the Sabbath." We can only understand it if we connect vers. 9 f. with vers. 4–8, for there it is said that the first and the last day of the feast of the unleavened bread shall be a Sabbath. If we separate vers. 9 f. from vers. 4–8 we do not only not understand the term "on the morrow after the Sabbath," but we also are compelled to assume that the festal calendar of H would not have mentioned the feast of the unleavened bread. The day of the sheaf cannot be identical with this feast. We can hardly believe that H would not have known this feast, for it appears in Exodus xxiii. 14 ff. and is also mentioned in Deuteronomy xvi. This shows that the theory of the school of Wellhausen cannot be right. The legislation assigned to the Priestly Code is to be regarded as the fundamental part of the chapter.

Now it is perfectly true that we cannot assume that vers. 9 ff. is a part of the legislation closed by the colophon

vers. 37 f. The style of vers. 9–21 is different from vers. 4–8, 23–38. In the former verses the animals that must be sacrificed are enumerated (vers. 16 ff.), in the latter it is only stated that a fire-offering is to be presented. Therefore it is probable that vers. 9 ff. are an addition to the legislation assigned to the Priestly Code. But in this case we also must presume that this legislation is older than the addition.

2. The feast of the tabernacles lasted seven days in the pre-exilic period. An eighth day was added to it in the post-exilic time. The eighth day is not mentioned in Deuteronomy. In 1 Kings viii. 66 the people are sent away on the eighth day, so the feast can only have lasted seven days. Nehemiah viii. 18 the eighth day is kept. The school of Wellhausen assumes that the festal calendar of H mentioned a feast of seven days and that the legislation of the Priestly Code knew a feast of eight days. But this conclusion is not to be reached from Leviticus xxiii.

In ver. 34 it is said, "on the fifteenth day of the seventh month is the feast of tabernacles for seven days." Ver. 36 says, "Seven days you shall bring a fire-offering to Jahve; on the eighth day you shall have a 'holy call' and you shall bring a fire offering." Now it is very improbable that a legislator, who aims at a feast of eight days will speak about a feast that is to last seven days. The only possible conclusion from ver. 34 is that the original form of this part of the legislation mentioned a feast of seven days and that the ordinance to keep an eighth day, as is brought in the second part of ver. 36, is to be regarded as a later addition, in order to agree with the post-exilic practice. In the verses assigned to H in the same way a feast of seven days is mentioned that appears to last eight days (ver. 39). We fail to understand why this eighth day is supposed to be a correction by a redactor in ver. 39 but why it should be part of the original text in vers. 34 ff. If we must admit

that vers. 34 ff. also know a feast of seven days, there is no further ground for the thesis that ver. 39 f. must be older than vers. 34 ff. Furthermore it is obvious that in ver. 41, "and ye shall keep it a feast to Jahve seven days in the year, it is a statute for ever in your generations," the ordinance of ver. 39 f. comes to a close. The following words, "Ye shall keep it in the seventh month," belong to the following verse, that contains the ordinance to dwell in tabernacles. This ordinance originally was not connected with vers. 39 f., otherwise the final words of ver. 41, "it is a statute for ever in your generations," would not separate these ordinances. But then there is no reason to separate ver. 39 from its introduction, "On the fifteenth day of the seventh month (. . . ye shall keep the feast)." The only ground for assigning these words to a redactor is the theory that H did not give fixed dates for this feast, but this result can only be obtained by an arbitrary cancelling of these words.

The ordinance to dwell in tabernacles can only be explained as an addition to ver. 39 f. So it is much more probable that vers. 39 ff. are also an addition to the so-called Priestly legislation, than that we should have to explain vers. 33 ff. as an addition to ver. 39 f. Both additions deal with different ordinances. Ver. 39 f. says that on the first day of the feast branches of various trees shall be taken, ver. 42 ordains to dwell in tabernacles. None of these verses contains a complete legislation about the feast in the seventh month. We may expect that a festal calendar of H, that enumerated the animals that should be sacrificed, would also have dealt in a more exhaustive way with the feast of the seventh month. It therefore is highly improbable that we may assign vers. 39 ff. to the same source as vers. 9–21, as the school of Wellhausen nevertheless does. We perfectly understand that the priests have written on

the margins of their manuscripts other ordinances about the feast of the tabernacles than were contained in ver. 33 f. (this legislation only intending to enumerate the days on which the "holy call" should be made and fire-offerings should be sacrificed). It is natural that these additions become part of the text. But we do not see how a complete festal calendar, that should be assigned to H, could be derived from Leviticus xxiii.

3. At the feasts mentioned in the fundamental part of this chapter, there shall be mikra kodesh. I translated these words in the quotations above by "holy call." This is not the usual translation. This term generally is translated by "holy convocation" or "holy religious meeting." It is supposed that the Israelites in the post-exilic period gathered in holy congregations in the temple. The word 'Edah, congregation, is supposed to be a technical term of the Priestly Code. The "holy religious meeting" of Leviticus xxiii., therefore, is supposed to prove the post-exilic origin of the fundamental part of this chapter.

The Hebrew word mikra, from the verb "to call," does not mean "convocation," but is simply "call." In Nehemiah viii. 8 it means "reading" ("and they read in the book . . . so that they understood the reading"), as the law was read aloud to the people (cf. Arabic Korân, "what is read"). Now a call may be a convocation if an object is added that expresses this meaning, as, e.g., Numbers x. 2, but in itself the word does not have this sense. The only place that might be quoted in favour of this sense is Isaiah iv. 5, but this place is a crux.[1]

Now ver. 2 shows that the usual translation is wrong. "Speak unto the children of Israel the feasts which you shall proclaim (תקראו) mikra-kodesh" cannot be trans-

[1] Probably instead of "her assemblies" (מקראה) should be read "her buildings" (מכרה); cf. Eccles. x. 18.

lated " which you shall proclaim to be holy religious meetings," for the feasts are no meetings, only on some days of the feasts religious meetings are supposed to be held, as on the first and seventh day of the feast of the unleavened bread and on the first day of the feast of tabernacles, but on the other days of these feasts no meetings are held. Furthermore, the term to proclaim a feast to be a meeting is a very improbable one. It is supposed that the purpose of the meetings is to present the fire-offerings unto Jahve. The congregation of the Israelites is thought to have assembled in order to bring these sacrifices as a gift of the holy congregation. We fail to understand how it is these circumstances can be possible to bring fire-offerings to Jahve on every day of the feasts (vers. 8, 36), a meeting only being held on the first and last days of the feasts (vers. 7, 8, 35). Obviously the mikra kodesh has nothing to do with the fire-offering but with the Sabbath-rest, which is in all instances immediately connected with this term (vers. 3, 7, 8, 21, 24 f., 27 f., 35 ; cf. Exod. xii. 16 ; Num. xxviii. 18–26, xxix. 1, 7, 12).

If a day is " holy " it is not allowed to do on this day the usual business of every day's life. The history of religions has taught us the real meaning of this word. Everything that is holy is excluded from common life. So it is quite easy to understand that a holy day should be a day of rest. It of course was necessary to announce the holy days, as no clocks and official calendars existed. The verb קרא, to call, is always used for this announcement (cf. 1 Kings xxi. 9 ; Jer. xxxvi. 9 ; Joel i. 14 ; ii. 15). In the same way as the arabian Muezzin reminds the Moslemin by his call of the time of prayer, so the call " holy " was to be called in order to announce that a " holy " day began. This interpretation is in harmony with the religious practice known unto this day to announce the approach of holy periods by the ringing of bells, etc. The post-exilic origin of Leviticus xxiii. 4–8,

23–38, therefore, cannot be proved by these supposed "religious meetings," which only originated from a misunderstanding of the Hebrew text. The question whether such meetings were really held in the post-exilic period as the school of Wellhausen assumes for our present purpose may be left aside.

4. Scholars assert that the alleged legislation of the Priestly Code had broken the close connexion between the life of the people and the operations of agriculture. But we find that of the feasts lasting seven days only two days are days of rest. So the other days must be days on which it is allowed to do work. This does not imply that the legislation breaks the connexion with the operations of agriculture. We may as well argue that these days are not days of rest as the population uses these days for the ingathering of the harvest.

But perhaps one will refer to the fixed date of this legislation and argue that no harvest-feast can be kept at a fixed date, as it can solely be determined by the ripening of the crops. Here we touch the main point in the argumentation of the school of Wellhausen.

We perfectly understand that this school could refer to this point in the period of Old Testament science, in which the history of religions was a nearly untraced field. We now see that the ingathering of the harvest is all over the world a thing that is closely connected with religious ceremonies and religious views, that determine the way in which the harvest feasts were celebrated.

We know from the Mishna in which way the harvest was opened. The way in which it is done is a curious one. It must be of much older date than the period of the Mishna, as all such ceremonies everywhere go back into remote antiquity. I refer to Mishna, Menakhoth x. 2 f. dealing with the sheaf of Leviticus xxiii. 9 f.

"It was usual to bring the sheaf from the fields in the

vicinity of Jerusalem, but if the crops had not ripened, it was brought from other fields. Once it came from Gannoth Serifin, and the loaves (of Pentecost) came from 'En Soker. How was it done ? The messengers of the law-court used to go on the day before the Sabbath to the field and to bind together the ears, that lay down on the ground, that they might be cut off easily. The inhabitants of the neighbouring towns assembled there that the sheaf might be cut off in the presence of a great assembly. As soon as it became dark one (of the messengers) said unto them : Did the sun set ? They answered : The sun set. They (the messengers) said : Is this a sickle ? They (the people) answered : It is a sickle. They (the messengers) said : Is this a basket ? They (the people) answered : It is a basket. They (the messengers) said on the Sabbath, he said unto them : Is it Sabbath ? They answered : It is Sabbath. They (the messengers) said : Shall I cut off ? They answered Cut off. Shall I cut off ? Cut off, they said. Each question was asked thrice. Why did they do so ? Because the Baithusim used to say that the sheaf should not be cut off on the evening after the Sabbath."

The last sentence shows that the priests of the family of Boethus desired that the harvest should not be opened at night. This certainly is a remarkable custom. It is obvious that it must be done for some religious reason, for we can hardly find a time that is less practical for opening the harvest than the night. This old custom, referred to in the Mishna, shows that the night was essential, for it was necessary that the sun had set and that it had become dark.

We understand this if we remember that the first day of the feast of the unleavened bread is the 15th of Nisan. The sheaf is cut off on the evening following the 15th, that is on the first night after the full moon. Now, we know that all over the world the moon is connected with the sowing, the

ripening, and also with the ingathering. The increasing moon is supposed to promote the growth. All things that exist in cutting off should be done as the moon decreases (J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*,[3] p. 677). That moon and growth were connected in Semitic religious thought is proved by the famous Babylonian hymn to the Moon-god Sin (IV. Rawl. 9, a–62, b–2, 4. If thy word blows like a wind in heaven, food and drink prosper. If thy wind is placed on earth the green plants grow. Thy word makes fat the cattle and makes the living beings numerous). In the present time it is still believed by the population of ancient Moab that the moon has a great influence (A. Musil, *Arabia Petraea*, iii. p. 309).

It deserves attention that the harvest festival in the autumn also begins on the 15th. We do not see why the post-exilic scholars should have chosen for both feasts the same day of the month. Religious feasts are not made, but grow; and if they are regulated by certain ordinances, these ordinances conform themselves to the old customs. In 1 Kings viii. 2 (cf. xii. 32) the harvest festival is kept on the 15th of the 7th month. In North Israel this feast was celebrated in the 8th month, but also on the 15th (1 Kings xii. 32 f.). The fruit ripens later in the north than in the southern part of Palestine, but the predilections for the 15th cannot be connected with the fact that the fruit was just at this day ripe enough to be gathered. There must be some other reason, and if we remember the influence of the moon as a part of ancient popular religious belief, we at once see that this belief explains the date of the feasts.

If this observation is justified, these things present themselves to us under a new light. The fixed date proves the connexion of the feasts with the agricultural operations of the people, instead of bearing testimony to a process of petrifaction, as the school of Wellhausen assumes.

But how is it to be explained in this case that in the festal calendar of Exodus xxiii. and of Deuteronomy xvi. no fixed dates are mentioned ? I tried to show in the EXPOSITOR for October, 1910, p. 324 f., that the laws of Leviticus are the legislation of the priests of Jerusalem for the population of Jerusalem and its vicinity. The laws of Leviticus xiii.-xv. imply that the people that is to obey these regulations lives in the neighbourhood of the temple. So we understand that Leviticus xxiii. mentions a fixed date for the feasts. 1 Kings viii. 2 and xii. 32 proves that the harvest festival was kept on the 15th of the 7th month at Jerusalem. The time of the ripening of the fruit is in a certain place every year nearly the same ; there is only a difference of a few days if there is any. It is, therefore, not astonishing to find that a local legislation contains fixed dates for the main agricultural feasts. The Book of the Covenant and Deuteronomy, however, are a legislation of a general character. In these laws the whole of Israel is addressed. In Exodus xx. 24 it even is supposed that altars for Jahve will be built in various places. This explains that in the festal calendars of both legislations no fixed date is mentioned for the harvest festival. Deuteronomy mentions the month Abib as that of the feast of the unleavened bread, but it deprives this feast of its original character by combining it with Pesach (cf. EXPOSITOR for Oct., 1910) and by connecting it with the Exodus.

In the festal calendar of Leviticus xxiii. the year begins at the equinox of the spring. This is a common argument for the post-exilic origin of the fundamental part of this chapter. We know (cf. EXPOSITOR for June, 1911, p. 498) that the year began in the spring in the time of Jeremiah. We have no certainty about the date of the shifting of the beginning of the year from the autumn to the spring season, but it cannot be maintained that this took place in the post-

exilic period. The character of the day of atonement proves that this day is connected with the New Year's festival. The celebration of this day must be pre-exilic, otherwise it would not have been kept on the 1st of the 7th month, in the middle of the post-exilic year. This proves that this feast dates back to the time that the year began in the autumn season.

So there is none of the feasts in this chapter that might not be regarded as pre-exilic, and the common theory about the evolution of the festal calendar is not confirmed if we place Leviticus xxiii. in the light of ancient religious ideas. To the fundamental part of the chapter some ordinances were added, which gave a more full description of some of the ceremonies.

The list of sacrifices in Numbers xxviii. and xxix. appears to be a post-exilic commentary to Leviticus xxiii. Numbers xxviii. 26 obviously depends upon Leviticus xxiii. 16, as the same term "a new offering" is used. The double burnt-offering of every day and the celebration of the feast of tabernacles during eight days prove that these chapters refer to the post-exilic period. So we understand the slight difference between the offerings mentioned in Leviticus xxiii. 18 (7 lambs, 1 young bullock and 2 rams) and Numbers xxviii. 27 (7 lambs, 2 young bullocks and 1 ram). This difference supports our theory that the list of feasts in Leviticus xxiii. is to be assigned to the pre-exilic period and is to be regarded as the festal calendar of the priests of the temple in Jerusalem.

B. D. Eerdmans.

PERSONALITY AND GRACE.

VII. Jesus Christ.

What is the relation of Jesus Christ to this faith? Faith manifestly is in God, and it is in God as He meets us day by day in our trials and duties. What connexion, then, can that faith have with a person who lived long ago and who meets us in a book?

First, faith in Jesus is not a substitute for this practical work-a-day faith in God. Mankind is only too ready for that way of escape from real faith. They imagine they can believe in Jesus without believing in the things Jesus stood for, and that through that faith they can be saved without needing to be saved from themselves. They can still believe that. Blessed is the man who rebelliously kicks against life's limitations, who seeks to live at ease even at some cost of conscience, who is a person of substance and repute even at the price of doubtful compromise and of concentration upon personal profit. Belief in Christ becomes a mere password which it is thought God will respect when we come knocking at the doors of eternity, and which is in no way inconsistent with putting our present faith for our own security in a bank account and for our country's in cannon balls. That any one can read the Gospels and come away with such an idea, or even an epistle, remembering the kind of person his faith had made the writer of it, only shows what power we have of self-deception.

Second, faith in Jesus is not an addition to this faith in God, a further burden upon it. That also no one ought to be able to read the New Testament and believe. The one thing of which every writer of it is convinced is that Jesus bears up and does not burden faith. Hence every word of it thrills with a strange, new, contagious joy.

Yet, in these critical days, can belief in Christ be more than a hard effort, a kind of intellectual venture ? Can a Christ whose words are so uncertainly reported and whose life is told in such hazy outline, be other than a perplexity for faith ? How can faith even at its highest stretch hold Him as more than a tentative hypothesis ? Instead of being a succour of faith, is He not precisely the most difficult thing faith can reach up to ? Instead of being the source of grace, is not faith in Him the last victory grace can win for us ?

To believe in Christ, however, is neither to make Him a substitute for faith in God nor an additional burden upon that faith. Belief here also is a discovery, and necessarily our own. It is precisely the discovery that He is the supreme succour of our genuine, practical, working faith in God.

Consider how we are judged in respect of Christ. It is not as He meets us in scripture or in doctrine, but as He meets us in life. When He is hungry, the blessed of the Father feed Him ; naked, they clothe Him ; sick and in prison, they visit Him. As we treat Christ when we meet Him in flesh and blood in our brother, as we recognise the power of His meekness and purity amid the actual claims of wealth and dignity, so is our living faith in Him. How, He asks, can ye believe who receive approbation one of another, and not that approbation which is of God alone ? The thing is impossible because it means two opposite and flatly contradictory views of what is life's highest good and final security. How, asks James with astonishment, can men hold the faith of Christ " in respect of persons," which, being literally interpreted, means " in flunkeyism." What, in short, is the good of looking for Christ who was meek and lowly in heart in the Gospels, when we should be certain not to recognise Him in our next-door neigh-

bour ? Till we believe in Him there, we cannot possibly believe in Him anywhere else.

Even after we believe in Him in life, many intellectual questions may remain, and we should not think that our belief gives us a right to silence them. It does not decide what sayings in the Gospels are authentic, or what miracles are related without any exaltation of the miraculous, or in what formula we shall express Christ's nature, though no one will ever answer these questions aright without it.

But, when we believe in Christ in life, however many intellectual problems remain, we shall find no religious difficulty in believing in Him in scripture. We believe on Him simply because He is the strength of our faith in God. By manifesting God's love in life's hardest appointments and sternest demands, by touching us with the love of God in its infinite requirements and infinite succour, and by lifting up our sins and weaknesses into God's compassion and pardon, He lays us open, as the manifest presence of God alone can lay us open, to God's whole appeal through the whole of life. Here, as nowhere else, we can discover that the weak things are the mighty, that, in the end, the things of love, not of violence, prevail. We believe, and we only can rightly believe, because the manifestation of our true blessedness in Jesus Christ is its own evidence.

In that sense faith is not of ourselves. It is the gift of God. A faith which is of ourselves would be no faith but a delusion. Every real belief is a belief in reality. Nor can it be belief except in so far as it comes from the reality itself. We do not find it, it finds us. It always is a gift, not an acquisition. And if we have faith in God, that necessarily is God's gift. But it can only be God's gift in the way all faith is given, by manifesting its object. It does not mean that He implants faith as a mere emotion, but that we being its object manifests

Himself, and so calls it out as a conviction. That He does above all else in Jesus Christ. By Him we can truly believe, because in Him God's infinite love and patience are so manifest, that only our manifold self-delusions can hinder us from trusting in them.

In that way alone the question of faith becomes a moral question. Directly it is no more a moral question than an intellectual. It no more depends on moral endeavour than on intellectual demonstration. But it is a moral question in the far deeper and more searching sense, that its only requisite is moral sincerity, just as it is an intellectual question in the deeper sense of utter loyalty to the whole truth.

JOHN OMAN.

ST. PAUL AND THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.

III. THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.

WE know far less about the actual ritual and doctrines of the Mystery-Religions in the Graeco-Roman world than we do of their wide diffusion and potent influence. This is not surprising, for, on the one hand, their votaries were strictly enjoined to keep silent on their most sacred experiences, and, on the other, stern critics of Paganism like the early Christian Fathers must inevitably have been biassed in their casual representations of the facts. The literary remains of these communities are very scanty. Some mystic formulae, a few hymns and prayers, some narratives of initiations and allied ceremonial practically exhaust the list. To supplement them, there are vague allusions and isolated fragments of information which may be pieced together from Hellenistic and early Christian writers. Further, the extant material has to be used with

caution. For it is often impossible to fix dates with any certainty. Thus, e.g., the *Corpus* of Hermetic writings contains elements from widely separated periods. Of the character of the so-called Mithras-liturgy, so competent an authority as R. Wünsch can only say : " Before we are in a position to judge with certainty, we must have a much clearer view of the history of syncretism in Egypt." [1] Some chronological landmarks, however, can be discerned. The famous description of the initiation of Lucius into the Mysteries of Isis at Cenchreae dates from the middle of the second century, A.D., but the elaborate ritual and the remarkable prayers plainly presuppose a long history lying behind. The same thing is true of the mystic formulae. They bear the stamp of antiquity, and in some instances their actual relations with primitive thought can be demonstrated. Moreover, there are special strains of religious thought and feeling more or less common to all the Mystery-Religions, such as that of regeneration (in some sense) and union or communion with deity. These appear and reappear in documents far removed from each other, and belonging to different spheres of culture. No doubt there must have been much mutual interchange between the various types of mystic religion. But such phenomena demand time. And the time required will probably have to be measured by half-centuries rather than decades. It is perhaps true, as Schweitzer asserts, that Paul cannot have known the Mystery-Religions as we know them, because they did not yet exist in this elaborated form.[2] But the " elaborated form " which we can trace in the second and third centuries A.D. postulates a lengthy development, and it is hazardous to dogmatise as to what was or was not possible, say, in the period from 30 to 100

[1] *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, ed. 2, p. 228.
[2] *Geschichte der Paulin. Forschung*, p 150.

A.D., or even earlier. Without discussing at present the extent to which Oriental mystic cults may have been influenced by the native Greek Mysteries, it is more than likely that their extraordinary sway in the opening years of the Imperial epoch was due to something deeper than their external pomp or the magical arts at their disposal.

We are bound to interpret in the light of parallel religious phenomena, present in every age, the meagre data which are available. There is good reason to believe, e.g., in the case of the State-Mysteries of Eleusis that the effect produced on the initiated was not merely that of an imposing ritual. In a former article we referred to the highly complex Orphic movement. Here, too, there is a danger of confining attention to the more obvious features. There is genuine truth in Monceaux' statement that Orphism "gathered an *élite* from among the worshippers of Dionysus."[1] But it is precarious, in view of the sporadic traces of Orphic beliefs and practices found throughout the Hellenistic world from the sixth century downwards, to restrict its *bona fide* influence to philosophers and poets, as he does, and to class all other alleged adherents with the notorious *Ὀρφεοτελεσταί* who traded on popular credulity.[2] Indeed, the analogy of all similar "conventicles" in the history of religion admonishes us to leave room within them for varying shades of faith and earnestness.

A most important source of evidence for the diffusion and influence of the Mystery-Religions is to be found in the numerous inscriptions which give us glimpses into

[1] Art. *Orphici* in Daremberg et Saglio's *Dictionnaire*, Tome 4, partie 1, p. 247.

[2] Prof. A. S. Taylor, in his brilliant essay on "The Impiety of Socrates," in which he shows Socrates to be "a firm believer in the faith according to Orpheus," seems inclined to make the same sharp twofold division (*Varia Socratica*, i. pp. 26, 27). Prof. Taylor has exhibited with convincing lucidity the Pythagorean affinities of these Orphics with whom Socrates was associated.

the life of religious *associations*. From the days of the Attic ὀργεῶνες, those private corporations of the worshippers of some local god or hero which we can trace as far back as the fourth century B.C., this phase of religious life becomes more and more prominent in the Hellenic world. As Kaerst has admirably shown, the religion of the Hellenistic period finds its characteristic type in the cult-brotherhood, the θίασος.[1] The old faith of the Greek πόλις had broken down. The new era inaugurated by the policy of Alexander the Great by its very expansiveness favoured individualism. Once the sanctions of the city-state had lost their validity, the individual saw the world lying open before him. In theory he became cosmopolitan, but in practice he was confronted by masses of new facts which disintegrated his traditional beliefs and threw him back upon himself. The successors of Alexander, more especially the Ptolemies and the Seleucidae, attempted to replace the state-religion by worship of the ruler. The attempt succeeded as a political symbol. But the pressure of religious need banded men together in larger and smaller groups, dedicated to the worship and service of a deity or group of deities.

It is interesting to note that the earliest inscriptions in Attica which record these associations of θιασῶται reveal a largely preponderating element of foreigners among their members.[2] And they are found predominantly at busy seaports like Piraeus. On the coasts of Asia Minor and in the islands of the Aegaean, θίασοι can be traced in considerable numbers before the Christian era. Poland thinks that the term still points to a connexion with Diony-

[1] *Geschichte d. Hellenistischen Zeitalters*, II. i. p. 280.

[2] See Fr. Poland, *Geschichte d. Griechischen Vereinswesens*, 1909, p. 20. Few modern scholars would support Foucart's hypothesis that *all* the Attic cult-associations were of foreign origin.

siac worship. In the Imperial period associations of μύσται, initiates, emerge in the same regions as those in which the θίασοι flourished, especially in Asia Minor. Smyrna and Ephesus appear to have been important centres of these mystic brotherhoods.[1] It is significant that in the Imperial era Dionysus is constantly associated with cult-guilds either as chief deity or in combination with others. His designation of βάκχος seems to have a special relation to mystery-associations. The area of his influence is extraordinarily wide. Beginning with the Διονυσιασταί of Piraeus about 180 B.C., we find similar guilds prominently represented in important centres like Rhodes and Thera.[2] In Thracian territory, the original home of Dionysus, a considerable number of mystic associations flourished, e.g., at Philippi and in its neighbourhood (e.g., μύσται Διονύσου, *Bulletin de Corresp. Hellénique*, xxiv. p. 304 f.). Asia Minor supplies abundant material. There is little doubt that the cult of Dionysus had intimate affinities in these religious unions with those of the Phrygian deities, the Great Mother and Sabazius, although we do not possess sufficient data to elucidate the question. Here we are confronted by foreign cult-associations, which are of such crucial importance for our discussion.

As early as the fourth century B.C., we have evidence in Piraeus of an association of ὀργεῶνες, worshippers of the Great Mother, whom they style "the goddess." In Asia Minor she is a favourite brotherhood-deity, and Attis is associated with her. The traces of Sabazius-unions are often mixed up with those of worshippers of θεὸς ὕψιστος. Egyptian deities occupy a peculiarly pro-

[1] See Poland, *op. cit.*, p. 38, and the reff. to Inscrr., pp. 568, 569. The dates extend over a wide period.

[2] See the numerous Inscrr. of first and second cent. B.C. in Poland, *op. cit.*, pp. 564, 565.

minent place. Serapis-associations abound in the islands of the Aegaean, many of them earlier than the Christian era. They are found in Attica about 250 B.C. It is practically certain that Isis was reverenced along with her consort, but frequently she receives independent recognition. Associations of *Ἰσιασταί* are found, e.g., in Rhodes in the first century B.C. These phenomena are not merely due to the propaganda of a nation of enterprising traders like the Egyptians. The Ptolemaic dynasty stood in a special relation to the deities Serapis, Isis, and Osiris. They were conscious of the affinity between Isis and Demeter, between Osiris and Dionysus. Serapis seems to have been a syncretistic deity from the outset. In any case, by the shrewd policy of the reigning house, these deities became, as Kaerst says, "characteristic figures of religious syncretism and at the same time symbols of the power and unique dignity which belonged to the Ptolemaic rulers, the most successful representations of a syncretistic *Religionspolitik*." [1] Accordingly the area over which Egyptian cult-brotherhoods extend corresponds roughly to the sphere of influence of the Ptolemaic dynasty.[2]

A word must be said as to the mystic deities of Samothrace. Possibly of Phoenician origin, they reveal Chthonian affinities, being closely allied with such Greek divinities as Hephaestus, Demeter, and Kore. They are worshipped in an influential mystery-cult. But their identification with a large variety of gods is proof of their syncretistic character. Their cult was peculiarly favoured by the monarchs who divided Alexander's dominions, especially by the Ptolemies,[3] and they also were honoured with the reverence of religious brotherhoods. A similar diffusion

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 273.
[2] See Poland's important discussion, *op. cit.*, pp. 522–524.
[3] See Kaerst, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

of religious associations is discernible in the Roman world. Livy describes guilds of Bacchus-worshippers, who engaged in mystic ritual, as far back as 186 B.C. In the days of Sulla († 78 B.C.), *collegia* devoted to the worship of Egyptian deities such as Osiris and Isis can be vouched for in Italy (Apul. *Metamorph.* xi. 30). Isiac guilds were already notorious in the Rome of the first century A.D.[1]

One or two features of the religious situation just delineated deserve emphasis. The favourite deities of the associations are foreign. The Hellenic gods who appear among them have already been connected with a mystic worship, or are noted for their saving energies, as, e.g., Aesculapius. The members of the guilds are predominantly foreigners, and a single association frequently contains representatives of many lands. Sometimes a number of deities share in the common worship of the "brethren." The most eager religious life of these brotherhoods belongs to great commercial centres like Athens, Delos, and Rhodes, where foreigners might be expected to congregate. Such cosmopolitan communities would present unusual facilities for religious propaganda. It is needless to call attention to the effect of the brotherhoods in producing a spirit of equality among their members. But recent research has shown that Foucart[2] and others have exaggerated the position assigned in them to women and slaves, at least in the non-Latin area.[3] The ethical tone of Graeco-Roman religious associations has been severely criticised, largely on the basis of statements found in the early Fathers. No doubt the moral standard was often low enough. But there is little unprejudiced evidence available. And we

[1] See Kornemann, art. *Collegium* in Pauly-Wissowa, vol. iv. sp. 386 f.; Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, p. 581.

[2] *Les associations réligieuses*, p. 5 f.

[3] See Poland, *op. cit.*, pp. 298, 329. In Roman *collegia* the circumstances were evidently much more favourable.

have hints here and there of a higher ideal, as, e.g., in an Inscr. of Ephesus (c. 83 A.D.), in which purity is laid down as indispensable for guilds of initiates. It would be generally admitted that a large part of the fascination of these brotherhoods lay in the halo of mystery which surrounded them, and the esoteric ritual through which admission was gained. But there can be no doubt that under the influence of popular philosophy the various mystic cults became gradually purified. Whatever name they bear, their ultimate aim was identical—to raise the soul above the transiency of perishable matter to an immortal life through actual union with the Divine.[1]

These associations of initiates formed an integral part of St. Paul's environment as he laboured in great centres of population like Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, and Rome. There is nothing far-fetched in the hypothesis that many of the Pagans who were attracted to his preaching, many even of those who were already God-fearers (*σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν*), had belonged to mystic brotherhoods. When a new group of travelling preachers from the East proclaimed the promise of *σωτηρία* and the assurance of life eternal their message was bound to appeal to such an audience. Inevitably, therefore, the great missionary would be brought into personal touch with inquirers of this type. And as he sought to instruct them in "the mystery of God, even Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (Coloss. ii. 2), he must have gained a first-hand acquaintance with those religious conceptions by which they had attempted to reach spiritual peace. Heinrici has tried to establish a detailed parallel between Pagan religious guilds and early Christian communities, e.g., at Corinth. He has adduced many remarkable resemblances

[1] See an admirable statement in Jacoby, *Die antiken Mysterienreligionen*, pp. 12, 13.

and shown some real points of contact. But we know too little about the organisation either of Pagan or early Christian societies to be able to accept his conclusion that the Christian community at Corinth was nothing else than a heathen religious guild transformed.[1] At the same time, the material which he has collected is very impressive as indicating the importance of these brotherhoods for the background of the Christian Church in the Apostolic age.

We must now attempt to estimate as concisely as possible the most typical Mystery-Religions of the Graeco-Roman world, endeavouring above all else to bring out their main characteristics in the light of recent research. These characteristics will be found to blend more or less in a common complex of ideas, which cannot be explained from mere processes of mutual borrowing. We shall examine in turn the State-Mysteries of Eleusis, the Mystery-Cults of the Great Mother (with Attis) and of Isis (with Serapis), and the typically Hellenistic religious phenomena connected with the Hermetic mystery-literature. This will provide an atmosphere for the detailed comparison of their conceptions with Pauline ideas.

Many scholars are still accustomed to draw a sharp line of cleavage between the state-regulated Mysteries of Eleusis and the more private and individualistic mystery-cults which proved to be such formidable rivals. Certain crucial differences, of course, lie on the surface. In the hey-day of Athenian prosperity, the Mysteries of Eleusis were little less than a national Hellenic festival. As far back as the time of Herodotus, all Greeks were eligible for initiation. The accompaniments of the festival were on a public scale. Such an institution was peculiarly exposed to the risk of externalism and formality. And there is sufficient evidence that the risk was not avoided. To the multitudes which

[1] *Zeitschr. f. Wiss. Theol.*, 1876, pp. 455–526, see esp. 484–490, 503–510.

thronged the sacred precincts the whole ceremonial must often have appeared no more than an imposing religious demonstration. In contrast, the private *θίασοι* offered something more personal and intimate. There was the bond of a human fellowship in communion with the special deity. There was the call to a brotherhood which ignored distinctions of race or status. There was the demand for self-denial. There was the constraint of a life-long obligation.[1] Now, no doubt, the influence of private associations must have reacted on the national mysteries in the way of deepening their religious significance. But we are almost compelled to believe, on the strength of the meagre data still extant, that the initiation at Eleusis already contained the germs of a higher religious outlook, admitting, of course, that these had often to be quickened into a more vigorous life. In a region where so much is matter of controversy, let us, first, briefly summarise some facts on which there is more or less general agreement.

Most modern scholars have rejected Foucart's hypothesis that the aim of the Eleusinian Mysteries was to furnish the initiated with a stock of magic formulae for escaping the dangers which attended the soul on its journey to the world of the departed. The intention was to create an overpowering impression rather than to communicate esoteric doctrines. Synesius[2] quotes the judgment of Aristotle: *οὐ μαθεῖν τι δεῖν ἀλλὰ παθεῖν.* There was an elaborate ceremonial of preparation which included as perhaps its most important element rites of purification (*καθαρμός*), and a long interval had to elapse between admission to the Lesser Mysteries at Athens and the complete initiation at Eleusis. There was a sacred exhortation, possibly an explanation of the mystic actions performed

[1] See Eisele, *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, xxiii. p. 627.
[2] *De Dione*, 10.

(τελετῆς παράδοσις). The climax consisted in the ἐποπτεία,[1] the vision of the sacred scenes, accompanied by the handling of certain holy things.[2] The final rites must have been performed in an atmosphere of highly intensified feeling.

Extreme divergence of opinion prevails as to the full significance and effect of the ritual and its accompaniments. While it is universally admitted that with the secret ceremonies was associated, in some sense, the assurance of immortality, some scholars, e.g., Rohde, hold that this was no new conviction, reached through the mystic experience. It already existed as the basis of the widely-diffused soul-cult. It was the blissful content of the future life which was impressed on the initiates, probably (as the Homeric Hymn to Demeter would suggest) by a series of *tableaux* which glorified the goddesses of the Mysteries, and made their votaries conscious of the joy to be attained by passing under their sway.[3] Rohde will not hear of any mystical experience reached in the initiation, or of any sense of communion with the divine. Hence he rules out the idea of a moral effect on the life of the worshipper.[4] But an important passage, whose obvious meaning he tries to evade, Aristoph., *Frogs*, 456 f., seems to us decisive as against his view: "All we who have been initiated and lived in pious wise" (εὐσεβῆ τε διήγομεν τρόπον). The uninitiated, whom Dionysus beholds lying in thick slime, are those who wronged strangers, maltreated parents, swore false oaths (ibid. 148 f.).[5] These lines reflect the current

[1] See Theon Smyrnaeus, *De Util. Mathem.*, p. 15.

[2] Cf. the mystic formula found in Clem. Alex. and Arnobius: ἐνήστευσα, ἔπιον τὸν κυκεῶνα, ἔλαβον ἐκ κίστης, ἐργασάμενος ἀπεθέμην εἰς κάλαθον καὶ ἐκ καλάθου εἰς κίστην.

[3] See Rohde, *Psyche*[3], i. pp. 294–298.

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 298–300.

[5] We are glad to find that Wobbermin, in his valuable *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien*, p 36 f., takes our standpoint. He shows that ὅσιος, which is almost a technical term for the initiated, cannot be taken in a merely ritual sense, but has an ethico-religious basis, see *op. cit.*, p. 38.

opinion. The very fact that the secret of Eleusis was so inviolably kept testifies to the genuine influence of the Mysteries. We cannot help believing, with Farnell,[1] that the drinking of the κυκεών points to the notion of a sacramental communion with the goddess-mother in her sorrow. And, whatever may have been the precise nature of the "passion-play," we can scarcely separate the prominence of the conception of immortality from the recovery from the under-world of the lost Kore, the triumph of life over death.[2] Suggestive light is shed upon this phase of the Mysteries by the association with them of the mystic deity Iacchos. In spite of Rohde's arguments, he must be identified with Dionysus, whose cult at Athens was no doubt a much later growth than that of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis, but probably came to be fused, in some sense, with it, after the union of Eleusis and Athens.[3] There are various facts which seem to indicate that Iacchos was, in the Mysteries, identified with the son of Kore. This connexion with Dionysus leads us into the heart of conceptions typical for mystery-religion, the conception of union with the Divine and attainment of undying life. We have no evidence as to the extent to which such ideas found expression. If Orphic religion with its intimate relation to the Dionysus-cult exercised any influence on the Eleusinian Mysteries,[4] the strain of thought and feeling which we have been discussing must have had a prominent place. On this problem any verdict must be hesitating. But we believe enough has been said to indicate that there is some justification for Sir W. M. Ramsay's position, that the Eleusinian Mysteries constituted "the one great attempt

[1] Art. *Mystery, Encyc. Brit.*, ed. 11., vol. xix. p. 120 f.

[2] Cf. Isocr. *Panegyr.* 28 : τὴν τελετήν, ἧς οἱ μετασχόντες περὶ τε τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰῶνος ἡδίους τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν.

[3] See Sir W. M. Ramsay in *Encyc. Brit.*, ed. 9, vol. xvii., p. 128.

[4] So, e.g., Sir W. M. Ramsay, Dieterich, and others.

made by Hellenic genius to construct a religion that should keep pace with the growth of thought and civilisation in Greece." [1]

The theory has been put forward that Eleusis was influenced by Egyptian cults, either directly at a very early date, or indirectly through the medium of the Orphic movement.[2] This is by no means impossible. But Thracian influence is more easily understood, and there were many affinities between the Thracian Dionysus and strictly Oriental deities like the Egyptian Osiris and the Phrygian Attis. These affinities would have some effect in opening a path for Oriental cults into the Graeco-Roman world. Considerable caution must be employed in attempting to define with any certainty the beliefs or ritual of these cults at special moments in their history. For that history remains exceedingly dim, especially for the period when Oriental faiths were confronted with Greek culture in Asia. Certain facts, however, stand out clearly. These religions, having no official prestige, could only be propagated by their appeal to the individual. The appeal consisted above all in the promise of raising men above the dreary pressure of bodily existence into a divine ecstasy, for the production of which they supplied the means. These means were often crass enough. For ignorant minds they became the channels of all manner of magical beliefs. For the cultivated they often served as far-reaching symbols of a high religious experience for which their souls were yearning.[3] It is clear, in the light of such phenomena, why Oriental cults appear in the Hellenistic area as Mystery-Religions. The sway they thus attained is strikingly illus-

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 126.

[2] See De Jong, *Das antike Mysterienwesen*, pp. 26–28.

[3] See Jacoby, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–11 : a luminous description of the Dionysiac ecstasy in Rohde, *Psyche*[3], ii., pp. 11–21.

trated by the fact that gradually the only Hellenic gods who retained their influence beside their rivals were the mystery-deities *par excellence*, Dionysus and Hecate.[1]

We have already referred to a cult-association in honour of the Great Mother, Cybele, in Piraeus, as early as the fourth century B.C. At the instigation of a special embassy her worship was introduced into Rome from Pessinus in Galatia, in 204 B.C., when the war with Carthage was a deadly menace to the Republic. For long that worship remained an exotic, but by the time of Augustus, Romans had been admitted to the religious associations of the goddess and had served as her priests. In her Phrygian home, and indeed throughout Asia Minor, the cult of Cybele seems often to have been fused with that of Dionysus to which it bore a remarkable resemblance. Each was an orgiastic worship, in which the votaries wrought themselves into a sacred frenzy and thereby believed they were united with the deity.[2] Rohde and others identify with Dionysus the Phrygian god Sabazius, whose worship came to be blended with that of Cybele and Dionysus in the syncretism of Hellenistic religion.[3] Possibly, however, his origin was Phrygian.[4] Eisele holds that his cult was non-orgiastic, and symbolised in crude but quiet ritual the most intimate union conceivable of the initiate with the deity. A suggestive feature, found, of course, in other cults, was the designation of the divinely-possessed worshippers by the name of the god, Sabos or Sabazius.[5] Central for the

[1] See Cumont, *Les Religions Orientales*, p. 410, note 12.

[2] Cf. the remarkable expressions in Livy's savage account of the Bacc Mysteries at Rome in 187 B.C. ; e.g. 39. 13 : *viros, velut mente capta jactatione fanatici corporis vaticinari . . . Raptos a diis homin*

[3] See Rohde, *op. cit.*, ii., pp. 7 (note 3), 14 f.

[4] So Eisele, *loc. cit.*, p. 625.

[5] So ὁ *κατεχόμενος τῇ μητρὶ τῶν θεῶν* was named Κύβηβος, c (= Cybele). See Photius, *s.* Κύβηβος. The parallel usage in t Serapis cult is significant. See *infra*.

Phrygian cult of the Great Mother was the Attis-ritual. For it is probable that the two deities were never separated.[1] The myth of the beloved youth who, in penitence for his unfaithfulness to the goddess, mutilated himself beneath the pine-tree : the mourning of Cybele for her lover, and his restoration to undying life, formed the basis of the drama which was annually celebrated at the spring-festival of the goddess. In this was embodied the mystic revelation. The process of initiation remains in obscurity, but the unmistakable analogy of the celebration to other mystery-cults dispels all doubts as to its real character. That its mystic significance was of no recent growth[2] is obvious from the ancient formulae which tradition has handed down. The ritual began with the felling of the sacred pine-tree. When the tree, bound like a corpse, and adorned with garlands and religious symbols, among them a statue of the god, was escorted into the sanctuary, the mourning for Attis broke forth. A time of abstinence followed, and then came the day of blood, when the tree was solemnly buried, and the participants in the ritual abandoned themselves to delirious dances. In a state of semi-unconsciousness they gashed themselves with knives and sprinkled the altar with their blood. On the succeeding night they met in the temple to celebrate the restoration of Attis to life. The grave was opened : a light was brought in : and the priest, as he anointed the lips of the worshippers with holy oil, uttered the consoling words : *θαρρεῖτε μύσται τοῦ θεοῦ σεσωσμένου, ἔσται γὰρ ὑμῖν τῶν πόνων σωτηρία* : "Be of good cheer, initiates, the god has been saved : thus for you also shall there be salvation from your troubles."[3] The joy of the *mystae* now found expression in a kind of carnival.

[1] See Hepding, *Attis*, p. 142.

[2] Schweitzer apparently regards it as a late development, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[3] Firmicus Maternus, *De Errore Profan. Relig.* (ed. Ziegler), p. 57, 14.

Various ritual actions were performed. A mystic formula has been preserved both by Firmicus Maternus (*op. cit.* p. 43, 13) and Clement of Alexandria (*Protrept.* ii. 15), which reminds us forcibly of the Eleusinian formula already quoted: ἐκ τυμπάνου βέβρωκα, ἐκ κυμβάλου πέπωκα, γέγονα μύστης Ἄττεως: "I have eaten out of the tympanum, I have drunk from the cymbal, I have become an initiate of Attis."[1] This certainly seems to point to some sacred meal in which the participant entered into communion with the god. We have no means of dating the formula, but it has all the appearance of a high antiquity.[2] The mystic words are put by Firmicus into the lips of a man whom he describes as *moriturus*, "about to die." Dieterich interprets this in a sacramental sense, and finds confirmation for his opinion in an extremely compressed account of the Attis-festival given by Sallustius, an official under the Emperor Julian, in his περὶ θεῶν καὶ κόσμου. There (ch. 4) the initiates are described, at a certain point, as "cut off from the further progress of their natural life," and, at the next stage of the cult, they are fed with milk, "as being born again" (ὥσπερ ἀναγεννωμένων).[3] Here again we are left in obscurity as to the age of the ritual. Plainly the conception points to a somewhat advanced step in the religious evolution of the cult. But if, as appears probable, these Phrygian rites sprang from a primitive nature-worship,[4] it only required the purification of the crude, primal instinct of sympathy with the fresh life of returning spring, by more spiritual aspirations which told

[1] In Clement the formula is more elaborate: ἐκ τυμπάνου ἔφαγον, ἐκ κυμβάλου ἐκερνοφόρησα, ὑπὸ τὸν παστὸν ὑπέδυν. It is needless to discuss the additional details.

[2] For a full description of the Attis-festival, see Eisele, *loc. cit.*, pp. 634–637.

[3] See Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*[2], p. 163.

[4] See, e.g., the felling of the pine-tree.

of man's kinship with a higher order of being, to reach the notion, still dim and anthropomorphic, of a divine life which the grave could not quench. Eisele believes that the Cybele-Attis religion had undergone a process of this kind long before it spread over the Hellenic world. Many scholars, including Cumont and Dill, find the chief stimulus to purer and more profound religious ideas much later, in the contact of this Phrygian worship with the rapidly extending movement of Mithraism.[1] To such contact they would assign the extraordinary ceremony of *taurobolium*, the bath of blood, which, from the middle of the second century A.D., constituted, perhaps, the most impressive rite in the worship of the Great Mother. Here the notion of regeneration stands in the forefront. Various inscriptions describe the "baptized" as *in aeternum renatus*.[2] The rite seems originally to have belonged to the worship of a Persian goddess, Anâhita, closely associated with Mithra in the old religion of the Achaemenidae, and apparently assimilated to Cybele in Asia Minor, especially in Cappadocia.[3] How far the savage ritual had shaken off its grosser associations before its late emergence in the Cybele-cult of the Western world, it is impossible to say. But it would be rash to use it as evidence for a mystic doctrine of immortality within the first century of our era. The brief sketch we have given of the Cybele-Attis cult reveals with sufficient clearness the barbaric ritual by which its votaries sought to satisfy their religious needs. The picture could be heightened on its ruder side. And yet no unbiassed mind can fail to read between the lines almost pathetic suggestions of a craving for fulness of life, for a real and enduring σωτηρία. We may believe that some

[1] See Cumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 98–103; Dill, *op. cit.*, pp. 554–559.
[2] See Dill, *op. cit.*, p. 547, note 4.
[3] See Cumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 99, 332; Dill, p. 556.

at least of the initiates could testify to a genuine experience in their ancient liturgical utterance: ἔφυγον κακόν, εὗρον ἄμεινον.[1]

In his famous treatise, *De Iside et Osir.*, 27, p. 45 (ed. Parthey), Plutarch tells how Isis, unwilling that all the hardships she had endured and the heroic deeds she had done in avenging her brother and consort Osiris should be forgotten, wove them into a mystic ritual, "and established a doctrine of piety and a consolation for men and women who should fall into like misfortunes." His words reveal the influence of Isis-Mysteries at the close of the first century A.D. We have no definite evidence, indeed, for these mysteries earlier than the Imperial age, but so cautious an investigator as Cumont considers that "all the probabilities are in favour of a more ancient origin," and that "the Mysteries no doubt were linked to early Egyptian esoteric doctrine."[2] The circumstances in which the cult of Isis (and Osiris-Serapis) was brought into direct touch with the Greek world certainly favour this hypothesis. It was part of the far-seeing political outlook of the first Ptolemy to make religion one of his instruments in fusing together his Greek and Egyptian subjects. For this purpose he introduced into Alexandria the cult of Serapis. The origin of the god is still an unsolved problem. Many scholars have derived his name from the Egyptian Osiris-Apis (i.e., Apis of Memphis transformed into Osiris). Wilcken believes that it is non-Egyptian, and that the god was brought in from outside. In any case he was immediately identified with Osiris (-Apis).[3] An old tradition

[1] Apparently a formula of the Sabazius-cult: referred to in Demosth. *De Cor.* 259. Used early in Attic marriage festivities, see Dieterich, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 335, note 4.

[3] Thus bilingual texts have in the Greek section Σαράπις, in the Egyptian Osiris-Apis. See Wilcken, *Grundzüge d. Papyruskunde*, I. i. pp. 101, 102.

found in Plutarch reports that Ptolemy summoned one of the hierarchical aristocracy of Eleusis, the Eumolpid, Timotheus, to consult with him as to the character of the new divinity. Whether the tradition be genuine or not, it is true to the situation. The cult of Serapis was syncretistic. Osiris, the Lord of life and death, the final arbiter of human destiny, was surrounded with the halo of the Greek mysteries. But his fitness to be a mystery-divinity had long since been recognised. Greeks had discerned in him an intimate affinity with their own Dionysus. Thus no serious obstacles had to be overcome to commend the new syncretistic mystery-cult to the Hellenistic world. From this time onward the Isis-Serapis worship had an extraordinarily wide range of diffusion. It is found at Athens at least as early as the third century B.C. ; at Pompeii about the end of the second ; in Rome by the time of Sulla.[1] Thence it spread wherever Roman influence penetrated. The fascination of the cult is not difficult to understand. There was, of course, the imposing ritual, distinguished by its " contemplative devotion," which had all the splendid precision and order characteristic of Egyptian liturgical tradition. Still more appealing were the eschatological doctrines promulgated. Here Egyptian theology remained true to itself. There is a famous passage in an ancient Egyptian text relating to the worship of Osiris, which speaks of the loyal votary of the god after death : " As truly as Osiris lives, shall he live : as truly as Osiris is not dead, shall he not die : as truly as Osiris is not annihilated, shall he not be annihilated." [2] In the reshaped Isis-Serapis-cult this doctrine remains fundamental. The ini-

[1] See Drexler's masterly article, *Isis*, in Roscher's *Lexikon*, vol ii. spp. 383–386, 399, 401. Drexler gives a remarkable survey of the area of influence which belonged to the Isis-cult.

[2] Qu. by Cumont from Erman, *Die ägyptische Religion*, pp. 96–97.

tiate is to share eternally in the divine life; nay, he does already share it. He becomes Osiris. Here is expressed with clearness the more dimly adumbrated hope of the Dionysiac-Orphic mysteries. The Isis Mystery-Religion exercised a peculiar attraction just because of its syncretism. Isis could be identified with innumerable deities. As queen of heaven, as Selene, as goddess of the cultivated earth, as Demeter, as giver of crops, as mistress of the underworld and also of the sea, as goddess of women and beauty and love, as queen of the gods assimilated to Hera and Juno, as goddess of salvation, and also of magical arts,[1] she will claim the adoration of a motley throng of worshippers. Thus "the great power of Isis 'of myriad names' was that, transfigured by Greek influences, she appealed to many orders of intellect, and satisfied many religious needs or fancies." [2]

A unique opportunity of understanding the significance of the Isis-Mystery-Religion is afforded by the famous description in Apuleius of the initiation of Lucius at Cenchreae.[3] The candidate for initiation had to remain within the precincts of the temple, until he was summoned (*vocatus*) by the goddess. Otherwise, he might pay the penalty of sacrilege by death. "For," says the high-priest, "the portals of the nether world and the guardianship of salvation are placed in the hand of the goddess, and the initiation itself is solemnised as the symbol of a voluntary death (*ad instar voluntariae mortis*) and a salvation given in answer to prayer, for the goddess is wont to choose such as, having

[1] See Drexler, *loc. cit.*, *passim ;* Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, pp. 162–164 ; and the notable passage in Apuleius, *Matamorph.* xi. 5, where, in her revelation to Lucius, Isis says : *cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis*, and then recounts her various names.

[2] Dill, *op. cit.*, p. 569.

[3] *Metamorph.* xi. chapp. 18–25. A graphic summary in Dill, pp. 96, 97.

fulfilled a course of life, stand at the very threshold of the departing light, to whom nevertheless the great mysteries of religion can be safely entrusted; and after they have been, by her providence, in a sense born again (*quodam modo renatos*), she places them again on the course of a new life in salvation." [1] Lucius awaited the will of the goddess, giving himself up to prayer and fasting. When, at length, the wished-for day arrived, he was escorted by a band of Isis-worshippers and bathed by the high-priest in the sacred laver. Thereafter, in presence of the goddess, he receives mystic communications. Ten days of ascetic preparation follow, and then he is led into the innermost sanctuary. A mystic delineation is given of his culminating experience: "I penetrated to the boundaries of death: I trod the threshold of Proserpine, and after being borne through all the elements I returned to earth: at midnight I beheld the sun radiating white light: I came into the presence of the gods below and the gods above, and did them reverence close at hand." [2]

The whole picture is of extraordinary significance both for the outer and inner aspects of Hellenistic Mystery-Religion. On the one hand there are the prescribed abstinences, the solemn baptism, the communication of mystic formulae, and the overpowering scenes which formed the climax of initiation.[3] On the other, there is presented to us the preparation of heart, the symbol of cleansing, the conception of regeneration, and finally, identification with

[1] Apuleius, *op. cit.* xi. 21 (ed. van der Vliet).

[2] *Op. cit.*, xi. 23.

[3] The description in Apuleius certainly implies something more than an ecstatic vision (so also Cumont as against De Jong), although, of course, a condition of ecstasy is implied in the ascent of the soul through the elements. This ascent typifies his assimilation to the deity, for next day he appears *duodecim sacratus stolis*, the *stolae* symbolising the 12 spheres through which he has passed. See Reitzenstein, *Archiv f. Religionswiss*, 1904, pp. 407, 408.

the deity. The effect of the experience, as genuinely religious, is disclosed by the impressive prayer of thanksgiving offered by Lucius to the goddess, after initiation, a prayer no doubt taken from an actual liturgy: "Thou who art the holy and eternal Saviour of mankind, ever bountiful to the mortals who cherish Thee, Thou bestowest thy gracious mother-love upon the wretched in their misfortunes. No day . . . no brief moment ever passes without Thy benefits. On land and sea Thou watchest over men and holdest out to them Thy saving right hand, dispelling the storms of life. Thou dost undo the hopelessly ravelled threads of Fate and dost alleviate the tempests of Fortune and restrainest the hurtful courses of the stars. . . . As for me, my spirit is too feeble to render Thee worthy praise, and my possessions too small to bring thee fitting sacrifices. I have no fluency of speech to put in words that which I feel of Thy majesty. . . . Therefore will I essay to do that which alone a poor but pious worshipper can: Thy divine countenance and Thy most holy Presence will I hide within the shrine of my heart: there will I guard Thee and continually keep Thee before my spirit."[1]

When we pass to the Hermetic Mystery-literature, we are confronted with many complex problems. To begin with, the *Corpus Hermeticum* is composed of various strata, some of which are by no means congruous with the rest. Even when we examine these strata separately, we discover a highly syncretistic blend of doctrine and ritual. It seems, therefore, illegitimate to speak of a Hermetic Mystery-Religion. Rather is this phase of religious thought valuable as embodying conceptions of Greek philosophy of the religious Stoic-Peripatetic type, relics of early Egyptian ideas, elements of the magical and alchemistic doctrines so prevalent in Egypt, and liturgic fragments which may belong to

[1] Apul., *op. cit.*, xi. 25.

Hellenised Egyptian communities, but which at any rate reflect the syncretistic Mystery-cults between 300 B.C. and 300 A.D. It is not surprising to find such a product in Egypt, which might almost be called the religious clearing-house of the Hellenistic world. But the nature of the situation puts us on our guard against constructing any hard and fast theories as to the influence of Hermetic conceptions on non-Egyptian structures of thought. Even Reitzenstein himself, who argues strenuously for the essentially Egyptian character of Hermetic religion, admits that in many sections of the literature it is scarcely possible to distinguish between Egyptian and Greek conceptions.[1]

A few words must be said as to the origin and character of Hermetic literature : then we shall emphasise some of its leading ideas from the standpoint of Mystery-Religion, including in our survey the so-called Liturgy of Mithra : and, finally, we shall indicate the conflicting theories which prevail regarding it.

Reitzenstein believes that in the reign of Diocletian, somewhere c. 300 A.D., an Egyptian priest made a compilation of 18 sacred documents intended to show that the Hellenised religion of Egypt was not different from that of the Empire as a whole. These documents belonged to different dates and to different religious communities, and they were arranged entirely to suit the various figures introduced into the dialogue. "Hermes, the herald of Egyptian religion, is summoned by the god *Νοῦς*, the Shepherd of men (Poimandres), to become Saviour for the whole world. He proclaims the new religion to his two disciples, Asclepios, son of the god Ptah, and his own son Tat : consecrates them at the close to be prophets, causing them to be born

[1] See his article, *Hellenistische Theologie in Ägypten, Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Alt.*, 1904, pp. 183, 184. This article is an indispensable introduction to his *Poimandres*, 1904, and *Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, 1910.

of God and united with Him, and then ascends again to heaven. The two prophets preach the new doctrine to King Ammon who adopts it, and thus the Egyptian religion is founded."[1] In addition to the Hermetic *Corpus*, various other fragments preserved in ancient authors may be assigned to this type of religion. It is important to note that the whole group of documents professes to be a revelation. Reitzenstein points out that this revelation is of two fundamental types. In the first, to which most of the purely theological documents belong, a god, Hermes or Aesculapius or Tat, describes what he has seen (e.g., the Creation), or what has been communicated to him by his divine Father and Teacher. In the second type, a man, who is of course a prophet, proclaims the revelation he has received either through drawing down by prayer a god who now dwells within him or by ascending to heaven with the help of a deity.[2] Reitzenstein would place the documents incorporated in this literature (whose dates cannot be accurately determined), roughly speaking, between the beginning of the first century A.D. and the end of the third.[3] But even if we did not possess impressive parallels in other Hellenistic religions, it would be reasonable to assume that many of the conceptions embodied belong to a much earlier date.

Perhaps the most interesting document in the group, from the point of view of the Mystery-Religions, is the dialogue between Hermes and his son Tat on regeneration.[4] Tat reminds his father that he had told him that no one

[1] Reitzenstein, *loc. cit.*, p. 178.

[2] See Reitzenstein, *ib.* pp. 179–181. The term *νοῦς*, so frequent in these writings, does not usually mean "understanding" but "the revealing God."

[3] *Die Hellenist. Mysterienreligionen*, p. 33.

[4] The Greek text printed in the appendix to Reitzenstein's *Poimandres*, pp. 339–348.

could be saved (σωθῆναι) without regeneration (παλιγγενεσία). Regeneration was only possible to one who had cut himself loose from the world. Tat has renounced the world and entreats his father, who has himself been regenerated, to communicate the secret. Hermes replies that this must be a revelation to the heart by the Divine Will. He had seen an immaterial vision (ἄπλαστον θέαν) inwardly by the mercy of God, and had passed out through his own body into an immortal body. He is no longer what he was. Tat cannot discern his real being with bodily eyes. While Hermes speaks, Tat becomes conscious of a transformation. He is set free from the twelve evil propensities, which are replaced by the ten powers of God. He is now able by the Divine energy to have spiritual vision, and he feels himself one with all the elements. He only needs now to ascend into the Ogdoas, the abode of God. He asks to be taught the hymn of praise sung by the Divine powers in the regenerate man when he reaches the Ogdoas. His father repeats the hymn, which is itself a very important document for Hermetic religion.[1] Tat can now declare: "My spirit is illumined . . . to Thee, O God, author of my new creation, I Tat offer spiritual sacrifices (λογικὰς θυσίας). O God and Father, Thou art the Lord, Thou art the Spirit (ὁ νοῦς). Accept from me the spiritual [sacrifices] which Thou desirest." Hermes sums up the whole meaning of the experience in the suggestive words: νοερῶς ἔγνως σεαυτὸν καὶ τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἡμέτερον: "in the spirit thou hast come to know thyself and our Father." It ought to be said that a large part of the dialogue is occupied with a blend of physical and ethical speculation of the

[1] A good translation in Jacoby, *Die antiken Mysterienreligionen*, pp. 33, 34. With this should be compared the closing hymn of the Mithras-Liturgy, which also celebrates the regeneration of him who sings it. See *Eine Mithrasliturgie*[2], p. 14.

later Stoic type. Various points of importance for Hermetic religion emerge from this dialogue. There is no external ritual in this mystery of regeneration. Tat experiences the psychical transformation as he listens to the revelation. Hence, the revelation itself, the λόγος, may be said to constitute the mystery: it produces the παλιγγενεσία. The chief result of the mystic experience is the true "knowledge" (γνῶσις) of God. This conception is prominent throughout Hermetic literature. Reitzenstein quotes a remarkable instance from the closing prayer of the Λόγος Τέλειος: [1] "We give thanks to Thee, Most High, for by Thy grace we received this light of knowledge. . . . Having been saved by Thee, we rejoice that thou didst show Thyself to us wholly, that Thou didst deify (ἀπεθέωσας) us in our mortal bodies by the vision of Thyself." [2] Here is a further idea of importance. The knowledge of God attained through the mystery of regeneration deifies. In *Poimandres* (*Hermetic Corpus*, i. § 26 [3]) occur the words: "This is the blessed end for those who have attained knowledge, to be deified" (θεωθῆναι). We may compare the prayer in the Mithra-Liturgy (p. 12, 2 ff.): "Having been regenerated by Thee to-day, out of so many thousands called to be immortal (ἀπαθανατισθείς) in this hour, according to the purpose of the most gracious God." In the Mithra-Liturgy, it may be noted, the prayers are mingled with prosaic directions as to breathing, bellowing loudly, taking up prescribed postures, and with uncouth magical incantations. The

[1] The Latin text found at the close of the *Asclepius* of Pseudo-Apuleius, proved by Bernays to be identical with the λόγος τέλειος of Hermes to Asclepius, mentioned by Lactantius. See Reitzenstein, *Archiv. f. Religionswiss.*, 1904, p. 393, note 1. Reitzenstein discovered the Greek text in the magical Papyrus Mimaut (c. 3rd cent. A.D.).

[2] See the whole prayer in Reitzenstein, *Die Hellenist. Mysterienrelig.*, pp. 113, 114.

[3] See Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, pp. 328–338.

observance of these instructions produces strange supernatural visions. In the genuine Hermetic writings, however, it is plain that there has been a certain spiritualising of mystic cult, although the λόγος τέλειος, the "revelation which initiates," has marked affinities with the Egyptian conception of ritual, according to which the man who acquires a full knowledge of the liturgy can exercise immense influence upon the spiritual world.[1]

It is exceedingly difficult to estimate this highly syncretistic literature. Reitzenstein, as is well known, regards its fundamental strain to be due to the evolution of ancient Egyptian ideas, and specifies the Hellenised doctrine of the priests of Ptah at Memphis. With this have been blended various constituents, such as the Stoic deification of the elements, a Hellenised non-Egyptian doctrine closely connected with astrology and the yearning for deliverance from εἱμαρμένη, and certain widely-diffused Hellenistic myths.[2] Cumont and W. Otto entirely dissent from Reitzenstein's belief that the Hermetic literature is a typical expression of general piety in the second and third centuries A.D. Cumont regards "Hermetic" as the result of a long process whose aim was "to reconcile Egyptians, at first with Chaldaean astrology, then with Greek philosophy, and it shared in the transformation of this philosophy."[3] Zielinski, in his searching investigation of *Hermetic*, irrefutably demonstrates the enormous preponderance of Greek philosophical elements in the syncretistic compound. He regards Peripatetic (-Stoic) cosmogonical speculations, which can be traced back to Arcadia and the Arcadian

[1] Cumont refers to an article of Maspero, *Sur le toute-puissance de la parole* (Recueil de travaux, xxiv., 1902, pp. 163–175).

[2] See especially *Poimandres*, pp. 62–68, 71, 109, 110, 114.

[3] See Cumont, *Les Religions Orientales*, p. 341; W. Otto, *Priester u. Tempel im Hellenistischen Aegypten*, ii. pp. 218–220.

myth of Hermes (= *Νοῦς*) and his son Pan (= *Λόγος*), as the groundwork of the system, a system which certainly took shape in Egypt. Upon this foundation was built up a structure, in which markedly Platonising and Pantheistic materials found a place. This he designates the *higher* Hermetic, and he regards the main error in Reitzenstein's theory to be his failure in distinguishing between the higher and lower types. The higher he considers to be purely Greek, the lower, which has attached itself, is a blend of Egyptian alchemy and magic.[1]

Probably each of these theories is partially true. To us it appears that Reitzenstein exaggerates the purely Egyptian character of this hybrid phase of religious thought and feeling. For Greek cosmogony is everywhere apparent. And yet the mystical conceptions of Hermetic literature can by no means be regarded merely as the outcome of these philosophical influences.[2] Rather do they appear as remarkable parallels to the doctrines we have examined in the other Mystery-Religions. They have been exposed, no doubt, to the influence of Greek religion in its Orphic-Dionysiac developments. But these developments themselves have been affected by Oriental beliefs. To find the Egyptian features of Hermetic only in what is magical, as Zielinski does, is to ignore the significance of Egypt in the history of Hellenistic Mystery-Religion. We believe that Reitzenstein is justified by the prayers which appear in the extant documents in speaking of definite religious communities in Egypt, gathered around devout, prophetic leaders.[3]

[1] See his elaborate articles on *Hermes und die Hermetik* in *Archiv. f. Religionswiss.*, 1905, 1906; esp. the latter, pp. 25–27, 35–41, 56, 60.

[2] We are not forgetting that later Stoic cosmogony could be the medium of a mysticism like that of Posidonius: see the first article in this series.

[3] See, e.g., *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Alt.*, 1904, p. 182, and compare his estimate of the Mithra-Liturgy as revealing the *individual* expression

In this sketch we have attempted to describe the leading ideas embodied in the Mystery-Religions and to indicate the range of their diffusion, giving instances, as occasion offered, of the religious terminology which they employed. We must next endeavour to estimate in detail the relation of St. Paul to their terminology and their ideas.[1]

H. A. A. Kennedy.

THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY.

XX. The Measure and Estimate of Faith.

In the Pastoral Epistles, as has been commonly held, "faith loses its unique significance and is almost reduced to a place side by side with other virtues," so that "the gift of eternal life appears almost as a reward of good living." At the present moment we are not concerned with defending the authenticity of those Epistles, but simply with the question whether this is a doctrinal position different from that of Paul's earlier letters, and likely to be non-Pauline and characteristic rather of Paulinism as conceived by a pupil of the Apostle.

That in the earlier letters salvation is said to come through faith and the gift of God, not through works, is of course admitted. From that we start. That is emphasised over and over again in the letters; and no quotations are needed to prove that this is the true Pauline teaching. But is that inconsistent with the statement that salvation is the result of the work and intense effort of the individual?

of ancient and widely-propagated religious ideas: "The main thing in the Mithra-Liturgy is that one man from an approximately definable period had these ideas" (*Zeitschr. f. N. T. Wissensch.*, 1912, i. pp. 13, 14).

[1] We have omitted consideration of the Mithra-Mysteries, as these fall outside the scope of our discussion: see Cumont, *op. cit.*, p. xvi.

There is no inconsistency; and he that finds inconsistency between the two statements has never apprehended in a right way the true nature of the relation between man and God. Paul, who says so emphatically that salvation is the free gift of God through faith, can with equal emphasis utter the advice, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling." Both are true: they contemplate the same operation, but from different points of view. Such is the true relation of the Divine nature to the human nature. One statement does not exhaust the character of that relation.

Moreover, faith is the driving power that turns man back from his tendency to degradation, and starts him in the course of movement towards God. The way to measure or estimate a force is through the effect that it produces: there is no other way. Now it will be observed that, where Paul is attempting to move the minds and hearts of men, he speaks most about faith and lays all the stress of his teaching on faith, but where he has in his mind the thought of judgment regarding men, he speaks of works, i.e., of the effect that this force produces. In the practical problems of Church management Timothy and Titus have to look to works as the standard of measurement. Only thus can they estimate the driving power in the heart of man. They cannot measure the faith, or judge the character, of their congregations in any other way. Yet throughout those same letters the characteristic Pauline view of faith is suggested here and there, as in 1 Timothy i. 2, 4, iii. 9, v. 8, 12, vi. 12; Timothy iv. 7; Titus iii. 5.[1]

The same thing is equally characteristic of the earlier letters, if we make allowance for the far greater part that is there devoted to stimulating, and the much less attention that is given to estimating. The estimating mentioned in those letters is that which is done by God: although He

[1] See Dr. R. F. Horton's *Introduction to the Pastorals*, p. 7.

knows the thoughts of the heart, He does not estimate the deserts of men by their faith, but by their works and their conduct. The Final Judgment partakes of the nature of a trial issuing in a formal sentence: and even in this trial, at which all "the counsels of the heart are made manifest and the hidden things of darkness are brought to light," [1] the test which is applied is conduct. "It is indeed surprising," says Professor W. P. Paterson,[2] "that no mention is made of faith."

From our point of view, however, that is quite natural and inevitable. There can be no other scientific measure of a force except in the effect it produces; and on this the estimate is based. "We must all be made manifest before the judgment-seat of Christ, that each one may receive the things done through the body according to what he hath done, whether *it be* good or bad." [3] "Whatsoever good thing each one doeth, the same shall he receive again from the Lord." [4] So again, writing from a slightly different point of view, Paul speaks to the same effect: "Not the hearers of the law are righteous before God, but the doers of the law shall be treated as righteous, . . . in the day when God shall judge the secret things of men according to my gospel by Jesus Christ." [5] If in Romans, Ephesians and Corinthians the judgment of God is consistently based on works, the judgment of men must still more necessarily be based on the same external standard, and not on the

[1] See 1 Corinthians iv. 5.

[2] *The Apostles' Teaching*, i. p. 116. Such is the usual remark made by theologians on this topic.

[3] 2 Corinthians v. 10.

[4] Ephesians vi. 8.

[5] Romans ii. 13–16. That the American Revision is right in so connecting the structure of the sentence seems clear, and has been already stated: the intermediate words are parenthetic. I refer to meditation in secret, not to the final judgment (as Westcott and Hort punctuate).

attempt to estimate a hidden force in the heart and nature of man.

Those who would bind Paul, regarded as a philosophic thinker and as a teacher for all time, to the bare statements in their narrowest form which are made most frequently and most emphatically in the earlier letters, miss much of his thought and character. He did not try to win men by setting before them a complete system of philosophy. He hammered on the potent and penetrating nail of faith. This was the all-important means of getting into their hearts. Hence this is the most characteristic idea of Paulinism as a power to convert. No emphasis can be too strong on that. This, however, does not exhaust the mind, or the philosophic position, or even the teaching, of Paul.

Now, when we attempt to go further and comprehend Paulinism as a complete system of thought and of teaching, and to show how it can make itself intelligible to men of the twentieth century, we must remember that he did not always preach to the unconverted or the newly converted and immature ; and we should not exclude the possibility that he could organise and govern as well as persuade and convert. It is the denial, sometimes overt and conscious, sometimes half-unconscious, of this possibility, that causes much of the difficulty experienced as to the truly Pauline character of the teaching in the Pastoral Epistles. The importance of faith in the teaching of Paul was immense ; but there was much more than faith in his teaching.

The emphasis which Paul lays upon faith is wholly justified and necessary. Faith is the motive power of good life : through its force man can begin to move towards God, and its continued impulse is needed right through to the end. We can make no step except through it. Without faith man is helpless : it is the power of the divine within him, believing, hoping, loving, and seeking after

the Divine around him. Too much emphasis cannot be laid on the indispensableness of faith.

It is not always easy for the practical expounder of Paulinism to find words that will rightly and exactly express the situation. In such perplexity, if you lay the superior stress on faith, you will not go far wrong.

Yet in attempting to comprehend the nature of Pauline teaching, we must remember that even Paul himself does not say that it is the only thing, nor even that it is the greatest thing. "Now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; and the greater of these is love" (1 Cor. xiii. 13). The singular "abideth," instead of the plural, is not merely a grammatical feature: it bears closely on the sense.[1] Paul does not mean simply that each one of the three separately and by itself remains permanent. He never would say so emphatically that you can trust in the permanence of faith by itself without the others. He means that the divine unity of faith, hope, love is the permanent thing amid the flux and change of the world. Faith, as he says in xiii. 2, is by itself insufficient: however great faith I have, however my faith fulfils the supreme test, it would be nothing without love. The one is incomplete without the other two. And, if you are determined to weigh them against one another, love is greater than faith as a constituent element in the divine whole; and love is in itself the most lasting and most Divine thing in the universe, for it, more completely than anything else, is the Divine nature.

XXI. Faith unto Salvation.

When the true nature and meaning of the Pauline term "faith" is understood we see that the greatest difficulties

[1] This I would venture to add to Dr. Harnack's exquisite statement of the quality of this passage, as set forth in an earlier page of the Expositor for June, 1912.

which Paulinism presents to the modern mind rest on a misconception of the word.

"Why should I be condemned because another man sinned, or made righteous because another has paid the penalty for me?" That is the question which constantly rises in one form or another to the mind of the ordinary man in modern time, and to a somewhat less degree probably in ancient time: every age has its own special difficulties to meet and its questions to put.

As has been pointed out in Section XVI., we are according to Paul not condemned because another man sinned, but because we have ourselves sinned; and I do not hesitate to say that according to Paul we are made righteous, not simply because another man, even Jesus, has paid the penalty for us, but because we, through faith in Jesus and in His payment of the penalty on behalf of all men, attain to righteousness.

This appears too markedly contrary to some widely received conceptions of Pauline teaching: is it justifiable as an expression of his thought?

The usual conception of Pauline teaching may be very roughly stated thus. Salvation is procured and earned, not by ceremonial observance and ritual acts of outward homage and external respect towards, nor even by obedience to the higher moral law which requires that man should "do justly and love mercy and walk humbly with God," but by faith alone: "By grace have ye been saved through faith."[1] Salvation is not obtained through merit of our own, nor is it the reward of excellent character or good conduct, but is the free gift of God, independent of ourselves. In this we find no fault, except in so far as it is stated to the exclusion of any further statement or teaching.

That salvation cannot be obtained by ritual is quite in

[1] Micah vi. 8; Ephesians ii. 8.

accordance with the judgment of the ordinary reasonable man, who wants to understand plainly and to think simply about his rule and conduct of life. He finds, however, that the words of Micah as quoted above express his own judgment and his own intention: he would like to do well, to be just and merciful, and to be finally judged by God accordingly.

Paul does not object to this desire and opinion of the ordinary reasonable man. Such was apparently his own original aim in life. He came to Jerusalem to live the higher life; he eagerly desired to do rightly; and in attempting with his whole heart and soul to carry into effect this eager desire, he found himself trampling on what was best in his nation, an accomplice in the murder or attempted murder of the noblest among his own people, and a hater and enemy of the Lord Himself.

The discovery that his enthusiasm to serve God aright had led him headlong into such perverse and shameful conduct produced the most profound effect on his judgment. He saw that the result of the eager desire to live one's own life well through one's own effort must be utter failure. You cannot do what you desire to do: you are inevitably led into sin and wrong-doing, partly by your own nature, partly by the perverting influence of the errors and sins of preceding generations, as the iniquity of the fathers is visited on the children and produces in them an ever-increasing liability to error, partly by the very law itself which stands above you and which you strive to obey. Paul felt keenly that the law had in itself been an influence to lead him astray: it had drawn his attention away from the truth: he had set it in the place of God, and it had concealed from him the true nature of God and the purpose of Christ.

Paul himself, therefore, had natural sympathy with that

judgment and intention of the common man. He began so, and he knew what was good in that intention, and what was mistaken.

In the natural condition of human character, when it is not yet too much perverted by wrong choice and wrong aspirations and has not yet begun to aim deliberately at wrongdoing for its own sake or as a means to something that lies beyond the wrongdoing, the ordinary reasonable man desires to do rightly, to act according to a good standard of conduct, and to gain thereby the rewards in character and in external blessings which ought (as he thinks) to accompany and result from good action. This his natural sense of right takes as a fair and just principle and measure of treatment.

It is commonly said that righteous action of this kind is of a lower class than the righteousness that is gained by faith, and therefore would not be sufficient to merit salvation. Theologians labour to prove this by a variety of considerations and arguments, on which we need not enter. The natural sense of fairness in the ordinary man of our time is not convinced by them ; and the Gospel of Paul, when recommended by such methods, fails to touch him. These arguments are, however, beside the point : they never touch the real problem : they do not interpret rightly the mind of Paul. To the Apostle the *crux* of the whole situation lay, not in the fact that righteousness if so gained is in itself of a lower order, but in the fact that righteousness cannot be attained in this way. If the way were possible, if it led to success and to true righteousness, all would be well. But it cannot lead to success : it does not produce true righteousness. Sometimes it leads to appalling error and crime : sometimes it produces less terrible, but still quite unsatisfactory results. There is no possible way except through faith.

Examine the question in every way you please. Take it historically. The history of the past was, as Paul saw and as every pagan thinker and poet (except Virgil, sometimes) acknowledged, a process of deterioration and degeneration. Man was not growing better. Racial sin had vitiated the whole fabric of society, and lowered the national standard of judgment and conduct. Take it in the individual case: no man could feel that, as he grew older, he grew better. Take it in the typical case of the first man, Adam. He had sinned where every circumstance was in his favour.

Another way was needed. Except by another way righteousness could not be attained. God had shown that way through Jesus. It is the way of dying that one may live, of suffering that one may triumph.

W. M. Ramsay.

THE CONSUMMATION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT IN JESUS CHRIST.

II. The Old Testament reached its Consummation in the Appearance and Work of Jesus.

This proposition can be best explained and demonstrated on the following lines of thought.

1. The appearance and work of Jesus are presented as a development or rather as the culmination of a history which began in earlier times.

Many besides myself must be conscious of a thrill of emotion when they read in the book of Isaiah the anxious question which sounds from the mountainous region of Seir, the dwelling-place of the Edomites to the south of the Dead Sea—a question twice repeated because of its urgency: "Watchman, what of the night? *Watchman, what of the night?*" Not less striking are the words borne upon the air as the answer of the guardian or watchman (i.e. the prophet), "If ye will inquire, inquire ye; turn ye, come" (Isa. xxi. 11 f.). A similar question to that of this passage, "Watchman, what of the night?" came once more in actual truth in a later age from the shore-country of the Dead Sea. I mean the question which John the Baptist sent to Jesus from his prison in the fortress of Machärus, and which, as we remember, was as follows: "Art Thou He that should come, or do we look for another?" Jesus in His answer said nothing as to any longer waiting. Instead, He pointed the questioner to His miracles as the

beneficent results of His superhuman gifts of power; and to the message, already proclaimed among men, of the Gospel, the glad tidings of the dawn of a new epoch in the history of the kingdom of God. Jesus, therefore, considered it quite proper that His appearance and His doings should be viewed as a *continuation*; and He solved the doubt which, as we can readily understand, haunted John as he languished in his dungeon, by explaining that His deeds formed the *termination* of the preceding history of the kingdom of God. Thus the very first fact made clear in the coming of Jesus to earth was that the Old Testament history in general does not form *a process of development without an end.*

But, further, the appearance of Jesus in the domain of religion proved this especially, that the *prophecy* of the Old Testament was *not a call without an echo.*

We hear the echo in the first sentence which Jesus uttered. When He cried to the men of His age, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," there was a sonorous echo of the thought as to the super-earthly kingdom of God which was uttered in the passages on the pilgrimage of the patriarchs and the priestly kingdom, right on to the words of Daniel (ii. 44) about the kingdom which should triumph over all the powers of earth and abide for evermore. It was not, then, in vain—let us note this especially—that the prophets of the Old Testament, in a life shadowed by conflict and misunderstanding, had held firmly to the conviction that, in spite of the thousandfold unfaithfulness of Israel, the cause of their God was moving forward to a brilliant triumph. No, *the prophets were not always misunderstood.* Jesus acknowledged their truthfulness, and made it possible for their glorified vision to behold as an actual reality that great turning-point in the history of the divine kingdom of grace which they had once proclaimed.

The next point will illustrate what I have said in the

clearest way. It was at Nazareth, as we know, that Jesus preached His so-called inaugural discourse. When He read these words from the book of Isaiah, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He hath anointed me to preach the Gospel to the poor," etc. (lxi. 1), and when the eyes of all in the synagogue were fastened upon Him, how did He begin His sermon? He did not remark, "This is a consoling promise of ancient days, and we hope that it *will* be fulfilled in the future." No, He said, "This day is the Scripture fulfilled in your ears," i.e. "in Me, who now speak to you" (Luke iv. 21). He applied the prophecy in a personal way, thus representing Himself as in line with the preceding course of the history of salvation. But at the same time Jesus declared that this prophecy had been *realised* in Himself, and in doing so He expressed the consciousness that the line of prophecies had reached its final point in His appearance upon earth.

We have seen, then, that at the beginning of His public activity Jesus characterised His ministry as the concluding portion of that history of religion which is narrated in the Scriptures of the Old Testament. In doing so He bore distinct and formal testimony to the fact that the Old Testament does not resemble one of those shallow streams which are often found in the East, and which are known in Hebrew literature as "deceitful brooks." In the rainy spring season they overflow their banks like the Jordan when Israel passed over into Canaan (Josh. iv. 18), but in the hot summer they vanish in the sand. The Old Testament history of religion was no shallow brook like these. It was an *inexhaustible* stream, which pours its waters into the sea of eternity. Jesus bore witness to this at the beginning of His work by the simple fact that He connected His own ministry with the prophetic period.

The same twofold witness, first as to His own relation to

the preceding history of redemption, and next as to the historic continuity of the Old Testament in His own work, was borne by Jesus in several other ways. This was done, to begin with, when at the commencement of His public ministry He associated Himself with the *national principle* of the Kingdom of God. When His mental vision surveyed the successors of that heathen captain who had distinguished himself by the firmness of his faith in the supernatural power of Christ, His eye did *not* exclude the earlier citizens of that kingdom. On the contrary, He said that many from the east and the west should sit down in the kingdom of God *with* Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Matt. viii. 11 and Luke xiii. 28 f.). He spoke also of the children of the kingdom to whom the bread of the Gospel must *first* be offered (Matt. xv. 26). Nay more, He declared that "Salvation is of the Jews" (John iv. 22).[1] Surveying the world-wide domain of the true kingdom of God, Jesus was not so devoid of the historical sense as to overlook the former earthly point of contact with the divine kingdom of grace. Jesus did *not ignore* the fact that the actual descendants of Abraham were the first heirs of salvation. He only wished to cultivate more extensively the old fruit-bearing soil of religion and morality which was depicted by Isaiah (v. 1–7) in the parable of the vineyard.

Let us inquire, further, whether Jesus established the regulations of the true kingdom of God without any reference to the Old Testament. That also cannot possibly be maintained. He *did not destroy the fundamental principles* of the Old Testament legislation on religion and morals. The cardinal principles of the Old Testament faith, "Thou shalt have no other gods besides Me," or "Thou shalt not make

[1] These are proofs of things which have been wholly overlooked by Friedrich Delitzsch, when he maintained in his last lecture on "Babel und Bibel," 1905, p. 48, that Jesus founded "a truly new religion."

unto thee any image to represent the spiritual God," etc., and also all the best maxims—the strong pillars—of Old Testament morality were retained by Jesus as the foundation principles in the upbuilding of the perfect kingdom of God. It was not only that He tolerated these principles by a tacit acceptance: they received from Him express confirmation. For what was His answer when a Scribe asked Him which was the first and greatest commandment? He answered, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," etc. (Matt. xxii. 37–40). Even the title by which He designated Himself "the Son of Man" was certainly used by Jesus in connexion with the Old Testament. By the choice of that epithet He wished, in my view, to declare this truth to His contemporaries: *I am He* who represents the seed of the woman in the Protevangelium (Gen. iii. 15). *I am He* who is to bruise the head of the serpent (i.e. of the world-elements which lure men to enmity with God). *In Me* is incarnated that symbol of the true kingdom of God of which Daniel wrote (vii. 13).

For the attempt which has been made recently [1] to trace the title "Son of Man" to a Babylonian origin has, we may safely assert, entirely failed. It is suggested that in the Babylonian language *mâr avîlim* means also "child of man," and is a paraphrase of the simple expression "man," but that the meaning always carries with it a certain idea of honouring. This does not, however, account for the fact that the prophet Ezekiel is often addressed as "son of man." For this interpretation is contradictory to the entire spiritual relationship of that prophet to God. He is described as "son of man" in contrast to the Judge of the world, who would at last be obliged, unhappily, to set Himself in stern opposition to Israel. We see this from the words, "I fell upon my face" and "I was afraid" (i. 28;

[1] Friedr. Delitzsch. Last lecture on *Babel und Bibel*, 1905, p. 51.

ii. 14, etc.). Neither did Jesus apply to Himself the expression " Son of Man " as a synonym for " a man " or as a title of honour. On the first point we have proof in the following passage, " John came neither eating nor drinking," etc. (Matt. xi. 18 f.). " The Son of Man is come eating and drinking," etc. (Matt. xi. 18 f.). How could another " man " be put in opposition to the one man, John ? And finally, Jesus did not choose the designation Son of Man as a title of honour for Himself, but because it was necessary for Him to conceal His claim to Messiahship until He had trained a group of adherents to understand the loftiness of His Messianic idea.

The preceding exposition has made it sufficiently clear that the historical appearance and work of Jesus was intended to be, and actually was, the continuation and culmination of the Old Testament history of salvation. Along with this it has been shown that the history of religion which is unrolled before us in the Old Testament reached its *final point* in the appearance of Jesus on earth. While the work of Jesus has been set forth in its true light as a manifestation which was *not separated* from the Old Testament, the history of salvation as recorded in the Old Testament Scriptures has been unfolded as merely the *beginning* of a great plan for the kingdom of God. The appearance of Jesus in history was no " erratic block," and Old Testament history was not left as an unfinished torso.

But the whole has not been said when we have traced this simple correlation between the coming of Jesus and the Old Testament history of religion. It is possible to show that the special line of tendency as regards the future which we see in Old Testament history found its consummation in the work of Jesus.

2. The continuation of the Old Testament history of salvation which lies before us in the doings of Christ on earth

corresponds to the indications contained in its pages as to its future completion.

(*a*) Let us examine this first in the field of legislation.

Here we recognise in the Old Testament writings, first of all as regards religious and moral principles, an unquestionable advance towards greater spirituality and a deeper inwardness. For even if we consider all the passages [1] it is only in the fifth book of Moses (vi. 5), which characterises itself distinctively as a transcript of the *farewell* words of Moses, that we find the command that veneration for the divine Being is to show itself in love. That feeling of love to God is there pressed upon the people's hearts with melting tenderness. And, further, the command " Thou shalt love thy neighbour " is *not* absent from the Old Testament (Lev. xix. 18), although the idea of " neighbour " was there almost exclusively [2] limited to one's own countrymen.

This line of development which we may observe in the Old Testament was continued with entire accuracy by Jesus when He named these two duties as the first and greatest commandments (Matt. xxii. 37–40), and at the same time set them free from their Old Testament separation from one another and put them on an equal footing. Thus He taught men to see in the love of God and the love of their neighbour the twin rays of a double flame, which stream forth from the two focal points of the same ellipsis. Humanitarian feeling in the moral domain of Old Testament legislation bears strongly-marked characteristics of the future. We may recognise this in the fifth Book of Moses from which we have just quoted. To take one example only (for others cf. my *Geschichte*, p. 366), the wife, who in the Decalogue of Exodus xx. 2–17 is placed after the house, is ranked before the house in the Decalogue of Deuteronomy v. 21, and is thus honoured

[1] They are collected in my *Geschichte*, p. 365.

[2] But cf. Exodus xi. 2 and the conduct of Elisha to Naaman, etc.

as a man's most intimate possession. In this case also Jesus moves upon the same line and takes only one step forward. He rejects the law of the " bill of divorcement " which, even according to Deuteronomy (xxiv. 1 f.), the husband is allowed to present to the wife who has some quality objectionable to him ; and proclaims the indissolubility of marriage, except in cases where one wedded partner has by actual adultery already broken the marriage covenant (Matt. xix. 3–9). He protects the wife against a wanton dismissal, and thereby raises the dignity of woman, while at the same time He advances humanity a step farther on the path of its development.

In the field of moral legislation also the Old Testament moves towards a deeper psychological inwardness. In Leviticus xix. 10b, 17 f., the people are forbidden not only to kill their brother, but to oppress him or to *hate him in their heart ;* and in Job xxxi. 1 even the lustful gaze upon an unmarried woman is regarded as sinful. Jesus therefore was merely moving forward on a path already opened when He ranked insults offered to a brother or " anger " against him " without a cause " as on the same plane with murder ; and when He described the lustful gaze upon a woman as adultery committed already in the heart (Matt. v. 22, 28).

Further, with reference to the legislation on worship, it was a great historic task of the prophets to protect from misinterpretation and neglect that primacy which in the Decalogue is given so unmistakably to religious piety and morality as *above* the mere carrying out of formal acts of worship. They were therefore obliged to oppose as dangerous errors all those merely corporeal forms of worship which were practised without any participation of the heart, and especially the combination of ceremonial worship with impiety and immorality. We have such a protest in that early saying, " To obey is better than sacrifice " (1 Sam. xv.

22), and guiding voices in the same conflict may be recognised also in Amos v. 25 ; Hosea v. 6, etc. ; Isaiah i. 12, etc.[1]

Even fasting is spiritualised in Isaiah lviii. 6 ff. How close is the connexion between such ideals and the teaching of Jesus, who in His words on almsgiving, prayer and fasting (Matt. vi. 1–18) rejected all merely external action, all unspiritual lip-service, all suggestion of a mere *opus operatum*, and in contrast to these stressed vehemently the perfect ideal of the religious life, a full and unlimited self-surrender in thought and effort to the fulfilment of the purposes of God (vi. 19–34) ! He developed this idea even as regards the observation of *times of worship*, in His references to the Sabbath. We know how plainly He set forth the truth that works of necessity and mercy are permitted even on the Sabbath day (Matt. xii. 1–13), and we remember how He refuted the accusations of His contemporaries by the utterance of those words of dazzling clearness : " The Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath " (Mark ii. 27).

(*b*) Let us consider, in the second place, whether the words and acts of Jesus correspond with the *prophecies* about a future development of the Old Testament plan of salvation. We observe, first, under this head, that the prophets always endeavoured to divest the conception of the *divine kingdom* of its earthly character. We know the prophetic utterances which are meant to elucidate this point, and also the fact, so intimately bound up with them, that the throne of the descendants of David was *not* set up again after the close of the Babylonian exile. Jesus also from the commencement of His ministry never intended to establish an earthly Messianic kingdom. For this reason He introduced into the

[1] Full information as to this work of the prophets will be found in my *Geschichte*, pp. 321–325, 378 f., 394–396.

Gospels the lately-discovered (!) " Messianic-secret." Jesus, as we know, enjoined silence about His deeds of mercy on more than one of the persons whom He healed (Mark i. 44 ; iii. 12, etc.). He also bade the disciples keep silence when they had recognised His Messiahship (viii. 30). What was the reason of this ? Simply that notwithstanding the numerous references of the prophets to the non-political mission of the kingdom of God, the Jewish people, whose interests were wholly external, regarded that kingdom as a political power. In the Gospels themselves we find that the masses wished to acclaim Jesus as King (John vi. 15). But as Jesus was not intended to be a political or merely national Messiah, and had no desire for such a position, His first concern was to explain the true conception of the Messianic kingdom to a group of trusted men, and to plant it deeply in their minds. He could not attain His end by the mere recurring expression of this idea. Any one who fancies that this was possible has formed a mistaken opinion as to the state of men's minds at that time in Palestine. Surely we ought not to be ignorant that under the oppression of the direct Roman rule over Judea, etc., which was established in the year 6 A.D., the longing for a political Messiah among the great majority of the Jewish people had reached the boiling-point. One method alone could suffice to cool it. Only if a group of men, living in continuous intercourse with Jesus, allowed His spirit to influence their own, could the Messianic hopes which were part and parcel of their being be finally rooted out, while at the same time there was no uprooting along with these of their personal trust in Christ. But the chief point to notice here is this : while Jesus was labouring for the realisation of a *non*-political Messianic kingdom, His plan was in full accord with those many voices of prophecy which had declared that the true vocation of the commonwealth of Israel lay in " quietness and confidence " (Isaiah

xxx. 15), and in the spreading of religious and moral light over all the races of the earth (xlii. 6, etc.).

We observe further that from the time of Nathan's significant utterance (2 Sam. vii. 11–16)[1] the prophetic message had connected the origin of the future Saviour with the family of David (cf. Hos. iii. 5, also Isa. ix. 5 f., etc.). The discrepancy which occurs in lv. 3–5 is only apparent. For there the assurances of a perpetual leadership for David are represented as promises made on the conclusion of a covenant with the people. It is highly probable that this passage is intended to emphasise the idea that the family of David must, so to speak, return into the people of Israel before the promises made to it can be fulfilled. Note how closely the coming of Jesus is connected with this prophecy ! For it was only after the family of David, as a sharer in the sufferings decreed for Israel, had been dethroned and, as it were, reduced to a root hidden beneath the earth (Isa. xi. 1), or, in other words, had returned into the people, that Jesus was actually born of David's line.

In the prophecies about the *salvation* which was to be realised in the culminating period of the kingdom of God, the material side, then, recedes more and more into the background. In ever more insistent language stress is placed on the religious and moral side of that salvation, and on the fact that the soul must receive it (Isa. ii. 3 f. ; Mic. vii. 19, etc.). Can there be a clearer concord than that which we find between the prophetic language already quoted and some of the earliest leading utterances of Jesus ?

He too had to answer the tempting question, whether He might entice and bind the masses to Himself with promises of material possessions. Such was the meaning of the tempter's proposal, " If Thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread " (Matt. iv. 3). But He

[1] Its age is discussed in my *Geschichte*, p. 248 f.

rejected this method of gaining a ready popularity with the multitude no less vigorously than the other two suggestions, that He should seek to win the favour of the staring street-crowd, whose minds were wholly turned on outward things, by performing the juggling tricks of the magician or by proclaiming an earthly kingdom. Jesus understood the deeper need of the human soul and longed to satisfy it. In proof of this, we need only quote His sublime saying : " Man shall not live by bread alone." These words show that His ear had caught the dominant note which resounds through the prophets' writings on the future salvation, and that He had re-composed the old music into a new harmony.

Do we not also recognise in the prophetic utterances an ever clearer indication that the circle of those who were to share in the coming salvation was to widen out till it embraced all nations ? Although Jesus, as we have seen already, did not for a moment forget that Israel was the historic point of connexion in the offer of the true salvation, His eye was turned still more fully on the world-wide company of those who should partake of it. We see this from such passages as these : " Many shall come from the east and west," etc. (Matt. viii. 7, 11) ; " the field is the world " (xiii. 38), etc. Isolated sayings which express the opposite idea are merely the teacher's instructions as to the progressive character of the offer of salvation which was to extend itself from a narrower to a wider field. This is the meaning of that direction to the disciples whom He first sent forth, that they should go only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel (Matt. x. 6) ; and the words to the woman of Canaan, " It is not meet to take the children's bread, and to cast it to the little dogs " (xv. 26), were not intended, as we see from the choice of the diminutive " little dogs," as a serious rejection. They were meant rather to provide an opportunity for the woman's faith to display itself under test.

The promise of the New Covenant was long forgotten. All the apocryphas and pseudo-epigraphs to the Old Testament are silent about it. Even in Baruch ii. 35 the words "And I will make an everlasting covenant with them" refer merely to the "everlasting covenant" which is mentioned in Isaiah lv. 3; lix. 21; lxi. 8; Jeremiah xxxii. 40; Ezekiel xvi. 60; xxxvii. 26.

In 4 Esdras iii. 15, which a recent interpreter quotes along with Baruch ii. 35,[1] the reference is only to the covenant with Abraham. Philo also is silent about the new covenant, and I have not discovered any reference to it in the Mischna or the Talmud, either in my own reading or in works on Talmudic theology.[2] But Jesus, unlike the others, did *not* keep silence about it. In the last Passover meal which He held with His disciples He said as He handed them the cup, "This is My blood of the new covenant, which is shed for many for the remission of sins."[3] Thus the thrilling words of Jeremiah xxxi. 34b, according to which the treading down of guilt was to form the foundation for a new union between God and men, found a perfect realisation in fact.

Note also, that among the three fruits of the covenant in the soul of man (faith, obedience or love, and hope) the prophets gave the same prominence to *faith* that it held in the patriarchal age (Isa. vii. 9, etc.; my *Geschichte*, p. 341 f.). How distinctly does the teaching of Jesus correspond with theirs even in this respect! Faith, for which a change of mind (or repentance) prepared the way, was the fundamental requirement of Jesus (Mark i. 15: "Repent ye and believe the Gospel"). It was necessary that this should be so, and we must stress this fact in opposition to many voices of Judaism (my *Geschichte*, p. 521). For peni-

[1] Kneucker, *Das Buch Baruch* (1879) on this passage.

[2] E.g. Oesterley and Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue* (1907).

[3] Matt. xxvi. 28 and the parallel passages, 1 Cor. xi. 25; Heb. viii. 8.

tential faith, as we may understand even on psychological grounds, is the one true lever of the religious and moral progress of a human soul, and therefore the one true means of pleasing God.

We see, then, that even the upward tending lines of prophecy were continued in the words and deeds of Jesus. We may therefore claim that as the Old Testament, compared with other literatures of antiquity, was conspicuously the herald of prophecy and expectation, so its utterances were not without an *echo* sounding clearly from afar. We ourselves indeed sometimes expect a beloved guest, but when we go to greet him we stand at an empty door. But when the two disciples on the road to Emmaus said, " We trusted that it had been He which should have redeemed Israel," *He stood before them there* and revealed Himself by His language beyond all question as the Redeemer of whom the prophets had testified in truth.

Is it possible that some will refuse assent to these conclusions ? We must assume such a possibility. For there is no complete correspondence between the Old Testament and the acts of Jesus. There are also discrepancies between the two, and so we have to explain the nature of such differences, and inquire whether, in spite of them, the Old Testament attained its fulfilment in Him. In a few concluding paragraphs let us set ourselves to this task.

3. The consummation of the Old Testament in Jesus is proved from internal evidence.

(*a*) The works of Jesus passed beyond those points which had been attained before His time in the forward movement of the Old Testament. The superiority of His achievements as compared with the highest landmarks of Old Testament development reveals itself alike in regard to legislation and to prophecy.

In the department of *legislation*, to begin with, we have

already touched upon the fact that Jesus advanced even beyond the highest limits of Old Testament progress. We have noted, e.g., that Jesus was the first to co-ordinate and equalise the two commands on the love of God and the love of one's neighbour, which are already to be found in the Old Testament. In doing so He showed for the first time the full compass and meaning of love to God and at the same time He showed the true and permanent source of neighbourly love. Jesus also was the first to give the classical definition of the idea behind the word " neighbour," [1] and He crowned all previous rules of kindness by the commandment " Love your enemies ! " (Matt. v. 44). Further, He formulated a wholly new instruction of cardinal importance with reference to the mutual obligations of men, for He said, " All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them " (Matt. vii. 12). In this utterance He was borrowing from no one—neither from Tobit iv. 16 or § 207 of the Aristeas letter, or Hillel's saying, " Thou shalt not do to thy neighbour that which is hateful to thyself," for all these previous sayings were negative, but the saying of Jesus is affirmative. Moreover, Jesus emphasised more strongly than any previous teacher the religious duty of man. This is the idea of the first of the Beatitudes, in which He sets forth the essential qualities which fit a man to attain citizenship in the true kingdom of God. Among these fundamental virtues the first place is given to the lowliness of spirit which realises that notwithstanding all the force of intellect man is unable of himself to solve the riddle of the universe or do away with guilt. He expresses the same thought again, e.g., in that soul-shaking sentence, " What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul ? " (Matt. xvi. 26). This

[1] Luke i. 30 ff. : our neighbour is any man who at any given moment requires our help.

deepest religious and moral duty of man outweighs the positive law of *worship*, as we gather from the words: "First be reconciled to thy brother and then come and offer thy gift" (Matt. v. 24). Note also that in Deuteronomy xii. 5 ff. the exclusive sanctity of that place, where alone in later times sacrifice was offered, was firmly maintained. Jesus, on the other hand, said to the woman of Samaria, "Woman, believe Me, the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father" (John iv. 21). And as He revised the Sabbatic legislation like one having sovereign power, so He appraised at their true value, from the same standpoint of sovereignty, all the "negative acts of worship," as I prefer to call them. He does so in a single sentence: Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man, but that which proceedeth out of the mouth reveals him as stained with impurity (cf. Matt. xv. 18). It was true indeed that "He taught as one having authority and not as the scribes" (vii. 29).

The "fulfilment of the prophets" (Matt. v. 17), i.e. of their predictive utterances, although less apparent on the surface, was also an integral part of the work of Jesus. The proof may be clearly set out from the following passages:—

It is certain that in the Old Testament the connexion of the true kingdom of God with the earth is frequently denoted as a negative relationship. But did any of the prophets say anywhere in plain words that the divine kingdom of grace in coming days should not be bound up *at all* with an earthly domain, and should not be *in any respect* of an earthly nature? No, such a declaration as this was never made in the Old Testament. Even keeping in view such passages as Isaiah xxx. 15 and Daniel ii. 44, etc., we find that a savour of earth, if I may put it so, still clings to the special kingdom of God as there described. Jesus, on the contrary, explained clearly that the divine kingdom could not

be apprehended by the senses (Luke xvii. 21), and *His* proclamation, uttered at a decisive moment, was in these words, "My kingdom is not of this world" (John xviii. 36). Jesus, then, was the first to set forth with perfect clearness the purely spiritual (i.e. religious-moral) character of the kingdom of God.

It is true that the eyes of prophecy were opened to perceive ever more clearly the superhuman *equipment* of the coming Saviour (Isa. xi. 2, etc.). But how much more distinctly do we hear the rushing mighty sound of such words as these: "All things are delivered unto Me of My Father, and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father," etc. (Matt. xi. 27; John x. 30, etc.).

It is true also that in the prophetic history of the Old Testament the *suffering* of the future Saviour was not concealed (Isa. vii. 15, etc.). But in prophecy the image of the suffering helper was placed merely *side by side* with that of the ruling descendant of David, and for that very reason this feature in the portrait of the coming Saviour became dimmed in later centuries.[1]

Jesus, on the other hand, with His vigorous words of rejection, "Get thee hence, Satan!" (Matt. iv. 10), cast down beneath the stage of human action all those dazzling images which might have guided Him towards the path of outward rulership; and we remember how decidedly He opposed Simon Peter, who wished to hold back his Master from the way of suffering (xvi. 23). For Jesus the culminating point of His Messiahship was found in the sacrifice He offered for the redemption of humanity, in the ransom He paid for the sins of the world when He yielded Himself unto the death of the Cross (xvi. 28), thus obtaining eternal redemption for us (Heb. ix. 12). He kept full in front of

[1] Proof of this is supplied in my *Geschichte*, pp. 536–539.

Him the ideal purpose of attaining through *suffering* the highest throne in the history of the human spirit.

In view of all this, three facts stand forth as incontestable. In the first place Jesus put an end to the term of prophecy and expectation (see above, Luke iv. 21, etc.); He might have said to the flowing stream of the prophetic period, "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther!"[1] Next we see that in the work of Jesus the highest utterances of the prophets in every direction are united into one corporate organism and filled with actual historic life. And thirdly, we recognise that in the Person of Jesus, in His coming amongst men, in His teachings and in the work He accomplished, the loftiest summits of Old Testament development were flooded with the golden radiance of the rising sun.[2]

(*b*) Can it be that the differences which exist, as has been shown above, between the highest points of Old Testament development and the work of Jesus, may prevent some from seeing the fulfilment of the Old Testament in Him? The right answer, it seems to me, lies along the following lines.

In judging the above-mentioned disparity between the summit-heights of prophecy and the work of Jesus, this may be said to begin with: The far superior number of the points of agreement, which are found between the two given quantities, decides as to their homogeneity. But we need

[1] He prepared the way for such records as these, "All the promises of God in Him are yea" (2 Cor. i. 20).

[2] St. Paul's words on "the shadow" (Col. ii. 16 f.) are true in a double sense. He said of the distinction between meats, and "in respect of an holyday, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath days," that they were "a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ." The regulations of the Old Testament kingdom of God are thus explained as a shadowy cloak of the glorious body of Christ (i.e. of the Christ phase of the divine kingdom) which was moving onwards towards its full manifestation. But we may also say that the factors of the Old Testament kingdom of God which concerned worship were thrown into shadow by the teaching and work of Christ. Cf. Gal. iv. 9 f.; Acts vii. 38–51; Heb. x. 1a.

not depend upon this argument. For we are dealing with a different matter in discussing, as in this case, the disparity between two historical phenomena. The second of the two is not mechanically different from the first, so that there could be any question as to the quantity or number of the deviations. No, the differences between the acts of Jesus and the Old Testament religion all lie on the line of the *actual* development of that religion.

The enlarging, deepening, and spiritualising tendency which, as has been proved in the above narrative, did exist as a fact in the Old Testament literature, alike in the sphere of legislation and in that of prophecy, was *really carried forward* in the words and deeds of Jesus. If we see anywhere that a plant grows, unfolds and puts forth a bud, may not the flower which finally develops from it display many new colours and forms ?[1] Surely it was only natural that the further development of the divine kingdom, founded by the call of Abraham, which had its beginning in the Old Testament, should progress in the *same direction* even after the age of prophecy had ended. Therefore we may briefly summarise as follows in conclusion : The consummation of the essential elements of Old Testament religion which lies before us in the work of Jesus was meant to be an *organic* development, i.e. a development which grew out of the inner nature of the Old Testament. So the relationship between the summits of prophecy and the work of Jesus cannot be accurately described as a mere deviation or a difference. It is rather a progressive unfolding, or, if we again apply the illustration used above, an opening of the bud into the blossom.

This historical process may be placed in a still clearer

[1] Cf. what M. Noordtzij, in his exposition of *De achtenzestigde Psalm* (1900), remarks on v. 19 : " Christianity possesses in the Old Testament root, stem and bud, but when have we ever seen that the fruit even resembles the bud ? "

light and guarded against some mistaken ideas by these further considerations.

Note first that the astonishing position of the Consummator which Jesus claimed, as has been shown, in reference to the Old Testament period of the kingdom of God, is explicable also from other points of view. For the unfolding of salvation involved a necessary progress. The divine Being possessed above all things the right to draw up a plan according to His own wisdom, whereby He might educate the citizens of the kingdom of God to advance from the outward to the inward, from the lower to the higher. But the divine grace was actually compelled, as we see from the prophecy about the new covenant, to offer ever larger proofs of its own fulness, to invite men by ever greater benefits, to blot out human sin by ever heavier sacrifices, that a full satisfaction might be offered to the divine holiness, because justice must remain the fundamental law of world history (Isa. v. 16; Rom. iii. 26). Moreover, the spiritualisation of the Old Testament laws, as, for instance, in relation to the unclean foods (Matt. xv. 18), is, as a rule, readily admitted to be a fact.

The same fact must be accepted also as regards the spiritualising of the prophecies.

We remark in the second place that if any one thought it his duty to protect Moses, e.g. in opposition to the Prophet Jeremiah, who proclaimed a new and different covenant, Moses would have been obliged to answer, "He must increase, but I must decrease." Or rather, Moses would have simply recognised that the God who chose him to be His herald had a right to develop His work yet farther. That would not have been difficult for "the man Moses," who was "very meek," [1] and he did actually foresee that a prophet of equal authority with his own would arise in the future (Deut. xviii.

[1] Numbers xii. 3. Cf. my *Hebräisches Wörterbuch*, p. 338b.

15). How much easier it would have been for Moses and the other prophets to use with regard to such a historic figure as Jesus those words of confession which, as we know, were uttered by John the Baptist when he beheld the Saviour's works, " He must increase, but I must decrease " (John iii. 30). John also agreed with that judgment which forced itself upon the people as they listened to the sayings of Jesus : " He spake as one having power " (i.e. authority), as we read in the original text of Matthew vii. 29.

In the third place, this authority is one of the factors that must be duly weighed when we attempt to answer the question, " Did Jesus fulfil the Old Testament ? " Let us recall His own words on that authority as we find them, for example, in this saying : " All things are delivered unto Me of My Father " (Matt. xi. 27)—words which imply at the very least an adequate knowledge of God. Let us remember how He rebuffed the Pharisees when they accused Him of performing His miracles with the aid of Beelzebub (xii. 24–36) ; or how He even dared to describe the Pharisaic movement, which had great ends in view, as a " plant which His heavenly Father had not planted " (xv. 13) ; or how He claimed the right to forgive sins (ix. 2 ff., etc.). But I pause here. I care not who may presume to question the superhuman authority of Jesus—for me the proof is sufficient. That steep path by which He climbed to the summit, that patience which endured even unto the death of the Cross, and along with these the noonday clearness of the consciousness of Jesus, are to me an unshakeable testimony that He really was that which He declared Himself to be—the Child of God whose place is far in front even of the prophets' ranks, the true Messiah.

Further, we observe that the claim made by Jesus to supreme authority, which is securely established by the testimony already noted, was *acknowledged* by those who

knew Him *most intimately*. These first witnesses of Jesus, who in their writings come before us as strict guardians of a conscientious accuracy,[1] must not be imagined as the kind of people who could furnish for themselves a dream-captain, round whose banner they would gather for the desperate charge against a world in arms. The authority of Jesus, established on sure evidence and accepted by those who knew Him best, affords yet another proof that it was He who truly fulfilled the Old Testament.

The first witnesses of Jesus were right, then, when they saw no difficulty in the fact that a plank was missing, so to speak, in the bridge which leads from the Old Testament to the New: and for us to-day this very fact is of supreme importance. Let us suppose for a moment that the picture of Christ's person and work which is delineated for us in the Gospels, corresponded with strict exactitude to those lines on which in the Old Testament the future Saviour and His deeds are described. What conclusion would immediately follow? Those people, it might be said, who disregard the clear utterances of Jesus about His relation to His heavenly Father and also about His own sinlessness (Matt. xi. 27, etc.; John viii. 46, etc.) would find it all the easier to draw the following inference from the precise agreement we have supposed between the Old Testament preparation with the New Testament reality: "Ah, then Jesus drew His Messianic consciousness out of the Old Testament. He read the Book and thought He might be the Messiah." But in view of the *actual* correspondence between the prophetic utterances, on the one hand, and the words and deeds of Jesus on the other, this opinion with regard to the originating source of the consciousness and claim of Jesus is entirely inadmis-

[1] Gal. i. 7 ff.; Rom. xii. 6, etc.; 1 Cor. xii. 10 ff.; Col. ii. 8; 1 Tim. i. 4, etc.

sible. *That* objection to Christ, thank God, was made impossible for men!

In Jesus, then, the Old Testament reached its perfect consummation. In proof of this we were able to cite so many testimonies from historical books and so many securely established arguments, that the fact itself is one of the most certain things in the history of the world. As we turn over afresh all the evidence that comes up before our minds in confirmation of this truth, we are constrained to blend our voices with that of the Apostle who was once a persecutor of the Christian flock (Rom. xi. 33 ff.): "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! . . . To Him be glory for ever!"

Ed. König.

THE SUBCONSCIOUS, THE SUPERCONSCIOUS, AND THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

Recent psychology has given much prominence to the Unconscious and "Subconscious" elements in our constitution, and some have thought that the study of these may throw light on certain important Christian facts. Quite recently, in his *Christology and Personality*, now completed by the addition of subsequent Lectures on *Personality in Christ and in Ourselves*, Dr Sanday has put forth tentatively, with great ability and in the finest spirit, the theory that the subconscious region was the proper seat or *locus* of the Deity of the incarnate Christ. It is in this view, he thinks, that we can best conceive the incarnation and realise how Jesus Christ could be at one and the same time perfectly human and truly Divine—the Divine being located in the subconscious realm and only occasionally rising up into that of the normal consciousness. He finds support for this conception in what he takes to be the facts of religious experience, of Divine communications in general, of the indwelling Spirit, recognisable only by its fruits, and of answers to prayer, which do not, he thinks, reach us through the normal consciousness. Everything from Dr. Sanday carries much weight, and this particular subject is vital to Christianity. This must be the excuse for venturing to accept the invitation to criticism which he gives. As he remarks, "Theology, perhaps more than any other science, needs to receive contributions from all sides." We are at one with him in seeking such a conception of the Person of Christ as shall make Him real to us without losing anything of either the human or the Divine, and, no doubt,

the subconscious played an important part in the incarnate Life of Christ, as it does in every truly human life.

I.

As for this "subconscious," however, notwithstanding all that has been written, the subject is still in great measure in obscurity. Does the term mean a state entirely *beneath* consciousness, as some hold; or is it to be understood as being a subordinate form of consciousness, as is held by others? If it be quite beneath consciousness it would seem that we may at once dismiss the idea that it could be either the medium of Divine communications or the *locus* of the Deity of Christ. No communication can be made to that which is entirely unconscious. The Deity of Christ could not be located in relation to what would be in itself purely physical, already in the individual definitely organised, and automatic in its action. Dr. Sanday does not make the matter clear. He speaks sometimes simply of the "unconscious," more often of "the unconscious and the subconscious," which latter phrase seems to imply that there is a difference between them. He speaks also of "the subliminal self," but he accepts the correction made by a reviewer that to speak of subliminal consciousness is self-contradictory; so far as the state is subliminal it is not conscious; "the subliminal self is," he says, "I should say, all right, but subliminal consciousness is a contradiction." But is it not just his contention that the "subconscious" is subliminal? If it be not subliminal it is one with the conscious; if it is subliminal it is unconscious. If it were thought of as a separate personality with a consciousness of its own, there would be two separate persons in the human being. "Unconscious cerebration" is a fact, as Dr. Carpenter showed long ago, but it is simply brain-action pro-

ceeding unconsciously to ourselves. This has evidently no bearing on the subject. Is the so-called "subconscious" in its normal procedure, anything else than a form of cerebral action which does not rise to the height of consciousness? Certain it is, in any case, that the whole contents of the subconscious realm have been matter of experience, whether of the individual or of his ancestors; they have all first passed through the consciousness, whether *attended* to or not. It is certain also that the whole, while truly alive and "mental" in its action, has a definite physical side to it in each individual. How Divine communications could be made, or a Divine Being impart so much of Himself to this *organised* subconsciousness, is a problem on which no light has been shed.

In any case, the subconscious is *lower* than consciousness, and one would naturally think that the Divine would be in touch with what is *highest* in man. It is also largely representative of what is *prior* to the fully developed human; much that it contains belongs to the earlier stages of life—faculties and functions that have been left behind as the race has made progress, matters of every-day experience which are of no present use are relegated to it. In one aspect it is a storehouse; in another it is a workshop where the materials that have entered it are being rearranged, coming into varying combinations, and often returning to consciousness in an altered, sometimes a surprising form. But all this work goes on automatically, beneath consciousness. The fact that some of the highest inspirations of genius come from thence is quite in keeping with this. Because the brain in its unconscious working, undisturbed by emotion, uninfluenced by error, or by conscious interference, is often truer than when we try to "use" it, and elements that have sunk into this region unheeded at the time, get therein into such arrangement as flashes up into

the consciousness as a new discovery or a luminous idea. As Dr. Stout remarks, "The ordinary man, no less than the man of Genius, may find what, relatively to him, are original ideas, develop while his thoughts are occupied with disconnected topics, or even while he is asleep." The truest thinking is done by the brain as the organ of Thought, when it has been properly trained, adequately stimulated, and left to act freely.

It is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to say where consciousness begins. There is much to support the belief that in some dim form it begins very low down in the scale of being. But even were it the case that, as some hold, a kind of consciousness belongs to each nervous centre, or even, as some maintain, to each living cell, it would not help the theory. For such forms of consciousness cannot be capable of receiving such Divine communications as are here in question.

It is true, indeed, that, while the workings of the lower region of the subconscious are in general entirely unconscious, there are, under certain conditions, states of partial consciousness, such as exist in reverie, dreaming, hypnotic and various abnormal conditions, and that in some of these states influences from without (as in hypnotism) can impress themselves. In these states the highest normal consciousness is in part asleep, while a portion of it remains awake ; or the action of the lower centres is such that there is a measure of consciousness of it. There are many grades of consciousness. But, whatever the true explanation may be, it must be noted that here we are no longer in the realm of the *sub*conscious, but, so far at least, in that of the *conscious*. In some of these states, and also in our normal condition, suggestions come to us from sources which we cannot with confidence identify. They may arise from elements in our subconsciousness for which we are respon-

sible, or which have come to us as an inheritance. They are perhaps as often evil as good, and they are sometimes such as would lead us to relate them to that lower spiritual region in which St. Paul says the spiritual conflict is carried on as well as in the world of flesh and blood. At other times they are such that we naturally ascribe to them a Divine origin, for, of course, the action of the all-pervading Spirit of God is not to be *excluded* from any part of our being. But this is a very different thing from making the subconscious the special abode of the Divine. Such a belief would lay us open to many forms of delusion, and there can be no reason why God should visit men only, or even chiefly, in these lower imperfect states instead of in their highest conscious state. The Divine operation on man is neither magical nor physical, but ethical and spiritual. Divine influences are such as can and must be intelligently received.

Under certain abnormal conditions there may also be developed a kind of "secondary self" which seems to have, for the time, a centre of its own. But this secondary consciousness is always incomplete as well as abnormal; it is psychologically explained by temporary "disaggregations" or "detachments" of the primary consciousness, and gives no ground whatever for belief in a permanent "subliminal self." The entire subconscious, in fact, belongs to the normal self as truly as do the hands and the feet; it is part of the organ of its psychical life; the whole of our conscious life indeed has its foundation in the unconscious and subconscious. But it is the *use* which the conscious personality makes of the material received from that source that gives it ultimate value. It is this *use* that forms the man as he is in relation to the Divine. We take or we refuse elements from the subconscious: the responsible self is not something subliminal, but something which we freely and consciously build up for ourselves. One would be sorry to think that

this strangely mixed "subconscious" was one's true self.

Deepest of all there is no doubt in each one of us something of God. But this must be *spiritual* as God Himself is. It makes itself felt in the conscious spiritual self as that true, ideal self which it is for us to realise or be conformed to. Christ is one with that true self: He is the revelation and the power of the true self in every man, and of Him the Apostle says, "we all with open (or unveiled) face beholding as in a mirror (or reflecting as in a mirror) the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit"—with *open* face, not as obscured by an intervening subconscious.

II.

It is strange that so much stress should be laid on the *Sub*conscious and so little on the *Super*conscious which is surely at least equally real. Mr. Myers aptly compared our consciousness to the solar spectrum as we have it reported to us. Just as beyond the range which gives us light there are at one end waves beyond the red which we recognise as heat and not light, and at the other end, beyond the violet, there are waves for long unknown and still little understood, so "beyond each end of our conscious spectrum extends a range of faculty and perception exceeding the known range, but as yet indistinctly guessed." But he forgot that there is a long distance between the two ends with all that lies beyond each. He applies *the whole* to the *subconscious* realm: "The range of our subliminal mentation is more extended than the range of our supraliminal. At one end of the scale we find *dreams*, a normal subliminal product, but of less practical value than any form of sane supraliminal thought. At the other end of

the scale, we find that the rarest, most precious knowledge comes to us from outside the ordinary field, through eminently subliminal processes." But the spectrum illustration rather suggests the subconscious at the one end and the superconscious at the other, with the normal consciousness between the two. It is losing sight of this superconscious realm (which the waves beyond the violet suggest) and with which the consciousness is as truly in touch as it is with the subconscious, that is the source of mistaken theories.

But this superconscious realm is not merely thus suggested, it is one of the surest facts in religious experience; it is at the very foundation of religion itself. There can be no religious experience if we are not open on one side of our being to God. Of course, this is not questioned by those who support the theory now criticised; it is the *directness* of the communication that is questioned; they hold that Divine communications are made through the subconscious instead of directly to the consciousness. That is, Dr. Sanday explains, as the rule; he says, in a note (p. 159), that he does not "mean to deny that the divine element makes itself felt, and at times directly felt, in consciousness. But it seems *to come up* (as it were) unto consciousness, as if from some lower and deeper sphere." But that which comes to us through the subconscious is of such a mixed nature that we can have no sure confidence in its Divine origin. We can only know *God* if He can manifest Himself to our consciousness: "Be not deceived, my beloved brethren," says St. James, "every good gift and every perfect gift is *from above, coming down* from the Father of lights." Professor James affirmed that "the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self, through which saving experiences come, . . . is literally and objectively true as far as it goes." But, although he

uses the term "God" to denote the something *more* with which we are thus continuous, he made the *hither* side of it the subconscious, and hence, before he has finished, he has to confess that he cannot say with certainty what God is or what is the nature of the something *more* on its farther side. Here lurks the danger of making this obscure and mixed realm the *locus* of the Divine. Dr. Sanday quotes Professor James in support of his theory, but he has surely overlooked the fact that in the passage he quotes (*Christology and Personality*, p, 147), James says that that which is controlling is—not the Divine in the sense in which Dr. Sanday would affirm the Divine—but that "it is primarily the higher faculties of *our own hidden mind* (Italics mine) which are controlling." It is this, he says, that gives "the sense of union with the power beyond us"; it is in *this* way that continuity with a wider self is "not merely apparently, but literally true." *God*, as Dr. Sanday would affirm Him, is not here at all; only "a wider self." Here again we see the possible outcome of a theology based on the subconscious.

But is not the whole Bible, and not the Bible only but every religion, a witness to the fact that man as a conscious being stands in a superconscious, spiritual environment, from whence Divine calls, inspirations, etc., come to him? Is it not true that "in Him we live and move and have our being," which does not mean, as some take it, an "immanent God," but an all-environing, all-sustaining Presence, from which, as the Psalmist said long before, we can by no means remove ourselves. How else could we *pray* if we were not in immediate contact with One in whose presence prayer is—

> "—the burden of a sigh,
> The falling of a tear,
> The upward glancing of an eye
> When none but God is near"?

Of course, God is *Spirit*, and there can be no sense-mediated consciousness of His presence and action. But the communion of spirit with spirit is none the less real, and our prayers are answered, not through the subconscious, but through the conscious. There is some conscious thought suggested, some increase of faith effected, some strength to face our trial or temptation, or to cast our burden on the Lord, imparted; what was dark is made clear, within the soul a light shineth, and "the peace of God which passeth all understanding" comes "to guard our hearts and minds." Or, if we think of the indwelling of the Spirit (in which we have the true immanence of *God* in man), we can have no sensuous consciousness of the Spirit's presence, and the surest proofs of that presence are doubtless "the fruits of the Spirit." But it by no means follows that these are all wrought in the subconscious realm. The Power is *spiritual*, not physical, therefore not allied to the physically expressed subconscious region, but to the spiritual consciousness.

And, although the Divine indwelling is real and influential, we know that Divine spiritual influences are *mediated* through "the word of truth," and in many other ways adapted to reach the personal consciousness. The very earliest movements in religion are made in response to thoughts and experiences which come to the conscious self. Through these man is made to feel that there is a greater, a higher, and, ultimately, a better than himself. With the prophet (in prophetic as distinguished from mantic inspiration), it was a consciously realised conviction of what was true, according to the mind of God, or right according to His will, and for the good of man, that was his inspiration, not something obscurely wrought in the subconscious region: the Divine communication was direct to his consciousness. Divine communications are

not intellectual merely; they are essentially *ethical*. God is a Holy Love, and it is in the entrance of what pertains to *this* into the human that the supreme Divine communications are made. It is difficult to conceive how these could come to man in any other way than by an appeal to his personal consciousness. As Dr. Garvie has said, "it is as man becomes not less but more fully conscious personality that he enters into closer contact and fuller communication with the Divine Personality."

The way in which Divine communications come may be to some extent illustrated by the facts of *conversion*, including those most marvellous examples of it in which we seem to see most clearly the operation of a superhuman Power. General Booth is quoted by Mr. Harold Begbie, in his striking book, *Broken Earthenware*, as saying that he "considers that the first vital step in saving outcasts consists in making them feel that some decent human being cares enough for them to take an interest in the question whether they rise or sink." This is how the saving Love that God *is* is mediated to their consciousness, may we not say, directly reaches them? The wonderful instances of conversion narrated in Mr. Begbie's book bear out the assertion that the first step towards conversion is something that enters the normal consciousness from without. It may be through one converted man speaking seriously to an unconverted person; through appeals at Salvation Army meetings; often through the sight of others saved and happy; in several instances through the knowledge of the change in one man in particular; through thoughts of death and judgment, and of the kindness of the Salvation Army to the very worst. Sometimes the impression made at first may be slight and little heeded, but it has entered the consciousness, sunk into the subconscious, and combining there with other elements, or with fresh impressions,

comes up again into the consciousness with vital power.[1] It was so in the great outstanding example of St. Paul. In whatever way the vision on the road to Damascus may be explained, it cannot be doubted that there were elements working in his mind—in his subconsciousness perhaps—derived originally from what he had *seen* of the character and bearing of the Christians whom he was persecuting and from his *consciousness* of failure to find what he had been seeking towards God.

We may go farther and ask, What of the other side, the human side ? If Divine communications are made through the subconscious, What of *our* communion with God ? Must this also go through the subconscious ? Is not the conscious spirit in man in direct relation with the Father of spirits ? The highest religious experience realises this relationship. Mysticism has been appealed to, but a close student of the Mystics tells us that " they declare one and all that the source of their supernal vitality was a transcendent life, a union with a Divine Reality of which they were clearly conscious," not with something in the obscure subconscious. (Evelyn Underhill, in the *Hibbert Journal* for April 1911, pp. 664–666.) Professor Rufus Jones also, in his *Studies in Mystical Religion*, describes Mysticism as " that type of religion which puts emphasis on the immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine presence."

[1] In Dr. Starbuck's *The Psychology of Religion*, we find that while " there are evidences of both conscious self-direction and automatism in religion," and while a large proportion of cases are classed as " equal to unconscious," it is at the same time said that " without exception, the cases studied, no matter how suddenly the new life bursts forth, have antecedents in thought and action that appear to lead up directly to the phenomenon of conversion " ; that " there is not a single instance in which there have not been some antecedents in thought or action which may be regarded as the ' causes ' leading toward the awakening " (pp. 105, 106).

The subconscious is real and ministers to the conscious life ; but as far as the *person* is concerned it is, normally, the unconscious. It is not with the unconscious (or subconscious) in us that the Divine superconscious is related, but with that conscious (and self-conscious) element in man which makes him personal and is most distinctive of him. It is still true that "spirit with spirit can meet." Whether directly or through such *spiritual* mediation as can reach the consciousness—such as truth, right, love, Christ—God can communicate Himself to man according to his capacity and receptivity.

III.

On Dr. Sanday's theory the difference between Christ and ourselves is that He was wholly possessed by the Divine, while we are only partially so. This is very carefully stated and must be quoted. "The difference was not in the essence, nor yet in the mode or sphere, of the indwelling, but *in the relation of the indwelling to the Person.* And when I say the Person, I mean the whole Person—each several organ and faculty—but especially the central core of Personality, the inner, controlling and commanding Person. There are Divine influences at work within ourselves ; and these influences touch more lightly or less lightly upon the Person, but they do not *hold and possess* it as the Deity within Him *held and possessed* the Person of the incarnate Christ." (*Personality in Christ and in Ourselves*, p. 48.) This is most true as far as it goes. But the theory fails even to attempt to account for the *Person* who *could* be thus in the central core of His Personality, or, may we not say ? in the deepest and dominating principle of His being, wholly possessed by God, especially if we remember *what* God essentially *is*. We have no intelligible account

of "the Person of Christ"; neither of the human with its capacity for such a full possession by God, nor of that pre-existent Divine element which led to the affirmation "the Word became flesh." We have certainly the assertion that a Divine Being located His Deity in the subconscious region of the humanity of Jesus, but (waving the objections which may be taken to this from the use of spatial language) this Divine Being stands to all appearance apart from the human Personality save by certain uprushes into it. These are seemingly equivalent to other Divine communications to human persons; we do not seem to have *God* here, really incarnate. When in one of the finest portions of his book Dr. Sanday speaks of the subliminal consciousness of Jesus coming into play (*Christology and Personality*, p. 183), we can easily believe that it did so; but we cannot avoid asking *what* it was that could thus come into play. Dr. Sanday refers in illustration to a "reserve of power" in ordinary men, to "*latent* powers" that on great occasions assert themselves in them. "With Jesus these latent powers had throughout His life been more abundant and nearer at hand than with others"; they had given an extraordinary character to His ministry and had fed His consciousness as Messiah and as Son. He had made no parade of them; they were rather hidden away out of sight. "But now that the end was nigh—the Lord felt these latent powers, so steadily restrained and so sparingly used, surging up within Him, gathering all their forces for an outbreak, crowding, as it were, towards the exit and ready to burst out upon the world." But if these latent powers were impersonal, not to say subconscious, it is merely figurative language to speak of them, when the end was near, surging up like this. According to the theory, they were His own Divine powers which He, the human Jesus, had hitherto steadily restrained, but which were now allowed to burst

out on the world. But, according to the theory, it was precisely in these that the Deity, the Divine in Christ, resided. Yet it was the conscious Person, Jesus, who had restrained these Divine powers and now suffered them to burst forth. But, if so, His Deity could not have resided in the subconscious merely, but in His personal consciousness as well. The Divine in Him could not have been restrained by the human, the higher by the lower; there must have been all along in the Personality of Jesus the actually Divine. And the Divine in Him, in its highest, ethical form at least, was far from being "hidden away out of sight." It informed and inspired His whole conscious personal life, and shone on the world so that men saw "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." If, as the theory asserts, the subconscious was the *locus* of the Deity in Christ, which could be in general "restrained and sparingly used" by Him, and then at a particular time, of its own motion it would seem, burst into consciousness, it looks very like as if there were *two* Divine Persons, one acting in the personal Christ, and one located in the subconscious. This seems to follow indeed from the statement that, "just as in one of us the conscious self is but a small part of the true self," so was it with Jesus. Certainly, there are not two persons in us; but that which is said to have been located in the subconsciousness of Christ was the *Deity*, the Divine in Him. If the Deity in Him was not conscious, we seem to have simply a familiar, but an extreme, form of the *Kenosis* doctrine. And, if this "bursting forth" of the Divine was not conscious Divine action, wherein did it differ from the normal action of the subconscious rising up into the conscious? But it seems to be forgotten throughout that this normal subconscious belongs to every human person. It would belong to Jesus as human simply, and be definitely

organised and physically expressed. How, then, could it become the *locus* of a Divine Being coming from without ? If the Divine Being merely wrought through or by means of it, then we have simply God in this way influencing a human person, and we lose touch with the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation of the Eternal Son in Christ. If we suppose that the Divine took the place that the subconscious holds in ordinary human persons, we should have in this a new form of the Apollinarian doctrine. Perhaps I have misunderstood, and I should be extremely sorry to misrepresent ; but these considerations lead one to feel that we do not have on this theory any consistent or intelligible account of the Person of Christ, or of the real incarnation of God in Him. Perhaps the chief practical error is the making the distinction between Christ and ourselves consist only in the difference of degree of possession by God, without the recognition that there was something prior to this to be accounted for, something Divine which constituted the Person who was so possessed. "If," says Dr. Sanday, "if, or in so far as, the Holy Spirit may be said to dwell in our hearts, it was the same Holy Spirit who dwelt in Christ." This is undoubtedly true if we think of the human Christ or of the incarnate Person. But the Divine Person who *became* incarnate seems here to be lost sight of. We have no intelligible statement of that which the Church intended when it spoke of "the Incarnation of the Eternal Son," which, of course, Dr. Sanday holds in his own way. We seem here to get out of "the continuity of Christian thought." How real the departure from Christian doctrine may (unintentionally) become, appears from the statement on p. 48 of *Personality in Christ and Ourselves*, that, if the ideal which shone in Paul when he said "Christ liveth in me" could have been realised, as it never has been and never will be completely

realised, "we should say, not that there were two Gods, but that there were two Incarnations." Was there not a very real distinction between the Incarnation of God in Christ and the Incarnation of Christ in Paul, beyond and prior to that of difference of degree? Was there not something organically present in the Person of Christ—in the depths of His Personality, or conscious Being—which made Him such an Incarnation of God as rendered the spiritual incarnation of Christ in Paul possible? I think that Paul would have said there was.

IV.

I do not intend to repeat in this place that theory of the Incarnation of God in Christ which after long seeking brought satisfaction to my own mind and which I have advocated in various publications. I will only say that, when thinking on this subject, we need to remember that God is *Spirit* and that He is essentially *ethical* Spirit—a Being with an ethical character and content. The real incarnation of God must be (for one thing) the incarnation of the spirit and character that God is. God, above all, is *Life*, and His Life is Holy Love. We need to seek some intelligible conception of how this Eternal ethical Being can become clothed in human flesh—He Himself and not another. I can see no way by which such an *ethical* Being can express Himself in personal form in human flesh save through a process of spiritual self-impartation to humanity, which becomes summed up, "recapitulated," in a Person who enters the world as the ripened fruit of this Divine spiritual working; *which is at the same time* the full manifestation in human form, the Incarnation, of the Divine creative Thought and Word—the Eternal Son in God.

It is the *humanity* that must express the Divine; it

must be *a Divine humanity.* That which God *is* must be so wrought into it that it shall be such a real incarnation of God as shall manifest *God* to man, in so far, of course, as God can be manifested in human form. It cannot be the work of a moment, but the result of long-continued Divine working through the Spirit, handed on as an inheritance along one specially prepared line. Much of that inheritance may have lain in the realm of the subconscious, and there may have been quite normal "uprushes" therefrom into the consciousness. It is here that the doctrine of the subconscious may aid us. It may help us to understand how so much could be stored up in Jesus Christ and why such marvellous powers manifested themselves in one who was truly human. But the essentially *Divine* is the ethical, and this had been working itself into the line which culminated in the organism that was the basis of the Divine-human Personality of Christ. In that Personality He stood in the same direct relation to the transcendent God and Father as we all stand in ; but the Divine was in Him (God was in Him), wholly possessing Him, from the first, as it is not in us, at least in anything like the same measure. In the very principle of His incarnate Being, and in His conscious truly human life, He was so completely one with God, and God was continuously so incarnated in Him, that we behold in Him, not a God *and* a man, a Divine *and* a human Person, but *a Divine-human Person,* the God-man, or God as man. His *humanity* is Divine and *God* is in Him in human form. It was, I believe, in the entrance of this Divine-human Person into the world that that working of God in the Spirit—for us the Divine Superconscious—on and in man, to which the Old Testament bears witness (and in which its very meaning is contained) found its culmination and that the Eternal God as Son was incarnate on the earth. And it is therefore that from

Jesus Christ the Spirit of God (with which He is for ever one) goes forth to raise all men into that Divinely intended life of man as conceived in the highest sense in the image of God, destined to the inheritance of "the sons and heirs of God, joint heirs with Christ," among whom He stands forth, wholly human and wholly Divine, "the firstborn among many brethren."

W. L. Walker.

PERSONALITY AND GRACE.

VIII. Repentance.

Faith, as we have seen, is God's gift in the sense that God manifests Himself to us as worthy of trust, and thus enables us to believe for the only proper reason, which is that we discern it to be true. We have also seen that we disbelieve because we break the impress of the truth upon us by the manifold hypocrisies which, in the nature of the case, issue from all sin. In that case it might appear that our first task must be to consider the moral goodness of our lives. Can we be wrong in supposing that God will make plain His gracious relation to us according to our moral attainment ?

Our faith in the love of God manifestly rests on a belief in God's goodness in the moral sense. To believe that God is love means also to believe that love is God. But that means love as interpreted by conscience, not love as sentimental kindliness. To believe in God means to see love behind conscience and power behind love. When we start at the other end and try to interpret conscience by love and not love by conscience, we are sure to end in the mere idea of benignity which manifestly has no relation to life's actual facts.

A gracious relationship of God to us is wholly further concerned with promoting moral goodness in us. If we choose to call its aim our salvation, we should not understand anything else by salvation than moral attainment. We are saved when sin has no right over us, and when it can neither drive us nor tempt us.

Moral goodness, moreover, is as much the outcome of faith as the ground of it. The proof that we believe in anything is our willingness to venture upon what we believe.

Faith in the love of God is faith in all we can discern of His holiness. Wherefore, willingness to follow the demands of God's holiness is one with faith in His love. It is not a consequence of faith only. It is the very essence of faith to trust our life to what we believe.

That situation is in no way altered by the succour of our faith through Jesus Christ. We must believe in Him because of what He stood for, and it is a mockery to say we believe in that, while we would not stand for it ourselves, but seek to safeguard our lives by every other possession and device. Wherefore, to call Jesus Saviour is in the same breath to call Him Lord.

But here we meet another of the antinomies of grace. Though grace is wholly concerned with moral goodness, it does not depend on how moral a man is. That is the antinomy which Phariseeism in all ages has failed to grasp. What a gracious relationship to God requires is moral sincerity not moral attainment. Though moral attainment is its sole object, to make it its condition is its supreme hindrance.

To have in any degree a right relation to God is to see how utterly vain it would be to make our own goodness the ground of it, or even any part of the ground.

Yet, we are not to conclude, as is too common, that we ought forthwith to work up a sense of being miserable sinners. That is one of the corners around which spiritual pride plays hide and seek with us. Our self-acquired moral abasement presents itself to us as one of our greatest and most meritorious moral attainments.

To deprecate any hold we have on truth, to make light of any self-discipline we have won, to undervalue any capacity we have for moral tasks is false humility. Jesus did not repudiate any standard He had set up when, looking upon the young ruler who had kept the command-

ments from his youth, He loved him. The requirement of grace is moral sincerity, and towards that we cannot advance by trying to persuade ourselves to think ourselves other than we see we are.

What is required for moral sincerity is not a different estimate of our moral attainments, but a different estimate of ourselves in respect of them. That also must be the estimate of simple truth. And truth makes but one demand. We must take off the spectacles of hypocrisy by which we see our privileges as if they were our merit. Truth reminds us that on the contrary privilege has its exact equivalent in responsibility, and in the eyes of God who gave it is, except the responsibility be exactly discharged, demerit.

That truth is obvious, yet the moment we genuinely accept it, all our conventional moral judgments are overthrown and, above everything else, our judgment of ourselves. What we took to be our virtue turns out to be the goodness and longsuffering of God which has had to shield us from ourselves and to hedge us in with what has been for the most part ill-used blessings. Instead of being our moral attainments, the moral attainments they have made possible have nearly all gone astray under our care, so that the very idea of merit in connexion with them is a vast self-delusion. Nor do we merely fail to use these gifts. They are always sooner or later positively misused. Instead of employing the goodness of God for its proper end of making us more sensitive to God's judgment upon us, we use our privileges to create for ourselves an armour of self-esteem which will ward it off.

The language about being poor and miserable and blind and naked may still not come naturally to our lips, but it will not appear much of an exaggeration when we see how our good opinion of ourselves has been formed in a world of quite perverted moral issues in which we have turned the

very privileges which are our chief condemnation into our merit. It is an unreal world in which our own consciousness of truth, our own conscience of right and our own sense of responsibility have had no chance of any straight speech with us, and in which we divert attention from our true character which constantly resists the truth in unrighteousness, to the outward respectabilities which we can only esteem through the reflected opinions of others who cannot see our hearts.

Outside of that unreal world there is no need to exaggerate our sins and shortcomings in order to realise the vanity and folly of producing our own goodness as the basis of our relation to God, and to discover that there never can be any good news of God which is not preached to the poor, preached simply to man's need. Hence to repent is nothing less than to lay ourselves open to the whole judgment of reality upon us and so to see ourselves as we really are. It is to see ourselves apart from the medium of that hypocrisy which so refracts our vision that we esteem our privileges, which are merely responsibilities and the misuse of which is our demerit, as in themselves making us worthy of moral approval.

Without that repentance, faith cannot be belief in face of all reality, especially moral reality. Yet to speak of repentance merely as the necessary condition of faith would mislead. It is not a preliminary to faith but an integral part of it. A gracious relation to God is as necessary for true penitence, as true penitence is for a gracious relation to God. "Repent and believe" does not mean repent first and then believe. In the real movements of the moral personality there is no such before and after. They are necessary, each to each. No man can lay himself open to reality without faith and no one can have faith without laying himself open to reality.

It is that living union of repentance and faith which finds itself succoured in Jesus Christ.

Whether He was without sin is a universal negative only omniscience could prove beyond cavil. Whether He had no limitation in His moral interest, no lack of devotion to tasks which vitally concern other ages than His own, is also a universal negative which will always be at the mercy of private judgment. But this positive effect of His life is not dubious, and, moreover, it is not past. Wheresoever men meet Him, in scripture or in His true followers, moral judgments have to be revised. Conventional moral judgments fail, and our responsibilities rise clearly out of our privileges. Moral compromises also fail, and our amazing moral baseness is only equalled by our amazing moral possibilities. As when the prophet saw God in His temple, men realise that they are of unclean lips and dwell amid a people of unclean lips. Nor does He merely demand it as moral effort preparatory for entering the temple. It comes to them precisely because He is the temple of God's presence, so that penitence and the vision of God are one inseparable experience. With whatsoever critical question of text or narrative, that effect abides, and not always least with those who most realise intellectual difficulties. Nor is it least with those whose relation to Him has no formal, ecclesiastical expression. Nothing is more certain in history than His influence throughout the ages in making men estimate themselves with true humility by the simple process of bringing them up against heart-searching moral realities. Where that effect fails, they have not laid themselves open to His influence, even though, according to all the orthodoxies, they may have believed in Him, and, according to all the traditions, been counted His followers and called by His name.

JOHN OMAN.

TWO WORDS IN GALATIANS.

κατεγνωσμένος.

On *κατεγνωσμένος* (Gal. ii. 11) Lightfoot says, "The condemnation spoken of is not the verdict of the bystanders, but the verdict of the act itself"; and he adduces parallels (Rom. xiv. 23, John iii. 18, Barnabas 10). Farrar translates "Because he was a condemned man," and explains in a note "manifestly and flagrantly in the wrong."

In spite of Lightfoot's pertinent quotations, the verse would, I think, be felt to run easier if we could get rid of the idea of condemnation. Cyril Alex. seems to have done so, from the following words of a comment on Exodus xxii. 2. (*De Adoratione*, Book viii. ad init.), *ὥστε κἂν εἰ γένοιτο ἐν αὐτῷ τεθνάναι τῷ κλέπτειν τὸν ἐπὶ τῷδε κατεγνωσμένον οὐδένα τοῖς ἀνηρηκόσι προστρίβεσθαι μῶμον*, i.e., he uses *κατεγν.* for "manifestly and flagrantly in the wrong"; for in such a passage a metaphor from condemnation would be very improbable. *Condemn*, to judge from the instances here given, would err by excess as including the pronouncing of sentence as well as verdict, by defect as wanting the feeling of *γινώσκειν* apparent in them.

Here are passages from Chrysostom on Matthew.

Hom. 28 (The Storm on the Lake): *διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ παρόντων τῶν ὄχλων τοῦτο ποιεῖ ὥστε μὴ καταγνωσθῆναι ὀλιγοπιστίας* (that they might not be seen to be guilty of want of faith).

Hom. 61 (The Unmerciful Servant): *προσέπεσε καὶ παρεκάλεσε καὶ κατέγνω τῶν οἰκείων ἁμαρτημάτων* (saw the wrong of his own sins) *καὶ ἔγνω τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ ὀφλήματος. Δύο τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ζητεῖ καὶ καταγινώσκειν* (recognise the evil) *ἡμᾶς τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ ἑτέροις ἀφιέναι.*

Hom. 68 (The wicked Husbandmen): *ἵνα ἐκ τῶν εἰς*

ἐκείνους [*τοὺς δούλους*] *γενομένων καταγνόντες ἑαυτῶν* (coming to a sense of their blameworthiness) . . . *ἐκεῖνον ἐντραπῶσιν ἐλθόντα.*

The Vulgate connects with *reprehendo;* Galatians ii. 11, "Quia reprehensibilis erat"; 1 John iii. 20–21, "Si reprehenderit nos cor nostrum." Westcott adds as Augustine's rendering, "male senserit," and distinguishes "from the formal sentence of the judge (*κατακρίνω*)."

Liddell and Scott give as a classical use "*to remark, discover*, especially something *to one's prejudice.*"

δικαιοῦσθαι.

The use of *δικαιοῦσθαι* in the sense of *δικαιοσύνην ποιεῖν* (epistle from Vienne and Lyons A.D. 177 ap. Euseb. *H. E.*, V. i. 53, and Rev. xxii. 11 T. R.), or something near that, may be applied to its occurrence in Galatians. This is not a forensic use.[1] Forensic justification so called is the change from guilt to non-guiltiness. It initiates a new state, after entrance into which forensic justification ceases to act. But the justification of the idiom in question is the continued habitual energy of the justified state already come into being. It moves not from guilt to innocence but at most from innocence to righteousness, or from righteousness of character to righteousness of act.

The justification of the law was not forensic. The law provided no method of absolution, the sin offering being outside the question. It did not transfer from darkness to light. It pointed out a path of light, and those were just

[1] May I refer to Expositor, Dec., 1910, p. 490, giving as examples Gen. xxxviii. 26; Sir. xviii. 22; xxvi. 29; xxxiv. 5; Isa. xlv. 25; also Job x. 15 (Aquila) *καὶ δικαιωθεὶς* (וצדקתי, LXX *ἐὰν ὦ δικαιὸς*) *οὐκ ἀρῶ κεφαλήν*: Job xxii. 3 (Symmachus) *μὴ χρήζει Ἱκανὸς ἵνα δικαιωθῇς* (כי תצדק, LXX *ἐὰν σὺ ἦσθα τοῖς ἔργοις ἄμεμπτος*): Clem. Rom 30, *ἔργοις δικαιούμενοι καὶ μὴ λόγοις*, showing your righteousness by works and not words. Cf. use of *ὁσιοῦσθαι* Ps. xvii. 26, and of *πιστοῦσθαι* Ps. lxxvii. 8, 37; Sir. xxvii. 17; xxix. 3.

who kept to it; but one false step plunged the transgressor into the dark, and the law could only aggravate the error by showing the hopelessness of restoration.

The Galatians do not appear to have been in search of forensic justification. They had begun well. There is no reason to think them uneasy about that. The justification of faith had done its transitional work. What is in debate is the form the righteousness of the established Christian should take.

St. Peter's action makes this clear. He was not seeking the initial justification by his conduct at Antioch, but to exhibit a life of legal righteousness.

To go through the passages in the Epistle :—

ii. 16, *εἰδότες ὅτι οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου.* "Knowing that a man does not attain righteousness (each moment of life and action) from the works of the law."

ἐπιστεύσαμεν ἵνα δικαιωθῶμεν ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ. "We believed in order to practise righteousness from the faith of Christ.

17. *εἰ δὲ ζητοῦντες δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ εὑρέθημεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτωλοί.*

How could it be any discovery that we were sinners if we were seeking forensic justification? How could there be any "if" about it?

20. As a contrast to legal justification, St. Paul dwells on his continued life in Christ, not on Christ's rescue of him from guilt.

21. *δικαιοσύνη* a permanent energy.

iii. 11. As in ii. 20, continued life.

iii. 24. *ὁ νόμος παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῶν γέγονεν εἰς Χριστὸν ἵνα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῶμεν.*

Forensic justification is not an end; it is only a door to a region beyond. We should expect rather an eternal state in contrast with the temporary law (Rev. xxii. 11).

v. 4. *οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοῦσθε.* The life of legal righteousness.

6. In contrast, *πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη.* The life of Christian righteousness.

22, 23. The same life of righteousness shown in *ὁ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος.*

St. Paul in Galatians is occupying, so to say, exactly the same stronghold as St. James, only facing an attack from a different direction. There is here no disparagement of works generally, only of works of the law and of the flesh. With both Apostles a living faith includes everything, for that must be a working faith. St. Paul does not use the expression "justified by works," perhaps avoids it intentionally; but he could not reject it, for to the justification he is speaking of in Galatians works are essential, though he prefers to call them fruit, and when he is speaking of faith as inevitably thinks of it in action, as we associate practice with a man's patience, gentleness, temperance. In Romans there is disparagement of works, for his great argument there is concerned with the initial justification, in which works have no place.

St. Paul was, no doubt, in this Epistle thinking most prominently of the Jewish Law; but it is not necessary for the above argument to restrict the meaning of law. It would cover any rule of morality disconnected from the personal object of faith.

F. W. Mozley.

THE UNCONSUMED PEOPLE.

Last year Maurice Fishberg, Fellow of the New York Academy of Sciences, wrote an interesting book [1] in which he presents a great many observations to show that his people, the Jews, are not, and never were, a pure race, and to explain what he calls "our optimism as regards the ultimate obliteration of all distinctions between Jews and Christians in Europe and America." In the ninth *Encyclopædia Britannica* Wellhausen concluded his article on *Hebrew Religion* by endorsing the prediction of Spinoza that "the so-called emancipation of the Jews must inevitably lead to the extinction of Judaism wherever the process is extended beyond the political to the social sphere"; but he cheapened Spinoza's prophecy by adding, "For the accomplishment of this centuries may be required."

Whatever is to be or not to be in after centuries, in the past the Jew has a distinct and inextinguishable place; he is a fact to-day; and from him the world has received the Book which reveals the secret and the source of all the life that lives, and that can live on. It was a good reply that was given to Frederick the Great by one of his godly generals when the monarch asked for an argument in a single word to prove his Bible true, and the veteran answered, "The Jews, Sire."

Dr. Salaman has a recent article on *Heredity and the Jew* [2] in which he studies "the facial expression" of his race in relation to Mendelism. He points out that what is readily recognisable in the Assyrian and Egyptian sculptures and drawings in the centuries B.C., and in a sketch caricature of a Jew in the Essex Forest Roll of 1277 A.D., is still so

[1] *The Jews—a Study of Race and Environment.*
[2] The *Eugenics* Review, iii. p. 187.

marked as to make it "quite easy to distinguish merely on sight as much as 80 per cent. of the Jews one meets," say in London or Berlin. In one of the galleries of the Exhibition of 1862, I forgathered with the venerable Dr. Keith, who then and there, in the world's momentarily biggest palace, entertained me to an hour's disquisition on unfulfilled prophecy. He told me that on some occasion when observing the coats of arms on a line of carriages he was specially attracted to one which bore on the panel the motto "FUIMUS—ERIMUS." Looking at the occupants he saw they were Jews with the characteristic facial expression of the long-enduring race.

The Jew still has his place, then, under the sun. In round numbers he stands for 12 of the 1500 millions of the world's population. But sample any outstanding group of the world's inhabitants, and the proportion changes. Of the enterprising company who set out to stride across the Atlantic on the ill-fated *Titanic* more than one in six were Jews ; and among them were notably displayed the heroism and the human affection that claimed our admiration and our sympathy. In the progressive capital of the New World every fourth or fifth man is of this old Oriental stock. It is said that there are 3,000 Jews among the lawyers in New York and 1,000 among the physicians; and that of the young women under training for the profession of teachers 75 per cent. are Jewesses. When men of other races are transplanted to America they become Americans, perhaps retaining an adjectival indication of the country whence they came. They are French, Italian, Dutch, British or other variety of Americans. The Jew in any place, amongst any people, however his complexion or his condition may change, is always a substantive. The Russian or German Jew who has crossed the Atlantic is not a Jewish American, he is what he always was, only with

another national adjective—he is an American Jew. His tendency to rise is seen everywhere. Numbering about 1 in 200 of our population he numbers 2 in 100 in our House of Commons, 1 in 15 on the front Bench there, and 1 in 10 in His Majesty's Cabinet. A recent column in the daily paper[1] gives names of 120 millionaires who died during the last twenty years. I gather that at least 1 in 8 of these were Jews. In Berlin the 5 per cent. of the Jewish members of the Community pay 30 per cent. of the City taxes. They are six times wealthier than their fellow-citizens. For they have ever the bargaining faculty—perhaps hereditary from the ancestor who crossed the Jordan as a youth with only a staff in his hand and recrossed it in later years with a millionaire-like fortune picked up from among the feet of his more careless cousins in Padan Aram—faculty that sets the sons of Jacob in the front rank of the world's financiers. And they have the power not only of the purse, but of the press. So much so that Drummont, doubtless with something of the exaggeration of a bitter anti-Semite, maintained that it was the provocative articles on one side and the other written by Jews in French and German journals respectively that hounded on the fire-eaters of the two nations to engage in the Franco-German war, which brought disaster to the second Empire of France, and led to the passing of millions of money from one country to the other largely through Jewish hands. It is interesting to note that when Romain Rolland brings his *John Christopher* to Paris he lets him learn various things about the Jews. Thus, e.g., "They have many faults: but they have one great quality—perhaps the greatest of all: they are alive and human: nothing human is foreign to them, and they are interested in every living being. . . . They are an

[1] The *Scotsman*, June 7, 1912.

active balm in society, the very leaven of life." Again, "Look at the activity of the Jews in every kind of way: commerce, industry, education, science, philanthropy, art. . . . It is all very well for us to criticise and make fun of the Jews, and speak ill of them. We can't do without them." And again, "The Jews in Europe to-day are the most active and living agents of good and evil. If we were so unfortunate as to have the Jews driven from Europe, we should be left so poor in intelligence and power for action that we should be in danger of utter bankruptcy." How can any one anticipate with complacency the extinction of a people of whom such things can be said?

We have seen that this People, who during the currency of their national life knew themselves to be the people of God, bequeathed to the world in the hour of their national death the Bible containing the Old and New Testaments. If we approach the Book of books "as little children"—and it opens the door of its Kingdom to no others—its first verse will introduce us to God at His creation work in the beginning, and its last verse will leave us engraced in His beloved Son. It will tell us how we all came to be in need of "the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ" in a world on which, when God had set man in His own likeness to rule it, the Creator's eye looked with satisfaction, while the Creator's word pronounced it to be "very good." It shows us a subtle, specious, snaky creature insinuating itself into the innocence of the earliest pair, murder in its heart and deceit in its tongue, persuading them to doubt the divine goodness, and to dare the divine judgment, till God had to put enmity between him and the mother of the race, and between his seed and her seed, which in the end should crush him. The Book is the story of the long-drawn-out conflict between the obedient, self-sacrificing saviour-seed and the deceitful, destructive, serpent-seed, till

in the end Grace reigns and the " great dragon . . . that old serpent " with his various aliases is led out in the last pages to his judgment and his final doom. The firstborn of the human race is a pattern of his seed. Cain slew his more righteous brother and said he knew nothing about him. He left also for a motto, to all who should go in his way down the road that grew broad and broader, " I'm not my brother's keeper."

He has many names in Scripture—this being [1] concerning whom St. Paul says, " The *god of this world* hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine into them," and whom in another place he calls " The *prince of the power of the air*, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience." " The prince of the world," as Jesus named him again and again, knew that his Overcomer was to take on the seed of Abraham, and did his evil utmost to destroy the chosen people. We find one of his earliest attempts at their destruction just in the hour when they were being born on the wilderness side of the Red Sea into their infant life as a nation. The same who in a later day entered into Judas and led him from the supper-table to the betrayal in Gethsemane, entered then into the Amalekite chief who led his bands to fight with Israel in Rephidim. But that Moses' hands were held up till sundown while on the hill-top he wrestled against spiritual wickedness in high places, it would have gone ill with the people for whom Joshua wrestled against flesh and blood in the valley. For when Moses let down his hand Amalek prevailed; and had Joshua failed to discomfit Amalek, Amalek had made

[1] It is noteworthy that leaders of Science who have lifted their heads above the mists of materialism that clouded the close of last century —like Dr. Alfred Russell Wallace in Zoology, and Sir Oliver Lodge and Sir William Barrett in Physics—have recognised that there is room for spirit agency in the works of creative evolution and providence.

an end of Israel. "And the LORD said unto Moses, Write this for a memorial in a book, and rehearse it in the ears of Joshua: for I will utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven. And Moses built an altar and called the name of it Jehovah-Nissi: For he said, Because the LORD hath sworn that the LORD will have war with Amalek from generation to generation." When they were finally prepared to enter into possession of Canaan, the people were reminded (Deut. xxv. 17–19) how Amalek, who feared not God and went in the way of Cain, had attempted their destruction; and they were commanded to "blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven; thou shalt not forget it."

The power attained by Amalek in Northern Arabia and Southern Palestine is attested in the Book of Numbers. The thirteenth chapter shows them heading the tribes that struck dismay into the spies who discouraged Israel from entering the Promised Land. In the fourteenth, we find that when the Israelites presumed to go up without the leadership of Jehovah, "The Amalekites came down and the Canaanites which dwelt in that hill and smote them and discomfited them, even unto Hormah." Forty years later their chief under the title of Agag (the Flame, the Fiery or Splendid, the Violent, the Powerful, the Vehement or Angry, as it is variously interpreted) is presented as the head of a kingdom, the highest that Balaam could see on his horizon when he had to foretell the future glory of Israel and say, "His kingdom shall be higher than Agag." And this strange prophet also said of Amalek, whom he called "the first of the nations," "his latter end shall be that he perish for ever."

Generations passed and the desert wanderers became a kingdom. The LORD bade Samuel say to their first king, "I remember that which Amalek did to Israel, how he laid

wait for him in the way, when he came up from Egypt. Now go and smite Amalek and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not." Saul's failure to carry out the divine decree lost him his crown. He took it upon himself to spare the king and much else that he had been commanded to destroy. The fawning ways and specious words of this Agag, however, were lost on the sage old prophet who had the mind of God. Samuel exposed the tiger-heart of the man whose sword had made women childless, and hewed him in pieces before the LORD. It is with a kind of poetic justice that the faithless Saul is reported to have received his death-stroke at the hand of a member of the race he had spared. So, at least, the prowler who on the stricken field of Gilboa despoiled the dead monarch of his crown and bracelets declared when he brought these to David and said, "I am the son of a stranger, an Amalekite" (2 Sam. i. 13).

The enmity of the tribe that Saul failed to exterminate is seen in later days. A psalm of Asaph—the 83rd—appeals to God for help against His enemies. They had taken crafty counsel against His people and said, "Come and let us cut them off from being a nation, that the name of Israel may be no more in remembrance." This was the traditional Agagite ambition, and Amalek has his place in this confederacy of "that old serpent" who never wearied seeking occasion for the destruction of the people from out of which his own Destroyer was to arise.

In the days of Ahasuerus, the ruler of the world from India to Ethiopia, the devourer all but gained his end; and still through the agency of an Amalekite. With the sleek plausibility of his kind, Haman, the son of Hammedatha the Agagite, had wormed himself into the favour of the great king, till he set him above all the princes of his world-wide realm and commanded all his servants in the king's gate to do him

reverence. Among these was a true Israelite who had too much reverence for the word of God to let him bow to an Agagite. Haman, swelled with pride at the friendship of the king and the fawning of the crowd, could not brook that a Jew should treat him as though he were a nobody. Full of wrath he thought scorn to lay hands on Mordecai alone. He determined in the evil heart of him to destroy all the Jews throughout the whole kingdom of Ahasuerus. Like others who have sold themselves to wickedness he was superstitious to a degree, and for days and months kept casting lots until he could find a lucky date for carrying out his devilish design. Mordecai the while possessed his soul in patience, having known from his childhood that "The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the LORD." The fateful Purim time at last had come. Haman obtained the king's decree for the wholesale slaughter of "all Jews, both young and old, little children and women, in one day." The knives of the slayers were ready sharpened, and their keenness to slay was whetted by the license given to take the spoil of the slain for a prey. The posts carrying the decree had gone out, hastened by the king's commandment; and the king and Haman sat down to drink, and the prince of the world was gleeful. But the king had a sleepless night; and judgment fell not on Mordecai and the Jews, but on their enemy and adversary "this wicked Haman."

The book that bears fair Esther's name tells the story of the deliverance and the retribution. Of the tribe of Benjamin, as was Saul the king, she was of the mind of another Benjamite, the Saul who is also called Paul, and who said, "I could wish myself accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh: who are Israelites, to whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises; whose are the fathers, and of whom as concerning

the flesh Christ came." The Saviour of the world had not yet come in Esther's time. But surely it was His Spirit that led her to stand between her race and impending doom when she said to Mordecai, "I will go in unto the king, which is not according to the law; and if I perish, I perish." This queenly soul has sometimes been apologised for and sometimes blamed because she had Haman hung on the gallows he had prepared for Mordecai, and with him his ten sons. She needs no apology: and no one may criticise her who has not been like her a self-sacrificing saviour. The Bible that discrowns Saul for letting Agag live, crowns Esther for sending these Agagites to execution. The stalwart king had softly yielded to Agag's blandishments and in sparing his enemy disobeyed his God: this trembling but true-hearted queen in her obedience simply carried out God's ancient Exodus decree for the extermination of that old-serpent-brood.

Amalek and his enmity thus came to their end. Israel lived, to love on. "The bush burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed." In the fullness of time the long-foretold seed of the woman appeared in Bethlehem, and wise men came to royal David's birthplace to see the young child that was "born King of the Jews." Not to stop at the attempt of the primeval enemy to take the life of the infant Messiah with Herod as his tool, and later to deflect Christ after His baptism from the path of obedience and suffering, if we look at the title on the Cross where the wicked one seemed to have at last triumphed we read, "The King of the Jews." Born King of the Jews, he died King of the Jews. And yet—the tragedy of it! it was at the demand of His own despising and rejecting people that Pilate hung Him there. In agreeing to the sentence of their chief priest that it was expedient that He should die that the nation might not perish, they sealed their own death warrant as a nation. The apostolic company to whom He showed Himself alive after His

resurrection called their fellow-countrymen with a clear and winning call to submit to Him, whom the God of their fathers had " exalted with His right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour for to give repentance to Israel and forgiveness of sins." The nation heard the call and was given space for repentance, but all in vain. They did not know the time of their visitation. They used the opportunity to persecute and kill the servants as they had persecuted and killed the Master. Till, when the cup of their inquity was full, the Romans, with the eagle flight of which their Moses had forewarned them, gathered round the walls of Jerusalem and laid them in the dust. Jews live on, as we see. But the people, as a people, is clothed like Lazarus with a winding-sheet. The nation, as a nation, is dead and buried among other nationalities all round the world. The majority of them have not yet given their King a chance to woo their love and win their allegiance. They still look for another. Some of them apostatise to become Moslems, as in Turkey, or nominal Christians, as in Germany, for the sake of position among the people with whom they sojourn. So Heine submitted to Christian baptism that he might be free to practise law, and went home from the desecrated sacrament to curse the Jew he saw in his looking-glass. Yet the Jews are more " naturally Christian " than any other people,[1] and many of them in all the centuries have become faithful followers of the once dead but evermore living Christ. Abraham, father of the faithful from among all the nations, was glad as he looked forward to see Christ's day ; and those of his seed according to the flesh, who are also his children by faith, look back to that day and are sharers of Abra-

[1] *Trusting and Toiling*, Nov. 1910, tells us that according to De Le Roy 72,740 Jews were baptized in Evangelical churches during last century, giving a proportion of 1 protestant convert from among 150 Jews; while the converts in other mission fields numbered only 1 from among 525 of various races and religions.

ham's joy. The living Church of Christ which is His body has never failed to count among its members a notable contingent from among His unforsaken Israel.

Now the Holy Spirit who came at Pentecost to convince the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment, has three witnesses to whom He can make appeal: (1) the Living Church: (2) the Living Book: (3) the Unconsumed People which in dying as a nation yielded up Church and Book to mankind. (1) The adversary of our race tried to crush out the life of the infant Church by martyrdoms upon martyrdoms, by the stones of the men who laid their clothes at the feet of young Saul of Tarsus, by the sword of a second Herod, by the fires of Nero, and the lions of other rulers of the world. (2) He consigned the Scriptures with them to destruction. (3) In the same fashion he dealt with the unwilling witness—the Jew. History tells us that Titus did not cease his deadly work till two-thirds of the Jewish people had been slaughtered. The Church grew apace; the Scriptures became more widely read; the Jews multiplied wherever they were scattered abroad.

Next, when pagan Rome had ceased to destroy, papal Rome was used in a more subtle way. (1) A hierarchy took the dominance of the Church, and priestcraft in Christ's name sought even to control the world. (2) The Bible could only be read at the will of a priest and according to his interpretation. Christ was left in the clouds, while men with little of His mind lorded it over His humble followers. (3) In these dark ages the Jew met something like a similar fate. Set as a subject of obloquy to other men he was shut off as far as might be and confined to the Ghetto, a creature to be if possible lost sight of and forgotten. The darkness began to pass away, when to a young German as he read the Bible chained to a pillar in his monastery, there shined in his heart "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." Martin Luther broke the bonds of priest-

craft, restored to Christ's poor something of their heritage, and put in their hands their title-deeds by giving them the Scriptures in the tongue of the common people. And betimes the gates of the Ghetto opened, and it became possible for the Jew to come out and mix on human terms with the onward moving races of the world.

And what can the wiles of man's enemy do now ? (1) As regards the living Church he sets preachers in her pulpits to proclaim that all men are sons of God and may, without any new birth, only by exercise of their own freewill and energy, become Christs, like Him who taught us to say," Our Father which art in Heaven." (2) As to the Bible, it is to multitudes but as a book like other books to be taken up and dealt with or laid away according to their liking. So we may see a man of learning choose some sayings of Jesus that it pleases him to count alone authentic, and set them down like ninepins for others to bowl over. (3) And as to the Jew—he also is to the blinded just a man among other men, a negligible quantity among the mass of humanity, and doomed to disappear. Yet the Jew as he is, and always has been, and will always be, fits to the open-eyed reader of the Bible like lock and key ; and I don't know what a Christian who expects the extinction of the Jews ere Christ's return can reply to the American Jew [1] who maintains that " had the Jews perished or been absorbed, the Christian's strongest proof of the authenticity of the Bible and the existence of his Saviour would have been lost."

The secret of the persistence of the Jews through the long generations is given in the words of the last of their Old Testament prophets when he says (Malachi iii. 6), " I am the LORD, I change not ; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed."

A. R. SIMPSON.

[1] Weinstock, *Jesus the Jew*, p. 33.

STUDIES IN CONVERSION.

VII.

Tholuck.

The Germans, being an intellectual people, are fond of tracing the revival of religion which visited their country, as it did the other Protestant communities throughout the world, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to Schleiermacher, the philosopher and theologian, who is looked upon by his fellow-countrymen as a second Luther and to whom all the schools of modern theology trace back their origin. But a close study of the facts will reveal that the revival, in the practical sphere, was due to older causes and humbler instrumentalities; and, whilst the influence of Schleiermacher was of inestimable value to many who had participated in the awakening, there is another name more deserving to be associated with the origination of the movement itself—that of Tholuck. The latter was in much more pronounced sympathy with the general European awakening; he was much more in contact with the men of the revival in other countries; his beliefs and experiences were much more those of average Evangelicalism; and he was animated, in a supreme degree, with the peculiar passion of the revival —that for winning souls. There is no parallel to his efforts in this direction amongst students, unless it be found in the evangelistic work of Professor Drummond in our own time among the students of the University of Edinburgh.

For a generation Tholuck was, in the public eye, the protagonist of the Awakening in Germany. When, in 1826, at the age of seven-and-twenty, he went as Professor to Halle, which was at that time the stronghold of Rationalism, a protest was made against his appointment by the members

of the theological faculty ; his windows were smashed by the students ; and many other marks of opposition fell to his lot. But such attacks proved a false move on the part of his antagonists, only serving to draw attention to him ; for he was a strong man, quite capable of standing a storm ; and he lived to see his cause triumphant. The Old Rationalism, as it was called, sank into contempt ; and Halle became the stronghold of Evangelicalism among the universities of Germany. One in the position of a theological professor requires, however, to justify himself by more than earnestness, if he is the mouthpiece of any cause ; for he is surrounded not only by students, who are always sensitive to the rumours of fame, but by professors who are able to point out any weaknesses in a colleague's armour. Tholuck was favoured with plenty of this kind of discipline, some of his Rationalistic colleagues being men of great ability as well as of European reputation, who did not spare his earliest efforts at authorship. But he had good humour enough to profit by such corrections ; and his books, which poured in rapid succession from the press, were always improving in ability and learning ; till he came, in course of time, to be acknowledged as the principal ornament of the University. On the occasion of his jubilee, in 1870, the King of Prussia sent him the Star of the Golden Eagle, and addresses of congratulation poured in on him not only from his native country but from many foreign lands.

The chief reason for mentioning him here is, that among his earliest books was one containing an account of his own conversion. This was thrown into an imaginative form, the story being told in letters supposed to have passed between two students, when they were in the throes of a religious crisis ; but it was substantially a record of his own experience. It was written in the glow of first love, and it is one of the most remarkable accounts of conversion ever

penned. The mind of the young author was stored not only with classical lore, but with the treasures of Oriental literature, in which he possessed rare proficiency, and he poured into his book all these materials, fused in the fire of religious passion. He has a great gift of style, and passages abound which are instinct with poetry and eloquence.

The title originally given to this production was *Guido and Julius*, these being the names of the imaginary correspondents, but, in subsequent editions, it was issued also under two other titles—*The True Consecration of the Doubter*, the reference here being to a Rationalistic book by De Wette, entitled *The Consecration of the Doubter*, and *The Doctrine of Sin*, the consciousness of sin being the decisive factor in the experience of the characters. Even yet it is as moving a book as a student can take into his hand ; but it is difficult now to realise the impression it made on a generation to which the ideas it embodies were startling novelties. Of it the author says himself : " I have not derived the same pleasure from any of my other writings ; and there have been many, even in distant lands, who have acknowledged that they could look back upon the reading of this book as the turning-point in their lives." The veil thrown over facts and personalities in this religious romance can be nearly altogether removed by turning to the Life of Tholuck, in two volumes, by his friend and disciple, Professor Leopold Witte ; and, in fashioning the following picture, the present writer is able to avail himself of notes, made at the time, of conversations with which the distinguished scholar, in his extreme old age, was good enough to honour him.

Friedrich August Gotttreu Tholuck was born at Breslau, the capital of Prussian Silesia, in 1799 ; and his boyhood and youth were spent among the religious influences which it was to be his lifework to denounce and counteract. Here is his own account of the kind of religion in which he was

educated. "The director of the gymnasium, an old man, honoured the pineal gland as the seat of the spirit, and had often discussed the question, whether it would not have been better if the Creator had given man a third hand or a third foot in place of a heart. He had to teach religion; and day by day, without remorse, he hauled into the classroom the skeleton of it, which he had constructed, and rattled the bones, till the pupils shuddered. The other masters were no better: they were linguists without one living word in their entire vocabulary. The preachers of the town were some of them orthodox, others neologian; but both kinds were feeble and insipid. All they had of religion consisted of cold lava collected from other people's volcanoes."

In his later life he used to narrate innumerable anecdotes illustrative of the beggarly and bankrupt state into which the mind and heart of Germany had been brought by the dominance of Rationalism, and he has left behind him books from which the most graphic picture may be obtained of what Rationalism actually was. It was the counterpart of what, in England, in the eighteenth century, was called Latitudinarianism and in Scotland is remembered as Moderatism. It was a form of Christianity with all that is distinctively Christian left out; it was a religion taught by men in whose life the conspicuous thing was the absence of religion; it boasted of its morality, but, under its influence, the life of the people became sordid, pagan and profane. In Germany Rationalism had the same character, but it was much more unorthodox than its counterparts in this country ever ventured to be. The students were taught from the professor's chair that the Widow's Son at Nain was not really dead, but that Jesus, chancing to meet the funeral procession at a moment when signs of life were visible in the apparently dead body, took advantage of this circumstance to effect what was considered a resurrection; that the Feed-

ing of the Five Thousand was due to the good example of Jesus, who opened His basket of provisions, and thus induced others likewise to assist their neighbours, till all were satisfied—and so on , the miracles of our Lord being one and all reduced to mere natural events. Jesus Himself was a good man and a great teacher—only somewhat enthusiastic and extravagant.

When Tholuck went to Halle, there were seven hundred theological students, but only five of these believed in the divinity of Christ : one of the five, he told me, was George Müller, afterwards so famous for his Orphan Homes at Bristol. For some years, as often as in his lectures the young professor referred to the deity of Christ, the students tried to ruff him down, until one day a big, brawny student put a stop to the practice by leaping up and, in terms the reverse of parliamentary, intimating that anyone who dared thus to interrupt again would have to answer to him.

These incidents of his subsequent life will convey some notion of the religious atmosphere in which he was brought up at Breslau. In his home there was nothing fitted to counteract the general impression ; for his parents, though they went regularly to church, had no religion beyond what was formal. He remembered, indeed, seeing in his early days one humble figure from which true religion had looked forth on him now and then : this was a Moravian Brother, who was employed occasionally in menial work about his father's house. But his parents laughed at the child of God, turning his warnings and prayers into ridicule, and the boy too easily followed their example. At school he developed an extraordinary passion for languages ; and, by the time he was sixteen years of age, he had mastered about a score of these. It was especially with the tongues of the Orient that he occupied himself. He wandered in the perfumed gardens of Arabia, and his mind intoxicated itself

with the pantheism and theosophy of Persia. In a public oration which he delivered, when leaving the high school, he placed Moses, Jesus and Mohammed side by side on the same level, but preferred to all three the Indian Menu, the Persian Zoroaster and the Chinese Confucius.

Thus the bastard religion of the time appeared likely to find in him an enthusiastic exponent, if ever he ascended the pulpit, though his thoughts at this time were directed towards the career of a traveller or Orientalist. But already he differed from his contemporaries in one important respect: he was thoroughly unsatisfied. He had a violent and volcanic nature, and his religion gave him no power to control it. His home was not a happy one. They had tried to make him a goldsmith—the trade of his father—but he found means of demonstrating that he was not fit for it. His mind was passionately set on the acquisition of knowledge, and nothing would satisfy him but a university career. He envied the sons of wealthier citizens, to whom the pathway was easy, and strove, not without success, to make a way by the force of his talents into their society. He was consumed with ambition and built the most daring castles in the air. His temper was uncontrollable; and the cyclops within him—as he called the demonic element by which he was possessed—raged, when his will was crossed, not only against men, but even against God. From an early age he was haunted with the thought of suicide, and attempted more than once to end what he considered his miserable existence.

A step which he took, after he had been about a year a student in the university of Breslau, will show what an original and reckless spirit he was of. Having borrowed from a friend as much money as would take him to Berlin, he appeared one morning at the gate of one of the finest mansions in the capital, inhabited by a famous Orientalist, whose works he had been studying, with the intention of

asking that he might be taken in as an inmate of the house or made the adopted son of the great scholar. At the door he was informed that the master was ill and could not see anyone ; whereupon he rushed off to fling himself into the river from the parapet of a neighbouring bridge. The manservant, alarmed at a strange look in his face, ran after him and, having brought him back, consented to carry in, to his master, a letter in which the singular visitor described himself and his desires. And—marvellous to relate—the request was granted. The aged scholar, having just lost his private secretary, was in urgent need of someone acquainted with Eastern tongues who could write for him ; and, that very day, Tholuck was installed in the house as his amanuensis and, in no long time, was acknowledged as his friend.

This extraordinary incident made a deep impression on the young man's morbid mind. It stilled the tumult of his ambitions and created in him the faith that a Providence was watching over his way. Von Diez—the scholar under whose roof he had been so strangely received—was an earnest Christian ; and it excited many salutary thoughts in the secretary's mind to see so much learning in union with such simple faith. Besides, von Diez was in contact—and through him Tholuck was brought into contact—with circles in the city in which a totally different kind of religion was to be met with from any which he had hitherto known.

In the middle of last century Berlin was a very irreligious place ; in fact, " Berliner " and " unbeliever " were often said to be synonymous terms ; Frederick the Great delighting to entertain at his court Voltaire and the other famous infidels of the day. Yet in the very darkest time some sparks of living religion burn on. In Berlin, although public oracles were dumb, yet they that feared the Lord spake often one to another. They assembled in little meetings, which were harried by the police but, nevertheless, multi-

plied, till, when Tholuck came, there were twenty of them in different parts of the city. Those who frequented these gatherings did not turn their backs on the churches; on the contrary, they went gladly to any church where anything like a living gospel was to be heard; but they craved for more and closer intercourse with one another. They sang hymns and prayed extempore; and they often read the writings of the English Evangelicals or accounts of the work of the English missionary societies. The majority of those who attended were humble people, yet there was not wanting a sprinkling of the educated and the high-born.

"Before I knew Jesus myself," says Tholuck, "I had sometimes heard individuals spoken of as Mystics, Bigots, Pietists.[1] I avoided such men, because there was nothing

[1] The following note on the nickname "pietist" is from *Bismarck, His Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. ii., p. 302, and it belongs to a very early stage of the great statesman's acquaintance with his future imperial master:—"A conversation connected with the name of Von Gerlach, which I had in 1853 with the Prince at Ostend, where I had been brought into closer connexion with him, has remained in my memory, for I was much struck by the Prince's want of acquaintance with our public institutions and the political situation.

"One day he spoke with a certain animosity about General von Gerlach, who, as it seemed, in consequence of a want of agreement, had in a bad humour resigned his post as adjutant. The Prince spoke of him as 'a Pietist.'

"I.—What does your Royal Highness mean by a pietist?

"He.—A man who plays the hypocrite in religion in order to advance in his career.

"I.—There is nothing of that in Gerlach; what could he become? In the language of the present day the word pietist has quite another meaning, viz., a man who believes in the Christian religion according to the orthodox creed and makes no secret of his belief; and there are many of them who have nothing to do with political life and do not think of making a career.

"He.—What do you mean by orthodox?

"I.—For example, one who seriously believes that Jesus is the Son of God and died for us as a sacrifice for the pardon of our sins. At the moment I cannot give a more accurate definition, but that is the essential part in the difference of belief.

"He (growing very red).—Who is there, then, so forsaken by God that he does not believe that?

I disliked more than narrow-mindedness, by which I felt that the open chest of a strong man was bandaged, the bold spirit of an ambitious youth handcuffed, and his life, like his face, turned to the pallid hue of death. I thought that with such views the splendid flower-garden of science would become a kitchen garden for daily use, the undulating Eden of nature would become a small, enclosed cloister-ground ; while the immeasurable sky above my head would shrivel up to the vault of a catacomb." In spite, however, of these prejudices, he was providentially led into the circles he had despised, and he found them very different from what he had anticipated.

It happened at the time that the dominating figure in them was an aged Baron von Kottwitz. This man was a genuine original. He had seen much of the world and reflected deeply on what he had seen. He did not obtrude religious conversation, but talked with interest of ordinary things and did not disdain the exchange of blithe and witty remarks ; but, when he was drawn out and in the right mood, he could speak with the depth and the fire of a prophet. He spent nearly the whole of his means and his time in works of mercy. On his journeys he visited prisons and hospitals, in the spirit of John Howard and Elizabeth Fry, and in Berlin his rooms were thronged by widows and orphans, and by representatives of every form of distress, to whom he never wearied of ministering. At the close of the Napoleonic Wars, when there was much suffering in Berlin through want of employment, the government placed at his disposal an old barracks, in which he succoured

"I.—If what you have just said were publicly known, your Royal Highness would yourself be counted among the pietists."

It may be added, in explanation of the fulness and accuracy of Bismarck's information, that a sister of his was long one of the most conspicuous figures in Evangelical circles and in all kinds of Home Mission effort in the capital of Prussia.

hundreds of the poorest of the poor. Once, it is said, he chanced to call on Fichte, the philosopher, when, after disposing of business, they fell into religious conversation. The philosopher began by talking down to his visitor from the height of his reputation, and at last said impatiently, "Prayer is for children; men must will and act." "Well," rejoined the old gentleman, "I have on my hands six hundred wretched people, and I often do not know where their next meal is to come from; but I pray, and help comes." Fichte was silent; a tear rolled down his cheek; and he said humbly, "Ah! that is something quite beyond the scope of my philosophy." He asked the Baron to be godfather to a child born soon after.

With Von Kottwitz Tholuck was brought into contact; and the experienced soul-winner knew how to act. He did not thrust himself on the young man, but allowed himself to be sought, instead of seeking. He did not spare or flatter him, but treated him with manly frankness. It was not long, however, before each became aware he had found a treasure, and they gave their whole hearts to each other; Von Kottwitz, seeing in this young man of talent one who might be the heir of his own testimony, and Tholuck discerning in his aged friend such an unmistakable embodiment of Christianity that he could not doubt that he had come upon the secret of the Lord. To use his own words, "from the imitation he learned to know the Original; the disciple cast light upon the Master; it was really as if in the patriarch he saw Christ living before his eyes; and the sight of this sanctified life made intelligible in a moment many passages of Scripture which no book had ever explained to him." [1]

[1] It is gratifying to note how the name of the humble and hidden servant of God is beginning to be assigned the place it deserves in the religious history of his country. Compare the frequent mention of it in H. Stephan's *Die Neuzeit*, which is vol. iv. of the latest considerable German work on Church History, Krüger's *Handbuch*. A small volume has also been recently devoted to his honour, *Baron Ernst von Kottwitz*, by A. Schultze.

Thus the redeeming force in Tholuck's experience was Christ brought nigh and made real in a Christlike disciple. But, in his autobiography, he explains also in detail how the leading elements of the Christian revelation were made personal possessions to him.

His tendency, from boyhood upwards, had been towards Pantheism, and this tendency was strengthened by his wide wanderings in the fields of Oriental Mysticism. Pantheism identifies the thinking subject with God ; and, in fact, in his daring moments the pantheist says, " I myself am God." To Tholuck's self-centred and towering nature this was a congenial doctrine. But, when he thought it out to the end, he found one rebellious fact, which obstinately refused to be reconciled with the system ; and this was the consciousness of sin. He felt himself to be standing alone and condemned, over against the commanding law of God. And the whole structure of Pantheism collapsed when touched with this one confession of conscience, " I have sinned."

Thus did he find sure footing for faith in the very sense of condemnation. But, in his case, this was no mere conclusion of the intellect. Mention has been made of his ungovernable nature, which allowed him no peace ; but of this he now obtained control. His existence had been not only self-centred, but dominated by an absorbing selfish ambition ; but now there awoke in his soul a hunger and thirst for the good of others which made him the friend and champion of every benevolent and missionary undertaking. His Pietistic friends were not always satisfied with his orthodoxy ; but, if he allowed himself a wider range it was because he desired to exhaust all the fulness of Christ. " In my opinion," he says, " it would have been better for the success of the message of salvation among men in our new time, if they had regarded the sun as sun, instead of breaking off its beams singly, which are sure to be extinguished when

separated. He is the Saviour, we say ; but we have laced up the idea so tightly that all life has gone out of it. We hear the word, and it suggests to us nothing else but—what is great indeed, but only in connexion with all besides—the blood and Golgotha. He came to be a Saviour for everything in thee that longs for salvation. He has saved thy heart and thy reason, thy spirit with thy body, thyself and nature round about thee. And He has saved thee not only by His death but also by His resurrection ; not only by His life on earth but also by His session at the right hand ; not only by what He did but by what He said ; not only by His manhood but by His godhead ; not only by His existence in time but by that in eternity. We cannot tie up the sunbeams in a bundle or put the sea in a tumbler."

Thus did Tholuck lay hold of a complete Christ ; and he laid hold of Him with all his heart and soul and strength and mind. He found a Saviour who not only set his heart on fire at the time, but filled his words with force, as he testified for Him all the days of a life of more than threescore years and ten. In the glow of first love he took as the motto for his entire life the words of Zinzendorf, and even the founder of the Moravian Church was not truer to their spirit : " I have only one passion, and it is Christ, and He alone."

James Stalker.

THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY.

XXII. The Gift of Christ.

Every line of thought and argument and personal experience—the last doubtless the most efficacious with him—led Paul to the same conclusion. Man cannot save himself: he cannot work out his own salvation through his own efforts: he always goes wrong. The force of circumstances and of his own nature are too strong: the flesh is more dominant than the spirit in his physical constitution.

The lifting power of some great enthusiasm, the driving force of some supreme idea, must come in to aid his personal efforts, and to strengthen in him the spirit in its struggle against the flesh. This God has provided from the beginning as part of the plan of creation which was originally formed in His mind: He did not bring in this device to remedy a defect that subsequently manifested itself in His creation: He had in view from the first the whole order of human history.

At some point in the life of every individual the consciousness is attained that one can do nothing of oneself for oneself; that one has failed to save oneself: that one's efforts have all been misdirected: that either one has been deliberately turning one's back towards God, and seeking after what was absolutely evil, or one's efforts to "keep justice and to do righteousness," [1] and to show the goodness which God desires in man,[2] have gone astray. Then one learns that only through Divine aid can one attain what one has longed for or ought to have longed for. The time is ripe: "the fulness of the time has come." [3]

[1] Isaiah lvi. 1.

[2] Hosea vi. 6. "I desire goodness, and not sacrifice; the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings."

[3] Galatians iv. 4.

Similarly, at a certain point in the history of the world as a whole, the collective consciousness of mankind seemed to Paul to have reached the same conclusion through the collective experience of all men.[1] The world had failed to save itself and to improve itself. It was on the way to destruction through a steady and ever accelerated deterioration. There was no possible aid for it through any human power, or device, or effort. No hope remained except in Divine aid through the coming of a Divine helper. When this conclusion was reached, then it seemed to Paul that the fulness of the time, the moment for the Divine purpose to complete itself, had arrived. The almost universal belief throughout the Mediterranean world in the time immediately preceding the life of Paul[2] and during the first half of his life was identical with his opinion, and appeared to him to attest its correctness.

This was the moment that the Divine will and purpose had found suitable to send into the world the Divine nature in human form, placed under the law with a view to rise above the law, made subject to human trials and weakness in order to prove superior to them, exposed to the temptations of man so that there might be exhibited a complete and glorious triumph of man over all temptations. That in Jesus the Divine nature was stronger than in simple man was true: otherwise, being a simple man, He could not overcome the limitations of human nature. Yet this does not, in Paul's philosophy of history, invalidate the fundamental fact that Jesus was man: He was man that He might be a

[1] "Mankind" and "all men" and "the world" here must, of course, be understood as meaning practically the Graeco-Roman world, ἡ οἰκουμένη, which alone was known to Paul. This sense is usual.

[2] Perhaps the solitary exception was Virgil, who was full of hope; but his hope was in a vague form connected with the birth of a Divine child. Some would see in the child an expected son of Augustus, which appears to me unjust to the poet, a petty idea such as Virgil could not and did not condescend to; see papers in the EXPOSITOR some years ago on this subject.

pattern: He was God in order that His pattern might be effective and final, absolutely conclusive once and for ever, sufficient for all men and for each individual man before and after Him.

That was what Paul called the supreme mystery. It had to be apprehended by each man for himself. It was a matter of faith. The highest test of human nature and will was the capacity to apprehend and believe this great mystery, to know that it was true and to base one's whole life upon it. This stage is reached by the individual man when—perhaps after long trial to achieve his own salvation, and work righteousness for himself—he has realised his helplessness and incapacity: when he has learned that he must trust to the God who is around him and outside of him, because the Divine element is too weak within him.

This supreme moment in the life of a man is regarded by Paul as the moment when the Divine power seizes him, grips him, reveals itself to him and in him.[1] The gift of salvation, therefore, is the free gift of the God who has taken hold of the man. The man himself has not earned it, has not deserved it, has done nothing to attain it. He is, as it were, compelled to the new course by the purpose and plan of God: he cannot do otherwise: it is impossible for him to strive against the Divine order, or to kick against the goad.

That is, however, in no way inconsistent with Paul's other point of view that, in the judgment of God and of man, eternal life is the reward of what the man does in life (as has been shown by clear quotations), and that the man works out his own salvation. These are merely expressions from two different points of view. Both can be true. If one is true, the other must be true. A force that is ineffective is not a force. The power of God inevitably works itself out in the action of the man whom God has seized.

[1] Galatians i. 14 f.

The apparent inconsistency lay only in a narrow or false view of the nature of God and of man in their mutual relation. Man has in him the Divine spark: he is capable of movement towards God only through the fact that God is within him. The first stage in salvation is the quickening of the Divine element in the man. Thus the Divine in man recognises the Divine outside of him. The great revelation, the manifestation by God of Himself to man, takes place; and the man is remade, reconstituted, reborn, once and for ever. The rest of life crumbles into ashes, and disappears as if it were nought. This alone remains. From this life begins again.

Yet this new life is a hard life, a long strain, a continuous work, taxing the whole powers of the man from day to day, often seeming to be too hard, and yet always making itself possible to him through the grace of God. Each day brings a sacrifice of oneself, a death to the old and a birth to the new and the higher. Such was Paul's experience in his own life; and he pictures to his converts the Divine life as being necessarily the same for them.

XXIII. The Sacerdotal Metaphor.

In attempting to gauge the depths of Paul's thought from the language of his letters, we must distinguish between forms of expression which are intended specially as educative and those through which the inner nature of his ideas looks forth on the world more simply and clearly.

Intellectually, it was necessary for him to make the deep things of God intelligible to pagan converts, and he must use metaphors and images, which would help them to understand; he must start from their thought and train their minds to appreciate higher thought; he was always confronted with the difficult problem of expressing infinite and

eternal truths in the utterly inadequate language of finite experience; and in view of his audience he must use the words of ordinary educated speech and could not take refuge in technical or artificial terms. Morally, he had to raise his hearers' standard of judgment and of life, so that the higher morality should be appreciated by them and establish itself in their minds and life.

All the early Christian teachers were confronted with the same problem. They had to create a new language to express a new religion, and yet they must use the current words and moulds, filling them with a new content. Paul was the most creative and successful master of language; but the other Apostles were not mere followers of Paul, and in the beginning they had to speak without Paul's model before them. There was a Christian language in process of evolving itself before Paul became a Christian. It was, however, addressed only to Jews, and adapted to their thoughts and customs and beliefs. It was not without its effect on Paul.

Among forms of expression which were specially suited to elevate the conceptions of the Hebrews to a higher level were those which picture the work and the being of Christ, by starting from the ideas of priesthood and of sacrifice. Such forms also appealed more or less to almost all pagans. Among the ancient peoples generally the relation of man to God was conceived as in a very large degree conducted through the medium of sacrificial offerings by the instrumentality of a priest who intervened and mediated between the worshipper and the deity.

Already the greatest of the Hebrew prophets were gradually rising above that conception. Christianity rose wholly above it.[1] But the popular views had not attained to free-

[1] I do not mean that all people think so. I am only attempting to express what appears to be the mind of Paul.

dom in this respect; and it was necessary that the popular views should be elevated to the higher plane. In order to elevate them it was necessary to begin from them, to assume what was good in them, and to develop and strengthen this element of right.

It is therefore not strange, but quite what was to be expected, that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews—not Paul himself, but a writer who was in close relations and in hearty sympathy with Paul, not a pupil, but one who took an independent and authoritative view (probably Philip the Evangelist writing at Caesarea during Paul's imprisonment, and in frequent communication with him)[1]—lays far more stress on this idea than any other writer in the New Testament. The task which this author felt to be imposed on him was to explain to the Jewish Christian congregation of Jerusalem—as distinguished from their leaders (ἡγούμενοι) who are not addressed and who did not need such instruction—that, and how, Christ's teaching was the perfect, true, and finally complete religion. "The writer to the Hebrews," as Professor Paterson says, "deals with the Old Testament dispensation as pre-eminently a priestly and sacrificial system"; that dispensation was founded upon divine revelation; but it was imperfect and narrow in aims and results. The method of this writer, therefore, is to take the hopes and wishes current among the Hebrews, and show how they are more perfectly fulfilled by the doctrine of Christianity than by the old dispensation. In doing this, naturally, the writer lays very great stress on the sacrificial and priestly aspect. As the Hebrews wished for a priest, the only true priest in the highest sense is Christ. If the Hebrews considered that sacrifice is needed or desired by God, then the one true and perfect sacrifice was Jesus;

[1] See a paper on the authorship of Hebrews in *Luke the Physician*. Acts xxiv. 23 touches on this freedom of communication.

this sacrifice was offered once and for all time ; and there should be no thought of any need for the imperfect and unworthy sacrifices of the Hebrew ritual, after that supreme and perfect offering has been made.

The fact that the ideas of the ordinary Jews of Palestine had to be carried upwards to a nobler level should not be taken as any proof that either Paul, or even the writer to the Hebrews, regarded the priestly functions of Christ and the sacrificial character of His death as being in themselves of real and essential importance, or that this aspect of Christ's work indicated the deepest truth regarding the relation between man and God. The minds of the people had to be trained by working on their past experience and acquired habits of thought. A modern missionary to savages would, if he be wise, take hold of their ideas in his teaching and develop them, and he would refrain from destroying any germs of good that lay in their conceptions of deity and divine demands.

Paul does not insist much on this sacrificial and priestly side of the relation of man to God, partly because he regards the old Hebrew dispensation more as a system of law than as a system of sacrifice by priests, partly because he approached the Greeks rather on the side of their philosophic and educated thoughts than through their pagan religious practices and ideas. Yet the ordinary pagans also regarded the relation of man to God as a system of gifts and sacrifices performed with the aid of a priest, who knew the proper rites and accompaniments ; and Paul sometimes approaches the minds of his hearers on this side.[1] Generally, however,

[1] Ignatius is far more addicted to appeals of this character. He pictures the life of the Christian as a religious procession in which the sacred symbols are borne through the streets of a city ; and his mind had been powerfully affected by the pagan Mysteries, as his language often shows. This subject has been briefly touched in one of the early chapters of the writer's *Letters to the Seven Churches*.

the context and the character of such allusions in Paul makes it clear that they are only illustrative and not essential; and it is unfortunate that so much stress has often been laid on them, as if they touched reality and as if they were not largely symbolical. So for example Ephesians v. 2, "Christ gave Himself up for us an offering and a sacrifice to God for an odour of sweet smell." One might have thought that the allusion to sacrifice and ritual is plainly metaphorical; but prepossession and the analogy of the Epistle to the Hebrews cause many scholars to quote this passage as a proof that Paul classed the death of Jesus as literally and in the deepest sense a sacrifice, similar in character and purpose to the sacrifices of animals in the old Hebrew ritual. The comparison of 2 Corinthians ii. 14, "the savour of his knowledge in every place," shows that the allusion to sweet smell is wholly figurative.

The expression of Paul that Christ "gave Himself up" for man does not (as is often maintained) necessarily, or even probably, involve the thought of a ritual sacrifice. The word παραδοῦναι does not in itself suggest that, and the thought is introduced into Ephesians v. 2, not by this verb, but by the quotation from the Old Testament which follows, "an offering and a sacrifice for an odour of sweet smell." In such a passage as Galatians ii. 20 the thought of sacrifice does not come in, though the same verb is used.

When the blood of Christ is referred to in such passages as Ephesians i. 7, 1 Corinthians x. 16, Romans v. 9, the guiding tone of the passage is not necessarily the idea of sacrifice; and in some cases the thought is probably of quite different character. In Romans viii. 3 the idea of sacrifice is introduced into the English version by interpolating the words "as an offering," which have nothing in the Greek to correspond to them or to justify them: the context here shows that Paul's thought is moving

entirely in the sphere of law, and not in the sphere of ritual.

There are other places, however, such as Romans iii. 25, where an allusion to the Hebrew ritual is probable or certain: especially 1 Corinthians v. 7 is a case in point. But certainly metaphor, not philosophic insight, is the character of these allusions.

All such passages may therefore be set aside as giving no proof or indication of the deeper movement of Paul's thought. They are educative and illustrative; they are used in order to rouse the minds of his readers to think, and do not spring from the philosophic basis of Paul's religious ideas, or serve as more than a mere index pointing towards it.

The one great exception probably is that to Paul Christ was the Paschal Lamb sacrificed for the people. This idea lay deep in the thought of the first century. It strongly affected the mind of John, as of Paul. It had great effect in moulding religious symbolism and imagery. It originates from the fact that Jesus was on the Cross at the time when the Paschal lamb was being slain in preparation for the Passover feast.[1] But it is characteristic rather of early Christian thought and symbolism in general than of Paul in particular. That is true of the whole Pauline doctrine and practice of the Eucharist. So far from being an invention of Paul's (as has sometimes been maintained) or from having been seriously modified by Paul, the Eucharist in its entirety was taken over by Paul from earlier ritual. He found it in the Church, and he transmitted it to the Church as he found it.[2] Its value and its efficacy lay in the

[1] Perhaps He was taken down from the Cross a little before the exact time of the slaying of the lamb; but this is immaterial, and was certainly considered immaterial in the early Church. The preparations for the Festival, and the providing of the lamb, had occurred earlier.

[2] A series of papers in the *Expository Times*, 1910, states the writer's view.

unchanged and pure preservation of the rite in its simplicity as it had been created by the Founder in His life, practised often by Him, and finally consecrated in the Last Supper.

After weighing these considerations we must conclude that the conception of the death of Christ after the image of the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb was early Christian, not specifically Pauline. It was, therefore, imposed on Paul from without, and not originated by him.

The priestly and sacrificial form of expression was really alien to Paul's most characteristic line of approach to this subject. It involved the idea of a priest as intervening, occupying the position of a mediator between man and God. The intervention of a priest was prescribed in the priestly law. The law " was ordained through angels by the hand of a mediator." [1] To Paul, however, and to all early Christian thought, the relation of man to God is direct, and not through a mediator. There can be no mediator between God and man except God Himself or the man himself. " To us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things and we unto Him ; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and we through Him." [2]

The essential contrast between the Pauline and the sacrificial idea is so strong that the fashion of speaking about Christ as the priest and mediator must be regarded as simply a concession to Jewish feeling. In this matter the Christian doctrine does away wholly with the function of the Hebrew priest. It is merely a device of instruction, a way of illustrating the preparatory and paedagogic character of the Jewish dispensation, to say that the place of the priest in that system is filled by Christ Himself in the Christian system. To the Jews this form of expression meant much in that early age of Christianity : it gathered up their ideas

[1] Galatians iii. 19.
[2] 1 Corinthians viii. 6. Compare also 1 Timothy ii. 5.

of ritual, brought them to a focus, and thus made the new doctrine intelligible to them in the light of the old. But in modern time there are many minds to which the priestly function seems alien and irrelevant, a mere relic of primitive and undeveloped and wholly inadequate religion ; and the idea that the Pauline teaching or the essential nature of Christianity attaches any sacrificial value or any priestly character to the work of Christ takes figure and symbol for reality, and is a profound error, which, besides being erroneous in itself, alienates the modern mind because it is incomprehensible to that mind.

It is more in accordance with Pauline thought to say that the narrow official priesthood of the old Hebrew system was merged in the universal priesthood of the Christian system. The intervention of the priest was no longer required, when each Christian felt his own direct relation to God and "worked out his own salvation." This idea of universal priesthood was strongly held in the earliest Church : "ye are an elect race, a royal priesthood" . . . "to offer spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God." [1] The union of the offices of king and priest in the person of every Christian appears also in John, Revelation i. 6, v. 10, xx. 6 : "they shall be priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand years."

In the latter quotation the conjunction of kingdom and priesthood shows that the idea is totally unlike Paul's conception of the saint as king.[2] Paul's conception is caught from the Greek philosophy : the saint is king, because he has been placed above the storms of worldly life. The union of priesthood and kingship in one person is oriental and theocratic. It carries us back into primitive oriental society, when the god ruled his people through his priest and representative on earth. In Peter the idea is expressed

[1] 1 Peter ii. 9 and 5.

[2] See Section xviii.

in quotations from the Old Testament, but it is moral and symbolical; while in Revelation it has hardened into an external fact placed within the limits of time. That is characteristic of the latter book; in it moral ideas are pictured as if they became facts of the temporal universe; and this relation shows that the ideas of early Christianity have been dwelt on in meditation by John until they externalised themselves and are so thought about by him.[1]

In Paul this priestly character of the saint is wholly unimportant. As to Peter, so to Paul, all the elect are saints and holy; but the latter is content to regard this as a fact of purity and morality, the elect are in the image of Christ, while to the former it conveys the implication that the elect are consecrated as priests of God.

The contrast between the different points of view which Ignatius and Paul respectively occupy in regard to this matter is the contrast between a person who, having himself grown out of paganism into Christianity, takes the best forms and thoughts he had known in his own paganism and gives them a Christian connotation and development, and another who, growing up a Jew, with a horror of paganism, yet in long contact with the education and philosophic thought of the pagan world, expounds Christian teaching to the pagan world by using the best forms and thoughts of pagan education and elevating these to the level of Christian life, while he tends rather to shrink from using any specially religious form or idea of paganism. In saying this we implicitly dissent from the theory (which has become fashionable recently but which will soon pass away) that the evolution of Paul's thought was stimulated or guided in any degree by the pagan Mysteries. That theory appears

[1] Incidentally we note that this relation stamps the book as later, and is not consistent with a date under Nero. The Hebraic and adopted element in the book is of course earlier.

fundamentally false. Any resemblance is due to the fact that the Mysteries in the time of Paul were developed in answer to the popular need for religious stimulation and guidance, and that Paul presents Christianity as the only complete fulfilment of the popular need.

XXIV. Metaphor and Truth.

Between metaphor and philosophic truth one must always distinguish in studying Paul. The purely religious writer, indeed, may always safely adopt the metaphorical language, confident that it will rouse the emotion and stir the spirit and affect the life of the hearers; but if he has to satisfy the intellectual judgment he must distinguish. Even the terms "Father" and "Son," as used of the Godhead, are metaphorical: in their literal sense they denote a human relationship, which cannot have any place in the Divine nature: they suggest to the human mind a certain tender, close relationship which is analogous, yet different. In the Divine nature the Father and the Son are one person: in human nature they are two. In the Divine nature they are co-existent from the beginning, co-eternal, of the same substance: in the human nature one originates from the other at a certain time. The very word "substance" is metaphorical, when applied to the Divine nature, for God is spirit.

The expression of Divine things, "the deep things of God," has always to struggle with the utter inadequacy of human language addressed to the finite intelligence, and drawn from finite and partial experience. Yet it has to suggest a "knowledge" that shall be perfect and non-finite, the real "wisdom" or "knowledge of God." Man has to grope and to force his way on along the path of knowledge. He gathers to himself detail after detail, and part

after part, taking them into his mind, making them portions of himself by realising for himself the spiritual reality and law, eternal, constant, infinite, that lies in or under the finite detail or metaphor. Such knowledge, according to Paul's vivid expression, is only "piecemeal" or partial knowledge. It has to be done away, and real knowledge substituted for it. The mind of man at last sees the truth stand open and bare and clear before it, and knows instantaneously: it leaps over the infinite[1] chasm that divides the finite from the infinite, and reaches its inheritance of divine knowledge. Then the partial knowledge falls away, after the mind has seen. In the human life "we see in a mirror, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know fully even as also I was fully known." So says Paul to the Corinthians, xiii. 12.

There is no room for hesitation or doubt regarding this perfect knowledge. When the mind of man sees it, it knows at once and for all time: it recognises its true self, for it recognises the Divine, and the end of man is to recognise his true nature in the Divine nature. And so Paul says, "then I shall know fully even as also I was fully known." This perfect knowledge is the knowledge which God possesses, and it will in the moment of insight be exercised as God exercises it—"as I also was fully known" by the mind and purpose of God.

To fall back from this knowledge is fatal: it amounts to the denial of God after having seen Him: it is "the sin against the Holy Spirit," irremediable and unpardonable. Yet to fall back from this knowledge is not possible. Because this sin is unpardonable, therefore this sin is impossible; for the love of God is infinite, and there is nothing that it cannot conquer, and nothing that it cannot pardon. Here again we are face to face with one of those apparent, but

[1] Infinite; yet it has to be crossed.

only apparent and not real, self-contradictions. This sin is unpardonable ; yet there is nothing that God cannot wash away. The finite intelligence in face of the infinite, owing to the partial, piecemeal, finite, character of its knowledge, is always exposed to such contradictions : it states what seems a fact, and then it sees the other side of the fact, and in trying to express this other side it contradicts its first statement.

Yet, while this perfect knowledge is gained finally as the end and crown of life—in other words, is a possession towards which we move, and which we attain only in putting off the human nature and attaining unto God—and while it is gained instantaneously and absolutely and for ever as a permanent possession ; yet it is equally true to say that it is involved in every step that we make along the path of knowledge and of real life. In the growth of knowledge, there is more than the adding of detail to detail and of part to part. The resulting knowledge is far more than the sum of the parts. It is a new thing. The parts are, so to say, done away and annihilated. One reaches truth for the moment. One recognises the truth, the Divine truth, one's own nature, one's real self. There is felt for the moment the glow of the fire of reality and the Divine. The past, the details, have perished : one's former self has died : a new self springs into life. This is true in the moral and spiritual life (as was pointed out in a former Section) : it is true also in the intellectual life on its highest side, for on that highest side the intellectual and the religious life are merged in one another.

In studying Paul it is always necessary to penetrate beneath the metaphor to the reality. What is adoption, as we find the term in his letters ? The word adoption in contemporary society described a legal and social process, whereby a family which came to an end so far as blood was

concerned was perpetuated by a species of legal fiction through the introduction of a stranger. The process was alien to the Jews: the term adoption carried no meaning to them, except as an exotic idea which they learned among the Gentiles. They attained the same purpose in another way. It was familiar to the Greeks and to the Romans, and it roused warm emotional ideas in the minds of many. The term was therefore highly suitable in addressing such people as the congregations of South Galatia, for they knew it in the Græco-Asiatic law.[1] But it is only a metaphorical expression, and not literally true. It expressed the process of bringing into the family an alien to inherit the religious duties and the property of the family, and this process presented a certain analogy to the process of bringing in the Gentiles to share or to possess the glories promised to the Jews. Yet the analogy is only an incomplete one: there are many points of difference between the two processes. Paul seizes the points of similarity, and slurs over the differences. His readers did the same thing; and therefore they learned to see what Paul had in mind. If, however, one takes the inheritance of the Gentiles, and argues that, because the sinner is adopted as a son of God, therefore everything that can be predicated about a legal process of adoption among men can be predicated about the bringing of sinners into the inheritance of God, one would be led into endless blunders.

Now many arguments against the Pauline teaching are founded on misapprehension of his language, which was necessarily figurative. His expression, owing to the bent and character of his mind, was largely legal and commercial. If the legal aspect is pressed, extreme inferences can be

[1] That the legal processes referred to in the Galatian Epistle are Græco-Asiatic, and differed from the analogous, but not identical processes of Roman law, has been proved in my *Historical Commentary* to the satisaction of the highest authority, Professor Mitteis.

drawn, and have been drawn ; and these inferences, which by some have been drawn in good faith, and with a profound belief that was able to blind itself to much of the erroneousness, have been by others condemned and misjudged as absurdities. They become absurdities, because they are looked at from the wrong point of view. Looked at in their proper character, as mere aids to understanding, the metaphors are wholly free from the absurd consequences which have been imported into them.

So, to take another example, the Christian term " redemption " acquires a connotation very different from the act of redeeming a slave or a captive, and must not be judged as if it were identical. The analogy may be seized, and the difference left out of mind.

One example may be added of false view and inference regarding the position of Paul : this will form our next Section.

XXV. The Beginning of Sin in the World.

In regard to the origin of sin in the world there is in Paul's teaching the same seeming, but only seeming, contradiction that has so often met us already. After man and the world had come into existence, sin began in the world at a particular moment through an act of the man. " Through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin."

It has sometimes been rashly inferred by unphilosophic speculation that there must have existed a state of sinlessness and moral perfection before the first act of sin was committed. Paul did not hold or teach such a doctrine ; and the inference from what he did state is unjustifiable. On the contrary, he says that " the first man is of the earth, earthy," [1] i.e., the potentiality of evil was involved from

[1] 1 Corinthians xv. 47.

the beginning, and sinfulness was implicit in the nature of the first man. Sin begins when man begins.

It would be merely senseless to argue that, in a literal interpretation of the story of Adam (which Paul indubitably regarded as true both historically and spiritually), the first man was sinless until the first sin was committed. This is a literalism too painful and too gross. In the evolution of man's history under conditions of time and space, the man exists and then sin enters. But the sin is potentially present in man from the moment of his creation. There is a moment when the potential becomes actual; but those who argue that Paul thought of a state of human sinlessness as reigning until Adam committed his first sin are incapacitating themselves from comprehending Paul.

As has already been stated, the permanent possibility of sin and the position of man as exposed to the temptation of sinning and as ultimately triumphing over this temptation and attaining to re-union with God, are the Divine order of creation and the law of the universe. This possibility of sinning is the measure of what we have figuratively termed the distance separating man from God. The distance is entailed in the act of making man, and the giving to him of a distinct individuality, in which he may exercise his separate powers; and his life ought to be the gradual overcoming of the temptation to sin, the traversing of the distance that divides him from God, and finally the attaining to God once more. It is not too strong—though it is a statement that is liable to be misinterpreted and requires to be read with sympathy to distinguish between the good and the bad in our imperfect expression—to say that man is an imperfect Jesus, and as it were a Christ who has failed to realise the end of his being and the purpose of his creation; that Jesus is the expression of the Divine purpose in the creation of man; and that the life of Jesus is the guar-

antee that this purpose can be realised, will be realised, and (as one might almost say) must ultimately be realised. The nature of Christ is the idea of Salvation, which takes possession of the man,[1] and works in him in the way of driving him on to work out his own salvation. It is merely another one among the many imperfect ways of describing the relation of man to God to say that, unless man is capable of sinning, he is not divided from God, and there can therefore be no complete creative act, until the new creature stands apart from the Original Creative Power, able and free to choose for himself and to act for himself, i.e., to sin or to avoid sinning.

XXVI. The Possibility of a "Super-Man."

It may be asked, Is not this too awkward, too roundabout, too complicated a process ; and therefore is it not unfair to man and unworthy of God ? Why not make man so that he will come right and be righteous of himself and through his own unaided activity ?

We might reply that, if man is such that he can (and therefore must) rise free from sin through himself alone, he is not really man : he is not divided from God, and there would have been in that case no act of creation, and nothing but God would exist : there would be no man. Let us, however, look at it in another way. If man were so made, he would in that case be (in modern phrase) a "Superman." Ancient thought seems to have dallied with this idea, and worked it out to its consequences. If we assume that such beings exist, freed from the fetters and imperfections of humanity, able to know and to act, the result must be (and has actually been, according to that ancient theory) that these beings are not reminded through their own

[1] Galatians ii. 20, Philippians iii. 12, 1 Corinthians xiii. 12.

failure that they must lean on God and trust to Him ; in other words they naturally trust themselves and fail to keep Him in regard, and thus they are merely led into sin in another form : they are the wicked angels, the lost spirits, the devils of popular superstition.

In every supposition that either ordinary man, or " super-man," or powers and beings intermediate between God and man (such as the " angels and principalities and powers " of Jewish belief), can through their own nature and power know the truth and attain it of themselves, there is involved the consequence that the conscious memory of the Divine nature outside of them and the Divine goal in front of them dies out, and that " knowing God, they glorified Him not as God, neither gave thanks," and therefore that " their heart was made senseless and darkened." Thus their wisdom becomes folly ; and their conception of the Divine nature is distorted ; and the career of evil sketched by Paul to the Romans [1] ensues. Sin thus comes in by another way and in another form even more serious.

Ancient religious thought in an almost unconscious way developed this line of speculation to the ultimate issue that these higher beings become powers of evil, separate permanently from God (except in so far as they repent, master their pride, and seek humbly to return to Him), hostile to God, foes to man as the work of God, and bent on preventing man from fulfilling the purpose of God. The fanciful theory of the " super-man " was worked out by ancient thought in this form, and was thus disproved by reducing to an absurdity. You cannot have the " super-man " without finding that you have merely got the " devil."

If, therefore, the division from God involved in the act of creation is real, the possibility of sinning is inevitably involved in it. If that division is not real, then there is

[1] Romans i. 21 ff.

nothing except the Divine, and no creation of human nature has occurred.

The consciousness of God in the human mind as continued, complete and eternal, as possible, is the condition of the higher life and the aim of human nature. Man attains towards this end by living it and making it real in his character : as he learns to swim by swimming, so he learns to realise God, to be conscious of God, to know God, by doing so and being so. If he attempts to do right and to be righteous through himself and his own power, he is thereby forgetting God ; his consciousness of God is interrupted through his own " senseless " exaltation of himself into the place of God ; and he has turned his back and moved in the contrary direction away from God. The element of delicate action and perverse choosing is involved in his conduct. Now, whereas the aim of life is re-union with God, i.e., absolutely unbroken, continuous and unending thinking with God and like God, it is purely absurd if men were to try to attain this end by forgetting Him and giving themselves the glory.

In the passage of Romans, which has just been mentioned,[1] if our interpretation is right, Paul is just stating the converse of his own words to the Galatians defining the true life, [2] " It is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me " : i.e., he thinks continuously and always with God, sees God in everything, has no consciousness except of the Divine purpose and will that moves and rules in every act of nature and of history, and thus his own individual will has been merged in the will of God, not by losing its distinct personality, but by attaining to its full development : he has not been absorbed and annihilated in the Divine, but in the Divine consciousness has attained the perfection of his own true individuality. He is re-united with God,

[1] Romans i. 2 ff. [2] Galatians ii. 20.

and yet remains his individual self in glorified form and in spiritual body. But yet—"not that I have already attained or am already made perfect; but I press on . . . toward the goal unto the prize of the upward calling of God in Jesus *who is the* Messiah." The way of this Salvation is, and must inevitably be, the passionate enthusiastic whole-hearted recognition of the real nature of Jesus as the message of God, the merging of one's own nature in the recognition of this message, the living of the Christ-life, i.e., being "crucified with Christ," the sacrifice of one's older false self in order to attain to one's true self, the seizing of Christ as one has been seized by Him. This is the law of growth: the process is defined by its ultimate and perfect stage. The completion of the process is involved already in the first step onwards, because the first step marks the guiding law of the whole. The Christian is already perfect, because he will be perfect; and yet immediately and always comes the instantaneous recognition that in all this process he himself has done nothing, but Christ and the message and purpose of God are working in him: not for one instant may he forget to give God the glory and render to Him the thanks,[1] otherwise the whole process is vitiated and turned to self-glorification, arrogance and deterioration. In each moment of growth all the process and the law are involved: one attains and yet one has not attained, but only grown a stage; and God remains in front, outside, beyond oneself! and the Divine in the man has still to press onwards towards reunion with the Divine which stands before. The re-union is ever in the process of being consummated, and yet is not consummated. Such is the law and the nature of Christ. What then is Christ, and what is the knowledge of Christ and of God?

W. M. Ramsay.

[1] Romans i. 21.

THE APOCALYPTIC ELEMENT IN OUR LORD'S TEACHING.

THERE has been in the last few years a remarkable concentration of attention by theologians and scholars on the subject of our Lord's Eschatological Teaching. This has become, in the words of the Dean of St. Paul's, "The Storm Centre of Christian Apologetics." A large field of study has been opened up. Current beliefs among the Jews with regard to the Messianic Coming, popular conceptions and misconceptions among the early Christians about the Lord's Second Advent and the "Day of Judgment" and the so-called "end of the world" have all been carefully investigated.

Now there are several preliminary thoughts which we should do well to bear in mind in entering upon this study. First, let us realise the inadequacy of ordinary human language to deal with it. The Apocalyptic sayings of the Christ are an attempt to express in language which deals with things of sense and time, realities which transcend time and sense alike. Therefore, Apocalyptic sayings must of necessity be of the nature of hints, attempts rather to suggest than to portray, and the most suitable vehicle will be the parable. Hence also this kind of teaching will tend to acquire a technical vocabulary of its own and to have an esoteric meaning intelligible only to the few.

Perhaps the analogy may help us if we imagine a learned scientist trying to explain the mysteries of wireless telegraphy to some untutored aboriginal tribe. The teacher

would be confronted with the double difficulty of the crudity of his hearers' minds and the extremely limited nature of their vocabulary.

Yet how trifling such difficulties would be compared with the task which our Divine Lord set before Himself to translate into the language of time and sense, for the benefit of men to whom the phenomenal world alone seemed real, the great timeless spiritual truths of that eternal world in which His own consciousness was ever centred!

His sayings were constantly misinterpreted even by His Apostles, and He knew that they were misunderstood and left them unexplained. For He spoke for all ages. He left them as unintelligible as books are to babies waiting until man should be sufficiently developed to understand them. There is something sublime in the calm certainty of His tone, and the assurance of His emphatic words—as though He anticipated the confused thinking of later ages, "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away." He spoke for all ages and His words can wait the development of the spiritual faculties by the aid of which alone they can be understood. From this point of view the popular opinions which prevailed in the primitive Church would seem to be comparatively unimportant as an aid to interpretation. Certainly they do not deserve the exaggerated importance which many scholars insist on assigning to them. Neither in that age nor in any age is it reasonable to insist that the sayings of those who know "the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven" are to be interpreted according to the intelligence of those to whom "all these things are in parables."

The sayings of the Christ round which many misconceptions rapidly gathered have been persistently interpreted in the light—if we can call it light—of these misconceptions, and many critics have read the popular belief in an immedi-

ate Parousia into the words of the Master, until some ordinarily cautious and conservative writers have come to assume that the Christ Himself entertained an expectation that failed.

But if it is important to ascertain the standpoint of those to whom the words were spoken, it is surely far more necessary to make every effort to discover the standpoint of the Speaker, and this has not received the attention it deserves. Of course it is just here that mere scholarship fails us—or at least it must in this study take quite definitely a second place, and mystical insight must be our main guide. "In this discussion," says Professor Denney, "the babes have the better of the philosophers."

Let us pause for a moment on this thought of the standpoint of the Speaker. "I came forth," He says, "from the Father and am come into the world. Again I leave the world and go unto the Father." There is movement, then, but no geographical movement—no movement in the three dimensions we know. God is no more "above the bright blue sky" than beneath the deep blue sea. Let us start from that great saying of St. Bonaventura,

"*God, who has His centre everywhere, and His circumference nowhere.*"

The dense is always interpenetrated by the less dense, and as we think of the physical world interpenetrated by ether so we can think of ether as interpenetrated by still subtler media till we come to pure spirit—to God who "filleth"—interpenetrates all.

> "The God I know of I shall ne'er
> Know though He dwell exceeding nigh.
> Cleave thou the wood and I am there,
> Raise thou the stone and there am I.
> Yea, in my life His Spirit doth flow
> Too near—too far—for me to *know*."

If we can realise that as ether, which is the medium of the vibrations of light, interpenetrates air, so it is interpenetrated by still finer forms of matter which are the media of emotional waves or waves of thought, then perhaps we may think that the discussions of the schoolmen as to the number of angels who could stand on the point of a needle is not so insane as its sounds. There is a real *point* in it.

And as we pass in thought from the dense earth with its coarse vibrations to the subtler vibrations of air, and ether, emotion and thought—in and in till we come to the central stillness—the conscious Bliss and Peace and Love which is God—we have found a new dimension and a new direction. In the light of that let us read again :

"I came forth from the Father and am come into the world.
Again I leave the world and go unto the Father."
"He ascended that He might fill (interpenetrate) all things," and so come nearer to all.
"I go away and I come unto you." (R.V.)

" Ah, yes," say nervous theologians, " let us accept by all means the doctrine of Immanence, but let us not forget to balance it by the opposite doctrine of Transcendence—otherwise we shall fall into the errors of Pantheism and think of God as limited by the universe which He has made."

Now if we put away the childish idea that Transcendence means geographical removal we shall see that it is not an opposing or balancing doctrine to the doctrine of Immanence, but a continuation of it.

We can only reach the true idea of transcendence *through* Immanence and—so to speak—out on the other side.

That is the idea contained in Chesterton's striking poem " The Holy of Holies," which I shall venture to quote in full :

" Elder Father, though thine eyes
Shine with hoary mysteries,
Canst thou tell what in the heart
Of a cowslip blossom lies ?

Smaller than all lives that be,
Secret as the deepest sea,
Stands a little house of seeds
Like an elfin's granary.

Speller of the stones and weeds,
Skilled in Nature's crafts and creeds,
Tell me what is in the heart
Of the smallest of the seeds ?

God Almighty, and with Him
Cherubim and Seraphim,
Filling all eternity—
Adonai Elohim ! "

" Filling all Eternity." What more can the most enthusiastic believer in Transcendence want than that ?

The less dense not only interpenetrates the dense, but transcends it. It is never identified with it or limited by it.

Ether is present in every particle of matter, yet ether extends beyond the world and embraces the stars.

And so we can accept Faber's sayings :

" Out beyond the shining of the furthest star
Thou art ever stretching—infinitely far ;
Yet the hearts of children hold what worlds cannot,
And the God of wonders loves the lowly spot."

" God is never far enough away to be even near."

Now starting from this thought we can see that there are two opposite standpoints from which we can look.

From the earth-side with the consciousness centred in the physical we see first things or actions, then more remotely the feelings or emotions behind them, and further off still the thoughts in which they originated. From the spiritual or Heaven-side we should see in just the reverse order. The focus would be completely changed. Then the thought would be more visible than the feeling and the action more remote than either.

If we grasp this I think we have the key to Apocalyptic teaching. Let me take an illustration from the fourth

chapter of the Book of Revelation. From the earth standpoint the normal order of vision would be, first, the things of nature, then the living forces behind them; later on we should dimly reach the thought of great intelligent controlling powers and finally arrive at the idea of God. But St. John is "in the spirit" and he sees in exactly the reverse order. First he sees the throne of God and Him who sits thereon, then the great Angelic Powers who rule the world for Him, the four and twenty Elders, then the living forces of nature symbolised by the four Living Creatures, and last of all the Creation itself—the "sea of glass."

Now let us return with this key in our hand to the account given in the synoptic Gospels of the discourse upon the Mount of Olives in answer to the question "When shall these things be, and what shall be the sign of Thy Coming and of the consummation of the age?" In this connexion it is difficult to speak with patience of the culpable weakness of the revisers in allowing the monstrous mistranslation of *συντελεία τῶν αἰῶνος* as "the end of the world" to remain in the text. It is not too much to say that the thought of Christians (including scholars) has been poisoned by the assumption that in this discourse our Lord is referring to the end of the world. Yet eminent scholars allow themselves to be led by the facility of a familiar and mistranslated phrase to assume that the Parousia involves the end of all things earthly. As a matter of fact the winding up of an age, the close of an epoch, which is all that the words imply, has no necessary connexion with "the end of the world." Ages have closed and civilisations been brought to an end again and again in the past, and the same process may be repeated again and again in the future. We shall never understand our Lord's Apocalyptic sayings till we cease to read them through the glare and haze of the *Dies Irae*, and learn to attach no more than their intrinsic value to the opinions of

the σάρκικοι of the primitive Church, and to banish what we know is a mistranslation, if not out of the Bible, at least out of our minds.

There have been many "great and terrible days of the Lord" in the history of mankind, days of judgment in which the accumulated evil of the age at length bursts into flame and is burnt out in suffering; "benignant fever paroxysms" which pass and leave humanity prostrate but purified.

Such a day of judgment—not to go far from our own times—was the French Revolution—when the explosive material to which every groan of the hungry and oppressed under that gilded and corrupt civilisation had contributed at length caught fire and smote the earth with a curse.

> "Down came the storm! O'er France it passed
> In sheets of scathing fire.
> All Europe felt the fiery blast,
> And shook as it rushed by her.
>
> Down came the storm! In ruins fell
> The worn out world we knew,
> It passed, that elemental swell,
> Again appeared the blue."

Such a "great and terrible day of the Lord" at the time when the Christ spoke His warning words was quickly drawing nigh to bring to a close in fire and blood the long age of Israel's probation; and its bitter obstinacy, its stoning of the prophets, and all the righteous blood that had been shed while the age lasted was to be required of that generation.

But all this has nothing to do with "the end of the world." It is among the pangs in which an old age perishes that a new age is born, and the world still goes on. "Et pur si muove," as Galileo said. Yet it is not without warning that epochs are so brought to a close. It was a matter of wonder to our Lord that even the Pharisees were unable to recognise the signs of the approaching doom. "Ye know how to discern the face of the heaven," He said, "but

ye cannot discern the signs of the time." Nor is it necessary that progress should always be by overthrow, nor need these great days of the Lord always smite the earth with a curse. It is when an age is closing on a society rent by fissures deep and wide, when the hearts of rulers and ruled are estranged, when the hearts of the fathers are turned from the children and the hearts of the children from the fathers, that these days of visitation which might have witnessed an orderly and majestic evolution bring instead a period of dreadful reckoning, of violence and destruction.

Perhaps this may seem too long a digression to hunt out one particular error, but I am convinced that so long as it dominates the situation thinking on our Lord's Apocalyptic teaching must remain hopelessly confused.

Let me give one or two examples of the way in which well-known thinkers have allowed themselves to be entangled by this error.

"So wise a man as the late Henry Sidgwick," said Bishop Gore at a recent Church Congress, "was alienated from the faith and membership of the Christian Church mainly by the conviction that Jesus Christ had certainly proclaimed the immediate coming of the end of the world and that it had not come as He prophesied. Jesus, he thought, was certainly under a delusion, and could not therefore be what Christendom believed Him to be."

Professor Denney speaks in very guarded language, and yet his meaning is not doubtful. "When all qualifications are made," he writes, "it is impossible for any candid reader to get rid of the fact that Jesus conceived the triumph of the Kingdom to come with His own Coming in glory, and that He spoke of it as so near that the very people whom He addressed must be in constant readiness for it."

And again, "Jesus knew that the powers of the world to come were present in Him, and that the coming of the

Kingdom was sure. God would triumph, and God's triumph would be His; He had no doubt of that. But God's triumph was not only sure; to the spirit of Jesus, who laid down His life for it, it was urgent; it *could* not be delayed; *adhuc enim modicum aliquantulum*, yet a little, ever so little, while, and He that cometh shall come. Does it change our attitude to Jesus to think of Him thus? Are we the less able, or the less willing, to call Him Lord when we realise that in the days of His flesh He walked by faith, and that the assurance of His triumph, and of God's triumph in Him—in which all history is His justification—did not enable Him to hold up to His disciples a mirror in which the course of history could be foreseen? In substance His words are true, but as in all prophecy the form is inadequate to the substance; and this state of the case must simply be recognised."

"The most important thing about the Second Advent in the New Testament is that in its dated and spectacular form it disappears. The last of our Gospels, which is ascribed not only by uniform Christian tradition, but by its own unequivocal testimony, to the disciple whom Jesus loved, has nothing to say of it. It was written when the Church had not only known, but, in this great spirit at least, outlived all its embarrassments about the delay of the advent. The eschatological hopes of the earlier Gospels are not simply omitted in John; they are replaced. Instead of the Apocalyptic discourses of Jesus, as at the close of Matthew and Mark, we have the intimate discourses of the upper room. Instead of a coming of the Son of Man on the clouds of heaven, we have the coming of the Spirit, the alter ego of Jesus, into the souls of believers. The evangelist takes it for granted that in this substitution of a spiritual for an outward coming he is true to the mind of the Master. He does indeed speak words which refer to the resurrection of Jesus, to His appearing to His own, and to a final day of judgment: but

substantially the speedy triumph of which Jesus spoke in apocalyptic language resolved itself for Him into the victory of the Spirit over the world."

He speaks of this as a "bold transmutation of the predictions of Jesus which was forced on the evangelist by the teaching of events and by the Spirit."

The Bishop of Ossory seeks to break out of the snare in another direction.

"Did Christ," he asks, "expect an immediate Parousia? His disciples, after His Ascension, did apparently anticipate His speedy return, and they were wrong. But did He not expect that His Messianic vindication was near at hand, even in the days of His public ministry? How are we to deal with such passages as 'Ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel, till the Son of Man be come,' and 'There be some of them that stand here which shall not taste of death till they see the Son of Man coming in His Kingdom'? I will say quite frankly that if we had no report of the Lord's words but that in St. Matthew there would be no escape from the conclusion that in these sayings He anticipated a manifestation of the Son of Man, which, in fact, did not take place. There was no such manifestation before the disciples returned from their mission, nor did any of them see the Son of Man coming with power. But no principle of Synoptic criticism is better established than this, that Matthew is a secondary authority as compared with Mark. When the same thing is reported by both, Mark is the original source which Matthew has edited. Now take the last quoted saying as it appears in Mark—'There be some here which shall not taste of death till they see the Kingdom of God come with power.' There is not a word about the Son of Man; it is the coming of the Kingdom that is spoken of, and he would be a bold interpreter who would deny that this was fulfilled at Pentecost. Or, again, examine the context

in Matthew of the saying about the disciples going through the cities of Israel. It follows a prediction of tribulations. Where does that prediction appear in Mark? Not at all in reference to the mission of the Twelve, but in the Apocalyptic discourse spoken before the Passion. Whatever the original form of St. Matthew x. 23 may have been, it was not spoken, unless Synoptic criticism is wholly at fault, in connexion with the preliminary excursion of the Apostles. I do not know a more striking illustration of the gains that New Testament criticism has brought to us than is suggested here. An examination of the internal relations between St. Matthew and St. Mark disposes of the perplexity which such sayings of Christ as those just quoted present in their Matthaean context. When reference is made to St. Mark there is seen to be no ground whatever for the suggestion that they imply an expectation on the part of Christ of a glorious manifestation of Himself in judgment in the immediate or the near future. The Apocalyptic discourse of St. Mark xiii., in which the Fall of Jerusalem and the end of all things are both discussed, presents a difficulty which cannot be thus explained, as every reader of the Gospel knows. I must leave it for discussion by those who follow me, and I will only say this about it—the report of this discourse is obviously so much abbreviated that there can be no question of verbal precision in the record; and hence the exact context of the words, 'This generation shall not pass away until all these things be accomplished,' cannot be certainly established."

The difficulty which forces Professor Denney to regard the predictions of Jesus as needing to be "boldly transmuted" forces the Bishop of Ossory to rely for his solution on the misplacement of a verse in St. Mark as well as a mistaken quotation in St. Matthew.

Once again so careful a scholar as Dr. Swete, commenting on the words from Revelation about "the trial which is

coming on the whole habitable earth," writes: "i.e., the troublous times which precede the Parousia. In the foreshortened view of the future which was taken by the apostolic age this final sifting of mankind was near at hand, not being yet clearly differentiated from the imperial persecution which had already begun." Now what authority has Dr. Swete for reading "final" into the prophecy? Why should he assume that a "coming" of the Christ necessarily implies "the end of the world"? It is the old error lying at the back of all these wrestlings with the text—the habit of assuming that our Lord meant His sayings to be interpreted by the not very enlightened minds of the first Christian communities; as if we had any right to expect that they were entirely free from those persistent tendencies to secularise spiritual sayings for which our Lord was continually rebuking His Apostles.

I would humbly suggest that, regarded apart from this distorting medium, there is not one word which justifies us in thinking that either the Christ or those Apostles who heard Him believed in His immediate visible return to the world after His Ascension. Certainly S. Paul in his earlier writings appears to share the popular belief, though later on he gains a truer perspective.

Let me take an example of the way in which sayings seem to me to have been altogether misapplied.

There are no words which have been more generally taken to refer to the Second Coming of our Lord than those in the first chapter of the Apocalypse.

> "Behold He cometh with clouds, and every eye shall see Him; and they also that pierced Him, and all kindreds of the earth shall wail because of Him. Even so. Amen."

Yet I think if we can break away from the traditional attitude we may see that St. John in these words is looking back on the first Advent; for he is quoting musingly two passages

from the Old Testament, blending and applying them, repeating them in view of his own experience.

"Behold He cometh with clouds" (so says Daniel), and every eye shall see Him.

"They shall look on Me," (says Zechariah), "whom they pierced."

How true! How wonderfully it has all been fulfilled. Yes—every eye shall see Him and they also that pierced Him.

"With clouds," *veiled, that is, from worldly sight.* The writer of Daniel and St. John after him are using technical Apocalyptic language. "With clouds"; how wonderfully applicable to His First Coming!

We can think of the clouds as rent indeed for a moment to the eyes of the shepherds of Bethlehem—rent for a moment when the star shows through that "led on the grey-haired wisdom of the East," but at Nazareth they closed over Him again. So as He begins His Ministry men ask, "Is not this the carpenter?" He comes with clouds. So it was designed—He does mighty works, yet He says, "See thou tell no man"—"He straitly charged them that they should not make Him known." The Pharisees demand a coming "with observation"—they want a sign from heaven, and He sighs deeply and leaves them. He draws the veiling clouds round Him. He will not disperse them, nor suffer them to be dispersed. Shortly before His Crucifixion He lays upon His future preachers the solemn charge that they should "tell no man that He was the Christ."

"Behold, He cometh"—He ever cometh—not "with observation," but "with clouds." Physical eyesight cannot pierce them, clever intellect cannot pierce them, but intuition, faith, spiritual vision can.

We think of another scene when the Master asks His disciples, "Who do men say that I am?" and St. Peter answers, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God," and we notice the joy with which He welcomes this evidence of the

faculty of mystical insight in His follower. "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jonah, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee"—the clouds are still there, but faith has pierced them. "Now I can begin to build My Church. Your answer," He seems to say, "shews the development of a faculty in that part of your being which is beyond the reach of death."

So we understand the deep *Ναί ἀμήν* of St. John as he musingly dwells on the words of the prophets with his eyes on his own memories of the Incarnate Life.

"Behold He cometh with clouds, and every eye shall see Him, and they also that pierced Him, and all kindreds of the earth shall wail because of Him. Even so, Amen." He sees the deep penitence all down the ages as the meaning of the eternal sacrifice dawns on generation after generation.

Similarly, let us take those words which the Bishop of Ossory throws overboard to lighten the ship—our Lord tells His disciples that ere that generation had passed away they should see "the Son of Man coming in a cloud with power and great glory."

These words also have strangely been taken to refer to the Second Coming, but surely that is a mistake. "What shall be the sign of Thy Coming?" they had asked. We know that when they asked it they did not for a moment expect the great eclipse of Calvary, to be followed by the Resurrection and Ascension. They believed, and rightly, that the age was near its close and that their Master was to be "manifested to the world." But they altogether misunderstood the manner in which He would reveal Himself. "By Thy Coming" they clearly meant "Thy manifestation"[1] They were far indeed from thinking then of a Second Coming.

In this same sense we understand Our Lord's saying, "Ye

[1] Cf. "Lord, what is come to pass, that Thou wilt manifest Thyself to *us* and not to the world?" (St. John xiv. 22).

shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come." So in answer to their question, which, as we have seen, had nothing whatever to do with a Second Advent, our Lord replies in the traditional language of Messianic prophecy and tells them that ere that generation passed away they should "see the Son of Man coming in clouds with power and great glory."

Notice how different the meaning of these words is when interpreted from the standpoint of Earth and from the standpoint of Heaven.

By "clouds" does our Lord mean a congregation of vapours, or does He use the word as the symbol of that which veils?

By "Power" is He referring to power like that wielded by Pontius Pilate—"power to crucify," or to the power of the pierced Hands—the power to be crucified?

"He had rays coming out of His Hands, and there was the hiding of His power."

And what is glory? Is it the tinsel flash of earthly splendour? Or is it manifestation of the going forth of Love? "And now, O Father, glorify Thou Me with the glory that I had with Thee before the world was." Let the going forth of Thy love (i.e.) be made manifest through this mortal Body." And the answer to that prayer was the Crucifixion.

Tu Rex gloriae, Christe!

St. John The Baptist's conception of the First Coming is extraordinarily like the popular conception of the Second, which prevails to-day. He accepted the traditional belief. He identified Jesus with the Messiah, and he watched and waited and expected. When would He "come"? When would He appear in clouds of light and splendour? When would He assume His power and manifest His glory?

In his prison we can imagine how he eagerly questioned

his disciples as to the attitude of the authorities and to the populace—What is He doing ? Going from place to place, they tell him, " teaching, healing, casting out demons." " Then is the Messiah," he thinks, " a still later comer ? " Are the clouds and the power and the glory to belong to another and is Jesus just carrying on my work of preparation ? So he sends his message, " Art Thou He that cometh or look we for another ? " (note the use of the word " cometh "). And the men deliver their message and then, like orientals, wait while the Master teaches and heals.

Then His answer in effect is this, " Do not clouds surround Me ? Is not power going forth from Me and manifested love ? Is not the sign of My true Kingship the number whom I can help and serve ? The world does not understand this, but the spiritually-minded will see, and " Blessed is he who shall not be offended in Me."

We can imagine the effect on St. John. It is " not with observation " then ! Silently—unrealised—the Coming will soon have taken place ! So He came in a cloud with power and great glory—so when their eyes were opened His followers saw, and ere the nation realised it was judged. We look forward to a Second Coming of our Lord. What are our conceptions of " clouds " and " power " and " glory " ? Have we not, like the Jews, and like the Baptist, and the disciples, materialised them ? Have we not, as they did, surrounded the thought of the Coming with all kinds of crude, material interpretations of spiritual figures till—if He should appear to His world, as He did 1900 years ago to the Jewish nation, unbelief would be demanding the expected visible " signs from Heaven," and worldliness and prejudice would be as blind as then, and the world, like Israel long ago, would be judged ere it knew.

" Tell us, when shall these things be (the overthrow of the Temple), and what shall be the sign of Thy Coming and of the Consummation of the Age ? "

It was a comprehensive question, and Our Lord's reply looks as if it might be divided into three distinct parts. He gives first in general terms the signs by which the close of an age may be recognised. Then He gives His followers the immediate signs of the closing of that particular age, and finally He answers the question as to the signs of His own Coming (not His Second Coming, let us note; they had no thought of that—but of His manifestation).

Generally the signs which herald and accompany the close of an age are excitement and tumult, wars and rumours of wars, earthquakes, famines, and a widespread turbulence, which seem to indicate that some restraining power is being withdrawn.

When an age—or civilisation, as we call it—is beginning, progress is slow, century after century passes with little change and precedent is slowly added to precedent; but toward the close things begin to move with ever increasing rapidity. Men feel themselves borne along helplessly by forces and tendencies which they cannot control and toward issues which they can only dimly and fearfully descry. Our Lord sums up the experience in one graphic and suggestive phrase, "These things are the beginning of travail," the birth-pangs, that is, of the age that is to be.

Then naturally and inevitably He goes on to deal with the events which would precede and accompany the close of that particular age and of what we call the Jewish Dispensation. Accordingly He warns His followers when they see Jerusalem compassed about with armies to flee to the mountains, and specially He puts them on their guard against pretenders who in that time of fearful crisis should claim to be the Christ. In St. Matthew's account, a significant hint is added to this warning. They need not fear that there is danger to them of failing to recognise His Coming. To them there will be no possibility of mistake. "For as the light-

ning cometh forth from the East and shineth even to the West, so shall the Coming of the Son of Man be." His Call, that is, will be unmistakable to His own; whenever He may come, wherever they may be, they will hear and recognise His voice, but the world will not see that which is to them as plain and all-pervading as the lightning flash; and so He adds, "Wheresoever the carcase is, thither will the eagles be gathered together." It is amazing that a theologian like Chrysostom should so entirely miss the meaning of these words as to see in them a reference to the Eucharist, and hardly less astonishing that some more modern commentators have fancied there was some reference to the eagles upon the Roman standards! Surely the point of the hint is the keenness of the vultures' sight. A camel falls in the desert, and straightway from North and South and East and West the vultures, till then hidden in the far off blue of the sky, hasten to the prey, which they and they alone among the creatures have seen. They have eyes to see what to the rest is invisible. Even so His Coming, unrecognised by the world, is visible to all who spiritually have eyes to see. And what are we to make of the concluding part of the discourse which speaks of the darkening of the sun and moon and the falling of the stars and the vision of the Son of Man and the gathering of His elect? All is to take place "after that tribulation" (i.e. the destruction of Jerusalem) and before that generation should pass away.

I would suggest that not only this limitation of time but the nature of the words themselves would lead us to interpret them as referring, not to some future cataclysm in history, but to a transcendental experience which was literally fulfilled in the lifetime of some at least of those who heard them. Under the Master's training their spiritual faculties had been awakened and were rapidly developing, and the spiritual world was ready to burst upon their inner vision, just as the

world of colour waits to grow round the blind man whose eyes are being opened. Flashes of revelation, glimpses of truth, visions of spiritual realities begin to break in upon the awakening inner sight, showing that "He is nigh at the doors." The consciousness of the seer, hitherto centred in the phenomenal, begins to transcend it and to centre itself in the timeless and eternal, and the change is like witnessing the break-up of the world. To one whose inner eye is opened to the glow of "the light that never was by sea or land," all that has before seemed brightest—the sun that was the very symbol of brightness—grows dark by comparison; and compared with the glories of that eternal world the stars themselves—those shining, age-long symbols of permanence—are like so many autumn leaves cast from a tree. "The sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall be falling from heaven."

And then to the awakening spiritual sense there becomes visible the great continuous Coming of the Son of Man—the vision of "the Light that lighteth every man" coming like a great dawn into the world. The age-long truth is manifested of which the First Advent, as we call it, is but a reflexion under conditions of time and space, and along with this there is seen, when viewed from the Heaven side, the gathering together into one mighty host of God's elect who seem to earthly eyes so feeble and scattered and isolated. The nature of the vision is inevitable when we realise the change of standpoint.

"And then shall they see the Son of Man coming in clouds with power and great glory. And then shall He send forth the angels, and shall gather together His elect from the four winds, from the uttermost part of the earth to the uttermost part of the heaven."

H. Erskine Hill.

ST. PAUL AND THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.

IV.

St. Paul and the Terminology of the Mystery-Religions.

In our last article enough was said to establish the fact that in all the main centres of his missionary operations the Apostle Paul must have been brought into constant touch with the influences of the Mystery-Religions. The process of Hellenisation through which they had passed would impart to each a certain rough similarity of outline. Hence, although his sphere of work might frequently change, the Christian preacher would be confronted by a more or less stable complex of religious ideas. We are aware, indeed, of the emphasis laid by early Christian apologetic on the repellent myths which lay in the background of various mystic cults. And such associations might seem once for all decisive against any openness on the part of the Apostle even to their profounder conceptions. But by this time their whole atmosphere was in process of being spiritualised. The Epistles give clear evidence that Paul did not shrink from deriving metaphors again and again from the Greek athletic festivals which equally came under the lash of ancient Christian writers. In vindicating the worship of the God who had revealed Himself in Jesus Christ against bondage to the elemental spirits (στοιχεῖα) he discloses his acquaintance with that astrological mysticism which we saw to be a potent force in contemporary Paganism. And the man who could write Philippians iv. 8 must surely have been sensitive to the higher aspirations of those whom he strove to win for the faith that had satisfied his own yearnings. It seems legitimate to cite his famous words: "I made myself slave of all that I might

gain the more. . . . To all men I have become all things that at all events I might save some" (1 Cor. ix. 19, 22) And there is some significance for Paul's attitude in the position of Philo, also a Jew of the Diaspora, who, while manifesting his dislike of mystic cults,[1] has nevertheless been powerfully affected by some of their ideas.

When we attempt, however, to estimate the data presented in the Epistles, we soon realise how delicate is the problem. There is no doubt that Paul frequently employs terms which have received a more or less technical meaning in connexion with the Mystery-Religions. These occur most prominently in the letters to Corinth and in the Imprisonment-Epistles, all of them addressed to communities which must have had intimate contact with mystery-brotherhoods. Side by side with these terms are found far-reaching conceptions to which, at least, there are thought-provoking analogies in Pagan religion. Restricting our discussion, meanwhile, to terminology, we must emphasise certain cautions which ought to be observed. To begin with, it seems highly precarious to postulate, as Reitzenstein does, an acquaintance on Paul's part with Hellenistic religious literature.[2] The description itself is nebulous. Probably it means for Reitzenstein documents of the type embodied in the Hermetic *Corpus* and the magical papyri. But this could scarcely be asserted even for Philo, who, no doubt, reflects many ideas belonging to the religion of ancient Egypt. And due weight must be assigned to Cumont's view, that the theology of the Egyptian Mysteries rather followed the general movement of ideas than stimulated it.[3] It is sheer hypothesis, therefore, to ascribe to

[1] See Bréhier, *Les Idées philosoph. et relig. de Philon*, pp. 244, 245.

[2] *Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, pp. 209, 210. For convenience sake we shall refer to this work as *H.M.R.*

[3] *Les Religions Orientales*, p. 135.

Paul any direct impression through literature of the mystery-conceptions. It is altogether different when we think of liturgical formulæ and the technical terms of ritual in common circulation. We may grant at once that many of these would be familiar to the Apostle. No great stretch of imagination, for example, is required to picture the situation at Corinth or Ephesus. Without venturing on details we may admit that the Corinthian brotherhood of Christians would have many links of connexion with the mystic guilds to which some of its members may, in all probability, have belonged. In 1 Corinthians vii. 11 and xii. 14 we see, as Heinrici has instructively pointed out, the Christian community "in danger of stooping to the level of a Pagan cult-association." [1] And the somewhat perplexing exordium of chapter xii. gives us a dim glimpse of the heathen background.

But the interesting question arises: How far does the use of mystic terminology involve the adoption of the ideas which it expresses? Are we to assume that terms can be transferred from one phase of religious thought to another without suffering serious alteration? It must be recognised that many of the Mystery-conceptions, and many of the terms in which they are set forth, spring directly from that strain of mysticism which seems to be everywhere latent in humanity and only requires favouring conditions to reveal itself.[2] Here Christianity and Pagan religion were bound to manifest affinities. The problem in such cases will be that of determining how far a more or less naïve realism has been subdued to finer intuitions of spiritual truth. Room will have to be left for the presence of symbolism, a factor which must certainly be reckoned with

[1] *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.*, 1876, p. 509.
[2] Cf. E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 126.

in the thought of Paul.[1] On the other hand, there is real force in Reitzenstein's contention that cult, conception, and language hang closely together.[2] To what extent, then, must the terminology of the Mystery-Religions carry with it its original significance? And how far are we to suppose a unique religious thinker like Paul to be conscious of this? May we adopt as a rough criterion his demonology? This, indeed, is to a large extent already part of his inheritance from Judaism. But it bears the clear stamp of foreign influences. Now it admittedly shows traces of primitive popular conceptions. Are we to suppose that his mind would be receptive of similarly primitive ideas in more central spheres of thought? These are questions which cannot be hastily answered. And dogmatic statements are utterly irrelevant. But it is of further interest to notice that here and there in the Pauline Epistles we have more than isolated terms and ideas of the type in question. In certain contexts, as, e.g., 1 Corinthians ii. 6 ff., we light upon *groups* of conceptions which have associations with the Mystery-Religions.[3] This cannot be accidental. It lets us see the connexions of thought in the Apostle's mind. And these constitute important evidence for the influence of Mystery-Religion. But this significance can easily be exaggerated. Take a familiar example from our own time. Many cultivated religious writers of to-day are fond of using analogies and illustrations from the field of biology. And these often appear in rather elaborate groupings. Yet if they are analysed with care, they will be found to be anything but rigidly scientific. Terms like

[1] Wendland shows how the value of the symbolic in religion was recognised by the higher Greek thought as far back as Socrates (*Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*, p. 58).

[2] *Zeitschr. f. N. T. Wiss.*, 1912, i. p. 17.

[3] Reitzenstein has emphasised this, *H.M.R.*, pp. 53, 210. See also Wendland in *G.G.A.*, Sept. 1910, p. 655.

"evolution," "heredity," "struggle for existence," "variations," "acquired characters," etc., are in the air. Hence they may be used singly or in series as little else than convenient channels of appeal to the popular interest. Such a possibility must certainly be allowed for in the case of a great preacher like Paul, who would make it his business to find common ground with his audiences, without necessarily accepting the precise interpretations which they might put upon his terms. In any case, an individuality like Paul could not borrow without transforming.[1] "If we are to speak of Mystery-piety in Paul's case," says Reitzenstein, "we must never forget that the mystery is for him only the symbol (*Bild*) of an actually experienced μεταβολή, a conversion."[2] It is a question wholly of his precise relation to his environment. That we can only estimate by a careful examination of the facts.

Let us begin with the important term μυστήριον. It occurs more than a dozen times in the Pauline Epistles,[3] and it certainly suggests some affinity with ethnic religious usage. But that usage is itself flexible. Probably the notion of "something kept secret" always belongs to it, including such ideas as the hidden sense of a passage and the mystic meaning of a word. It stands, of course, for any ritual or magical action. From that it develops such senses as the document which contains a revelation, or a divinely-taught prayer which is of necessity believed to

[1] See an admirable paragraph by Reitzenstein in *Zeitsch. f. N.T. Wiss.*, 1912, i. p. 23.

[2] *Ib.* p. 27. Wendland attractively suggests that Paul stood towards the religion of the Mysteries, as Plato towards Orphism. It constitutes in no sense the centre of his religious life, but it gives him effective forms of expression for his Christian experience (*G.G.A.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 656).

[3] We include *Ephesians*, as the only argument which appears to us really valid against Paul's authorship is that of the *style*, and in this respect there seems to be a far closer affinity between *Ephesians* and *Colossians* than between *Colossians* and any of the other Epistles.

be effectual.[1] In trying to determine the shades of meaning involved in any Pauline terms, it is self-evident that the usage of the LXX. must be investigated. There are, roughly speaking, about a dozen instances of μυστήριον in the LXX., and with the exception of two, in which it is combined with τελετή in the technical sense (*Wisd. of Sol.* xiv. 15, 23), it seems invariably to mean "secrets" or "secret plans," once or twice of God, usually of men. In Daniel ii. 17 (LXX.) it stands for the dream which the king had forgotten. In the one passage where it occurs in the Gospels (Matt. xiii. 11 = Mark iv. 11 = Luke viii. 10), in the phrase τὰ μυστήρια (Mark, τὸ μ.) τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ θεοῦ (Matt., τῶν οὐρανῶν), it suggests the secret purposes or plans of God concerning His Kingdom which are coming to light in the work and teaching of Jesus, and which appeal only to sensitive hearts. When we turn to the Pauline Epistles, we at once discover that some of the instances directly tally with the usage of the LXX. and Synoptics. To this class belongs Romans ii. 25: "For I do not wish you, brethren, to be ignorant of this μυστήριον . . . that callousness has, in part, fallen upon Israel until the fulness of the Gentiles come in, and so all Israel shall be saved." Paul here deals with what has been for him a serious problem, the rejection of the Gospel by the chosen people, and its glad acceptance by the heathen. The one explanation he can find is a *secret purpose* of God, whereby the ingathering of the Gentiles shall finally prove a compelling force to attract Israel also. In 1 Corinthians xv. 51 he describes the transformation of believers at the Parousia as a μυστήριον, i.e., as a Divine plan which has been revealed to him, the knowledge of which could not have been reached in any other way. His standpoint here is made plain by 1 Corinthians xiii. 2: "If I have the gift of prophecy, and know

[1] See Reitzenstein's valuable note, *H.M.R.*, pp. 95–97.

all μυστήρια and all γνῶσις." The prophet is for the Apostolic Age, as for the Old Testament (and we may include the Mystery-Religions), the man who is able to declare to his fellows the secret mind of God. So Paul, in 1 Corinthians iv. 1, can speak of himself and his fellow-labourers as "ministers of Christ and stewards of the μυστήρια of God." Their function is to reveal the Divine "secrets." The "speaking" with tongues Paul estimates at a lower value than "prophesying," yet that also is a gift of the πνεῦμα, and presupposes a certain contact with the Divine. Hence he who speaks "in a tongue" may be described (1 Cor. xiv. 2) as speaking μυστήρια by the Spirit.

One secret purpose of God, however, overshadows all others for the Apostle's mind, and in its various bearings seems to fill his thought predominantly as he lies a prisoner at Rome. It is described most explicitly in Ephesians iii. 1 ff.: "For this cause I Paul, the prisoner of Christ Jesus on behalf of you Gentiles, if as a matter of fact ye heard of the stewardship of the grace of God granted to me with a view to you, how that by revelation was made known to me the μυστήριον . . . which was not made known in other generations . . . that the Gentiles are fellow-heirs, and fellow-members of the body, and fellow-partakers of the promise in Christ Jesus through the Gospel." It is magnified also in Colossians i. 25 ff.: "According to the stewardship of God granted to me with a view to you, to fulfil the word of God, the μυστήριον hidden from ages and generations: but now it has been manifested to his saints, to whom God was pleased to make known what is the wealth of the glory of this μυστήριον among the Gentiles, which is Christ in you [i.e. Gentiles] the hope of glory." The same overpowering fact is referred to, a few verses lower down, in ii. 2, a passage in which the text is far from certain but which on any reading connects the μυστήριον

of God with "Christ, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden." In Colossians iv. 3 and Ephesians vi. 19, Paul describes himself as a prisoner on account of this *μυστήριον*. A wider aspect of the significance of the great truth is unfolded in Ephesians i. 9 ff.: "Having made known to us the *μ.* of his will, according to his good pleasure which he purposed in him for the dispensation of the fulness of the times, to sum up all things in Christ." The notion of a hidden process to be revealed in its true character at the Parousia, when all restraints shall be removed, is apparent in 2 Thessalonians ii. 6–8 (*τὸ μ. τῆς ἀνομίας*). Ephesians v. 32 stands by itself. In admonishing husbands and wives as to their mutual relationships, he enforces his precepts by the illustration of Christ and the Church. He cites Genesis ii. 24 on the unity of man and wife and then adds: "This *μ.* is important; I declare it with reference to Christ and the Church." The instances quoted by Hatch from Justin Martyr,[1] in which *μυστήριον* is interchanged with *παραβολή*, *σύμβολον*, and *τύπος*, justify in our passage the translation "symbol."

Before we deal with the only remaining passage,[2] let us briefly collect the implications of Paul's use of *μυστήριον*. It is remarkable that it is generally found, paradoxically, in close connexion with verbs of revelation (*ἀποκαλύπτειν*, *φανεροῦν*, *γνωρίζειν*). That wholly accords with Paul's favourite idea of his own function as *κηρύσσειν* (e.g., 1 Cor. i. 23; cf. *πρεσβεύειν*, 2 Cor. v. 20). It most commonly refers to that transforming discovery which Paul had reached along the lines of his own Christian experience, that the Gospel of Christ was intended for Gentiles on the

[1] *Essays in Biblical Greek*, pp. 60, 61.

[2] We have omitted Rom. xvi. 25, as we entirely agree with Dr. Denney's judgment on the passage: "It is very difficult to believe that such mosaic work is the original composition of Paul" (*E.G.T.*, *ad loc.*).

very same terms as for Jews. Often it has a distinctly eschatological outlook, as in Romans ii. 25, 1 Corinthians ii. 7 (εἰς δόξαν ἡμῶν), 1 Corinthians xv. 51, Ephesians i. 9, Colossians i. 26 (ἡ ἐλπὶς τῆς δόξης), 2 Thessalonians ii. 7.[1] Hence there is no justification for Professor Percy Gardner's assertion that for Paul "the Christian mystery lies in a relation between the disciple and his heavenly Master," or that "the mystery of Paul was a sacred but secret belief in the existence of a spiritual bond holding together a society in union with a spiritual lord with whom the society had communion."[2] Evidence for such a position is completely lacking. Indeed Professor Gardner passes by the most significant feature in the passage which he takes as his starting-point (1 Cor. ii. 1–10), a passage which we must now consider. Here Paul distinguishes between the usual subject of his preaching, "Jesus Christ and him as crucified" (ver. 2), and "a wisdom," a more difficult element in his teaching, which he declares ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, "a divine wisdom ἐν μυστηρίῳ (vers. 6, 7), which has been hidden." The following clauses show that this is concerned with the glorious future of the redeemed. We must examine the meaning of τέλειος immediately, but this passage certainly has a suggestion of the Mysteries; the Apostle speaks of a more advanced stage of Christian instruction which demands a higher grade of understanding. The same background appears in the continuation of the passage, in which emphasis is laid upon the revelation of the deep things of God through the Spirit to the πνευματικός. Here, however, as we have seen, Old Testament conceptions must be allowed for, and

[1] It is putting the matter too strongly to say, as J. Weiss does (on 1 Cor. ii. 7), that μυστήριον "is concerned as a rule with eschatological matters," but there is some ground for the statement.

[2] *The Religious Experience of St. Paul*, pp. 78, 79.

even in the former case we cannot, on the basis of our data, decide how far Paul identifies himself with the Mystery-standpoint. We are warned against straining his language by the phrase which he employs quite casually in Philippians iv. 12: "I have been initiated into the secret of being filled and of being hungry."

We have just noted that Paul refers in 1 Corinthians ii. 6 to a *σοφία*, a higher stage of instruction, which he imparts to the *τέλειοι*. How much is involved in the content of the term? It is possible that there is an allusion in both these expressions to arrogant claims made by adherents of the Apollos-party. We know that Alexandrian Judaism laid great stress on a superior knowledge (*σοφία*) which was the privilege of elect souls, bestowed by God. The personified *σοφία* is described as *μύστις . . . τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιστήμης* (Wisd. viii. 4). Philo, in expounding certain Old Testament passages, speaks of "instructing in divine mysteries (*τελετὰς . . . θείας*) the initiates (*μύστας*) who are worthy of such sacred mysteries" (*De Cherub.* 42). He himself has been *μυηθεὶς τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια* (*ib.* 49). It is probable that *τέλειος* may belong to this circle of mystery-ideas. Plato uses the phrase *τὰ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά* [*μυστήρια*] to denote the higher initiation (*Sympos.* 210 A), and describes the man who rightly uses the recollections of what his soul once saw in fellowship with God (*συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ*) as "being ever initiated into perfect mysteries" (*τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος*) and alone becoming "truly perfect" (*τέλεος ὄντως*: *Phædr.* 249 C). Some scholars, as, e.g., W. Bauer, hold that *τέλεος* (=*τέλειος*) here cannot mean "fully initiated," that sense being involved in *τελούμενος*, and *τέλεος*, which is suggested by a play upon words, having its ordinary significance. But when we find *μυστικοῦ τέλους* (=mystic rite) in Aesch. *Fr.* 377, and the plural *τέλη* (e.g., Eur. *Hipp.* 25, *τέλη μυστηρίων*)

constantly employed with this meaning, it is surely hazardous to say that τέλειος cannot be used with this technical connotation. In the Hermetic literature, those who have received the baptism of the Divine νοῦς become τέλειοι.[1] Only the τέλειος, who has shared in the divine γνῶσις, can make another τέλειος.[2] Hence arises the phrase λόγος τέλειος used as a title for one of the Hermetic documents, the revelation which initiates into the knowledge of God.

But other aspects of τέλειος must not be ignored. Of the seven passages in which the word occurs, two definitely contrast τέλειος with νήπιος (1 Cor. xiv. 20; Eph. iv. 13, 14). Here the word must mean "grown-up," "mature," as opposed to "childish." This is the stage of ripe knowledge as contrasted with rudimentary attainment. As we shall find πνευματικοί used as equivalent to τέλειοι in the context of the passage from which we started (1 Cor. iii. 1 ff.) and there set in antithesis to νήπιοι, there seems a good deal to be said for this significance. The term "mature" would, roughly speaking, suit all the Pauline passages. A further possibility, however, is emphasised by J. Weiss in the excellent note on τέλειοι, appended to his commentary on chapter iii. 3. He points out that in the later Stoics and Philo τέλειος is constantly used of the culminating stage of the good life, which the philosopher is called to strive after. Philo (*Leg. Alleg.* iii. 159) places it after the two earlier phases of ὁ ἀρχόμενος and ὁ προκόπτων. And a passage in Epictetus (*Enchir.* 51, 1 f.) aptly illuminates τὸ τέλειον which Paul contrasts with τὸ ἐκ μέρους in 1 Corinthians xiii. 10, and still more the difficult οἱ τέλειοι of Philippians iii. 15. In the latter verse, as in 1 Corinthians ii. 6, τέλειος seems to have an anticipatory sense. For Paul has just spoken of himself as "not having yet reached

[1] See Reitzenstein, *H.M.R.*, p. 165.

[2] See Reitzenstein, *Neue Jahrb. f. klass. Alt.*, 1904, p. 188.

the goal" (τετελείωμαι, Phil. iii. 12), and that implication may certainly be read between the lines in 1 Corinthians ii. 6 ff. Epictetus warns the τέλειος of the danger of making no progress (οὐ προκόψας) and remaining in life and death an ordinary man. Thus for him the term applies already to the man who has set out on the true path and is still advancing. This accords admirably with Paul's usual standpoint, from which he sees in his converts the end in the beginning, and can think of them as ideally "saints" because they have received the new life, although that life has to develop in the face of many obstacles. It is extremely difficult to decide between these various shades of meaning. And in this case the LXX. sheds little light on Paul's usage. There τέλειος usually translates תָּמִים (and תָּם), "sound," "healthy" (of sacrificial animals) or, "having integrity" (of men), as well as שָׁלֵם and שֶׁלֶם, denoting "submission to God" and "peace-offerings." Wellhausen finds the root-idea in שָׁלֵם to be fellowship between God and His worshippers, and this suggests an early ritual connotation which is perhaps implied in τέλειος as used in the LXX. In one passage (1 Chron. xxv. 8), it occurs in the phrase τελείων καὶ μανθανόντων, translating מבין ="teachers." This recalls the contrast in Paul between τέλειοι and νήπιοι. It seems quite possible to combine the sense of "mature" with that of "complete attainment" for which J. Weiss argues. And in view of the earlier associations of the communities which Paul addresses, we cannot certainly rule out the suggestion that the Mystery-atmosphere is to some extent present,[1] although plainly no conclusion can be drawn from this term as to Paul's personal attitude towards the mystery-conceptions.

It is universally admitted that Paul's use of πνευματικοί in 2 Corinthians iii. 1 implies its equivalence to τέλειοι in

[1] So even Lightfoot on Col. i. 28.

ii. 6. And whatever differences may arise in the interpretation of details, it is obvious from ii. 10–16 that the basal significance of πνευματικός is "one who has received 'the spirit that is from God,'" as Paul puts it (ver. 12). He applies the adjective to spiritual gifts such as prophecy and speaking with "tongues" (1 Cor. xiv. 1 ff.), to the law as a Divine ordinance (Rom. vii. 14), to the future organism (σῶμα) of believers divinely-given (1 Cor. xv. 44 f.), and in the vague phrase, τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας, to "spiritual powers of evil" (Eph. vi. 12). A more abnormal use appears in 1 Corinthians x. 3 f., where, as epithet of βρῶμα, πῶμα, and πέτρα, it seems to be the antithesis of "literal." Characteristic of Paul's standpoint is 1 Corinthians xiv. 37, from which it is evident that προφήτης and πνευματικός are alternative descriptions of the same type of person. "Endowed with πνεῦμα" expresses the content of the term. We can without much difficulty determine what this involves for the Apostle. Out of some 150 instances of πνεῦμα in his Epistles, all, except perhaps about thirty, refer to the direct influence of God. The πνεῦμα for Paul is, in these cases, the Divine response to faith, faith in Christ crucified, risen, and alive for evermore. We omit for the present discussion of the relation of the πνεῦμα to Baptism. But it may be said that, as a matter of practical religious experience, Paul identifies the πνεῦμα with the indwelling Christ. Romans viii. 9, 10 is decisive: "But ye are not in the flesh but in the spirit, that is if the Spirit of God dwells in you. Now if any one have not the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to him. But if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness." Possession of the πνεῦμα neutralises the evil tendencies of the σάρξ, the "flesh," which the Apostle has discovered as an actual fact of experience, but which he never analyses metaphysically. The

last clause of the passage just quoted illustrates about one half of the remaining uses of πνεῦμα in Paul. The gift or accession of the Spirit transforms the inner life so that it becomes assimilated to the life of Christ, the Divine life. Hence the new life of the Christian can be designated πνεῦμα as contrasted with σάρξ, as, e.g., in Romans viii. 10, or i. 9: "God, whom I serve ἐν τῷ πνεύματί μου in the Gospel of his Son." Sometimes he distinguishes between the indwelling πνεῦμα and the life which it controls, as in Romans viii. 16: "The Spirit itself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God." At others, the distinction falls into the background: e.g., 1 Corinthians vi. 17: "He that is joined to the Lord is ἓν πνεῦμα." Rather more than a dozen passages occur in which πνεῦμα is more colourless and seems to stand simply for the inner life of man without special reference to Divine inspiration, e.g., 1 Corinthians ii. 11: "What man knows the things of man, except the spirit of man which is in him?" Here πνεῦμα is virtually the equivalent of ψυχή, the ordinary life-principle of humanity, the correlative of σάρξ, man's material nature discovered in experience to be sinful. So Paul can speak in 2 Corinthians vii. 1 of cleansing themselves "from all defilement of flesh and spirit (σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος)," a passage which proves that he has no really dualistic theory of σάρξ and πνεῦμα. He very rarely employs ψυχή and only in the sense we have mentioned, but in three interesting passages he contrasts ψυχικός with πνευματικός to describe man apart from the Divine influence of the πνεῦμα (1 Cor. ii. 14, xv. 44, 46). His exact meaning is brought out by Jude 19: οὗτοί εἰσιν . . . ψυχικοί, πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες. It is more difficult to define the precise relationships of the term νοῦς which Paul occasionally uses in this circle of ideas, but, generally speaking, it seems to have the meaning given it in the popular philosophy of the

period (=λογικὴ ψυχή), the power of judging which belongs to the inner life as such. When this judgment is true to itself, it will decide for the Divine law, as, e.g., Romans vii. 25: "So therefore I for myself (i.e., as apart from Divine influence) with my νοῦς serve the law of God." But so long as the νοῦς is not invigorated by the Divine πνεῦμα it will be hampered by its fleshly associations, so that he has to add: "but with my flesh the law of sin." The νοῦς is a purely natural capacity which, however, provides as it were the basis for the operations of the Divine πνεῦμα. Hence, in Romans xii. 2, Paul can speak of the "renewing" (ἀνακαίνωσις) of the νοῦς (cf. Eph. iv. 23). And in his graphic description of ecstatic experiences in 1 Corinthians xiv. 13 ff. he still distinguishes between τὸ πνεῦμά μου and ὁ νοῦς μου, πνεῦμα denoting his inner life on its inspired side, while νοῦς represents the cool critical judgment which regulates unique spiritual experiences with a view to practical utility.[1] In two important passages (Rom. xi. 34; 1 Cor. ii. 16), the Apostle, quoting from the LXX. of Isaiah xl. 13, retains the expression νοῦν κυρίου, νοῦς being here the LXX. translation of the Hebrew *ruach*, ordinarily rendered by πνεῦμα. Probably the translators must have known of a use of νοῦς equivalent to πνεῦμα. At any rate it is impossible to make a distinction between the two in 1 Corinthians ii. 16.

Now Reitzenstein, in his famous researches into the Hermetic literature and its parallels in magical papyri and contemporary Pagan mystery-cults, asserts that Paul's various uses of πνεῦμα are all to be found in Hellenistic religious documents; that his antithesis between πνευματικός and ψυχικός was current before Paul's time; that πνευματικός was a fixed religious conception in the sphere of the mystic faiths of Paganism; and that νοῦς had already become an important

[1] J. Weiss' note on 1 Cor. iv. 14 appears to us to miss the whole point of the passage.

religious term, the direct equivalent of *πνεῦμα*. "It is in any case noteworthy," he declares, "that all the passages in Paul can be explained from Hellenistic usage (particularly those in which we cannot decide whether he is speaking of the *πνεῦμα* of man or of a Divine *πνεῦμα*, as, e.g., 1 Cor. v. 4, 5). Whether all may be as easily understood from the Hebrew use of *ruach* and *nephesh* or from that of *πνεῦμα* in the LXX., the theologian must determine."[1] We shall attempt briefly to examine and estimate the evidence which he adduces, and then to analyse the relevant phenomena in the Old Testament.

(1) The use of *πνεῦμα* in Hellenistic mystery-documents. (*a*) *πνεῦμα* contrasted with *σῶμα* and *σάρξ*: Kenyon, Greek Pap. i. 80: *ἐπικαλοῦμαί σε τὸν κτίσαντα . . . πᾶσαν σάρκα καὶ πᾶν πνεῦμα*: Pap. Berol. i. 177: *σοῦ τὸ σῶμα περιστελεῖ* [*ὁ θεός*], *σοῦ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα . . . ἄξει σὺν ἑαυτῷ*[2]: (*b*) Used of God: Wessely, Zauberpap. i. 72 (l. 1115): "Hail, Spirit that enters into me, according to the Divine will, in graciousness": Kenyon, *op. cit.* i. 284: "And straightway enters the Divine Spirit" (*τὸ θεῖον πνεῦμα*).[3] Cf. the prayer in the Mithras-liturgy (4. 14): "that I may be initiated and that the holy Spirit (*ἱερὸν πνεῦμα*) may blow within me."[4] The materialistic character of the latter passage is obvious. An interesting example is found in the prayer of the prophet Urbicus (Pap. Lugd. v. col. 10, 12, publ. by Dieterich): "My spirit (*πνεῦμα*) was heard by all the gods and demons"; this is expounded in detail: "My spirit was heard by the spirit of heaven . . . by the spirit of earth, etc." *πνεῦμα* is the link between earth and heaven.[5] (*c*) Identification of *πνεῦμα* with *ψυχή*. Here Reitzenstein confines himself to a group of striking instances

[1] *H.M.R.*, p. 140. [2] *H.M.R.*, p. 136. [3] *H.M.R.*, pp. 137, 136.
[4] Ed. 2 (Dieterich-Wünsch). [5] *H.M.R.*, p. 138.

from Philo. He holds that in more philosophical circles, while the πνεῦμα-description of the higher life is known, the conception of ψυχή as the antithesis of σῶμα has taken so firm a root that it cannot be displaced. But it is impossible to mistake the significance of such sentences as *De Abrah.* 236: "All those who are able to behold things in a bodiless and naked form, who live rather for the soul (ψυχῇ) than for the body." Here and in numerous other places, ψυχή stands for the spiritual life. A very suggestive example occurs in a prayer of the Mithras-liturgy (14. 24 f.): "Abide with me in my soul (ψυχῇ), forsake me not." Obviously no sharp distinction could here be drawn between ψυχή and πνεῦμα.

(2) πνευματικός and ψυχικός in the Mystery-literature. The form in which Reitzenstein has presented his material on this point makes it difficult to distinguish between the actual data and his bold inferences from them. In our last paragraph we noted the conception of the Divine Spirit (πνεῦμα) as entering the human personality. This being so, we might expect to find the corresponding adjective to describe the condition of the spirit-possessed person. As a matter of fact, only one instance is adduced, from Wessely, Zauberpap. i. 89 (l. 1778), where Eros is addressed as "lord of all *spiritual* perception (πνευματικῆς αἰσθήσεως) of all hidden (i.e., Divine) things." The contrasted term ψυχικός seems only to occur once in the extant fragments, but the passage is very suggestive. In the opening prayer of the Mithras-liturgy, the aspirant after the vision of God makes supplication: "For to-day I, a mortal born of mortal womb, exalted by Almighty power and incorruptible right hand, with immortal eyes shall behold by immortal spirit the immortal Aeon and Lord of the crowns of fire, I who have been sanctified by sacred rites, while, for a little, my human natural powers (ἀνθρωπινῆς μου ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως)

stay behind . . . Stand still, mortal nature of man." [1] Obviously ψυχικῆς here describes human nature as apart from πνεῦμα. The other examples to which Reitzenstein refers come from Gnostic documents of post-Christian date. He asserts without argument that the well-known Gnostic categories, σαρκικοί, ψυχικοί, and πνευματικοί cannot have had their origin in Paul's usage (e.g., 1 Cor. iii. 1), but must be due to the Hellenistic Mystery-Religions, which recognised three classes, unbelievers, proselytes (*religiosi*), and τέλειοι (or, πνευματικοί). He seems to base his position largely on the fact that in the Gnostic classification the use of ψυχικός for an intermediate group reveals the persistence of the more philosophical idea of ψυχή as practically synonymous with πνεῦμα, so that no sharp division had to be made. But in Paul also there are various instances, as we have seen, in which no clear distinction is drawn between ψυχή and πνεῦμα. And at this point it may be worth while to remind ourselves of a possibility which may not be summarily ruled out. The Hellenistic documents from which quotations have been made cannot be dated with any confidence. In a former article we noted the remarkable influence of certain Jewish conceptions on Egyptian magical papyri. When we remember how fluctuating were the boundary-lines between various phases of Gnosticism and Pagan religious communities, it is by no means impossible to believe that semi-Christian Gnostic influence filtered into these Hellenistic Mystery-brotherhoods, leaving its mark both upon ideas and terminology.

Without, however, pressing this point, let us glance at Reitzenstein's parallels between what he calls the "double-being" of Paul and corresponding phenomena in the Mystery-Religions. Here we must guard against clear-cut definitions and rigidly logical inferences. For we move in an extra-

[1] *Eine Mithrasliturgie*[2], 4. 18 ff.

ordinarily elusive sphere. "If it be asked," says Dr. Inge, "which is our personality, the shifting *moi* (as Fénelon calls it) or the ideal self, the end or the developing states? we must answer that it is both and neither, and that the root of mystical religion is in the conviction that it is at once both and neither." [1] Hence we dare not isolate such an affirmation as Paul's daring words in Galatians ii. 20: "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." Indeed, the very sentence which follows reveals that Paul's is anything rather than a disintegrated life: "that which I now live *in the flesh* I live by faith, faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me." That is to say, the relation of the human individual Paul to Jesus the historic Person is never lost in an impalpable, indescribable experience. Reitzenstein lays great stress on what he regards as a sort of two-fold personality in the initiates of the Hellenistic Mystery-Religions. Thus, e.g., in the Mithras-liturgy the suppliant exclaims: "It is not possible for me, a mortal born, to rise up on high with the golden radiance of the immortal light," and he bids his human nature be still, while with his divine he attains the vision of God.[2] In the vision of the alchemist Zosimus, which reflects the popular Mystery-theology, such sentences occur as this: "The men who desire to reach virtue enter in here and become spirits (*πνεύματα*), escaping from the body." [3] Reitzenstein believes that various expressions in the poets of this period indicate a quickening of the religious sense in the direction which we are discussing, as, e.g., Lucan, *Phars.* v. 167, 168, of the inspiration of the Pythia: the god, who takes possession of her, *mentemque priorem expulit*

[1] *Christian Mysticism*, p. 33.

[2] *Eine Mithrasliturgie*[2], 4. 27–29.

[3] See Berthelot, *Les alchimistes grecs*, p. 109, 12, cited by Reitzenstein, *H.M.R.*, p. 141.

atque hominem toto sibi cedere jussit pectore. Here he takes *mens* as equal to ψυχή. That is driven out and replaced by the presence of the god himself, so that a new being arises for the time.[1] To such instances as we have quoted Reitzenstein adduces parallels from Paul, more especially the antithesis between πνευματικός and ψυχικός. On the basis of 1 Corinthians ii. 6–iii. 4, he asserts that for Paul the ψυχικός is "man pure and simple," the πνευματικός "no longer man at all." But the parallels are not relevant. So far as we can judge, the "pneumatic" condition in the Mystery-literature seems always to be associated with states of ecstasy. There is no evidence that Paul regards the πνευματικός as in any sense having ceased to be true man. For possession of the πνεῦμα is in Paul's eyes the normal, abiding condition of the Christian. We, of course, recognise his descriptions of special "pneumatic" experiences such as glossolalia and prophecy, and to them we shall return. But they are always subordinated to the permanent "fruit" of the Spirit, "Love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness," etc. (Gal. v. 22 f.). Nothing, therefore, could be more irrelevant than to take the phrases κατὰ ἄνθρωπον (1 Cor. iii. 3) and ἄνθρωποι (iii. 4) as Reitzenstein does, in a baldly literal sense.[2] The πνευματικοί are still liable to temptations and spiritual perils (Gal. vi. 1 f.). But as those who possess the pledge of the Spirit (2 Cor. v. 5) they are destined for the eternal life of God.

(3) We have seen that in one or two instances Paul adopts from the LXX. a use of νοῦς as virtually equivalent to πνεῦμα. Probably this implies, as Reitzenstein urges, that the usage was not unfamiliar to the Apostle and his readers. It would be unsafe to dogmatise, but it is certainly suggestive to find that in the Hermetic mystical literature νοῦς appears often to be a synonym for πνεῦμα. Thus in

[1] *H.M.R.*, p. 150. [2] *H.M.R.*, p. 168.

the famous *Λόγος τέλειος*, extracted by Reitzenstein from the Papyrus Mimaut,[1] thanks are given to the Highest because he has graciously bestowed "spirit, revelation, and knowledge" (*νοῦν, λόγον, γνῶσιν*). In document XII. (XIII.) of the Hermetic *Corpus*, *ὁ νοῦς* is described as the "soul" (*ψυχή*) of God, which rules over everything.[2] This conception appears continually in *Poimandres*. The conception, no doubt, has markedly philosophical affinities,[3] but it has filtered down into popular religion. Very significant is a passage in the *Κρατὴρ ἢ Μονάς*: "All who were baptized in the *νοῦς*, these partake of *γνῶσις* and become *τέλειοι ἄνθρωποι*, having received the *νοῦς* (§ 4). It is evidently a Divine gift. We may compare *Mithras-liturgy*, 4. 13: "in order that I may be regenerated by *νόημα*," which we are almost bound to translate by "spirit." It lies outside our present purpose to deal with the intimate connexion between *νοῦς* and *λόγος*, the thought being regarded in Hermetic philosophical mythology as the father of the Word. But the hypothesis maintained by Reitzenstein that Egyptian religion, as embodied in the Hermetic Mystery-literature, had really become the religion of *νοῦς*, not in the sense of "understanding," but of a revealing deity, receives a good deal of corroboration from the documents which have come down to us.

Before going further, let us try to ascertain the positions which may be regarded as established. Reitzenstein has certainly shown that in documents of the Hellenistic Mystery-Religions *πνεῦμα* and *νοῦς* are used to denote the Divine life or spirit in itself, or that life or spirit as imparted to those who fulfil certain religious conditions, and, especially, some prescribed initiation. They become, in short, religious terms. It is also evident that a distinction can now be

[1] See *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft*, 1904, p. 393 ff.
[2] Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, p. 102, note 1.
[3] See, e.g., Zielinski, *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft*, 1906, pp. 25, 35, 56.

drawn between πνεῦμα and ψυχή, the principle of Divine life being contrasted with that of merely human. But instances are exceedingly uncommon, and Reitzenstein himself admits that ψυχή has been so firmly entrenched as the antithesis of σῶμα that it could with difficulty be used in a disparaging sense. It need scarcely be observed that the usages in question reveal a marked departure from the ordinary Greek use of πνεῦμα or νοῦς. Reitzenstein would attribute their appearance mainly to Oriental influence, a realm in which a man like Paul would easily find himself at home. But the instance, e.g., which he cites from Lucan has surely distinct affinities with earlier Hellenic thought: cf., e.g., Aesch. *Prom.* 902 ff.: ἔξω δὲ δρόμου φέρομαι λύσσης πνεύματι μάργῳ, where the "raging spirit of frenzy" is the visitation of a god. When we remember how prevalent was the conception of the ἔνθεος, the person filled with the God, and recall the derivation of πνεῦμα from πνέω, to "blow" or "breathe," it seems precarious to restrict the emergence of such ideas to a period dominated by its contact with Oriental religions. One question, perhaps, should here be touched upon. Reitzenstein, Heitmüller and others lay stress on the notion that Paul, like his Stoic contemporaries and the devotees of the Mystery-Religions, conceived the πνεῦμα to be substance as well as power. In the Mithras-liturgy, e.g., one of the instructions given runs: "Take up your stand and draw the πνεῦμα from the divine . . . and say, Come to me, O Lord" (10. 23 ff.). That is typical of the πνεῦμα-conception in Hellenistic religious literature. Traces of a similar "animism" may be found in Hebrew thought. But there, as Volz shows, with the ethical deepening of religion, the conception of power in *ruach* as the Spirit of God comes to overshadow that of a substance imparted.[1] It is from this standpoint,

[1] See *Der Geist Gottes im A.T.*, pp. 76, 77.

as we shall discover, that Paul's thought must, in the main, be estimated. We would frankly admit that the processes of ancient psychology are so far removed from our habits of thought that it is unsafe to deny the survival of realistic notions side by side with such profoundly ethical conceptions as those most prominent in Paul's use of πνεῦμα. We must recognise that he lived in an atmosphere in which everything causal was regarded as substantial, in which "force" and "body" constituted no antithesis.[1] But it is difficult to find unmistakable traces of such a view even in Paul's speculations on the σῶμα πνευματικόν. If his conception of πνεῦμα was highly animistic, he has succeeded even there in concealing it. To interpret 1 Corinthians vii. 14, where Paul speaks of an unbelieving husband being sanctified by his believing wife, as referring to a physical process by which the πνεῦμα is transmitted (so Heitmüller),[2] is grossly to caricature the Apostle's entire standpoint in the passage.

In view of the conclusions reached, we must now return to Reitzenstein's original inquiry as to whether Paul's use of the terms πνεῦμα, ψυχή, νοῦς, πνευματικός, and ψυχικός is more easily explained from Hellenistic religious usage or from the Old Testament. Our examination of Reitzenstein's material discloses an interesting affinity between conceptions of the indwelling divine spirit belonging to the Mystery-Religions, and Paul's central idea of the gift of the πνεῦμα. But one omission is noteworthy. Nothing adduced is strictly relevant to the profoundly ethical contrast which Paul draws between σάρξ, "flesh" (not σῶμα) and πνεῦμα, "spirit." Further, on Reitzenstein's own showing, the antithesis between πνεῦμα and ψυχή, so funda-

[1] Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 106: *quod facit corpus est.* It is remarkable to find the blending of these ideas in recent scientific speculation on matter and energy. [2] *Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus*, p. 19.

mental for Paul, is exceedingly rare, inasmuch as ψυχή is always apt to retain its significance as the higher part of man, in opposition to σῶμα.

What light is thrown on the situation by the Old Testament? Practically every leading conception in this sphere of Paul's religious thought may be said to have its roots definitely laid in that soil. In a number of Old Testament passages, *bāsār*, "flesh," like many of the physical organs of man (e.g., liver, kidneys), has a psychical connotation (e.g. Job iv. 15, Ps. lxxxiv. 3, Ezek. xxxvi. 26); and "in an important group of cases, 'flesh' is used of man, or man's essential nature, in contrast with God, or with 'spirit' to emphasise man's frailty, dependence, or incapacity" (Isa. xxxi. 3, xl. 6, Ps. lvi. 4, Jer. xvii. 5, etc.).[1] Here is the palpable foundation for Paul's conception of σάρξ, a factor which he had discovered in his own experience as making for evil, although he affords no evidence for the hypothesis of an inherently evil matter. This σάρξ, with its evil affections, can be overcome by πνεῦμα. We have already seen that for Paul πνεῦμα means, in an overwhelming number of instances, the Divine gift to faith in Christ, the indwelling Spirit of God, or the indwelling Christ. Again his thought links on directly to the Old Testament. There, the conception of the *ruach* of God, developing with that of God Himself, came to be regarded as the source of prophetic inspiration (Ezek. ii. 2), the instrument of Divine revelation generally (Zech. vii. 12), and, most notably, the endowment for special functions (Isa. lxi. 1 f.), and for character (Ps. li. 11). The Old Testament had conceived man's relation to God "along two principal lines, namely, that of the Spirit of God as acting more or less

[1] See the admirable discussion in Prof. Wheeler Robinson's *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, pp. 22–25, a work to which we are deeply indebted in this section of the article.

intermittently and externally upon man, and that of spiritual fellowship with God, which sought realisation in many ways." [1] These lines converge in Paul, and are fused together through his personal experience of the risen Christ. The relation of πνεῦμα to ψυχή and of πνευματικός to ψυχικός in Paul finds its direct explanation in Old Testament usage. We noted that occasionally the Apostle makes no apparent distinction between the Divine πνεῦμα as imparted, and the resultant human life which he designates πνεῦμα, e.g., Romans viii. 10. So also, e.g., in Ezekiel xi. 19, xxxvi. 26, no line of cleavage can be drawn between the Divine and the (renewed) human *ruach*.[2]

Of special interest is the connexion of Paul's terminology with the relationships of *ruach* (πνεῦμα in LXX.) and *nephesh* (ψυχή in LXX.), in the Old Testament. A group of passages in Paul has been referred to, in which πνεῦμα seems to denote the inner life of man, apart from any emphasis on its Divine elements. This usage has often complicated the exegesis of the Epistles, but it is only another proof of Paul's fidelity to Old Testament terminology. After the Exile, *ruach* encroaches on the sphere of *nephesh*, with which it has always been akin, and comes to denote "the normal breath-soul as the principle of life in man" [3]; see especially Isaiah xxvi. 9: "with my *nephesh* I desired thee in the night, yea, with my *ruach* within me, I sought longingly for thee"; and compare the exact parallel in Psalm lxxvii. 3, 4. Finally, the use of *nephesh* (ψυχή) in the Old Testament to signify the life-principle both in itself and as the basis of individuality, and further, in connexion with a wide range of states of consciousness (particularly, emotional),[4] supplies a luminous background (*a*) for Paul's religious use of πνεῦμα,

[1] Wheeler Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 125. [2] See Volz, *op. cit.*, p. 76, note 1.
[3] See Wheeler Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 19, 110.
[4] Wheeler Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 17.

(*b*) for the sharp antithesis between πνευματικός and ψυχικός, which rests essentially on normal Old Testament usage.

A word must be said as to the Old Testament affinities of νοῦς. Following O. T. practice, Paul frequently uses καρδία (=*lēb*), "heart," as a more or less general description of the inner life of man, occasionally emphasising its emotional, intellectual, or volitional character, all these being aspects of *lēb* which receive separate prominence in the O. T. (e.g., Judg. xviii. 20, 1 Kings iii. 9, 1 Sam. ii. 35).[1] But the range of καρδία as denoting intellectual activities is curtailed by Paul's employment of νοῦς. And the existence beside it, in a scarcely distinguishable sense, of the term συνείδησις, which belongs to Greek (popular) philosophy, suggests that this is the point in his psychological terminology at which Paul was chiefly affected by contemporary usage. But, as we have seen, his employment of νοῦς as the equivalent of πνεῦμα, the phenomenon singled out by Reitzenstein in this connexion for comparison with the Mystery-terminology, depends on quotations from the LXX., and cannot, therefore, be made the basis of any far-reaching hypothesis.

In our next article we shall deal with terms which in Paul and the Mystery-Religions are descriptive of crucial pneumatic activities. H. A. A. Kennedy.

STUDIES IN CONVERSION.

VIII. Chalmers.

The Evangelical Revival was blessing England with the influences of a spiritual springtime by the middle of the eighteenth century. But, at that time and for long afterwards, Scotland still lay in the cold and wintry grasp of Moderatism ; and it was not till the commencement of the

[1] See Wheeler Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

nineteenth century that the spiritual movement crossed the Border. Scotland became sure of the blessing only when, at the close of the first decade of the nineteenth century, the new truths laid hold of the mind of Thomas Chalmers. This does not mean that the religious discoveries of Wesley, Whitefield and Newton had been unheard-of in the North. As early as 1741 Whitefield visited Scotland, and by means of his preaching a revival similar to that which through his labours had been experienced at many places in England took place at Cambuslang. Besides, during the reign of Moderatism the pure Gospel was kept alive in the Church of the Erskines; and in the Establishment itself it was the property of many a humble soul and of many a family. As an illustration of this might be cited the family in which Thomas Chalmers himself was born; for both the father and the mother were genuinely evangelical, though their religion did not exercise the influence which might have been expected on their gifted son. But, till the conversion of Chalmers, Moderatism not only occupied the high places in the Church but reigned over the convictions and sentiments of the community at large.

Chalmers is a remarkable example of how much a change taking place in the consciousness of a single man may do to affect an entire country. Unquestionably he was the greatest Scotsman of his day, and he would be assigned a place in any list of the ten greatest men whom the country has produced. Indeed, in his own peculiar line—that of oratory—he would have a good chance of being included in any list of the ten foremost in the entire history of the world. When, therefore, the principles of Evangelicalism captured him, they were assured of diffusion throughout the whole country.

Chalmers stamped his own image on the Evangelicalism of Scotland; and this was the stamp of a large nature.

If, as Scotsmen flatter themselves, Evangelicalism has attained on their side of the Border to a more robust and attractive development than in the South, this is in a large measure attributable to him. He was a man of academic tastes and liberal culture ; and Evangelicalism has not, as a rule, exhibited the intellectual narrowness and obscurantism sometimes charged against it in England, by which such spirits have been repelled from it as the late Robertson of Brighton. Chalmers was a political economist, manifesting intense interest in such subjects as pauperism and the conditions of life in large cities ; and Scottish Evangelicalism has been honourably identified with patriotism and public life. This is why a movement like that associated with the name of Keswick, in which the Evangelicalism of the South at present finds expression—much to the benefit, it cannot be doubted, of those connected with it—fails to satisfy visitors from the North, who feel the atmosphere too much that of a coterie and the spirit too remote from the actual life of the nation.

Chalmers was born in 1780 at Anstruther, a Fifeshire town, of which his father was provost for many years. He was sent to the University of St. Andrew's at the inconceivably early age of eleven, and he was actually licensed to preach when he was nineteen—that is, little, if anything, above the age when students nowadays enter college. The law of the Church required that candidates should be one-and-twenty before receiving licence ; but an old statute was fished-up allowing exception to be made in a case of extraordinary prematurity ; and by this side-door he was admitted to the ministry as "a lad of pregnant parts."

At the university his acquirements were not remarkable as a whole. But in one department—that of mathematics and natural philosophy—he gave promise of unusual talent ; and, after being licensed to preach and leaving St. Andrews,

he prosecuted mathematical and scientific studies further at the University of Edinburgh.

At that time the science of Europe, receiving inspiration and direction largely from France, was deeply tinged with scepticism ; and Chalmers, as a student, went through a painful period, when he was haunted by the doubt, so prevalent in the subsequent century, when science made such rapid progress and its results became the property of the common man, that the universe might be a mere machine, producing everything from its own resources by unalterable laws, without any intelligence at the origin or any love at the heart of it. From the perusal, however, of Jonathan Edwards' famous *Treatise on the Will* he derived a conception of nature in which the reign of law was combined with belief in an omnipotent and omniscient Lawgiver ; and, for a whole year, he lived in a kind of ecstasy, as his scientific studies opened out before his mind the extent and magnificence of the universe, and his religious belief enabled him to think of the divine wisdom as presiding over all. This was the first form in which religion kindled his mind ; and that the effects were permanent may be seen in his *Astronomical Discourses*, one or two of which may perhaps be pronounced the grandest efforts of the Christian pulpit. Many years afterwards he wrote to his wife, in reference to the impressions of these student days : " Oh that God possessed me with a sense of His holiness and His love as He at one time possessed me with a sense of His greatness and His power, and His pervading agency ! I remember, when a student of Divinity, and long before I could relish Evangelical sentiments, I spent nearly a twelvemonth in a sort of mental elysium ; and the one idea which ministered to my soul in all its rapture was the magnificence of the Godhead, and the universal subordination of all things to the one great purpose for which He evolved and was supporting creation. I should like

to be so inspired over again, but with such a view of Deity as coalesced and was in harmony with the doctrine of the New Testament." [1]

It will be observed that the religious impressions of this

[1] In his *Lectures on the Scottish Church* Dean Stanley seized on this passage as a proof that, in his later years, Chalmers looked back on the religious impressions of his Moderate days as more wholesome than the more ardent and agitated feelings of his subsequent religion. But Principal Rainy, in the lectures delivered by him in reply to those of the Dean, showed that this was a mistaken inference:—"The days referred to were referred to just because in Dr. Chalmers' belief they were the days before the awaking of the true religious life. In those days, in Dr. Chalmers' case, as in many another, a glow of earnest sentiment and high enthusiasm gathered around the great ideas of the divine power and omnipresence. They were true thoughts, and worthy to be realised with such a glow of feeling; and this perception of truth he ascribed to the Author of all good gifts. But it was his deliberate and most assured judgment that this kind of religion, in his own case, was the religion of one who had not returned to God, who had not bowed to God's will, who had never realised his own relation to God, who was not at peace with God. It was his deliberate judgment that this religion had not made him a man of God, and that by and by it proved every way a failure. And that completeness of delighted sentiment, that thorough entrancement in the great thought he spoke of, was possible, just because the feeling never touched the real question between God and him, never revealed to him his true self nor the true God. A change came. The great question of sin arose in its simple reality, the question of salvation. The revelation came of a Saviour, of an atonement, of grace, of the divine omnipotent love that saves the lost, of holiness that thrilled his heart with a sorrow and a longing he had never known before. Thenceforth he lived in a new world—a far greater world, a far intenser. As the narrow material heavens of the old astronomers have broken up and widened to our eyes to infinite depths that our souls ache to fathom, so his moral and spiritual horizons fell back every way. But while, it opened for him a far truer, deeper peace, that new world was in one sense less peaceful than the former; for him, as for each man who experiences such a history, it became a scene of conflict—hopeful, trustful, joyful conflict, yet stern and often weary. Ah, to have the whole soul brought to final harmony with the hopes and longings that this new world inspired, with the new apprehension of what God is, Christ is!—that was so great a thing, and a thing so withstood by the strange rebellious principle within, that the heart strove and yearned with sorrowful and contrite longings. To be so attuned to the meaning, and possessed by the power of holiness and of love, the pitying love that bends over sinners, as once he had been with impressions of magnificent and unwearied power! But the latter, how possible, how unresisted, how easily, in those early days, it could touch a mind like his; the former, how hard and high, how all but impossible, the continued experience of life through death."

student period, though sublime and salutary, had nothing distinctively Christian about them. They were rather the sentiments common to all religions, which may be experienced by a heathen; as they actually were in ancient times by such men as Plato and Cicero. For what was distinctively Christian he had, as yet, no relish, but rather the reverse. At St. Andrew's Moderatism was rampant, and he fell completely under its spell. "We inhaled," he says himself, "not a distaste only but a positive contempt for all that is properly and peculiarly Gospel." Accordingly, when he came out of the divinity-hall as a fully fledged divine, he might have passed for a perfect specimen of a young Moderate.

At first he had to betake himself to tutoring in a noble family; but he found the restraint and humiliation of such a position insufferable. Apparently he was not treated well; but it would not have been easy to treat him as well as he expected; for he was full of high-flown notions of his own dignity and was constantly on the outlook for slights. In his letters of this period there is a remarkable resemblance to those of Burns, when the poet is in his most truculent mood, boasting of his independence and launching forth against the lordly state and arrogant assuming of the great.

When he began to preach, it was with himself and the effect which he was producing that his mind was occupied. For instance, in writing home, he unconsciously speaks of his first sermon as his "first public exhibition." Wherever he went, his anxiety was to act his part "with dignity and with effect"; yet he was constantly haunted by thought of being surrounded with "the attempts of an envious and unprincipled malignity." He was full of jealousy for the honour of his order, and his ideal of a parish minister was, in his own words, "to be a distinguished member of society, the ornament of a most respectable profession, the virtuous companion of the great, and a generous consolation to all the

sickness and poverty around him." He was passionately ambitious of academic renown, and it was entirely to his taste when he was appointed as locum tenens for the professor of mathematics at St. Andrew's in session 1802–3. Into this work he threw himself with the utmost eagerness ; but it was with no enthusiasm that he entered on his work as a minister of the Gospel when, a week after the close of the session, he was ordained, at the age of three-and-twenty, over the rural parish of Kilmany, in the north of Fife, to which he had been presented by the professors of his college. To him the life of a parish minister in the country appeared a dreary exile ; for he was panting for fame—for academic distinction and literary renown.

So strong was this desire that, the next winter, he was back in St. Andrew's forming mathematical and scientific classes, though he had no official position and though his endeavours were opposed by the authorities of the university. He used to teach in the city all the week, ride out on Saturday to Kilmany, make absolutely necessary visits, preach on Sunday after the most hurried preparation, and rush back to the city on Monday morning. The following session the Presbytery stepped in to restrain him ; but he yielded with the worst possible grace ; and for years he continued to reside at St Andrew's during the winter on the plea that the manse at Kilmany was out of order. He used to say openly in those days, and he published the statement in print, that a clergyman could do all his work in two days of the week and have the other five to extend his influence and build up his fame in any way which might be agreeable to himself. He became a candidate for the chair of mathematics in St. Andrew's and for that of natural philosophy in Edinburgh. He endeavoured to bring himself into notice by pamphlets on such subjects as the Stability of National Resources. He threw himself with ardour into volunteering, an invasion

of the country by Buonaparte being anticipated at the time. He sometimes became absorbed in gardening. In short, as one of his parishioners, John Bonthron, who came often to the manse, said, he was always to be found busy at something, but never at the work of his own calling.

Such was Chalmers during the first seven years of his ministry; and it must be confessed, that to contemplate him at this period is not a lovely sight. It is easy to see, indeed, the mighty brain already at work which was afterwards to accomplish such wonders; as well as the passionate nature, the restless energy, the imperious will; but as yet self is the centre of everything, ambition consumes him, and he is sick with the fever of suspicion and disappointment. A typical Moderate he has been already called; and such he was. Moderatism was not heresy; it was sometimes jealously orthodox, though it knew only the surface of the dogmas it accepted. Its apostles displayed a sufficient amount of independence and other manly virtues; and much can with justice be said of their services to the literature and learning of the country. But the one fatal thing about them was that, being religious teachers, they were without religion. They were worldly men, vain, ambitious and self-seeking; and their hearts were anywhere rather than in the spiritual work of their office.

There could not be a greater contrast than between the Chalmers of this period, full to the lips of selfishness, ambition and pride, and the Chalmers of subsequent years, who, when his fame was at its height, was remarkable for nothing so much as simplicity and humility, while his whole being overflowed with compassion for the poor and needy and with sympathy and help for every good cause.

We must now inquire to what this transformation was due.

As has happened in many other cases, the instrumentality employed by Providence was affliction. First, his

brother George, a sailor, died, a victim to consumption. He passed away in his father's house at Anstruther in the peace of God ; and during his last illness a singular experience fell to the lot of the brother visiting him. Being a bitter enemy of Evangelicalism, the minister of Kilmany had not concealed his sentiments but had warned his people against the Evangelical books from the South which were spreading in the country ; and among others he had denounced those of John Newton by name. But one of the books which his dying brother asked to have read to him was by Newton ; and the young minister not only had to read aloud in these solemn circumstances the book he had denounced, but he saw it filling the departing soul with rapture for its last journey. Not long time afterwards he had again to be in the same place, by the deathbed of a sister, who also died joyously in the same faith. She was a victim to the same insidious disease, which proceeded to lay its grasp on two other sisters. And then it seemed as if he himself were to be the next victim. For four months he was confined to his bed in Kilmany manse ; for half-a-year he was unable to appear in the pulpit ; and, when he returned to the world again, he bore the broken and delicate look of an invalid.

But these months of retirement formed the turning-point of his life, and in the chamber over which death seemed to be flapping his wings he became a new creature. In a change of this kind there is a mystery with which no stranger intermeddleth and which even the subject of it could only partially explain ; yet in the journal which Chalmers composed at this period we can follow the stages of the transformation from afar.

First, there was that sight of eternity which has so often been the commencement of earnest religion and which makes the ambitions of the world shrivel up like paper in the flames. The pursuit of honour and the dreams of success in which

he had been indulging appeared to him, in the prospect of death, to be no better than the fancies of a madman. He had been putting self in the place of God. Henceforth, he resolved, he would live for God and eternity only.

Then ensued what his biographer calls "the effort after a pure and heavenly morality." He noted down every outbreak of temper, every outburst of self-assertion, every act of unkindness or inconsiderateness. He was determined to crucify self and to overcome his besetting sins. But he found, as Luther did before him, that the more he washed his hands, the less clean they were; he was only dealing with the symptoms of the disease, while the centre from which these proceeded was untouched.

At this point he was specially helped by one of the great books of the English Evangelical Revival—Wilberforce's *Practical View*.[1] He began to realise what Christ has done

[1] With Wilberforce he had a point of connexion in identity of politics, and he was an intense admirer of the efforts against the Slave Trade which the abolitionist was then making. But there is, besides, a philosophic strain in the *Practical View* kindred to that in the mind of Chalmers; for instance, the mode in which the presence of the passions in religion is justified—because the passions need the restraint of religion and religion needs the impulse communicated by the passions—is very like a choice bit of Chalmers' own exposition. The two men met in subsequent life, and an account of the scene has come down from the friendly pen of Joseph John Gurney:—"Our morning passed delightfully; Chalmers was indeed comparatively silent, as he often is when many persons are collected, and the stream of conversation flowed between ourselves and the ever lively Wilberforce. I have seldom observed a more amusing and pleasing contrast between two great men than between Wilberforce and Chalmers. Chalmers is stout and erect with a broad countenance—Wilberforce minute and singularly twisted. Chalmers both in body and mind moves with a deliberate step—Wilberforce, infirm as he is in his advanced years, flies about with astonishing activity, and while, with nimble fingers, he seizes on everything that adorns or diversifies his path, his mind flits from object to object with unceasing versatility. I often think that particular men bear about with them an analogy to particular animals: Chalmers is like a good-tempered lion—Wilberforce is like a bee. Chalmers can say a pleasant thing now and then and laugh when he has said it, and he has a strong touch of humour in his countenance, but in general he is grave, his thoughts grow to a great size before they are uttered—Wilberforce sparkles with life and wit, and the characteristic of his mind is rapid pro-

for sinners, and what inexhaustible help is to be found in Him. He saw that the righteousness with which God is well pleased is not a reward bestowed at the end of a lifetime of struggle and obedience, but is the gift of God Himself and forms the beginning of practical Christianity. This was the same discovery as had been made before him by St. Paul and by Luther ; but it was characteristic that what Chalmers chiefly gloried in was not the satisfaction which the Evangelical Scheme affords for sins that are past, but the power which it furnishes for a course of new obedience. He was in search of a motive strong enough to sustain a life of constant and growing devotion to God ; and he found it, first, in the gratitude excited by complete and gratuitous forgiveness and, then, in the influence of lifelong union and communion with Christ. In defending the Evangelicalism which he had once despised and denounced this was always the ground he took up—that, though constantly speaking about morality, Moderatism did not make men truly moral ; but the Gospel, while denying the ability of sinful men to please God by their own good works, yet, by bringing men nigh to God and inspiring them with the desire to do His will and to be like His Son from motives of love and gratitude, carries them to a far higher level of morality.

In his own person he was soon able to prove that this

ductiveness. A man might be in Chalmers' company for an hour, especially in a party, without knowing who or what he was—though in the end he would be sure to be detected by some unexpected display of powerful originality. Wilberforce, except when fairly asleep, is never latent. Chalmers knows how to veil himself in a decent cloud—Wilberforce is always in sunshine ; seldom, I believe, has any mind been more strung to love and praise. Yet these persons, distinguished as they are from the world at large, and from each other, present some admirable points of resemblance : both of them are broad thinkers and keen feelers ; both are arrayed in humility, meekness and charity ; both appear to hold self in little reputation : above all, both love the Lord Jesus Christ, and reverently acknowledge Him to be their only Saviour."

was no idle theory. When he rose from his sick-bed and ascended his pulpit again, it was obvious to all that he was an altered man. The change was most marked in his fulfilment of pastoral duty. Once he had boasted that he could do all the work demanded by his office in two days of the week ; but now seven days seemed all too short for what he had to do. He seemed to be always preaching, always visiting, always studying, always devising new schemes for benefiting the parish or enlisting his parishioners in work for the welfare of others. Once in the General Assembly his old statement—about two days of the week being enough for a minister's work, the rest being devoted to mathematics or any similar pursuit—was brought up against him by an opponent ; when, addressing the moderator, the accused made the following touching reply. "Alas, sir, so I thought in my ignorance and pride. I have now no reserve in saying that the sentiment was wrong, and that, in the utterance of it, I penned what was outrageously wrong. Strangely blinded that I was :—What, sir, is the object of mathematical science ? Magnitude and the proportions of magnitude. But then, sir, I had forgotten two magnitudes—I thought not of the littleness of time, and I recklessly thought not of the greatness of eternity."

The change in his inner life, which only he himself could see, was as great as that in the professional fidelity which lay open to the observation of all. Of this we possess an imperishable record in a diary which he began to keep with considerable fulness and which is printed in his Memoirs ; and rarely in the whole range of Christian biography will there be found an account more interesting of the early stages of the new life. On these pages there rests a freshness like that of the dawn, with a delicacy and simplicity by which every reader must be captivated. Not only was prayer with him now a daily and an hourly habit, but he set apart a

special season once a month for prolonged communion with God ; and of these hidden hours numerous records have been preserved in the journal. Here we are permitted to see in almost absolute nakedness the communion of a soul with God. We see him laying hold afresh of the great new convictions that had mastered him and turning these into prayers for a more perfect faith and a more comprehensive appreciation of the fulness treasured up in Christ. We see him wrestling with besetting sins, which still clung to him, such as the passion for human applause, the tendency to be suspicious and touchy, the habit of turning others into ridicule or making a joke of serious things, and the difficulty of being patient with his parents, who were turning old and, on account of deafness and slowness of apprehension, were trying to a temper like his. He is stirred with the most touching anxiety for the conversion of his own relatives, and he seeks by wrestling prayer to ensure that the sick and dying among his parishioners are well prepared before they pass away. In order to get further into the heart of Scripture, he begins again the study of Hebrew and Greek ; and his reading takes a wide range not only among works of learning but among books of the kind he had once despised—the writings of such authors as Baxter, Bunyan, Henry, Doddridge, Newton and Cowper. There were of course ups and downs in his state of feeling ; but the change was decisive : religion was no longer a burden and a drudgery, but an inspiration and a passion which made all burdens light.

The effects were not long of appearing also in other lives. The appeals of the new man from the pulpit were irresistible ; and he followed them up by earnest dealing with his parishioners one by one, training himself to introduce religious topics into ordinary conversation. The valley in which Kilmany lies was shaken with the movement of the Spirit of God, and in its farmhouses and cottages the

light of true religion began to shine. But Chalmers was as anxious as in his own case that the new Gospel should prove itself in the lives of his parishioners not merely a set of new opinions but a power for righteousness. Nor was he disappointed. When, in 1815, he was leaving Kilmany for Glasgow, he issued an address to his parishioners ; and this was the point to which he directed attention :—" And here I cannot but record the effect of an actual though undesigned experience, which I prosecuted for upwards of twelve years among you. For the greater part of that time I could expatiate on the meanness of dishonesty, on the villainy of falsehood, on the despicable arts of calumny ; in a word, upon all those deformities of character which awaken the natural indignation of the human heart against the pests and disturbers of human society. Now, could I, upon the strength of these warm expostulations, have got the thief to give up his stealing, and the evil speaker his censoriousness, and the liar his deviations from truth, I should have felt all the repose of one who had gotten his ultimate object. It never occurred to me that all this might have been done, and yet the soul of every hearer have remained in full alienation from God ; and that, even could I have established in the bosom of one who stole such a principle of abhorrence at the meanness of dishonesty that he was prevailed upon to steal no more, he might still have retained a heart as completely unturned to God and as totally unpossessed by a principle of love to Him as before. In a word, though I might have made him a more upright and honourable man, I might have left him as destitute of the essence of religious principle as ever. But the interesting fact is, that during the whole of that period in which I made no attempt against the natural enmity of the mind to God ; while I was inattentive to the way in which this enmity is dissolved, even by the free offer on the one hand and the

believing acceptance on the other of the Gospel salvation ; while Christ, through whose blood the sinner, who by nature stands afar off, is brought near to the heavenly Lawgiver, whom he has offended, was scarcely ever spoken of, or spoken of in such a way as stripped Him of all the importance of His character and His offices ; even at this time I certainly did press the reformations of honour, and truth, and integrity among my people ; but I never once heard of any such reformations having been effected amongst them. If there was anything at all brought about in this way, it was more than ever I got any account of. I am not sensible that all the vehemence with which I urged the virtues and the proprieties of social life had the weight of a feather on the moral habits of my parishioners. And it was not till I got impressed by the utter alienation of the heart in all its desires and affections from God ; it was not till reconciliation to Him became the distinct and the prominent object of my ministerial exertions ; it was not till I took the Scriptural way of laying the method of reconciliation before them ; it was not till the free offer of forgiveness through the blood of Christ was urged upon their acceptance, and the Holy Spirit, given through the channel of Christ's mediatorship to all who ask Him, was set before them as the unceasing object of their dependence and their prayers ; in one word, it was not till the contemplations of my people were turned to these great and essential elements in the business of a soul providing for its interest with God and the concerns of its eternity, that I ever heard of any of those subordinate reformations which I aforetime made the earnest and the zealous, but, I am afraid, at the same time the ultimate object of my earlier ministrations. Ye servants, whose scrupulous fidelity has now attracted the notice, and drawn forth in my hearing a delightful testimony from your masters, what mischief you would have done, had your zeal for doctrines and sacraments

been accompanied by the sloth and the remissness, and what, in the prevailing tone of moral relaxation, is counted the allowable purloining of your earlier days. But a sense of your Heavenly Master's eye has brought another influence upon you ; and, while you are thus striving to adorn the doctrine of God your Saviour in all things, you may, poor as you are, reclaim the great ones of the land to the acknowledgment of the faith. You have at least taught me that to preach Christ is the only effective way of preaching morality in all its branches ; and out of your humble cottage-homes have I gathered a lesson, which, I pray God, I may be enabled to carry out with all its simplicity into a wider theatre, and to bring with all the power of its subduing efficacy upon the vices of a more crowded population."

In the absence of a detailed account of his conversion from Chalmers' own hand, this autobiographical contrast between the old things which had passed away and the all things which had become new is of matchless value. Indeed, when the sincerity of the man, the closeness of his observation and the range of his subsequent influence are taken into account, this must be reckoned one of the most remarkable documents in the entire range of Church History. It has a special bearing on the vocation of the preacher, and it will continue to serve to future generations of students and ministers as a beacon-light to reveal both the path to be avoided and that to be pursued by those devoting their energies to the coming of the Kingdom of God.

JAMES STALKER.

PERSONALITY AND GRACE.

IX. JUSTIFICATION.

WITH that demand for moral sincerity, grace is manifestly as loyal to the moral requirements as to the religious, as

heedful of the moral personality as of the appeal of God. But why should it go farther ? Why do not ideas of personal duty and personal responsibility meet all the needs of the moral personality ? What can religion be more than illumination on these matters, an illumination which, considering how hard and external our moral judgments are, we may gladly admit is a succour morality greatly needs ?

But the moment we escape from a hard, external, legal judgment of conscience, the moral problem is larger and more insoluble than ever, and we feel ourselves more than ever in the coils of that hypocrisy with which we can have no right relation to truth either in faith or penitence.

The first and sternest reality we meet in life is moral failure. If we see our moral failure in the light of a new conception of responsibility, yet our morality remains in essence a legal rule, what do we face, if not a remorse from which there is no way of escape except to ignore its cause ? And is not the desire to overlook the causes of remorse the well-spring of all hypocrisy ? Nor can it ever cease to flow till there is some moral reality in saying that sins are pardoned. So long as the forgiveness of sins is only a legal fiction, no way lies open towards moral sincerity.

As the want of sincerity stands between us and God's appeal, so unpardoned sin stands between us and sincerity. So long as sin means mere remorse, it is impossible not to seek to break its force by self-delusions. Mere blank, unchanging guilt no one can look upon with unveiled face. We are then shut up in a vicious circle. Sin means hypocrisy, and hypocrisy means sin. To realise that, is to be made to cry out with the Apostle, Who shall deliver me from this body of death ?

Plainly, it is a moral problem as much as a religious, but equally plainly it is a problem with which morality has no means of dealing. The more intensely and seriously moral

a man is, the more bitterly he feels that his morality merely "shuts him up to disobedience."

The difficulty has its source in the very nature of morality. Imputation of our doings to ourselves is the very stuff out of which personality is made. Everything else in us may change. In all besides we may say we are different persons. But the sense of responsibility abides and insists that each is himself and not another. It links inexperienced youth and intrepid manhood and decrepit age into one, and so forms the basis of our self-consciousness, our ideals, our character. If the gracious relation to God we have spoken of plays fast and loose with this imputation of our own doings to our own selves, it would be more deadly for the moral personality than even to be overridden occasionally by the direct force of omnipotent grace.

Here then is a legal relationship springing immediately from the sense of duty and responsibility which cannot be ignored. The word imputation has fallen into disrepute through falling into suspicious company, but the thing itself is the life nerve of our moral personality. Yet the very morality which without it would have no business to do upon the earth, has no solution for the imputation of wrong except, at convenient seasons, to ignore it. The blank, unchangeable past is all we look out on when we face the moral reality with unaverted eyes. What, then, is left except to avert our eyes, and ignore the hindrances of our past as best we may? But a morality not resolute to face all reality is in a perilous state. Yet, if morality is a legal requirement and every breach of it is legal guilt, and nothing can alter the past that it should not be past forever or make it other than our own, what is left except to do our best to make up in the future for our failure in the past?

The first thing is to realise that there is no legal way out of this legal *impasse*. Men have wearied out their spirits

seeking it and have not found it. Their solutions have had no moral value, have indeed only added to the perplexity of the moral problem and at times increased the practical moral evil.

The legal solution is of two kinds. The first and simplest one is that we can ourselves attain so much more merit in the future than the bare legal demands of the future will require, that we shall be able to compensate for falling below the bare legal demands of the past.

There we have the pure legalistic, moralistic spirit at its shallowest. It has no consciousness of life's varied opportunities, no infinite standard of its demands, nothing but the most mechanical conception of character. The noble and austere form even of a legal morality has not truly risen upon its spirit, and the intrusion of a morality which demands the whole devotion of a spirit of perfect love to God and man, is undreamt of.

Unconfessed, however, that view is still at the root of much theory, both moral and religious, and of still more practice. It is needless to say how much religious doing, such as penance and masses, is of that nature, but there are far more people than the world recognises, going about among us to-day, who are filled with the idea, not of meeting their present duty because it is their present duty, but of compensating for the past, sometimes in strangely arbitrary and only vaguely moral ways. All our present tasks come out of the past, and to meet the consequences of our sin may be part of our present task, but the service of the present never leaves us anything but debtors to its calls.

The other legal solution is the idea that the merit of another person better than ourselves may compensate for our demerit. This may be merely the transference of the merits of the saints, or it may be the more definite conception of a substitute who takes our place.

The whole feeling by which this theory lives may have come down to us from the days when the moral personality was still submerged in the clan or city, when men's moral interests were so intermingled and undefined that such transference of guilt was not morally forbidding and may even have been morally significant. The trouble with it to-day is that it is expected to work legally in a legal situation, the essence of which is the ascription of guilt to the individual. There it does not come to shipwreck merely on details, such as the difficulty of seeing how any one's merit could both be transferred to another and still be his own to give him a higher place in the hierarchy of saints. It fails because it does not fulfil the legal conditions of the very legal difficulty which called it into being.

Even on the basis of moral law it is no moral solution. The root of the legal difficulty is precisely that the guilt is ours, ours only, and was always. In that respect the moral personality is quite isolated and impenetrable. Nor is it a moral solution, if we take a wider view and regard sin as a wrong done to the moral government of the world; for a Moral Governor who suffered the transference of guilt from the guilty to the innocent would not, according to any enlightened conscience, be a moral governor at all.

Nor is it a religious solution, for it would not explain to us in any way what is meant by calling God Father or make it in any way plainer how our relationship to Him is wholly of love. God manifestly would not be dealing with us as with sons, but at best He would be giving us some kind of state condonation for a cause foreign to ourselves and foreign to our filial relation to Him.

If, however, pardon is to break the vicious circle of sin and hypocrisy and hypocrisy and sin in which we find ourselves imprisoned, the first requirement of it must be that it deals with the actual situation. That must mean above

all else power to look the whole moral situation straight in the face. It must be no preaching of peace while there is no peace, no mere palliating or ignoring. It must mean courage to open all cupboards, assured of finding no skeletons. To be forgiven just means that all need has gone from us of trying to think anything, ourselves included, other than it is. To be justified means to be set free from moral juggling with ourselves. Justification and the power to look all reality in the face must be one. Otherwise, at least, it can do nothing to deliver us from hypocrisy. As a mere legal fiction it would only add another illusion. Nothing will avail except a pardon which will so deal with our real moral situation that we can at once have utter moral sincerity and peace. A peace of moral insincerity we can too easily obtain, but only at the price of self-deception in which, as we have already seen, the spirit is shut up in a round of sin and hypocrisy. From this it is the very business of justification to set us free.

"Blessed," says the Psalmist, "is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity, in whose spirit there is no guile." No guile means no desire to shield oneself in any way by falsehood, to derive profit from anything save sincerity and truth, and it is both the condition and the consequence of the Lord not imputing iniquity. But if the Lord is not a legal fiction, if He is only another name for reality, if the one thing He must do is to impute to every man exactly what is his, how can we have any blessed sense of pardon, except under some illusion ?

But that kind of forgiveness would only complete our self-deception by taking the most real thing in our lives, the imputation of sin, out of it. Instead of being our deliverance, it would only be the sanction of our spiritual annihilation.

From this practical moral standpoint, the difficulty lies precisely in this close partnership of sin with unreality. We

cannot be forgiven without spiritual death so long as there is guile, and we cannot be rid of guile till we look out upon forgiveness. That is the legal situation which cannot by any legal device be dealt with legally.

Here we come upon another antinomy of grace. It sets right our legal relation to God, but only by making it cease to be legal. The essence of grace, indeed, is that it is not legal. That is the very quality in it which makes it not a straight line of force passing direct through our personality, but a curve of personal succour encircling and embracing it.

We are said to be justified by faith. Perhaps no phrase gives us a stronger feeling that pardon is an unreality. We could far more easily believe that God justifies us on signs of amendment or in view of the moral elevation He foresees we shall attain. Even when, in deference to apostolic language, men still say we are justified by faith, they import these meanings into the words. God justifies us by faith, it is urged, because faith shows that we have altered our ways, and so faith can be completed by love and holy works, or because faith has in it the germ of all that God approves. With both explanations we are back at the old legal solution which turns out again to be nothing but the old legal fiction. Nothing in the world that changes any moral reality has come to pass. When we speak in that way of God justifying, we have merely made reality one thing and God another.

Men so speak of faith because they think of faith itself as fulfilling some kind of legal condition for a legal acquittal. They must, therefore, discover some justifying virtue in faith itself as a mental state, with the result that they are brought into a distressing and morally calamitous conflict between faith and intellectual honesty and even between faith and moral sincerity.

The whole perplexity arises from forgetting what the faith by which we are justified is faith in. It is simply faith in a

new world of spiritual realities. There the old hard legal requirements with the old hard boundaries of our personalities, and all their old self-regarding distinctions, have disappeared. Love alone is power and ultimate reality. The cross is the sign of victory, because we also can fill up the sufferings of Christ for His body's sake. To find God is to find His will of love working through us for our fellow-men. To love one another is the fulfilling of all law, and the bearing of each other's sins as much required as the bearing of each other's sorrows. Not to share our brother's shame would be even more unbrotherly than not to share with him in his want or not to comfort him in his bereavement.

In that world, and not in any other, atonement is a reality. There the sacrifice and service of Jesus Christ are no longer the moral absurdity of taking so absolutely personal a thing as guilt and transferring it to the shoulders of another, an innocent person. They are the manifestation of the deepest significance and holiest relationships of our own personality in a world, the meaning of which, in spite of everything to the contrary, is love. They form the holy of holies of a new world with new and healing moral conditions, where legal ideas of meeting God's judgment fall away from us and God's service rises upon our spirits, not with legal demands and threats, but as a divine righteousness which we shall ever rejoice to pursue, yet ever rejoice also to know is always beyond us. Then forgiveness is a reality and a deliverance because the whole moral order of our life is transformed.

Only in that world is atonement ever preached in the New Testament.

When Paul went to the outside world, he preached that men should repent and turn to God and do works meet for repentance. In short, he asked simply for moral sincerity, with an appeal to the things which made moral sincerity possible. Only in the writings he wrote out of the bosom of

the Christian community, for the community itself, did he speak of being justified by grace, and even then only in that marvellous setting of personal devotion in the service of love which was at once the outcome and the interpretation of his faith.

John's order is equally illuminating. "But if we walk in the light as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus His Son cleanseth us from all sin." The note of that world of light is to have fellowship one with another. In that bearing and forbearing with one another, we have the fellowship of Christ's sufferings and enter the sphere where Christ's blood, meaning His service and sufferings, cleanses from sin.

The reality of pardon appears in the simple fact that penitence is made the way to peace and peace the way to a truer penitence, that in short the vicious circle of sin and hypocrisy and hypocrisy and sin is turned into the emancipating road of sincerity and inward liberty and inward liberty and sincerity. It does not mean that we can continue in a world of merely legal moral responsibilities, yet have a device found for us by which we may evade them.

Even if such a device could be found, the forgiveness of sins would not be a good in itself, bringing us out of our self-regarding state, but only a means to a self-regarding good beyond—escape from the unpleasant consequences of sin. And if the device is the substitution of the innocent for the guilty, it is a way of escape which could only be accepted through pure self-regarding fear and, therefore, could not be a moral trust at all.

If the theory of substitution, thus legally interpreted, has, as it doubtless has, brought peace to burdened souls, if it has not hardened them in self-love but has given them deliverance from self as well as from sin, the reason is not that the theory is capable of some subtler legal interpretation which

makes it truly meet some need of conscience, or that it is capable of some more comprehensive legal application, which solves for us some problem in God's government. The true reason is that the cross of Christ has, in spite of theory, interpreted and displayed to religious souls the new world in which hard legal conditions do not obtain and where we are not shut up in them with adamantine walls, but that these legal frontiers of our moral personality have been lost in a new moral fellowship with our Father and our brethren, wherein we realise that the bearing of each other's burdens, whether of sorrow or of sin, is the deepest and the surest of all realities, and that the bearing of sin in particular is the very heart of God's gracious relation to us, which is love.

By crucifying in that way the old world of moral actions for legal awards to us, and by crucifying us with our self-regarding performance of moral tasks to it, the cross of Christ joins for us into inseparable unity sincerity and peace.

For that reason faith in Christ is above all else justifying faith. In itself and merely as an inward grace, faith in Christ no more effects pardon by legal merit than any other faith. It is not the faith but the cross with the love of God which speaks in it that works peace. Precisely because the faith is not of ourselves, but because Christ's cross so speaks to us and makes certain to us what, understanding it out of the sufferings of Christ and our partaking of them, we may call an atoning order, it is the gift of God.

Justification in that sense deals not with the consequences of sin, but with the sin itself. It is not condonation, but forgiveness. It is not a letter from the father to the prodigal saying, Come home and nothing will be said about the past. In that case the past would not require to have anything said about it. Its own voice would be quite loud enough. True forgiveness demands positive manifestation of a love which will surmount the evil past and silence its voice. It is the

father who says, My son, let us share the sorrow together and let us live down the past together. That is what the cross means. It works peace because God is manifesting that redeeming love every day and in every event of every day. It is the high altar of sacrifice because it shows that the world is its temple.

JOHN OMAN.

THE INDWELLING TRINITY.

The form in which the doctrine of the Trinity has been authoritatively presented to the Church in the Athanasian Creed is admirable as a summing up on the Catholic side of the great controversies determined by the conciliar utterances of the fourth and fifth centuries. To any one acquainted with the theological expression of that epoch this document satisfies every demand with its exactness of definition and logical consistency. But to the average Christian of the present day its terminology presents insuperable difficulty. Not only is the language in itself unintelligible, but it creates the impression that the whole subject lies out of the range of ordinary religious thought, and is to be approached only by the trained theological expert. Such words as "Person," "substance," "incomprehensible" which have passed from the Greek through the Latin to the English language not only fail to convey their true meaning, but even suggest an entirely false one. In this way the revelation concerning the Trinity, so far from being made clearer by the Athanasian Creed, has been for most people obscured and darkened by its language. On the other hand, the value and authority of the Creed as an exponent of the doctrine have so dominated religious thought on the subject as to debar, or at least discourage, a fresh statement of this great truth derived more immediately from the language of Scripture.

An unequalled source for such a re-examination and restatement of this belief is to be found in the fourteenth chapter of St. John's Gospel. There is the surpassing advantage in going to that source that the revelation comes direct from the Master's own lips; that light is thrown upon it by the context; and that a relation is shown to exist be-

tween this truth and the nature of man, purified and exalted through the Incarnation, and the indwelling God.

The revelation was made at the last Supper, at a moment of utmost sorrow of parting. It was preceded by the revelation of the "many mansions" in the Father's House, but the immediate occasion was the demand of St. Philip, "Lord, shew us the Father." The answer to that demand refuted for the Christian believer decisively and for ever the Arian position, and affirmed the oneness of Christ with God: "Believest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in Me?" (*v.* 10). Then the mission of the Comforter is announced from the Father at the prayer of the Son. This completes the revelation of the Trinity to the disciples from the lips of Jesus so far as it concerns the mode of Divine existence. The disciple who saw Jesus *saw* God in Christ, the Father co-existing with the Son and potentially with the Holy Spirit, the Comforter who is the Spirit of God and of Christ.

The next revelation is still more wonderful, and one which affects the innermost secret of human nature enriched and sanctified by the Incarnation. "In that day," Jesus said, "ye shall know that I am in the Father, and ye in Me, and I in you" (*v.* 20). No wonder that in the presence of so astounding a revelation the Apostle Jude should ask, "What is come to pass that Thou wilt manifest Thyself unto us, and not unto the world?" The answer of Jesus is of the last importance, and has to do with the whole of Christian life. "If a man love Me," He said, "he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come unto him, and make Our abode with him" (*v.* 23). Thus in near connexion with the Divine indwelling love and obedience are shewn to be closely linked together, as they are in the first Epistle of St. John—often the best Commentary on the words of the Gospel, "This is the love of God, that we keep

His commandments" (1 John v. 3, and compare iii. 24). Obedience is the test of love, and love to God is the assurance of the divine indwelling, not only of the Father and of the Son, but of the Holy Spirit (*v.* 26).

If, then, the words of Christ are unreservedly accepted as a revelation of the Trinity regarded as the mode of the Divine existence and also as a constituent part of human nature, the doctrine can no longer be considered as abstract, remote and unpractical. It is presented to us in words, simple indeed, but profound and full of mystery. But the Master has shewn that the solution of the mystery lies in the nature of man made after the image of God, and primarily and supremely in perfected human nature exhibited in Christ Jesus.

The mystery of the indwelling Trinity had already been foreshadowed and illustrated by the threefold nature of man, in which mind, will and the affections (of which love is chief) wonderfully co-exist, invisible, intangible and inseparable, and yet each capable of being conceived as a distinct element or force. A man's intellect or mind may act apart from his will. He may know what is right and not will to do it (Rom. vii. 19). Again, his affections may act quite apart from what he thinks to be right and may divert his will, as they often do, from a settled purpose. Again, a man may be known in different ways to different people and in different capacities. One may know him as an intellectual teacher or thinker; another may know him as a master or ruler with a strong will determined to have his own way; and a third may know him only as an affectionate friend or father. He is, as the common phrase goes, a different *person* when he is lecturing, for instance, and when he is at home surrounded by his children. Familiar as these facts are, they are mysterious and suggestive, and, rightly considered, are preparations to

the deeper mystery revealed in Christ. St. John speaks of this indwelling as a communion with the Father and the Son based on love and obedience or service through which the revelation is made. It is interesting to note that this conception of union of humanity on the basis of service had already entered into Greek philosophical thought. In his treatise on Politics (i. 6) Aristotle, discussing the subject of slavery, puts forth his well known theory that some men are by nature (*φύσει*) slaves while others are by nature appointed to rule. "Between these two classes there is a marked distinction, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slave and the others to be masters, the one practising obedience, the others exercising the authority which nature intended them to have." He goes on to say: "The abuse of this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and *the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame* [1] (*ὁ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμψυχόν τι τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος*). These last words are remarkable, and bear closely on the fellowship or communion (*κοινωνία*) of the believer with Christ, and in Him with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Aristotle's contention is that, if the relations are perfectly sustained between master and slave, together they form one entity as body and soul. It is an intuitive anticipation of the unity of the body of believers with one another and with God in Christ.

Aristotle's words also throw light in an interesting way on the revealed thought of love, or service, which is another word for love, as the basis of union. "Where," says Aristotle, "the relation between them (master and slave) is natural *they are friends* and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force the reverse is true." Compare with this our Lord's words: "Ye are My friends

[1] Jowett's Translation.

if ye do the things which I command you. No longer do I call you servants (or slaves), for the servant (or slave) knoweth not what his Lord doeth : but I have called you friends " (John xv. 14, 15).

Nevertheless the Apostles in their humility prefer to describe themselves as " slaves " of Christ rather than friends or even disciples. It was a recognition of a relation at once higher and lowlier than discipleship. No Jew would call himself the slave of a Gamaliel or a Hillel ; no Greek would deign to be the slave of a Socrates or a Cleanthes. It is therefore a significant word carrying with it the conception of service and obedience, which is the secret of union with God in Christ (1 John ii. 5, 6). To be a slave of Christ was to be a bondservant of One who was more than man.

The revelation of the Trinity, then, as presented by Jesus Christ is not only the solution of the mystery of the Godhead ; it is also a revelation about regenerate human nature. It throws light on such expressions as : " If any man is in Christ he is a new creature " (2 Cor. v. 17), or, " Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost " (1 Cor. vi. 19) ; or, " Partakers of the divine nature " (2 Pet. i. 4) ; or, " It is not ye that speak, but the spirit of your Father which speaketh in you " (Matt. x. 20).

In the light of this revelation the doctrine of the Holy Trinity ceases to be a distant or theoretical dogma. It comes very near to practical everyday life. The believer is as certain of the indwelling God as he is of the indwelling mind and will and feeling :—

" Pray to Him, thou, for He hears, and spirit with spirit can meet ;
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."

The supreme practical use of this momentous revelation is indicated by the connexion in which it occurs. It comes in a train of thought, the keynote of which is : " Let not your heart be troubled : ye believe in God, believe also in Me "

(*v.* 1), and the consolation for the sorrowing disciples is centred not so much in the mansions or resting-places in the Father's house, as in the inseparable union with Christ, and through Him with the Father and the Holy Spirit. For after all there was to be no parting of friends. The fellowship would remain for ever unbroken. Again, God revealed in His threefold nature would be for ever present as the Teacher and Remembrancer of His people (*vv.* 26, 27) ; and peace would be the enduring gift to every soul that has perfect trust. And so the great discourse ends as it began : " Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be fearful " (*v.* 27).

ARTHUR CARR.

THE ANGELS AT THE EMPTY TOMB: A STUDY IN SYNOPTICS.

Each of the four Gospels tells a different story of the angels seen on that first Easter morning at the tomb of the Risen Saviour. These stories harmonise perfectly with one another and with the primary purpose of their respective books. The evangelists must have often listened to a full and detailed account of all that happened at the tomb from the lips of the women, who would never forget or tire of telling what they saw. Evidently there were at least four appearances of angels on that eventful day, but for a special reason each writer recounts but one and that a different one. Matthew, for instance, writes impressively of *one angel*, whose "appearance was as lightning and whose clothing was white as snow." A great earthquake attends his descent from heaven; he approaches the stone, rolls it aside, and sits thereon (xxviii. 2, 3). Mark quietly mentions *a youth* sitting in the tomb on the right side wrapped in a white cloak (xvi. 5). Luke tells of *two men* in glittering apparel standing near the women in the sepulchre. John, again, speaks of "*two angels* in white sitting one at the head and one at the feet where the body of Jesus lay." We hope to show not only the consistency underlying these apparent discrepancies—for that is an easy task—but the delicate subtlety and consummate skill whereby these different epiphanies are made to harmonise with and subserve the prime purpose of the whole narrative.

Linking the four accounts together we ascertain that Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James, and Salome came very early to the tomb with spices for the anointing of the body (Mark xvi. 1, 2). They found the stone rolled away and an angel enthroned upon it (Matt. xxviii. 2). He an-

nounces to them the Resurrection, and invites them to enter the tomb and assure themselves that it is empty. They obey, and on entering see the angel described as a youth by Mark. He shows them where Christ had lain, and bids them go tell the others. Next comes Luke's story (xxiv. 4). Whilst the women lingered bewildered and irresolute in the tomb, two men in glittering raiment appear by their side, enlighten their ignorance, and remind them of the Lord's own prophecy touching His resurrection. Thus at last, commanded by the angel in Matthew, encouraged by the youth in Mark, and instructed by the two men in Luke, the women rally their faculties and hasten away. Mary Magdalene ran to find Peter and John, and here John's narrative begins (xx. 2). Mary follows them as they hurry to the tomb; and on their departure homeward she lingered there to mourn her vanished Lord. Still weeping at the entrance to the sepulchre she stooped to catch another glimpse of the sacred spot where last she saw Him. But the tomb was no longer desolate. Incredulous Peter and believing John missed the twofold vision vouchsafed to Mary's clinging love. To her the angels appear saying, "Woman, why weepest thou?" But turning from them with yearnings still unsatisfied she met the Lord Himself.

Having thus woven the four records into one consistent whole, we proceed to find the reasons influencing each author in selecting for his use a particular portion of the whole story. These reasons spring naturally and inevitably from the leading purpose in the writer's mind, which governs not only his treatment of these epiphanies, but his whole narrative from first to last. For a distinct and dominating purpose has most profoundly affected the manner, matter, and method of these Memoirs. They are not general sketches of the Life of Christ. Each is a sermon written with a definite aim and urgent application. Each writer presents a different aspect

of our Lord's life and ministry, that the picture of Christ as Ideal Man and Very God of Very God may be foursquare and complete. Matthew portrays Jesus of Nazareth as son of David and Israel's rightful King. This conception colours the narrative throughout from the opening genealogy to the comprehensive royal manifesto for the nations at the close. Mark shows us Christ as the Ideal Prophet-Preacher and his vivid tableaux are all consistent with this main idea from the prophet-utterances of the opening verses to the prophet-voices of the New Era at the end. Luke portrays similarly the Priestly office and work of Christ from the temple-vision of Zacharias, a true priest of the old order, to the glad ministry of the new priesthood continually in the temple praising and blessing God; and John avowedly writes to unveil the Son of God in Jesus Christ. Not only does the thought of this presentation affect their style and method of treatment, but has governed them in selecting their material from the superabundant stores of knowledge they possessed. For of course these brief memoirs represent but a fraction of what these men knew of Jesus and His works. Our brief study of these angel-epiphanies in the light of the purposes already stated may shed some valuable light upon the methods of the writers, the synoptic problem, and the general question of gospel harmony.

The keynote of the first Gospel is :—Jesus of Nazareth, the born King of the Jews—*ὁ τεχθεὶς βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἰουδαίων* (ii. 2); and the angel in Matthew appears in character as the Imperious Herald and Puissant Representative of Royalty. Burst are the barriers of adamantine rock : all earth trembles at his touch : the sacred seals of a proud hierarchy are contemptuously snapped : the Temple guard is dashed into insensibility : and, with the rolled-back stone his throne and earth his footstool, he sits in majesty

victorious over all that would obstruct the triumphal pathway of the King of Glory.

With arresting authority and purposeful irony he addresses the group of listless women who, sunk in the bewildered apathy of despair, have crept near "to see the tomb." Fear not YOU, the angel cried—let grizzled men-at-arms, so brave to mock and torture one unarmed man, lie numb with terror, but *you*—the king's friends, draw boldly near. Then in clear-cut, decisive tones he issues his commands, and finally rallies their flickering thoughts by another emphatic *you*:—"Lo! I spoke to you." This climax claimed their loyal heed, defined his auditory, and sealed his mandate. The narrative throughout is full of austere dignity, the note of command is dominant, and the angel endeavours to rouse the women from their lethargy to the activity of alert obedience. Matthew represents him as victorious here also, for the women are said to leave *quickly* and *run* to execute the orders given. Yet we know from the other Gospels that encouragement and instruction from other angelic beings were necessary before the women recovered sufficiently to obey. The story in this Gospel shows us *Royalty commanding loyalty.*

In striking contrast is the account given by Mark; yet it is in perfect accord with his prime purpose. Here the women are not lethargic; but busily occupied in buying spices, arranging to anoint the body, and discussing ways to remove the stone. They arrive very early in the morning; their activity is undeniable, but their *courage*—the primary and essential characteristic for all prophethood—is small. A youth in white sitting within the tomb suddenly meets their gaze, and paralyzed with fear they halt aghast. Here the angel is as one of "the sons of the prophets." He sits—the preacher's posture in those days. He represents the Ideal Prophet-Preacher, and strives to instil into the

women the *courage* upon which Mark insists throughout as the leading trait of the Saviour's ministry. His tone is earnest and familiar rather than peremptory and commanding. He exhorts and encourages, and his discourse, of which we have the *précis* here, is arranged under three heads—for Mark, like many modern preachers, loved triple partition."

(1) He soothes and strengthens *the spirit*—"*Be not aghast.*"

(2) He informs *the mind*—"*He rose, He is not here.*"

(3) He employs *the body*—"*Come, see—go, tell.*"

Thus he tries to inspire them with that confidence based on belief which is the root of all such courage as men need for telling out the tidings of the Risen Saviour.

Mark records the failure of the sermon—which of the prophets did not fail? But after Pentecost the boldness came and they "went everywhere." Here the angel is *prophet-preacher exhorting to courage.*

In St. Luke the angels fulfil with calm dignity the priestly office of *instructing the ignorant.*[1]

The women come with spices expecting to find the body of the Lord Jesus in the tomb. No other contingency occurred to them. But had they understood the Lord's teaching they would have come without spices to hail the Risen Christ. Now the empty sepulchre perplexed them utterly; and as they stand helpless and absolutely at a loss, the angels appear, gently chide them for their ignorance, and remind them of what the Lord had said to them in His many Galilaean "talks," when He foretold His betrayal, crucifixion, and resurrection. Convicted of error, informed of facts, and reminded of predictions, the women return to be "priests" themselves by instructing the Eleven and all the rest. Here the picture is of *angel-priests informing ignorance.*

[1] *Vide* Lev. x. 11; Deut. xxxiii. 10; 2 Chron. xv. 3; Ezek. xliv. 23, 24; Mal. ii. 7.

The first words of the angels mentioned by Matthew and Mark are *imperative*, and constitute a *command* in the first Gospel and an *exhortation* in the second. Whereas the opening words of the angelic beings appearing in Luke and John are *interrogative;* and in Luke they rebuke the women for ignorance of the *Teaching of Christ*, and in John they rebuke Mary Magdalene for ignorance of the *Nature of Christ*. That John's narrative here fits in so perfectly with his *avowed purpose* (xx. 31), and in that respect resembles so closely the other Gospels, is a powerful argument in favour of our estimate of the *unavowed purposes* of the synoptic writers.

The angels in John are ministers of God the Son and marvel at the unbelief which can suppose Him dead. Mary Magdalene is still weeping inconsolably for the missing body of the Lord. She believes Him dead, mourns for Him as for a human friend deceased, and all her thoughts of Him centre in the sacred form reverently buried but now so strangely lost. To find His lifeless body and arrange for its peaceful repose in a grave that would be watched and tended by those who loved Him was the full content of her hope.

But such sorrow and such a hope were a sad confession that she had missed the truth—so insistently presented in the fourth Gospel—of the Deity of Christ. There Jesus is the Eternal Word, in the beginning with God, before Abraham was, one with the Father, the Resurrection and the Life, who will raise His own at the last day, and "whose years are throughout all generations." Mary should have known all this, but she was weeping as though He were but the lifeless body missing from the tomb. The angels see her thus, and in surprise and wonder ask, "Woman, why weepest thou?" A world of meaning throbbed in the simple words. But she is blind, and turns impatiently away, still inquiring pitifully for the missing body of the Lord. In infinite com-

passion Jesus met and answered her, and as she clung prostrate to His dear feet He lingered for a time although the open heavens, the glory, and the throne were awaiting Him, to tell her of that deathless Union of humanity with Deity, whereby all those who love Him are His brethren, sons of His Father and His God.

W. J. Cunningham Pike.

THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY.

XXVI (*continued*).[1]

It would, however, be going very far beyond what Paul would have allowed: it would, in fact, amount to a statement which he would have totally condemned: if one were to assert (as some do) that Paul regarded Christ as the "better self" of the individual man, and that in this world man is realising his higher self in the Christian life. Nothing can be more certain than that to Paul Christ is the real God beyond us and outside of us, but manifesting Himself to and seizing upon the man whom He has chosen. In the process of the true life, Christ is the moving power in the man whom He has seized. Of course, in this process, man realises his own higher self, that is to say, he attains to the true purpose of his life, and to the nature which God intended him to realise. But all the time that divine figure remains above him and beyond him, drawing him on, though also moving within him and possessing him. Thus Christ is, in a metaphorical sense, the "better self" of the individual man; but He is far more than that; and the part that is left unsaid in this term "better self" is by far the more important part of the whole.

[1] Omitted by mistake in its proper place, in the end of § XXVI., where it should come after "consummated," the last word of the third sentence from the end of that Section.

XXVII. Influence of Contemporary Custom on Paul.

There is another difficulty in understanding Paul's teaching besides the figurative nature of the language in which he was compelled to appeal to the understanding of pagans and Jews in the first century. Not merely was he obliged to suit his expression to their powers of comprehension. His own comprehension was perhaps in certain respects imperfect. He was to some extent bound in the fetters of his time and guided in its way of contemplating the world. He was not free from the beliefs and even the superstitions of his age. How far they influenced his mind and thought is far from certain: in the present writer's opinion they exercised far less influence on him than some modern writers think, and less even than would appear from the occasional expressions which occur in his letters. We might quote in sufficient number examples of phrases or statements, which are a riddle to exercise the ingenuity of commentators, and which are probably the expression of some belief or superstition current in Jewish circles at that time; but these are of small importance in studying the teaching of Paul. They are commonly mere incidental phrases. They hardly ever touch even remotely the essentials of his doctrine. They might all be left on one side without taking away anything from his teaching. Yet they are quoted by some writers, and dwelt upon at considerable length, as if Paul could be best understood through them and could not be correctly understood except through them.

Regarding these as wholly unimportant in their bearing on his doctrine, we need not linger on them; and they are here mentioned only to guard against the error of overvaluing them. They are of interest only in estimating the character of Paul as a man. He was caught in the net of his own age: in the non-essentials he sometimes, or often, remains impeded and encumbered by the tone and ideas

of his age ; but his teaching is for every age, and in all important respects rises clear and free above his own time and above all limitations and imperfections due to his circumstances, and soars into the empyrean of eternal truth. It is essentially true to say of him, as Ben Jonson said of Shakespeare,

He was not of an age, but for all time.

Some, or perhaps many, of Paul's references to angels are influenced by popular superstition. Moreover, the instructions of a practical kind which he sometimes gives regarding the conduct of women are peculiarly liable to be affected by current popular ideas : there is no department of life in which a man's views are so apt to be coloured by early circumstances and training and by current social ideas as this. Where both angels and women are found in any passage, Paul is doubly liable to be fettered by current ideas and superstitions.

Thus, for example, when Paul orders women to wear veils always, he says, " if a woman is not veiled, let her also be shorn " : an unveiled woman is as bad as a woman with her head close-cut or shaved. Now, the disgrace of having the hair cut is a purely external matter : the loss or the cutting may be due to accident or to precaution against disease : it involves only the loss of a natural adornment, and may naturally be regretted and mourned on that ground. After all, however, this is only a matter of social estimation, not of moral quality ; yet Paul, in using this comparison, assumes that it has a moral and religious character. The wearing of long hair is not an ethical duty, but only expedient, socially and æsthetically. Accordingly the attempt of Paul to exalt the wearing of the veil into a religious duty is discredited by the comparison which he uses for the purpose of clinching his argument. The one and the other duty stand on the same level. Neither is morally binding.

Paul's early associations with Tarsus are responsible in this case. The veiling of women was practised more closely and completely in Tarsus than in any other Greek or Græco-Asiatic city known to Dion Chrysostom; and Paul, who had grown up to regard veiling as a duty incumbent on all women, now presents it as a moral and religious duty to the Corinthians. He declares that women, *qua* women, ought to veil, and that it is an outrage on the nature of women not to do so. One cannot plead that he is merely urging the Corinthians to have regard to current social conventions and customs. It is quite true that one should not lightly outrage such social customs, and always Paul teaches so; but here he presents the obligation to veil in a far more emphatic fashion as an eternal unvarying duty imposed on women by her own nature and by the relation in which she stands to the universe as a whole.

In this matter we must recognise one of the rare instances of the Apostle's occasional inability to rise above the ideas of his own time. Old prepossessions, dominant in his mind from infancy, made him see a moral duty, where in our modern estimation only a social custom was really in account. To the modern European judgment, Paul prefers the lower and poorer view of human and womanly nature to the higher and nobler view. Here he shows himself of an age, and not for all time. How different a conception does he exhibit of women, where he writes with the insight of a prophet to the Galatians (iii. 28) that in the perfected church "there can be no (different rank and standard of estimation for) male and female, for ye are all one in Christ."

To buttress his opinion Paul has recourse to the popular superstition: "for this cause ought the woman to have authority on her head because of the angels." In her relation to the universe as a whole she may come under the

power of, and even be exposed to outrage by, demons or angels, unless she has on her head the authority which protects her from them. It was a popular superstition that women were liable to come under the influence of such angelic beings, who were more powerful in many ways than men : an example of this belief appears in Genesis vi. 2–4. Obedience to the social conventions gave them authority and immunity from the power of demons or angels ; the veil was their strength and their protection ; and the social convention was made more binding on women by the sanction and penalty involved in this belief.

Here we have an example of the first century Tarsian Jewish education, and its strong influence on the man. Yet how small a part of Paul's teaching is this ! how far it is from even touching the essential elements of his doctrine ! how out of harmony it is with himself in another place and another vein of thought.

One must, however, always remember that, to our judgment, Paul's method in reasoning is frequently liable to seem unconvincing to us. He draws his arguments and his illustrations and analogies sometimes from quarters that carry no conviction to our minds, and he trusts to the predilections that lay deep in every Jewish mind at that time.

His quotations from Scripture are often divorced from their context, and used in a sense which is quite out of harmony with their fair meaning in their original position. His analogies are sometimes forced and, in our view, unnatural. It would, however, be a serious blunder to estimate the quality and the insight either of Paul or of Plato by the superficial appearance of their argumentation. The Platonic Socrates is presented to us as discussing with his own contemporaries ; and he overpowers them by arguments that often appear to us extremely unfair and weak. But in both Paul and Plato there lies beneath the surface

of their ratiocination the direct insight into truth. To understand them, we must accept their intuition at its real value, and not at the rank of the argumentation which appeared convincing, more or less, to contemporary taste; but does not appear so to us.

How far Paul's opinions about women should be regarded as springing from his insight into the divine force that moves the world, we do not venture to judge; they are out of harmony with ours; but the fault may well lie with us, and we may be judging under the prepossession of modern custom, which will perhaps prove evanescent and discordant with the plan of the universe and the purpose of God. There can, however, be no question that his argument or analogy drawn from the length of the hair confuses between what is *only* customary or æsthetic and what is ethically binding and universal. On the whole matter we appeal from Paul to Paul himself in Galatians iii. 28.

Other examples might be quoted and discussed at length; but they are quaint and curious, rather than instructive. They do not touch the greatness of Paul, and it would only tend to distort our views about the real nature of his teaching, if we devoted further attention to this subject. The biographer of Paul will do well to study them more carefully, for they throw light on his personal quality as a human being; but we are not writing a biography at present.

XXVIII. The Happy Lot of Man.

In all ages of the world many people, not seeing the real truth, but judging only from superficial and vain fancies, have been filled with the thought that this world is all awry, that "the times are out of joint," that fate is hard and cruel, that the lot of man is nought but misery from the cradle to the grave. Such had been the experience and the general opinion of the pagan world, whose writers were

almost all penetrated (as we have already mentioned) with the thought of human misery, deterioration and hopelessness. Paul writes and speaks always with the knowledge of their opinions and words in his mind ; and his attitude is never rightly comprehended by us until we have this fixed firmly in our minds. To that pagan world, to its statesmen, its philosophers, its writers, its common people, all either plunged in hopelessness about the future or quietly resigned to the conclusion, " let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," Paul came with his message of hope, joy, love, peace, in short " Salvation." In contrast to their ignorance and despair, he is always transported with the lively and true perception of the beauty, the love, the kindness, in one word the grace of God in all His dealings with men. What an abundantly happy lot is that of mankind ! what perfect and indescribably bountiful grace is God's !

The Apostle rises to the loftiest height of enthusiasm, and expresses himself in a kind of lyrical and poetic prose, when he contemplates the saving grace of God, as shown in the plan which He had conceived in the foundation of the world and worked out stage by stage and detail by detail to its completion and perfection in Jesus Christ. Words almost fail him to picture " the exceeding riches of God's grace in kindness towards us in Christ Jesus," and " the unsearchable riches of Christ." [1] Not merely do we receive from Christ. We are the riches of Christ. To that great honour have we been exalted by the grace of God. The assembly of the saints, the whole body of Christians, the Universal and Catholic Church, constitutes the inheritance of Christ : the purpose of God from the

[1] Ephesians ii. 7, iii. 8 : the thought of the richness and splendour and magnificence of our inheritance in Christ is peculiarly characteristic of Ephesians i. 8, 18, 3, etc.

creation has been to create and complete this structure as the kingdom of God, "the wealth of the glory of Christ's inheritance among the saints." We are necessary to God and to Christ! What an honour and happiness for mankind! The glory of God and the splendour of Christ cannot be made real and established definitely except through the completion of the salvation of man in the congregation of the saints. Our bliss is His glory. Paul heaps up word upon word to blazon before the eyes of the Asian Christians the grandeur of their lot in being made the completion and perfection of the eternal purpose of God, "the riches of the glory of the patrimonial estate of Christ." [1]

We have become so familiarised from infancy with these and similar words that it needs an effort to hold them in thought apart from ourselves and gaze upon their true meaning, so as to realise the glittering and dazzling beauty of that which they describe. We are, however, always thinking and reasoning about the idea which is pictured in these words, as it is being slowly worked out in the Church of God and the civilisation and progress of men. The thought is not strange to us; on the contrary, it is the sum and the kernel, and it contains the germ, of all modern science and modern speculation. Put in modern terms, it is the idea of evolution in history and science. Paul prefers to give it a personal form: the Will of God works itself out in the gradual creation of His Church: every other process is subsidiary to that: the Church as it shall be is the sum and the embodiment of every line of development. The growth of the world and of man towards the higher stage is the working out of the glory of the Creator and of His creation. Paul would not have put it in those words, for he was of the first century, and did not dream of or understand the nature of Science; but none the less

[1] Ephesians i. 18.

that is the real import in modern terms of what he said in such enthusiastic and half-poetic language.

To Paul this idea was not new when he wrote to the "Ephesians." It was not attained to by him for the first time, while he was composing that wonderful letter, in some respects the greatest and most glittering and dazzling of all his letters. It had been reached by him in meditation before he was ready to carry his message to the pagans, and therefore it was his possession before he was finally called upon to lay aside all other duties and plans, pressing as they seemed to be, and to "Depart, for I will send thee far hence to the Graeco-Roman world." That was the command, urgent and imperative and requiring instant obedience, completing and making clear at last to Paul those previous instructions (which had been less lucid to him, because he was not yet ready and able to comprehend them). Such was the vision and the glory which he had seen in the fourteenth year before the winter of A.D. 56–7, accompanied with words unspeakable, "which it is not lawful for a man to utter." To the Christian mind there can be only one such vision, and that is the vision of the glory of God and the marvellous and perfect purpose of God, which in its completion will make manifest His goodness, His unspeakable goodness, His complete and perfect Salvation, His way with man. In that purpose there was much that Paul must not declare to men. He might only contemplate it, and fill his mind with it, and have it as a precious and power-giving possession to himself; and this possession was his greatest glory and his supreme consolation.

He had seen, and he knew, the glory of God; and the glory of God is the completion of His purpose in the perfecting of His Church. This idea lay in his heart. It gave fire and point and life and power to his words, but it must

not be declared fully at any time to men. It could be revealed partially to the saints as they learned to appreciate it for themselves. It was the sort of knowledge which can never be comprehended except by those who have risen to that level and seen for themselves. It cannot be set forth to the ignorant, because it is too sacred, too perfect, and far beyond their understanding: "the word is sharper than a two-edged sword," and a sword is always dangerous to the ignorant, the stupid or the foolish. This knowledge is "the mystery of the Will of God," [1] a thing still hidden, though in process of being revealed, a rich possession to those who are growing into the knowledge of it.

XXIX. The Mystery of God.

At the present stage it will best serve the purpose which is set before the present writer to allude to the meaning of this term "mystery" in Paul's letters. The word has been by some scholars defined as "something once hidden, but now revealed"; and it is regarded as being "always used in the New Testament in the sense of an 'open secret.'" [2] That definition and description is partially, but, as I think, not wholly accurate, and is therefore not quite satisfactory, though it is in practice very useful. It has got hold of the truth, and has got hold of the right end of the truth. But the deeper expression of the truth is that the mystery is "something once hidden, but now in process of being revealed." In a sense, of course, the mystery is revealed once for all and finally in Christ. That thought is rightly in the mind of the writers, who employ that definition. But who knows Christ? We are in process of com-

[1] Ephesians i. 9 f. "to sum up all things in Christ."

[2] I quote from Rev. G. Currie Martin (to whom I am much indebted: writing in Turkey in tents or in trains, one has in hand little except the text of Paul), in his edition of Ephesians, Philippians, etc., in the "Century Bible," a tiny volume convenient for the traveller.

prehending Him, and so comprehending the mystery of "the wealth of the glory of His inheritance among the saints." Life is the process of acquiring this knowledge, which is forced on us, and which, so to say, seizes us and takes possession of us ; the experience of life drives wisdom in some degree into the minds of all men, except in so far as obstinate resistance and determined prepossession by a selfish desire or by an over-conceit of knowledge, keeps out the knowledge. Now, as in the process of righteousness, which is true and real life, "the saints" acquired this knowledge, it became possible for Paul to declare more and more fully "the mystery" to them. This mystery of God's purpose, of course, is declared, in a sense and to some degree, in the first words that Paul addresses to an audience new to him : it is declared in every speech and in every letter more and more perfectly, as the hearers live themselves into a sympathy with and comprehension of the purpose of God. Yet there always remained something, nay much, of the mystery, "words unspeakable, which it is not lawful for a man to utter," hidden in the heart of Paul.

That is always the case with the great teacher, and the great writer. Who has ever had any deep power over the minds and life of men, that declared all he knew ? There must always remain in the speaker's or writer's mind a large store of reserved knowledge. It is the force of that unspoken knowledge that gives driving and penetrating power to his words.

In none of Paul's letters is this knowledge and mystery so fully declared as in Ephesians. In prison, as he says in iii. and iv. 1, he has no thought about his suffering, or his want of power, or about submission to the will of gaolers and guards. All that the law and all that the authority of officials imposes on him he accepts and does. That is right and just : they are placed in authority by the will of

God for the time: they form a stage in the evolution of the Divine will, and for him the duty is to act in such matters according to the constituted law of the Empire. But they have no influence over him. His inheritance, his happiness, his knowledge of God's purpose, his complete and unhesitating confidence that this purpose is fulfilling itself even in "these bonds," all remain far outside of the competence of guards and officials. Whatever they may do, even to the infliction of flogging or death upon him, is his triumph and their failure. He is ready to depart: he is equally ready to continue his work, obeying the Imperial law and obeying the law of God. It may be regarded as quite certain that he would not have escaped from prison, except under direct Divine command. The slave or the prisoner should accept the lot and will of God.

To the Corinthian philosophers and clever people he sets forth similar truth in a far more veiled fashion,[1] but still he "speaks wisdom among the perfect. . . . God's wisdom in mystery, even the wisdom that hath been hidden, which God foreordained before the worlds unto our glory." [2] In that passage also he describes the glory, the power, the royal and imperial lot of the Christian; and he plays with the Stoic paradox of the philosopher-king, rising, however, through irony (as in iv. 8–10) to lofty and mystic expression almost perfectly on a level with the language of Ephesians: "let no one glory in men. For all things are yours: whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are yours; and ye are Christ's; and Christ is God's." Ephesians does not condescend even to play with and to give new meaning to "persuasive words of philosophy . . . the wisdom of men." It stands entirely on the level of the pure Christ-thought, embodied in the new Christian language, which

[1] 1 Corinthians i.-iv. [2] *Ibidem* ii. 6 f.

Paul had already constructed to express this new and loftier thought, a language of the people, using few if any words that were not familiar to the fairly educated Græco-Roman public, yet transforming all the words by the wealth of the thought which was shadowed forth in them.

This thought as set forth in Ephesians was, as we have stated, Pauline from the beginning of his work among the Gentiles. It was this reserve of knowledge that gave force to his opening address to the people of Antioch, and penetrated the whole city before he had completed his second week there (Acts xiii. 12 ff.). The message that he then preached was his own, gained through revelation and meditation : [1] he placarded or blazoned it before them : [2] it gave them marvellous powers, and the inheritance of God ; it called them to freedom, it clothed them with Christ.[3] The language of Galatians is simpler than that of Ephesians, but it is informed with the same knowledge and the same power : the knowledge is the power.

XXX. The Knowledge of God.

In Ephesians it is remarkable how completely the glory and the inheritance of "the saints" is identified with knowledge. "Ye can perceive my understanding in the mystery of Christ." [4] As Mr. Currie Martin says, "It seems natural and fitting that he should remind his readers how great an authority by the grace of God" he possesses ; this authority is due to his comprehension of the mystery, i.e., to his knowledge. The verses that follow practically make the seeing of the mystery equivalent to the comprehension of the eternal purpose of God and the cause of confident and bold access to God. Knowledge is power. The saying is trite, as applied to practical life, to business or to

[1] Galatians i. 12, 17, iii. 7. [2] Galatians iii. 1.
[3] Galatians iii. 5, 29, iv. 7, v. 13, iii. 27.
[4] Ephesians i. 4.

science. The same saying, hackneyed in the modern application, is equally and perfectly suitable in regard to the doctrine of Paul : the knowledge of God is the power of God. That is the meaning of Colossians i. 9 f. : " that ye may be filled with the knowledge of His will in all spiritual wisdom and understanding, to walk worthily . . . bearing fruit unto every good work, and increasing by the knowledge of God ; strengthened with all power . . . unto all patience and long-suffering with joy."

It is urgently necessary for our purpose of clearly comprehending the nature of Paulinism, as always and in all matters the expression of the idea of growth towards God, as dynamic and not static, to study his conception of knowledge, the wisdom of God. We shall start best from an earlier Epistle, viz., from 1 Corinthians xiii., and from Professor Harnack's exposition of it, in which he takes a view differing in some respects from ours.[2]

W. M. Ramsay.

[1] " By " not " *in* the knowledge of God." The rendering " by " is given in the margin of the Revised Version (English).

[2] The perception of this point of view, as that which is characteristic of the Epistle, gives rise to the opinion (widely spread among modern scholars for a time, but now gradually disappearing) that the Epistle was not the work of Paul, but of a successor. Our contention is that this " Ephesian " point of view is essentially and characteristically Pauline, but is more definitely and prominently expressed here.

RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.[1]

I. General.

We are all fully familiar with the fact that religion is a divisive force amongst progressive and strenuous peoples. Religion, for instance, has split English society into a thousand fragments.

Every period of the history of Israel illustrates this truth. The Pentateuch continually describes the struggles between Moses and those who disputed his authority. Later on we have the kings of Israel and Judah divided into two classes, "those who did that which was right in the eyes of Yahweh," and "those who did evil in the sight of Yahweh." Then we have Elijah and Elisha contending with the worshippers of Baal; later still we have a succession of great prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah and their fellows denouncing the conventional religion of their times in opposition to the ecclesiastical authorities, kings, priests and prophets. Again after the Exile we find similar divisions, Ezra and Nehemiah are the leaders of one party, while many of the nobles and priests of Judah are found in the other. This division was perpetuated in the bitter feud between the Jews and the Samaritans.

When Alexander the Great had introduced Greek civilisation into the East, the Jews were divided between the friends and the enemies of Greek culture. In our Lord's time there were Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes and Zealots.

[1] Two Lectures delivered at the Oxford Summer School of Theology, 1912.

Herein, as in so much else, Christianity has followed in the steps of Judaism.

Christ Himself was under no delusion in this matter, He knew that He had not come to give peace in the earth, but rather division, henceforth there were to be five in one house divided, three against two and two against three; father against son, and son against father; mother against daughter, and daughter against mother; mother-in-law against daughter-in-law, and daughter-in-law against mother-in-law.

It has been very much the fashion to deal with these antagonisms under simple and clear categories which provided vivid contrasts, e.g., true religion and idolatry, good and bad kings, true and false prophets, the Chosen People—the heathen. One party was all right and the other all wrong.

According to this view, true religion might be compared to a single stream, forcing its way through all obstacles, gathering strength as it went on—one, simple, homogeneous, subduing all things to itself. There would of course be a measure of truth in the figure. Or, again, we might take the Biblical figures; religion is a tree whose history is that of continuous growth from a seed, continuous development of what was present in the seed at the beginning. Or yet again, the gradual leavening of a mass by a small piece of leaven.

In these days we think in terms of evolution (not perhaps so much now as we did a few years ago, but still very largely), and we think of the steady continuous evolution of truth from good to better, from better to best.

In all this there is much truth. We take sides, as it were, with Moses and David, with Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezra, and we applaud and admire them and condemn their adversaries; and practically and broadly we are right.

Practically and broadly—but when we look at the matter from the point of view of the historian, we can hardly be satisfied with the popular treatment of the controversies of the Old Testament.

Let us take two or three well-known examples, e.g. Jeroboam I., who made Israel to sin, Ahab and Jezebel. How often we have heard these monarchs held up as monsters of iniquity. Their ecclesiastical policy was condemned by the more mature experience of Israel; they were in opposition to the prophets whose teaching ultimately triumphed, and therefore—they may be assumed to be guilty of every possible crime. Smith's *Old Testament History*, for instance, speaks of the vices of Jeroboam and his family, and describes Ahab as the feeblest of the kings of Israel; such phrases as "the wicked Ahab" are familiar; and as for the unfortunate Jezebel, her very name is a byword.

Notice too what different measure is meted out to Ahab and David. The record of each is blotted by a foul crime. David had Uriah done to death for the sake of his wife; Ahab had Naboth executed for the sake of a vineyard. Each of these sinners repented at the admonition of a prophet and received the Divine forgiveness.

But David is a saint and hero; we treat his act as the one great lapse of a noble character; we admire his penitence almost more than we abhor his sin. But in the case of Ahab it has been the fashion to treat *his* sin as characteristic, to judge his whole life by it, and even to doubt the sincerity of his repentance. Thus Calvin (*Inst.* i. 530) tells us that Ahab "was only amazed on the sudden, and afterwards continued his former course of life. He, indeed, clothed himself in sackcloth, covered himself with ashes, lay on the ground and (as the testimony given to him bears) humbled himself before God. It was a small matter

to rend his garments while his heart continued obstinate and swollen with wickedness."

I may illustrate by a modern instance. If any one were to say that Mr. Asquith or Mr. Bonar Law, as the case might be, was the David of our English Israel, we might think the comparison inappropriate, but we should understand that it was meant to be complimentary. But if I were to say that Ahab was as respectable as some leading politician of the present day, I should probably delight some of my readers and disgust the rest. I certainly could not venture to parallel any lady to Jezebel.

I have an impression that this attitude still persists in a good deal of popular teaching and preaching, but Christian scholarship has become more impartial ; some perhaps are inclined to go to the opposite extreme in whitewashing the villains, so to speak, of the Old Testament.

I have no wish to go to such extremes ; but it is only fair to remember that the judgment of the Old Testament on these kings is political and ecclesiastical. Jeroboam was a rebel against the House of David, the founder, or at any rate the patron, of sanctuaries which were rivals to the Temple. Ahab and Jezebel encouraged the worship of the Tyrian Baal and neglected the claims of Yahweh to the exclusive homage of Israel. It does not therefore follow that they were bad. There is nothing, for instance, to show that the family of Jeroboam was more vicious, or indeed anything like so vicious, as the family of David. We have practically no information whatever about the moral character of Jeroboam. Considering that all we read about him comes from hostile pens, it seems to me that it is quite possible that he was as good—I do not say as spiritual—a man as David.

We are coming to recognise too that, as Dr. Welch says (p. 158), Ahab was not " the feeble fool who is frequently

held up to derision," and may be inclined to agree with Loisy (p. 137) that "Ahab was, so far as we can judge, a brave prince and an able statesman."

It is quite clear that the Syrians did not regard him as a "feeble fool" at his last fatal battle at Ramoth Gilead; he was the one man that mattered both to friend and foe. "The king of Syria commanded the thirty and two captains of his chariots, saying, Fight neither with small nor great, save only with the king of Israel." Sore wounded and dying, "he was stayed up in his chariot against the Syrians till the evening," and it was only when he died that his army dispersed.

A prince or soldier or statesman may take the wrong side in religious controversy and yet be able, good and even devout.

That, I suppose, seems obvious when it is stated as an abstract proposition, but we are slow to apply it practically in our own times, in such matters, say, as Disestablishment; and we are not much inclined to apply it to history. For instance, the popular Protestant view of Queen Mary Tudor is usually summed up in a single rude uncomplimentary epithet. So, too, in the Old Testament the popular imagination clings to the sacred tradition which provides it with striking contrasts between perfect saints and heroes on the one hand and desperate villains on the other.

But we cannot afford to sacrifice too much to the popular passion for melodrama, the Scripture narrative gains in real value when we understand the progress of revealed religion not as a struggle between angels and demons, but as worked out between people who were alike human and imperfect. On both sides, for the most part, men were earnest, sincere and well-intentioned; on both sides there was usually a measure of self-will and self-seeking.

We do not lose much; we need not dwell on the defects

of the saints, the Scriptures encourage us to contemplate them at their best, when they attained most nearly to their ideals ; but we have a great gain because we can recognise what was noble and true and good even in men who had the misfortune to be on what ultimately turned out to be the wrong side.

Take, for instance, the end of Saul, forsaken by God and man, defeated and slain, he and his gallant sons, in a last, desperate struggle with the enemies of Israel. I suppose it would sound very dreadful to say that such an end was more heroic, more noble, than that of David, who passed away in the odour of sanctity, with priest and prophet about his dying bed. And yet I am not sure that David, harassed in his last hours by the selfish intrigues of his wife and sons, eager for the succession, may not have envied the loyal fellowship in life and death of Saul and Jonathan. At any rate David knew how to appreciate Saul ; it may be, of course, that the right view of him is as the guilty king, the sinner crushed by the wrath of God ; but I am not sure how far we have the right to judge him. Surely the world owes much to princes and captains who persevered in their service to their country, though the Lord did not answer them either by dreams, or by Urim, or by prophets, though they were banned by the Church and the oracles were dumb.

Let us turn, by way of further example, to the antagonism represented by the judgments of the Deuteronomic writers on the kings of Israel and Judah. You remember that these monarchs are dealt with in the fashion which we have been describing ; they are sharply divided into two classes, one class receives emphatic approval, the other an equally emphatic condemnation. There were the kings who " did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord, as did David " (Asa, 1 Kings xv. 11), and those " who did

that which was evil in the eyes of the Lord" (Baasha, xv. 34). We may call them for short the "good" kings and the "bad" kings. There is no express statement as to what is meant by the formulæ.

But I think we can easily discern that these judgments were not, essentially and in the first instance, moral or even religious, but rather ecclesiastical and political. They mean that these kings, from the point of view of the Deuteronomic writers, were on the wrong side in religious controversies and incidentally also on the wrong side in politics.

To begin with the kings of Israel, they were all without exception "bad," they all "did evil in the eyes of the Lord." There were twenty-one of them and they belonged to several different families. The condemnation is evidently a conventional formula; it is applied even to Zimri, who only reigned a week (1 Kings xvi. 19); and also, to refer for a moment to kings of Judah, to Jehoahaz, who came to the throne at the age of twenty-three and reigned three months (2 Kings xxiii. 31); and to Jehoiachin, who came to the throne at the age of eighteen, and also reigned three months (xxiv. 8).

Now, in the absence of express and definite statements as to the evil deeds of the kings of Israel, it is hardly fair to condemn all twenty-one, all the members of all the various dynasties, on the strength of a conventional formula. We rather interpret the formula by its indiscriminate application to so many men who must have differed widely in their moral character and conduct.

No doubt, there were amongst them not only able statesmen and brave warriors like Ahab, but also men of high moral character, who were also earnest and devout. When a formula is applied to all the kings of Israel, it is clear that they are condemned because they were kings of Israel;

heads of the State and Church in the Northern Kingdom.

It was an offence to the Deuteronomic writers that there was any Israelite state which did not own Jerusalem as its capital and a Davidic prince as its king ; and that there was any Israelite Church of which Solomon's Temple was not the one sanctuary. Hence in their eyes the kings of Israel were all rebels, heretics, and schismatics ; they did evil in the sight of the Lord.

The use of the formulæ for the Northern kings helps us to understand what they mean for the kings of Judah. When it is said that a king of Judah " did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord," it means first of all that he was a prince of the House of David and a patron of the Temple. If we ask how much more it means, various answers may be given.

The matter, however, is simple for the last kings of Judah. The judgments upon them, as we have said, are the work of writers whose Bible, so to speak, was *Deuteronomy*. For them, therefore, an essential feature of true religion was the unique position of the Temple as the only legitimate sanctuary of Yahweh. Hezekiah, we are told, anticipated the requirements of *Deuteronomy* in this matter, and Josiah carried out its ordinances ; therefore it is said that they did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord. The other kings after Hezekiah failed in this respect, therefore it is said of them that they did that which was evil in the eyes of the Lord.

But when we turn to the period before Hezekiah, the formulæ cannot be explained thus. *Kings* tells us frankly that none of the " good " kings were " good " in this respect ; none of them tried to limit the public worship of Yahweh to the Temple, all of them tolerated other sanctuaries. Again and again we are told that the high places were not taken away, even by the " good " kings. Hence before

Hezekiah the criterion of royal rightness in the eyes of the Lord cannot have been a scrupulous insistence on the unique claims of the Temple.

The condemnation of the "bad" kings of Judah is mostly intelligible. Rehoboam seems to have lost the ten tribes by a display of foolish insolence; moreover *Deuteronomy* regards misfortune as a mark of God's anger against sin. Thus both the disruption of the kingdom, and the way in which it came about, would fully explain the adverse judgment on the king who was responsible for this calamity.

Another group of Jewish sovereigns were discredited by their connexion with Ahab and Jezebel; Athaliah was their daughter; Jehoram was the husband of Athaliah; and Ahaziah was their son. We need not ask for any further reason why it is said that Jehoram, Ahaziah and Athaliah did that which was evil in the eyes of the Lord; though, of course, Athaliah's massacre of the princes of the House of David, and her Baal worship were heinous sins.

It is a little striking that Jehoshaphat is described as a "good" king, for he made peace with Israel; he became an ally of Ahab; and presumably arranged the match between his son Jehoram and Athaliah. Apparently, however, all this was more than atoned for by his other doings; we read that he executed certain moral reforms, and that he attached more importance to a single prophet who was hostile to Ahab than to the 400 prophets of the Lord who gave the king of Israel the advice he wanted.

There is no definite information to explain the statement, I. xv. 3, that Abijah the son of Rehoboam "walked in all the sins of his father." Moreover 2 Chronicles xiii. omits this description of Abijah's conduct and rewards him with a great victory over Jeroboam, because in his

days Judah was loyal to Yahweh. It may be doubted how far any real information is behind either *Kings* or *Chronicles* as to the character and conduct of Abijah. Ahaz could not fail to be condemned because of his antagonism to Isaiah.

Turning to the "good" kings, Asa, like Jehoshaphat, effected certain reforms in morals and ritual; Joash was the protégé of a high priest; Amaziah acted like Joash, Uzziah like Amaziah, Jotham like Uzziah. Here again the statement that "X did according to all that his father Y had done" is clearly a conventional formula indicating continuity of ecclesiastical policy, and may have nothing to do with the personal character of the several kings.

When we try to explain the different formulæ in the light of the facts, two main alternatives suggest themselves, and it is not easy to decide between them.

(1) It is possible that throughout the monarchy there were two well-defined religious parties, and that the sovereign sometimes belonged to the one and sometimes to the other; the kings of the one party did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord, the kings of the other party did that which was evil in His eyes. If this were so, there was an age-long religious controversy in Israel between a higher and a lower faith, and the government was sometimes upon the one side and sometimes upon the other; or, as we might say, now the one, and now the other was the Established Church; much as for a time the English sovereigns and the English Church alternated between Romanism and Protestantism.

Our view on this particular point will largely depend on our theory as to the early history of the religion of Israel; and here unfortunately there is much uncertainty, because the data are meagre and ambiguous. According to some, Moses, or even Abraham, taught a pure and

enlightened monotheism. Thus, for instance, Volz, in his monograph *Mose*, not only credits Moses with such teaching, but also supposes that he founded within Israel a league or guild to preserve and transmit his teaching. After the Conquest of Canaan many of the people adulterated the pure worship of Yahweh with Canaanite superstitions, and even identified Yahweh with the Baals, or worshipped the Baals along with Him ; but the League and its followers remained faithful to the higher faith. If this is a correct theory, it might give us our two parties, one faithful to the traditions of Moses, the other indulging a loose, eclectic worship, which combined or confounded Yahweh and Baal.

It is quite possible that the Deuteronomic writers held some such theory.

It is, of course, true that we can trace two tendencies after the Conquest ; on the one hand there are the Israelite ideas of religion and worship, which they brought with them from the wilderness and associated with Yahweh ; on the other hand the Israelites came under the influence of Canaanite religion and largely yielded to that influence. But I doubt whether these developed a sharp antagonism between defined and organised parties on the lines of these two tendencies.

Doubtless there would be rivalry between the priests of one sanctuary and those of another ; but the evidence suggests that the priests of two Yahweh-Temples, say Jerusalem and Bethel, might be as bitterly opposed to one another as a Yahweh priesthood to a Baal priesthood.

The value of the Deuteronomic theory on this matter is uncertain ; even if these writers were following tradition, they probably interpreted the tradition according to their own experience, and transferred to ancient history the conditions of their own times. Probably they disguised these conditions in names and words suitable to the bygone

days of which they wrote; they were familiar with the warfare between Yahweh and Bel of Babylon; it was easy to imagine a like struggle between Yahweh and Baal of Canaan. The later contest with the idolatry of Babylon had clear and definite issues; it was easy to imagine that the earlier controversy was equally simple.

But the surviving literature does not give the impression of conscious and continuous antagonism, of opposing ideals represented by conflicting parties. At any rate, so it seems to me, and such, I should gather, is the view of most of the writers on Old Testament Theology, though they do not expressly discuss this problem.

The primitive portions [1] of the history up to the time of Ahab and Elijah imply a certain unity amongst Israel in religious matters, Yahweh is universally acknowledged as the God of Israel, but the special devotion of Israel to Yahweh does not exclude a minor homage to other supernatural beings. Within this unity there were many differences and dissensions, differences of ritual at the various temples, rival priests and sanctuaries, rivalries between priests and prophets and kings, varying degrees of zeal for Yahweh as shown in external religious observances. But all these differences were such as might exist in a single church, so to speak, which had not developed any clearly defined parties.

If this view is correct, it follows that the "good" and "bad" kings cannot have been representatives of such opposing parties.

Indeed the uniform badness of the Northern kings seems fatal to any such view.

There were constant revolutions and changes of dynasty in the Northern Kingdom; and in the nature of things a pretender to the throne would sometimes have associated

[1] I.e., omitting the notes, etc., of the Deuteronomic Editors.

himself with the religious party opposed to the reigning sovereign. Once indeed something of the sort happened; Elijah and Elisha were hostile to the dynasty of Omri, and Jehu came to the throne by the help of Elisha, and Elisha appears as the friend and counsellor of Jehu and his successors. Nevertheless Jehu and his house are "bad" kings, because—we are told—they still maintained the worship of the Golden Calf. But probably at this time nobody in Israel objected to the Calf.

Let us turn, then, to a second alternative, thus :—

(2) We have already said that the judgments on the kings cannot be regarded as determining their conduct or their moral or spiritual character. In the case of the later kings of Judah these judgments probably indicate their ecclesiastical policy; it is possible that the judgments on the earlier kings of Judah are an application of the Deuteronomic theory as to the alternate supremacy of parties loyal and disloyal to Yahweh. The Deuteronomic framework of the Book of Judges is constructed on that theory.

The theory no doubt had some foundation in fact, there *were* changes of attitude towards the exclusive claims of Yahweh, but the details both in *Judges* and *Kings* are due to a mechanical and rigid application of the theory which does not correspond to the facts.

I am inclined, therefore, to believe that the judgments on the earlier kings of Judah are not based on real information as to their religious policy. I should rather explain these judgments thus : a king of Israel, as I have said, was "bad" because he was a king of Israel, nothing could atone for rebellion against the House of David and patronage of rival sanctuaries to the Temple. Similarly the kings of Judah were "good" simply as kings of Judah, unless tradition had preserved the memory of wrong-doing or

misfortune, etc., which marked them out as "bad," in the way we have already shown.

Thus this discussion as to "good" and "bad" kings serves in any case to illustrate the position that kings, judges, and other secular leaders who are condemned by the writers of the Old Testament, may nevertheless have been good and spiritually-minded men. The Old Testament writers were concerned with the practical edification of the people for whom they wrote. They condemned, and rightly condemned, principles and practices inconsistent with a fuller revelation; and they condemned certain persons as symbols and representatives of a lower obsolete stage of religious development. The practical effect of their judgments was entirely right.

A moment's thought will show that this principle cannot be limited to kings and judges; but must be extended, however startling it may seem, to priests whose ritual was condemned by inspired prophets, and even to the so-called "false prophets" whom the true prophets denounced.

High-priests of the sanctuary at Bethel where the Golden Calf was the symbol of Yahweh, and prophets who opposed Israel and Jeremiah were in the wrong as a matter of judgment and insight, but they might be good and holy men.

Indeed the principle must be carried even further: I said that these men were wrong as a matter of judgment and insight; that is not quite true; it requires two qualifications. (1) The religion which is condemned had its value for a primitive people; it carried their religious experience up to a certain point and expressed their spiritual emotions. Even with regard to idols, our experience of the immense superiority of worship without images prevents our realising that there is a stage at which images have their use, and that Israel passed through that stage.

Doubtless there came a time when certain priests and

prophets were wrong in clinging to obsolete formulæ and ceremonies which had outlived their usefulness, or would soon have outlived it. But this surely cannot be an unpardonable sin, for it is a characteristic of some of the best Christians of our own time; they are absorbed in the practical duties and exercises of religion, and do not care to revise the idioms, vocabulary and symbols of their faith. Thus in every period of transition there are always many for whom the older formulæ and the older spiritual dialect are still valid, and those who minister to them in this dialect are still delivering a divine message. Doubtless this was as true in the time of Amos and Isaiah as it is now.

(2) The second qualification is this. The history of religious controversy shows that the victory is never wholly on one side; the final result is always a compromise. The ultimate settlement owes much to the conquered as well as to the conquerors. This was true of Christianity and Judaism, Christianity and Paganism, Christianity and Greek Philosophy. It was also true of the various stages of the development of the Revealed Religion.

Moreover the contribution of the vanquished heretic to triumphant orthodoxy is not merely adulteration or corruption. It may be crude and primitive, inferior in a sense as other metals are to gold and silver; and yet the baser metals are useful as alloy in a coin or in the setting of a diamond.

But even as regards pure and ultimate truth, neither side in a theological controversy is ever entirely right; and even here the permanent faith often owes something to the heretic.

At one time there was much controversy in Israel between priest and prophet, between the religion of external observance and the religion of the inner life and of pure morality.

The final form of Judaism took much from each side. Ancient superstitions survived in rites which might be unmeaning but were harmless and picturesque. Sometimes such rites were clothed with a new symbolism, as in the case of Azazel and the Scapegoat. The elaborate ritual of the later law was largely a survival or an adaptation of things which Amos and Isaiah held of little account; and yet it had its value for the development of religion.

The angelic and demonic hierarchy of Judaism and Christianity is only the primitive world of supernatural beings thinly disguised.

Many other illustrations might be given, and my second lecture will deal with some of them.

Meanwhile I may conclude with one or two modern analogies to the relation between such prophets as Elijah and their opponents.

In the first place we must avoid a false analogy which does much to prevent a proper understanding of the Old Testament. Many modern Christians who are interested in missions would compare the relation between the prophets and their opponents with that between a modern missionary and the heathen of our day. Such a comparison is obviously misleading.

The missionary and his hearers belong to different races and different civilisations, and are often on entirely different planes as regards knowledge, education, and religion; whereas the prophets and their opponents were very much alike in all these matters; the differences were personal, such as might exist between two groups of Englishmen,—I am leaving on one side all question of inspiration.

I do not think, therefore, that the relations of missionaries to the heathen throw much light on our subject. Controversies in Israel would be better illustrated, as we have just suggested, by the contentions between two opposing

ecclesiastical parties in England, or some other mediæval or modern state.

Take, for instance, Protestants and Romanists: a controversial preacher or pamphleteer might speak about the other side much as the prophets did about their opponents.

Personally I am a pronounced Protestant, with the utmost respect and admiration for Luther and Calvin; but I should hardly use their statements without verification for a history of the Reformation or even of the Middle Ages. I feel, for instance, that I must make some allowance for rhetoric when Calvin says (Acts xxvi. 7) that "the Papists . . . oppress the Word of God, and give also the name and title of the Catholic Church to a filthy rabblement of unlearned and impure men without any colour or shame."

The sort of criticism we should apply to Luther and Calvin applies also in some measure to the writers of the Old Testament. They are first-class authorities, of their kind, on the social, moral and religious condition in their own times. Moreover, they have an inspired message. But we must remember what kind of authorities they are, and with what purpose they write and speak. Many of them, especially the prophets, are not only preachers or public speakers, but also poets; and they were engaged in a fierce controversy. The historical force of their statements must be estimated accordingly. Words and phrases used by orators and poets on the one hand, and by scientific historians and theologians on the other, have quite a different meaning and value. We allow for poetic and rhetorical licence.

We in no way detract from the sincerity of the inspired writers or from their importance for the development of Revealed Religion; but we must make these allowances if we seriously desire to understand the history of Israel.

W. H. Bennett.

ST. PAUL AND THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.

V. St. Paul and the Terminology of the Mystery-Religions (*continued*).

We have attempted to show that Paul's religious use of πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and cognate terms, has its roots in the soil of the Old Testament. Endowment with the Spirit was never lost sight of, even in the most barren periods of Judaism. But the exuberance of religious feeling in the early Christian community brought the phenomenon into the forefront of experience. And one of Paul's most notable spiritual achievements was the regulation of all that was uncontrolled in these manifestations, in order that the spiritual energy which lay behind them might be conserved for the edification of the Church. Now it is abundantly clear that parallel phenomena existed in the ethnic religions. There also the πνευματικός, by whatever name he might be called, was a familiar figure. As possessed by the god, or partaking of the Divine πνεῦμα or νοῦς, he, too, burst forth into mysterious ejaculations and rapt utterances of the kind described in the New Testament as γλώσσαις λαλεῖν. The experience is as wide-spread as the sway of intense religious feeling. It is found to a greater or less degree in all revival movements. Its psychological significance can, up to a certain point, be analysed. Here as elsewhere the tree is known by its fruit. The one criterion of such religious ferment is its ethical productivity.

It is interesting to note that Paul himself distinctly recognises the existence of such experiences in his Pagan environment, experiences belonging to the sphere of the Mystery-Religions. In the difficult passage (1 Cor. xii. 1 ff.) in which he introduces his discussion of πνευματικοί

(or πνευματικά) he refers to ecstatic conditions known to his readers in their pre-Christian days, and supplies a test (ver. 3) for distinguishing from these their new Christian enthusiasm. And then, among the gifts of the Spirit, he specifies that of διακρίσεις πνευμάτων, the power of discerning between the Spirit of the true God, the Holy Spirit, and other spiritual manifestations which he regards as having no moral value. In the same paragraph he singles out an important endowment of the Spirit, the λόγος γνώσεως or "word of knowledge," which he classifies with such gifts as faith, power to heal, prophecy, glossolalia, and others. The salient fact about γνῶσις for our investigation is its prominence in the terminology of the Mystery-Religions.

No better illustration of the meaning of γνῶσις in the Hermetic Mystery-literature could be given than that afforded by the closing prayer of the Λόγος τέλειος of the Papyrus Mimaut, whose Greek text has been reconstructed by Reitzenstein with the help of the very valuable Latin translation found in the *Asclepius* of Pseudo-Apuleius.[1] Here the worshippers give thanks to the Highest that by his grace they have received "the light of knowledge." This γνῶσις has been bestowed upon them "in order that knowing thee truly (ἐπιγνόντες) we may rejoice." And then the prayer proceeds: "Having been saved by thee, we rejoice that thou didst reveal thyself to us wholly, we rejoice that while in our bodies thou didst deify us by the sight of thyself." After further thanksgiving there comes the closing petition: "Having thus worshipped thee, we have made no request of thy goodness (?) but this:

[1] See Reitzenstein in *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft*, 1904, pp. 393–397; *H.M.R.*, pp. 113, 114. The papyrus probably belongs to the third century A.D., but the condition of the text shows that it goes back to a much earlier original.

be pleased to keep us in the knowledge (γνῶσις) of thee: hear our supplication that we should not fall away from this manner of life." With this may be compared the concluding prayer in *Poimandres*, § 32 (ed. Reitzenstein, p. 338): "Listen to me when I pray that I may not fall away from knowledge . . . and strengthen me and [fill me] with this grace that I may enlighten (φωτίσω) those in ignorance." It is plain from the connexion of sentences in the first of these extracts that γνῶσις means that apprehension of God which results in salvation or, in its more concentrated description, deification. This is made quite clear by a remarkable sentence in *Poimandres*, § 26 (ed. Reitz., p. 336): "This is the blessed issue for those who have attained γνῶσις, to be deified (θεωθῆναι)." Hence it may be said that γνῶσις in the Hermetic Mystery-religion is the direct pathway to the highest point which can be reached by the initiate. It is essentially a supernatural gift, not to be attained by any mere process of intellectual reflexion. Its associations in the Hermetic literature are very significant. In *Corp. Hermet.* ix. (x.) 4, εὐσέβεια, piety, is defined as γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ. In xiii. (xiv.) 8, the coming of γνῶσις is accompanied by the impartation of the "powers" of God. So when in the hymn of regeneration the initiate calls on these δυναμεῖς to join in the praise he offers, he appeals to γνῶσις ἁγία as the source of his illumination (xiii. 18). Akin to this conception is that of ἐξουσία, which belongs to the man endowed with γνῶσις, and enables him to become holy like God (*Poim.* § 32). Now the term ἐξουσία is used in magical literature for the supernatural power which depends on a supernatural knowledge.[1] And so we need not be surprised to find γνῶσις itself appearing in magical formulæ. Thus a magician in supplicating the god whose powers he desires to have

[1] See Reitzenstein, *H.M.R.*, p. 183; *Poimandres*, p. 48, note 3.

at his command, says: "I am he to whom . . . thou didst grant the γνῶσις of thy mighty name, which I shall keep secret, sharing it with no one." [1] Occasionally γνῶσις is associated with cosmological mysticism, and seems to be attained by the ascent of the soul through the elements.[2] This is its more philosophical aspect, which came to be accentuated in the speculations of Christian Gnosticism. It is worth noting that emphasis is laid upon the converse of γνῶσις, ἀγνωσία. Thus in *Poim.* § 27, an appeal is made to "earth-born" men, who have given themselves over to slumber and drunkenness and to ἀγνωσία τοῦ θεοῦ. The brief conspectus of evidence presented suffices to indicate that γνῶσις belongs to the same circle of ideas as πνεῦμα and νοῦς in this literature. Perhaps Reitzenstein does not exaggerate in saying that γνῶσις θεοῦ as transforming into πνεῦμα is a fundamental conception in the phase of religion which we are considering.[3]

On the strength of the affinities between Paul and the Mystery-Religions in the "pneumatic" group of ideas, Reitzenstein finds the clue to the Apostle's use of γνῶσις in the influence of mystery-conceptions. The term is used with considerable elasticity in the Epistles, but certain fixed ideas lie in the background. Paul undoubtedly regards γνῶσις as a supernatural χάρισμα. So, e.g., in 1 Corinthians xii. 8, where it is grouped with ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων, προφητεία, and other "gifts." Indeed its connexion with προφητεία is specially intimate, e.g., 1 Corinthians xiii. 2: "If I have prophecy and know all μυστήρια and all γνῶσις," and vers. 8, 9, where, in contrast with love,

[1] Quoted by Reitzenstein from a Leiden Papyrus published by Dieterich (*Jahrb. f. klass. Phil.*, Suppl. xvi. p. 799, l. 19).

[3] *H.M.R.*, p. 121.

[2] *H.M.R.*, p. 133. With ἀγνωσία (*supra*) cf. 1 Corinthians xv. 34. The relation between this passage and that from *Poimandres* admits of more than one explanation.

γνῶσις, προφητεῖαι, and γλῶσσαι are described as vanishing, in view of a complete γνῶσις which is to come. "Knowledge," therefore, in Paul's sense, is the result of possessing the Divine πνεῦμα. In passages like Romans ii. 20 γνῶσις may appear to have a more general sense, but we are inclined to agree with Reitzenstein that for Paul it never means merely "rational knowledge."[1] A most suggestive glimpse of the Apostle's conception is afforded by 1 Corinthians viii. 1–3. In consulting Paul about their attitude towards flesh which has been offered to idols, the "stronger" Christians at Corinth assert the claim: "We all have γνῶσις." Obviously they mean the application of that γνῶσις which they possess, as having the πνεῦμα, to this special case, and the words have a tone of contempt for the "weaker" brethren. Paul, as in ch. xiii., subordinates "knowledge" to love.[2] And then come the important words: "if any one presumes to have attained a measure of knowledge, he has not yet come to know in the manner in which he ought. But if a man love God, he is known by Him." Here is a surprising turn of thought. Love is the condition of mutual understanding between God and man. And clearly such an understanding means far more than intellectual comprehension: it is really fellowship of spirit. The same sense of γνῶσις appears in 1 Corinthians xiii. 12: "At present I know partially, but then I shall know completely as already I am completely known (i.e., by God)." Galatians iv. 9 is parallel: "But now having come to know God, or rather having been known by God, how do you turn again to the weak and beggarly elemental spirits?" Reitzenstein has omitted to notice the most important passage of all, Phil. iii. 8–10: "I count all things but loss on account of the surpassing worth

[1] *H.M.R.*, p. 126.

[2] In ch. xiii. all manner of spiritual χαρίσματα are similarly subordinated.

of the γνῶσις of Christ Jesus my Lord . . . that I may win Christ and be found in Him . . . in order to know (γνῶναι) Him and the power of His resurrection and the fellowship of His sufferings . . . if haply I may attain to the resurrection from the dead." Plainly γνῶσις and γνῶναι here refer to the most intimate fellowship conceivable between the soul and Christ. We may compare with these passages *Corp. Hermet.* x. 15: "For God does not ignore man, but thoroughly knows (γνωρίζει) and desires to be known by him. For this alone is salvation for man, the γνῶσις of God." While γνῶσις in Paul, as in the Mystery-literature, is repeatedly emphasised on its intellectual side, its inherently religious significance is quite apparent. The question, therefore, arises: Was Paul's use of γνῶσις shaped by the Mystery-terminology, or can we trace it back to a strain of thought in the Old Testament?

In a former article we indicated that the "knowledge of God" for the prophets was something experimental, a revelation of God in the inner being. Thus, e.g., Hosea ii. 22: "I will betroth thee unto me in faithfulness, and thou shalt know (ἐπιγνώσῃ) the Lord" (cf. v. 4) [1]; Isaiah xi. 2: "The spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge (LXX. γνώσεως) and of godly fear (εὐσεβείας)." Cf. Proverbs ii. 5: "Then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord [virtually = piety, εὐσέβεια] and find the knowledge (ἐπίγνωσιν) of God," where the parallel clauses describe a practical relationship towards God. These and other instances suggest a close affinity between the Old Testament conception and that of Hellenistic religion. In view of Paul's intimate con-

[1] It is possible that this *intimate* significance of יָדַע may be the spiritual expansion of the earlier sexual application of the term. Cf. 1 Cor. vi. 15–17.

nexion with the prophetic standpoint it is scarcely possible to doubt that his use of γνῶσις is affected by the דַּעַת יְהוָה of the Old Testament. But it seems equally certain that in employing the term and the idea it embodies, he presupposed his hearers' acquaintance with these through the medium of the Mystery-religions, and to some extent at least identified himself with the current usage.[1]

There are several noteworthy utterances in which Paul hints at a direct relationship between γνῶσις and ἀποκάλυψις, "revelation." In 1 Corinthians xiv. 6 glossolalia is said to be unprofitable unless accompanied by ἀποκάλυψις or γνῶσις or προφητεῖα or διδαχή. In verses 29, 30, the προφήτης appears as the recipient of ἀποκαλύψεις. In Ephesians i. 17 he prays that God may grant his readers the spirit of wisdom and ἀποκάλυψις in the full knowledge (ἐπιγνώσει) of Him.[2] Obviously ἀποκάλυψις signifies for the Apostle a special Divine communication of spiritual truth, the illumining by the πνεῦμα of some matters of spiritual moment,[3] and it depends on fellowship with God in Christ. Now Paul himself closely associates ἀποκαλύψεις with ὀπτασίαι, "visions," in 2 Corinthians xii. 1. And the description there confronts us with a definite instance of an experience which is appealed to as a proof of his inherent sympathy with the phenomena of the Mystery-cults. The breathlessness and brokenness of the sentences reflect the intense emotion with which Paul defends himself against unscrupulous opponents. Any unprejudiced exegesis, however, of 2 Corinthians xii. 1–5 must conclude

[1] See further an admirable excursus on 1 Corinthians xii. 10, by J. Weiss (Meyer[9]), and Lietzmann's note on 1 Corinthians viii. 3.

[2] Dr. Armitage Robinson, as against Lightfoot, Hatch, and others, endeavours to prove that ἐπίγνωσις is not an intensified γνῶσις, but rather means "knowledge directed towards a particular object" (*Comm. on Ephes.*, pp. 248–254). We have not found his arguments convincing.

[3] Cf. Galatians i. 12; ii. 2; Ephesians iii. 2.

that this was an experience in which the Apostle gloried (vers. 1, 5), and which he regarded as a momentous element in his spiritual history. The abrupt fashion in which he breaks off his narrative, combined with the plurals used in verse 1, suggests that he could have recounted other occurrences of the same kind. The reason he refrains is clear from verse 6: "I hold back (i.e., from enlarging on experiences of this kind), lest any one should place to my credit anything beyond what he sees me to be or hears from me." "His authority must not rest on any trafficking in mysteries which cannot be controlled, but only on that which the Corinthians can see and hear—namely, the 'weakness' of Paul, i.e., his sufferings for Christ's sake and the courage with which he faces them" (Lietzm. *ad loc.*). The occurrence described belongs evidently to the "ecstatic" type. It is definitely dated, "fourteen years ago," like the analogous events in the lives of Old Testament prophets.[1] It was a time of spiritual crisis for Paul, apparently some seven years after his conversion. The main detail of the description is characteristic of Jewish Apocalyptic. In the original recension of the *Testament of Levi* (ii. 9, 10; iii. 1–4, ed. Charles), God dwells in the third heaven, and there *Slavonic Enoch* (ch. viii.) places Paradise. The narrative as a whole is closely parallel to accounts of the ascent of the soul to heaven in Hellenistic Mystery-religions,[2] in Jewish Apocalypses, in Rabbinic mysticism, in Philo, Plotinus, Suso,[3] and later mystics. Suso's account of his ecstasy is peculiarly suggestive. We noted in an earlier article the ecstatic accompaniments of Ezekiel's prophetic work, and corresponding conditions

[1] Cf. Isaiah vi. 1; Jeremiah i. 1; Ezekiel i. 1.

[2] An excellent summary in Wendland's *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*, ed. 2 (much enlarged and completely revised), 1912, pp. 170–176.

[3] See especially E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, pp. 225–227.

in Judaism.[1] "Mystics of all ages," says Miss Underhill, "have agreed in regarding such ecstasy as an exceptionally favourable state: the one in which man's spirit is caught up to its most immediate vision of the Divine . . . Clearly this apprehension will vary with the place of the subject in the spiritual scale. The ecstasy is simply the psycho-physical agent by which it is obtained."[2] It is futile to regard such phenomena as pure hallucinations. But their worth can only be tested by the effect produced upon the spiritual life and activity of their subjects. St. Paul has nothing to fear from the application of such a criticism.

In the light of established facts, it is evident that no conclusions can be drawn as to the Apostle's relation to the Mystery-Religions on the strength of his ecstatic experiences. Yet it cannot be doubted that these would afford him important points of contact with men and women who had grown up in the atmosphere of mystic cults. The peculiar sensitiveness of temperament which made the great missionary "theopathetic" in this special sense was an integral part of his equipment for the work to which he was consecrated. We need not dwell on Paul's further reference to ecstasy in 2 Corinthians iv. 13: εἴτε γὰρ ἐξέστημεν, θεῷ· εἴτε σωφρονοῦμεν, ὑμῖν. Here, as in chapter xii., he will make no boast of his ecstatic experiences. These were, like the glossolalia (1 Cor. xiv. 2), a matter between him and God. His ordinary controlled life is what concerns them, and he is not afraid to confront his enemies with that, for it has been absorbed in the faithful preaching of the Gospel.[3] It is illegitimate for Reitzenstein

[1] Similar states are recorded of themselves by such sober geniuses as Wordsworth and Tennyson. See Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 14.

[2] See the very valuable examination of ecstasy in *Mysticism*, pp. 427–452.

[3] See Heinrici's admirable notes *ad loc.* σωφρονεῖν is the technical antithesis to ἐκστῆναι. The evidence in Heinrici.

to connect ἐκστῆναι and σωφρονεῖν directly with ἐκδημοῦντες and ἐνδημοῦντες of verse 9, and, further, to translate our passage: "Our ecstasies occurred and still occur for God, are a service to Him, a cult," in order to find a common Mystery-conception in St. Paul.[1] There is no trace of such a notion in the passage.

As we propose in our next article to discuss the two central doctrines of the Mystery-Religions, regeneration and communion with the Divine, we must defer until then our examination of ἀναγεννᾶσθαι, παλιγγενεσία, σωτηρία, ἐν Χριστῷ εἶναι, and cognate expressions. Meanwhile we shall consider certain terms which, indeed, touch these doctrines, but admit of separate treatment. It has already been indicated that for the Mystery-cults γνῶσις was the pathway to a transformation finally resulting in deification. From *Corp. Hermet.* x. 4 we learn that when the knowledge and vision (γνῶσις καὶ θεά) of the Divine light is attained, all the bodily senses are lulled into silence. The initiate forgets all bodily perceptions and movements. That which is beheld illumines the whole inner life, drawing the soul out from the body and transforming (μεταβάλλειν) it into οὐσία ("the Divine or supra-sensible," Reitzenst.). "For it is impossible that the soul which has contemplated the beauty of the good should be deified ἐν σώματι ἀνθρώπου." Compare the direction given in the Mithras-Liturgy (14. 26 ff.): "Gaze upon the God and greet him thus: 'Hail, Lord, ruler of the water . . . potentate of the spirit. Born again, I depart, being exalted: and having been exalted I die: born through that birth which gives life, dissolved into death, I go the way which thou hast appointed.'" Here the transformation is compared to dying. In a magical papyrus[2] the following occurs: "I was

[1] *H.M.R.*, p. 193.

[2] Wessely, *Griech. Zauberpap.* i. p. 48 (?): quoted by Reitzenstein, *H.M.R.*, p. 69. The reference is not clearly given.

united with thy sacred form (*μορφῇ*), I was strengthened by Thy holy name." The new *μορφή* appears as the consequence of initiation. Reitzenstein refers to a remarkable passage in Seneca (*Ep.* vi. 1), where he tells his friend Lucilius that he is not only improved (*emendari*) but transformed (*transfigurari*), and speaks of his sudden change. This means, of course, for Seneca an inward experience.[1] But Reitzenstein believes that the metaphor is derived from the terminology of the Mystery-Religions, perhaps through Posidonius. We are unable to see the relevance of the parallels which Reitzenstein finds in the use of *reformare* and *reformatio* in the initiation-experience of Lucius (Apul. *Metamorph.* xi. 16, 27), for these surely refer to his restoration to human form.[2] But it is pertinent to note certain expressions in the vision of the alchemist Zosimus, who seems to have preserved a much older stratum of Mystery-theology. He speaks of a priest who, in his vision, "renewed" him (*καινουργῶν με*) so that he became *πνεῦμα*. This process he describes later as *μετασωματούμενος*, exchanging body for spirit.[3]

The material with which we have been dealing recalls Paul's utterance in 2 Corinthians iii. 18: "We all with unveiled face beholding (or, reflecting) as in a mirror the glory of the Lord are transformed (*μεταμορφούμεθα*) into the same image from glory to glory, as from the Lord, the Spirit." Romans viii. 29 declares that "those whom God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed (*συμμόρφους*) to the image of his Son." And in Philippians iii. 21 it is said of Christ that He "will transform (*μετασχηματίσει*) the body of our humiliation so as to be con-

[1] See Wendland, *Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*,[2] p. 85, note 4.

[2] *H.M.R.*, p. 105. Possibly there may be some cogency in Apul. xi. 30: *Osiris in alienam quampiam personam reformatus.*

[3] Berthelot, *Les alchimistes grecs*, p. 108, 5, 17: qu. in *H.M.R.*, p. 141.

formed (*σύμμορφον*) to the body of his glory." With these passages we may connect Romans viii. 23: "We ourselves also who have the firstfruits of the Spirit [i.e., the *πνεῦμα* as pledge of what is to be], we also groan within ourselves, earnestly awaiting our sonship, the redemption of our body." Obviously Philippians iii. 21 and Romans viii. 23 refer to the transformation of the *σῶμα ψυχικόν* (1 Cor. xv. 44), the ordinary body of flesh and blood, into the *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, the organism which is the fit expression of the *πνεῦμα*. These two statements associate the transformation with the Parousia. But the mention of the "firstfruits consisting in the *πνεῦμα*" at least suggests that Paul may have regarded the process as having in some sense already begun. It is possible to find that idea implied in 2 Corinthians v. 4, 5: "Those of us who are in the body (*τῷ σκήνει*)[1] groan under our burden, not that we desire to strip ourselves of it (*ἐκδύσασθαι*), but to put on another over it (*ἐπενδύσασθαι*), that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life. Now He that prepared us for this very experience is God, who gave us the pledge of the Spirit." The germ of the future *σῶμα* is somehow connected with the indwelling *πνεῦμα*. How are we to estimate the crucial statement, 2 Corinthians iii. 18, in view of all the facts? The key to it is surely found in the expression *πολλῇ παρρησίᾳ*, in the introductory sentence of the paragraph. Paul has been accused of concealing something (iv. 2, 3). He repels the charge indignantly and emphasises the openness of his Gospel. This he contrasts with the veil on Moses' face (ver. 13), the veil on the heart of Israel (ver. 15), and the veiling of the Gospel in the minds of unbelievers (iv. 3, 4). Hence the prominent idea in verse 18 is the "unveiled face." Here we are plainly moving, to some extent, among

[1] A typically Hellenistic term: cf. *Corp. Hermet.* xiii. 15: *Καλῶς σπεύδεις λῦσαι τὸ σκῆνος.*

metaphors, yet the occurrence of the terms εἰκών and δόξα warns us against a merely metaphorical interpretation. No doubt in Romans xii. 2 μεταμορφοῦσθαι is used of a purely inward "renewal." But the combination, e.g., of συμμορφιζόμενος with γνῶναι in Philippians iii. 10 suggests a background for the Apostle's conception akin to that of the Mystery-terminology. In 2 Corinthians iv. 16, the very context in which the "spiritual organism" is introduced, there occurs the pregnant statement: "If our outward man is being destroyed, yet our inward is being renewed day by day." It is natural to connect this "renewal" with the growth of a "pneumatic" life in the believer, which ultimately issues in the σῶμα πνευματικόν.[1] And some colour is lent to the influence of the Mystery-conceptions upon this whole group of ideas by the doctrine of the σῶμα πνευματικόν itself which we must proceed briefly to investigate. But before doing so, we would point out that, whatever links of contact may be here detected between Paul's thought and the Mystery-idea of transformation by the vision of God, there is a difference in the point of emphasis. In the Mystery-Religions the chief stress is laid upon a quasi-magical transmutation of essence. The very nature of Paul's conception of the πνεῦμα sets in the forefront the *moral* significance of the process. And so it is difficult even to surmise the nature of any "metaphysical" speculation on the experience which may have found a place in Paul's mind.[2]

This difficulty is not lessened by his statements regarding

[1] Reitzenstein refers to a conception of the alchemist Zosimus which assigns to the inner life of every man a φωτεινὸς καὶ πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος (*H.M.R.*, p. 177). But this may be a late development.

[2] Little light is shed on Paul's conception by Schweitzer's statement that for the Apostle, renewal, spirit, ecstasy, gnosis, etc., are all dependent on the entrance of the individual into a "new cosmic process" (*Geschichte d. Paulin. Forschung*, p. 175).

the σῶμα πνευματικόν. The most lucid, in our judgment, is Philippians iii. 21. There, two things are said. Christ, at his Parousia, is to transform by His almighty power the earthly bodies (σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα, 1 Cor. xv. 50) of believers. The result will be assimilation to His own σῶμα, whose characteristic is δόξα. In 1 Corinthians xv. 49 Paul affirms: "Even as we wore the image of the earthly (i.e., Adam), so shall we wear the image of the heavenly (i.e., Christ)."[1] Plainly, the idea of the σ. πν. is modelled on his conception of the mode of existence of the exalted Christ. And it seems to us impossible to doubt that this conception is intimately associated with the Damascus-vision.[2] In the obscure passage, 2 Corinthians v. 1, 2, the σ. πν. is described as the "building from God," the "house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens" (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 38). The impression that this is a definite and sudden act of God is confirmed by 1 Corinthians xv. 51: "we shall all be changed, in a moment." In 2 Corinthians v. 1 ff. the suggestion is of a sudden event (ἐπενδύσασθαι). It is difficult to regard this passage as denoting a condition which already belongs to the constitution of the believer's life. Reitzenstein argues strongly for the conception of the ἔσωθεν ἄνθρωπος as the nucleus which, as, in a certain sense, an ἔνδυμα or garment, is to be clothed over (ἐπενδ.) with the σ. πν.[3] His argument, however, depends largely for its validity on the very doubtful reading ἐκδυσάμενοι (for ἐνδυσάμενοι) in 2 Corinthians v. 3. And it reads into Paul a crassness of idea which we fail to trace in the passages

[1] The reading φορέσωμεν, although so widely attested, is plainly an error. The whole context demands φορέσομεν, which is read by B. This common interchange in MSS. between ο and ω, due to pronunciation, appears also in Romans v. 1.

[2] See some suggestive paragraphs in Feine, *N.T. Theologie*, pp. 362, 501, 502.

[3] *H.M.R.*, pp. 177, 178.

adduced. Probably it is impossible, on the basis of our data, to determine how Paul conceived the relation of the πνεῦμα in the believer to the σ. πν. To say, as J. Weiss does, that "Paul evidently pictures it as an 'ethereal,' light, pure, heavenly material" does not conspicuously aid us in grasping the conception.[1] He is following a far more important clue when he urges that what concerned the Apostle above all else was the continuance of his individuality.

Reitzenstein holds that the notion of the σ. πν. has its roots in Hellenistic Mystery-religion. The passages to which he refers are of a highly philosophical character. The one (*Corp. Herm.* vii. 2, 3) speaks of the necessity of "tearing off the tunic which you are wearing, the robe woven of ignorance,"[2] but there is no hint of the Pauline conception. The other (*ib.* xvii.) deals with σώματα ἀσώματα, "incorporeal bodies," but a glance at the context shows that we are moving in the region of abstract metaphysics, from which there appears to be no path to the realm of Paul's speculations. More arresting are two extracts quoted by J. Weiss. In *Corp. Herm.* xiii. 14,[3] Tat, who has just been regenerated, asks if his transfigured σῶμα will ever suffer dissolution. His father assures him that the former body was subject to disintegration, but that which has come from the birth of true being is indissoluble and immortal. "You do not recognise that you are now θεός and a child of the One." In the opening prayer of the Mithras-Liturgy, the initiate, after addressing the various elements, appeals to "my perfected body . . . formed by a glorious arm . . . in the world which is unlighted and in that which is full of light."[4] In the first passage, apart altogether from its

[1] *Erster Kor.-Brief* (Meyer[9]), p. 373.
[2] The same metaphor in Plato, *Cratyl.*, 400 C.
[3] *Poimandres* (ed. Reitz.), p. 345, 1 ff.
[4] *Eine Mithrasliturgie*,[2] p. 4, 3 ff.

philosophical substratum, the notion of a completely transformed essence, which makes the subject already a god, is utterly alien to Paul's standpoint. Weiss himself admits that he is unable to explain the sentence from the Liturgy, but believes that at any rate we find here the notion of a "supra-earthly body." An examination of the context will show that we have in the passage a curious blend of Stoic speculation and cosmological tradition.[1] And it is noteworthy that the appeal of the prayer is made before the regenerating process begins. There is surely a wide gulf between such representations and the thought of St. Paul.

Some scholars, notably Reitzenstein[2] and Wendland,[3] bring the Pauline conception of the σῶμα πνευματικόν into direct connexion with the notion of the heavenly garments, which, in various phases of Oriental religion, purified souls receive in their ascent through the spheres towards their abode in the infinite light.[4] Traces of the idea appear in the account of the initiation of Lucius given by Apuleius.[5] But even if primitive imagination has left its impression on the Apostle's conception, the picture of the beatified soul in shining raiment is much too obvious to require explanation by any process of borrowing. If such a process had to be postulated, it would be more relevant to refer to parallels in the Apocalypses, e.g., Eth. Enoch, lxii. 15 (ed. Charles): "The righteous and elect will have risen from the earth . . . and will have been clothed with garments of glory."[6] Paul's metaphor of "putting on Christ"

[1] See Dieterich's notes on the passage, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*,[2] pp. 58, 59.

[2] *H.M.R.*, pp. 106, 159, 175 ff.

[3] *Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*,[2] p. 172, note 2: *G.G.A.*, September 1910, p. 657.

[4] See Cumont, *Les Religions Orientales*, pp. 235 f., 391 f.

[5] Esp. *Metamorph.* xi. 23.

[6] See Charles's notes, the parallel in Slav. Enoch, 22. 8 (with references), and Bousset, *Die Religion d. Judentums*,[2] p. 319.

(Gal. iii. 27) cannot be regarded as a true parallel to his speculations on the "spiritual organism," but must rather be compared with such Old Testament passages as Psalm cxxxii. 9: "Let thy priests be clothed with righteousness" (cf. 2 Chron. vi. 41 *et al.*), and such remarkable usages as that of Judges vi. 34: "The spirit of Jehovah clothed itself with Gideon" (cf. Job xxix. 14, etc.).

In discussing γνῶσις we pointed out that for the Mystery-Religions its ultimate issue was deification. We must reserve our discussion of this conception for the present. We shall conclude with a brief survey of the terms εἰκών and δόξα, which have intimate affinities with the σῶμα πνευματικόν. They are linked together in the important passage, 1 Corinthians iii. 18, which has already been before us. In connexion with 1 Corinthians xv. 49 we indicated that "the εἰκὼν of the heavenly" was virtually equivalent to the σ. πν. And Phil. iii. 21 is evidence that the character of the σ. πν. is δόξα. It may therefore be said that δόξα is that by which the εἰκών expresses itself. Where are we to look for the background of these ideas? Paul's use of εἰκών is very instructive. In 1 Corinthians xi. 7 he describes man as the εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ, and in Colossians iii. 10 he speaks of the "new man" as being "renewed with a view to complete knowledge κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν." Obviously these passages are an echo of Genesis i. 27 (LXX.): "And God created man, κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ created he him" (cf. v. 1). The idea is emphasised both in Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism, e.g., Wisd. ii. 23, Sirach xvii. 3. Alongside of this usage in Paul is that which designates Christ as the εἰκων of God (2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15), and regards believers as destined to be conformed to that εἰκών (Rom. viii. 29). This combination is precisely parallel to his conception of the first and second creations (Rom. v. 12–21; 1 Cor. xv. 44–49). The εἰκών of God which

was lost in the first creation through sin is to be restored in the second through Christ, in whom sin's power has been broken. It is therefore impossible to doubt, in spite of Clemen,[1] that Paul's use of εἰκών has an intimate connexion with the Old Testament through the medium of the LXX. We believe that this holds good also of δόξα. The term is extraordinarily common in the Epistles with varying shades of meaning, from that of the radiance of a heavenly body to the energy which is exerted by the Divine nature, and including such senses as "honour" and "praise," as well as the eschatological idea of the "glory" which awaits the redeemed. Now δόξα is almost invariably the LXX. translation of *kabod*, which occurs an immense number of times in the Old Testament with a considerable flexibility of significance, and as expressing or interpreting *kabod*, a most important religious term, it must have been thoroughly familiar to all Jews of the Diaspora. To discuss the conception in the Old Testament and in Judaism would require a treatise. A somewhat careful investigation has convinced us of the validity of Professor Buchanan Gray's conclusions[2]: "The glory of J″. was originally used to express the manifestations of J″.'s power and might, or more generally of His nature; through Isaiah the phrase became enriched and deepened in meaning, and subsequently continued to express this idea. . . . The phrase first unmistakably expresses a physical phenomenon in Ezekiel, who uses it to express the form under which *in his visions* he realizes the movement of J″. . . . It is not till we come to P in the fifth century that the phrase is used of a physical phenomenon actually supposed to have been visible to the natural eye."[3] This statement requires to

[1] *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung d. NT.*, pp. 262, 263.

[2] Art. *Glory* (*in Old Testament*), *H.D.B.*, ii. p. 185.

[3] See also Duhm, *Die Theologie d. Propheten*, pp. 170, 171, 279; Dillmann, *Handbuch d. A.T. Theologie*, 1895, p. 283, where *kabod* is defined

be supplemented only as regards the fact, probably exaggerated by Stade [1] and Von Gall,[2] that in the Psalter more especially the glory of J″. is closely associated with the Messianic Age.

Paul's use of δόξα corresponds remarkably to its Old Testament background and also to its occurrences in Apocalyptic writings, which usually emphasise its more "physical" aspect.[3] From what has already been said, its close kinship with πνεῦμα is evident. Faithful to its Old Testament atmosphere, it denotes the manifested life or energy of the living God, e.g., Romans vi. 4: "As Christ was raised from the dead through the δόξα of the Father"; Colossians i. 11: "strengthened with all power according to the might of His δόξα." A second group of instances are distinctly eschatological, e.g., Romans viii. 18: "the glory destined to be revealed εἰς ἡμᾶς"; Colossians i. 27: "Christ in you, the hope of glory"; 1 Thessalonians ii. 12: "who calleth you into his own kingdom and glory." This usage seems to be parallel to the Old Testament notion of "glory" as characteristic of the Messianic Age. Finally there are passages which may be directly linked to Old Testament pictures of theophanies, e.g., 2 Thessalonians i. 9: "who shall suffer punishment . . . from the face of the Lord and from the glory of His might"; Philippians iii. 21: "the body of His (i.e. Christ's) glory"; 2 Corinthians iii. 8: "if glory (i.e., the reflexion of the Divine on the face of Moses) belonged to the ministry of condemnation." Obviously it will be difficult to draw a distinction between

as "the majesty of a self-revealing Being." For its connexion with holiness, see Cheyne on Isaiah vi. 3.

[1] *Ausgewählte Reden*, p. 49.

[2] *Die Herrlichkeit Gottes*, pp. 32–47. This discussion contains much that is suggestive for the New Testament.

[3] See, e.g., 4 Ezra vii. 78, 91; Eth. Enoch lxi. 8; lviii. 3; Apoc. Bar. xlviii. 49, etc.

such utterances and the eschatological group. For these have usually in view the unveiled Divine Presence, the sphere of the Divine existence. We have indicated that Paul's conception of the *σῶμα πνευματικόν* was bound up with his vision on the Damascus road. Now the essential characteristic of the *σ. πν.* for him was *δόξα*. Hence *δόξα*, in its sense of the radiant self-expression of the (Divine) *πνεῦμα*, probably reflects a certain impression belonging to his conversion-experience, and this impression has imparted to it a quasi-physical significance.[1] But already in the Old Testament and the Apocalypses, a "sensible" element belonged to the conception. So that Paul has only followed his usual practice of re-moulding the earlier idea in the light of his personal experience.

In view of these facts, it is quite irrelevant, with Reitzenstein, to refer the "peculiar association of the conceptions *δόξα* and *πνεῦμα* of necessity to Egyptian-Hellenistic mysticism."[2] But we must glance at the interesting parallels to Paul's use of *δόξα* which he adduces from the Mystery-literature. In a magical papyrus, edited by Dieterich,[3] it is said of the Creator: "Thou didst give to the sun its *δόξα* and all its might," where *δ.* evidently means "radiance," a sense unknown in ordinary Greek literature.[4] Similarly in other parts of this document, and in a papyrus published by Wessely (I. p. 74, l. 1200): "I addressed thine unsur-

[1] See Sokolowski, *Geist u. Leben bei Paulus*, pp. 63, 64, 94, 162, 163. S. is inclined to exaggerate the "materiality" of *δόξα*, but it is true that Paul "was not accustomed to distinguish between the physical and the spiritual in our fashion."

[2] *H.M.R.*, p. 180.

[3] *Abraxas*, p. 176, 5.

[4] Deissmann, in his pamphlet, *Die Hellenisierung d. semit. Monotheismus*, pp. 5, 6, suggests that this may have been an ancient realistic meaning which survived in the popular language of the environment of the LXX. translators, and points to Δόξα as a name of women and ships as perhaps retaining this significance.

passable δόξαν." In a curious alchemistic treatise ascribed to Komarios, dealing with chemical processes in terms derived from the Mystery-religions, the phrase ἐνδύσασθαι δόξαν occurs repeatedly, but the evidence, it seems to us, is invalidated, as Reitzenstein himself admits that this work has undergone Christian revision.[1] Founding on this passage, Reitzenstein is inclined to ascribe the sense of "radiance" belonging to δόξα to the influence of an Egyptian verb, meaning "to shine," with a corresponding noun signifying "advantage," from which he attempts, without data, to derive the meaning "glory." This would connect the LXX. use of δόξα with Egyptian Mystery-terminology. Deissmann's suggestion, quoted above, appears to us far more probable. A notable parallel occurs in *Corp. Hermet.* x. 7, in which the transformed soul is represented as "joining the chorus of the gods," and then it is said: "this is ἡ τελειοτάτη δόξα of the soul." Here we are reminded of various Pauline passages. Perhaps the most remarkable instance is in Wessely, *Zauberpap.* ii. p. 37, l. 512, where a magician prays to Isis: δόξασόν με, ὡς ἐδόξασα τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ σου Ὥρου.[2] Probably the prayer is one for Divine power, an idea characteristic of the Pauline δόξα, while the second clause contains the notion of "glory" in the stricter sense. Reitzenstein aptly compares ἐδόξασεν of Romans viii. 30. But the evidence we have adduced of Old Testament usage makes it wholly needless to seek for the explanation of Paul's employment of the terms in Hellenistic Mystery-Religion. What we do learn from the parallels is the ability of many of his readers to catch the meaning of a more or less technical terminology, not merely through a course of instruction

[1] *H.M.R.*, p. 142.

[2] *H.M.R.*, pp. 100, 170. Reitzenstein's interpretation of the whole passage Romans viii. 30 is quite arbitrary.

in the Old Testament, but by means of their acquaintance with a religious vocabulary already current among the Mystery-associations.[1]

H. A. A. Kennedy.

STUDIES IN CONVERSION.

IX. Rabbi Duncan.

In the New College, to which, after the Disruption, Chalmers' professorial activities were transferred from the University of Edinburgh, the subject of our last study had, as one of his colleagues, a kindred spirit, who was affectionately known throughout the country under the title of "Rabbi" Duncan; and among many points of resemblance connecting the two men the foremost was this, that each had gone through a strongly marked conversion, which became the gateway into all the profoundest experiences of the soul.

In outward fortunes, on the contrary, two men could hardly have been less alike. Duncan had been a minister of the Church of Scotland in Glasgow; then, when, through the rising tide of Evangelical enthusiasm, Missions to the Jews were founded, he was put in charge of such a mission at Buda-Pesth, the origin of which is associated with the venerable names of Robert Murray McCheyne and Andrew Bonar; and thence he was called home, when the Free Church was setting up a college, to be the professor of Hebrew. With all the leaders of the Disruption movement he enjoyed the closest intimacy, and he followed every step of the history of the new Church with sympathy; but his name holds no place in the public debates and controversies of the time; his gifts not being of such a kind as to fit

[1] Considerations of space prevent us from referring to the allied term φωτίζω (φωτισμός), but the same principles of investigation are justified in its interpretation.

him for such appearances. It was in his professorship that his life-work was done, and his immediate influence only reached a few. Even in the class-room, indeed, the effect of his labours was limited by deficiencies and eccentricities. His personal habits were odd in the extreme; and he became the hero of innumerable stories, true and untrue, such as people delight to repeat about a man of this type. Yet he was a scholar, acquainted with a score of languages, especially those of the East; and he was a philosopher and theologian of omnivorous reading. But he was much more than this—he was a man of unquestionable genius. He possessed the insight which goes like a flash to the heart of abstruse and mysterious subjects; and he could make others see his vision. His students, though they had much to bear from his habits of irregularity, were proud of him, knowing that, somewhere between the commencement and the end of the hour, something would be said which would shine in the memory like a jewel; and they were aware that, if they could get him away from the class-room, it was easy to engage him in conversation, which poured from him like a torrent and revealed the riches of an original and thoroughly furnished mind.

It was through the ingenuity of one of his students, more conscious than the rest of the value of such opportunities, that the world at large owed its first knowledge of the Rabbi. William Knight, afterwards Professor of Moral Philosophy at St. Andrews, not only assiduously cultivated his acquaintance, but, during a summer-vacation, carried him off to the home of his father in Fife, where, in long, sunny walks, he boswellized him; and he gave the results to the public under the title of *Colloquia Peripatetica or Deep-sea Soundings*.[1] It was a tiny volume of a hundred-

[1] Professor Knight's volume reached its sixth edition in 1907, and this edition contains some additional *colloquia*.

and-fifty pages, but it disclosed to those who had eyes to see a thinker of the first rank. It proved Dr. Duncan to have been possessed not only of immense erudition but of the most penetrating insight into the genius of philosophical and theological systems and the most delicate powers of expressing the niceties of thought in language. It proved him to have been a man of great breadth of culture and sympathy, who, while holding what might be considered a narrow creed of his own, could enter into the feelings and convictions of Christians of every branch of the Church. And it proved that he could express his ideas in terms the most eloquent or in epigrams which stick in the memory like arrows.

It may be well to quote, from this source, a few of his sayings, in order to give those unacquainted with him some notion of his mental calibre :—

" Genius lies very much in that region where the profound is simple, and the simple profound. The great thoughts of such men as Chalmers are very simple when expressed, but only a man of genius could think them."

" Everyone should have a strait creed for himself, and a wide one for other people."

" Hyper-Calvinism is all house and no door, Arminianism is all door and no house."

" ' Who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb '—ah, yes ; and they will be prouder of their redness than of their whiteness."

" ' Very religious ' was the character given of some devout but unrenewed man. ' He is very religiose,' was the Rabbi's answer."

" The Christian Fathers found salvation only in Christ, but they had a bleeding heart for Plato, whose philosophy one of them called a sigh for Christ."

" There is an immense power in Christianity to evoke

latent talent. There is nothing that I know of so powerful to call out the 'mute inglorious Miltons.' "

"The cultus of the Ritualist and of the old Scotch Seceder are at opposite extremes. In the one we have the external form, often without the internal spirit; in the other we have the internal element, without the smallest regard to its outward form. But it is the ghost and the body together that make the man."

"The *Te Deum* is a grand piece of writing—by far the finest fragment of post-apostolic devotion. I am particularly fond of these lines—'Thou art the King of Glory, O Christ. Thou art the everlasting Son of the Father. When Thou tookest upon Thee to deliver man, Thou didst not abhor the Virgin's womb. When Thou hadst overcome the sharpness of death, Thou didst open the Kingdom of heaven to all believers.' The *Te Deum* must be very old. It was sung at Augustine's ordination, but it is much older. No one can tell the influence of that hymn during the fourteen centuries it has been in use. There are magnificent prayers in the Roman Missal. They are chiefly relics of a very early and much purer age; and many a good Romanist gets on very well in his Church by the help of these alone."

"'Fulfil yourself' is the vague and cloudy cry of some shallow analysts of human nature. Fulfil what? Again I ask, fulfil what? Your fallen nature, or the new creature? The summons to let your nature, whatever it may be, get free play, with all its corrupt instincts, is a summons to pandemonium. Let men start from the new creature, and the fulfilment of that is the perfection and completion of man."

"A merely æsthetic religion, like that of Goethe and all worshippers of the beautiful, is a miserable substitute for piety, and it never stands the tear and wear of time, especially in great sorrows. It is the offspring of sentiment divorced

from law ; and that is an illegal divorce. It leads to a crude philanthropy, to moonlight views of God's government of the world. It has often led to a hazy latitudinarianism, and sometimes to what is even worse, an antinomian evangelism, great raptures and gross viciousness going together. Æsthetic religionism is at bottom the bringing of religion to God, instead of bringing the soul to God to get religion. Let the effort to clothe yourself with the raiment of the beautiful be changed into an effort to strip yourself. Humble yourself, and think of the law. Yet God is an æsthetic Being ; let me never forget that fact. The æsthetical in religion must not be eradicated : it must be supplemented."

In Professor Knight's book there are important references to the conversion ; but the full account is due to a friend of the Rabbi's youth, subsequently known to the world as Principal Brown, who not only had firsthand knowledge of the facts at the time, but was himself a part of the facts, as will be seen from the following narrative.[1]

John Duncan, like so many of the distinguished Scotsmen of his century, was an Aberdonian, having been born in the city of Aberdeen in the last decade of the eighteenth century. He was of humble parentage and might have been supposed to be destined to follow some common handicraft ; but the thirst for knowledge, so characteristic of the North, was early awake in him. During an illness which he had as a child he was heard sighing, " Oh that God would spare me till I get on the red cloakie " (meaning the student's gown) ! He early lost his mother ; but he had the good fortune to get, as stepmother, a woman of rare discretion and sympathy, who entered into his feelings and encouraged

[1] Principal Brown published, in 1872, *Life of John Duncan, LL.D.* (second edition the same year), and, in 1874, *The Rev. John Duncan, LL.D., in the Pulpit and at the Communion Table.* See also Dr. Moody Stuart, *Recollections of the late John Duncan*, 1872. Professor Blaikie's Life of Principal Brown should also be consulted.

him to attempt the career of learning. Thus he succeeded in passing through both the high school and the university. But he made no mark in either. Already the eccentricity of his genius and the disorderliness of his habits were strongly marked. He could not keep to the prescribed paths, wherein the rewards of learning are gathered. Nevertheless, his mind was early awake, and he was keenly pursuing pathways of his own. When he ought to have been doing the exercises prescribed in the classes, he was greedily acquiring foreign languages or reading voraciously in philosophy.

His parents belonged to the Original Secession Church and intended him for the ministry in that body; but, when his preliminary studies were nearly completed, he announced, to their surprise and chagrin, his intention of entering the Established Church. For this step he gave them what reasons he could, but he did not disclose the real reason till long afterwards. It was that he had completely lost his faith. In subsequent years he used to say that he had been an atheist. Apparently the ordinary arguments for the existence of God had broken down in his mind; and it seemed to follow that there was no God. Whether he actually affirmed this is not quite clear: he would seem rather to have taken refuge in a vague kind of Pantheism; for he used to say that for three years he had been a Spinozist. He was not at all at rest, however, but plunged in misery; for he felt that there was nothing in Pantheism to control the impulses of his passionate and irregular nature. Pantheism has no personal God to claim authority over the conscience or to curb the will.

In these circumstances his entrance to the divinity hall of the Established Church proved a blessing to him; because the first professor under whom he studied there, Dr. Mearns, broke down his objections and convinced him

both that God exists and that He has revealed Himself in the Bible; and so satisfactory was the demonstration that Duncan never again questioned these great truths. In fact, the recovery of his faith filled him with ecstasy. "When I was convinced," he said in after life, "that there was a God, I danced on the Brig o' Dee with delight." That dancing figure on the bridge is one of the queerest sights in Church history; and it proves what a bizarre spirit dwelt in the brain of the ungainly and abstracted student.

This was not, however, his conversion. His convictions at this stage were processes of the intellect; he was consciously unreconciled to God, and he lived a prayerless life. When his divinity-course was ended, he did not take licence; for not only could he not sign the Confession of Faith, but he was conscious of an active aversion to such doctrines as the divinity and the atonement of Christ. When he was nearly thirty years of age, he at length did take licence, but it was only to please and silence his friends, and it was on the tacit understanding that subscription meant merely a pledge not to preach against the Church's creed—a view of the subject which he subsequently abhorred. Instead of seeking a church, he supported himself by teaching, and his erudition grew from year to year; but the irregularity of his habits, in which the most childlike unworldliness was combined with outbursts of wild hilarity and sociability, extended to his morals as well as his manners; and it seemed not unlikely that he might become a distinguished specimen of the type known in Scotland under the name of "stickit minister"—a creature causing merriment by his oddities, admired for his genius and acquirements, but haunting the shady pathways of dissipation.

His deliverance came through a youthful companion and friend. Principal Brown—to make use of the title by which this friend is now known—had not only been his pupil and an

admirer of his genius, but had been admitted to such close and daily intimacy that he knew him through and through. He shared also his sceptical views, until, during a session spent at Edinburgh, he was drawn into the tide of the warm Evangelical influences then flowing in the capital, and returned to the North a changed man. Duncan, having heard what had happened, was shy of meeting his friend, but at last they came together and, after long preliminaries, landed on the subject of personal religion. The younger man acknowledged what had happened to himself; but Duncan would only say that they looked at the subject from different points of view, and therefore could not agree. His friend, however, was led at last to ask what his religion had done for him, and he was compelled to answer, "Very little." "Is it making you holy?" "No." Thus Duncan's conscience was awakened to the confession of personal sin; and his friend told him of the power over sin which his new religion had given him.

But the completion of the work thus auspiciously begun was reserved for a more practised hand. A visit was at the time expected in Aberdeen from a celebrity of those days—César Malan of Geneva—and a plan was laid for bringing Duncan and him together. Malan was a Swiss pastor, who had been converted through the influence of Mr. Robert Haldane, an Edinburgh lawyer, who, beside founding, with his brother James, the Congregational body in Scotland, to counteract Moderatism, was privileged to carry the fire of the Evangelical Revival to foreign cities, visited by him, such as Geneva and Montauban. Malan was persecuted in his own country for his Evangelical views, but he was warmly welcomed in Scotland, which he visited again and again. He was a man of cultivation and personal charm; wherever he went he did the work of an evangelist, chiefly through conversation; and his watchwords were instant

salvation and consciousness of the same. He was made especially useful among the educated classes; and it is interesting to note how the blessing carried to Switzerland by Haldane was carried back to Scotland again by Malan.

Malan's method was to quote the text, "He that believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God"; then to ask, "Do you believe that Jesus is the Christ?" and, when an affirmative answer was given, to press the inference, "Then you are born of God." He tried this method on Duncan; but the Aberdonian was too cautious to be put through so simple a mill. In the conversation which ensued, however, Duncan having by chance quoted a text of Scripture, Malan exclaimed eagerly, "There, you have the Word of God in your mouth." "And," says Duncan, "it passed through me like electricity —the great thought that God meant man to know His mind: God—His Word—in my very mouth. It was perhaps the seed of all I have, if I have anything, to this hour. Seminally it was all there, though I cannot even now unfold it, much less then."

It is not difficult to see what the nature of this impression was. A godless man's way of thinking of God, when he thinks about Him at all, is to conceive a Being far away—as distant as heaven—Christ is a figure of the past; faith is the assent demanded to a creed. Thus had Duncan been thinking of religion; but here, before him, was a man in whom it was a present power and a present joy; and it flashed on him that God was also present, dealing with him through His Word, as if speaking with an audible voice. And to realise this is the kind of experience which in a moment can change everything.

Duncan had some more pleasant intercourse with Malan; and, besides, all his own faculties were roused and concentrated on the subject. Following Malan's method, he constructed syllogisms for himself, like this: "'As I live, saith

the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live ' ; I am one of the wicked ; therefore, God has no pleasure in my death " ; and so on ; and he was helped from point to point by his friend, David Brown. Those interested in his spiritual welfare had hardly dared to hope for much from a mind so subtle and stubborn ; but it soon became manifest that he was radically changed.

To himself he seemed to have passed into a new world ; and three things in it astonished him. One of them was that the besetting sin to which he had been enslaved at once lost its power ; another was that he had the most ardent delight in the society and conversation of the people of God, however uneducated they might be ; and the third was that the doctrines of the Gospel, which he had disliked and despised, commended themselves to him as reasonable and acceptable. " Next day," he says, " as I sat down to study, and took my pen in hand, I became suddenly the passive recipient of all the truths which I had heard and been taught in my childhood. I sat there unmoving for hours, and they came and preached themselves to me. There was no investigation such as I had desired, but presentation of the truth to me passive." The interpretation of this singular experience may be, that for years he had been unconsciously convinced of these truths, but had unawares been keeping them out of his mind, because he had an interest in not letting them in, as they would have demanded a surrender which he was not prepared to give, but that now, when this barrier was removed, they immediately exerted their natural force in the region of conviction. He himself, however, believed that there was a deeper reason : he believed he was taught them of the Spirit. And he may have been right, because between the truth of the Gospel and the spirit of man, when it is restored to its proper disposition

towards God, there is an affinity which renders their rushing together natural and immediate; the key finds the wards of the lock, and there is instant adjustment.

There had been no deep conviction of sin in the experience through which Duncan had passed; but this came two years later, when he experienced what he used to call his second conversion. It came with great violence; the evil of his nature was so opened to him that he abhorred himself, and his past sin rose before him in forms so awful that he could hardly believe that he was forgiven. Indeed, on this side there continued with him permanently a measure of morbidity, which often darkened his spirit and obscured his presentation of the Gospel. This, however, may have been needed to keep his conscience always tender, and as a counteractive to the eccentricity and carelessness of his disposition.

At all events, the change, from the first, was deep, and it was permanent. Duncan became an eminently saintly man; his talents were consecrated to the service of Christ and thus a life which might easily have become a wreck was redeemed from destruction.

JAMES STALKER.

CHRIST, OR ARCHELAUS?

It was perhaps inevitable that our translators should have transliterated "austēros" by "austere" in Luke xix. 21, but it is not a good translation. For, however little we may *like* austerity in practice, we all recognise a certain fineness and nobility in it. It would be easy to name both statesmen and men of letters among our contemporaries who owe to their austere character much of the confidence and respect which they enjoy. Whereas the slothful servant certainly intended nothing which could be twisted into a compliment: he meant to say that his master was a hard and grasping man of business, against whom he had to be very carefully on his guard. In a word "austēros" here is practically indistinguishable from "sklēros" in Matthew xxv. 24. What is so perplexing is the fact that in both stories, but more especially in St. Luke's, the "austere man" fully justifies by his subsequent conduct the bad character ascribed to him by his servant. In the first Gospel the punishment inflicted on this servant is excessive and vindictive. *We* indeed vaguely understand the words as if they referred to the sufferings of the lost: but those who heard the story would think at once of those dreadful dens of darkness and of torture into which the miserable slaves were cast who had aroused the wrath of cruel masters. Still more odious is the conduct of the "austere man" in St. Luke. It was probably quite in keeping with the character of Archelaus that on his return from Rome, triumphant over Antipas, he should have the Jews who had petitioned against him collected together and slaughtered before his eyes. Whether he actually did this is immaterial. Everybody knew that nothing would have better pleased the tiger-cub who had inherited his father's lust for blood. But then the story

is not really about Archelaus: it is about Christ. The whole value of it lies in the fact—which everybody takes for granted—that our Lord is talking about Himself on the one part, and about us on the other. At once, then, we run up against the extraordinary difficulty that our Lord, in talking about Himself, assumes the rôle (without any sign that He dislikes it) of an "austere man"—of a harsh, callous, and cruel ruler. The difficulty is, no doubt, familiar, for it recurs often enough in the parables: but here we meet with it in its simplest and most unequivocal form. There can be no question that the parable speaks of duty, responsibility, and reward to those who "serve the Lord Christ": but we should not want to serve Him if He went on to have His personal enemies slaughtered before His face. If He *were* like that, He would deserve the character imputed to Him by the defaulting servant: we could have little sympathy with Him and feel no affection for Him: our service, if rendered at all, would be prompted either by fear or by self-interest. Why should our Lord go out of His way, as it were, in such a connexion as this, to resemble Himself to a vindictive and blood-thirsty creature like Archelaus? St. Augustine indeed saw the point, and utilised it against Marcion and all his followers. You see, he said, that after all the God of the New Testament is just as inexorably stern (vindictive even, from a human point of view) as the God of the Old Testament! But then for St. Augustine the Divine Being *was* emphatically "austere" and "hard," sending men and women by the million into this world pre-condemned to moral failure and eternal punishment. It is not any use to quote St. Augustine on the harshness of the Gospel. Modern writers, therefore, lay themselves out to tone down this harshness, urging (what no man need doubt) that rebellion against God must needs bring about its own punishment, and that inexorably.

What they wholly fail to explain is that our Lord takes to Himself the rôle of one who is incapable of being generous even in the hour of his triumph: that the thing quite clearly intimated is not a sad necessity, not abstract justice, or even righteous retribution, but vindictive cruelty and the gratification of personal animosity. Try as hard as you like, you cannot see the Christ of God in it, you can only see Archelaus.

For our Lord and the princes of this world (including Archelaus) are eternally and diametrically opposed. In all the Scriptures, and in the very truth of things, they stand over against one another as opposites. Behind the princes stands the Prince of this world, who secretly controls their action, and is in turn openly represented by them. They try, they convict, they crucify the Lord of glory. In that very act they are themselves judged, convicted, and (in principle) abolished. "The Prince of this world hath been judged," in the person of those princes—of whom Archelaus is one. Harshness and vindictiveness are no less condemned "under Pontius Pilate" than licentiousness or moral cowardice. The character of the "austere man" must needs be odious in the eyes of a good Christian.

Why then does our Lord seem to identify Himself with a character so odious?

In the first place, because He is never afraid of being misunderstood. We *are* afraid: and the more conscientiously we try to stand for what is good and true, the more afraid we are. It is not so much that to be misunderstood hurts *us* (although most of us are very sensitive to that) as that it compromises the cause of goodness and truth. Our Lord was, it seems, quite indifferent to any such considerations. He never guarded His utterances, never stopped to tone them down—never "hedged" in any way. He went habitually to the very outside of a truth in order

to teach it effectively, and only avoided gross exaggeration by teaching the complemental truth with equally unguarded emphasis. We need not doubt that it is quite the most successful way of teaching—men being what they are. Only, it is not open to *us*. In proportion as our eyes are open to the many-sidedness of Christian truth, we are obliged to balance and guard our presentation of it in every direction, lest we be misunderstood. Our Saviour alone was equally concerned with all the many sides of the Truth which He taught, and yet remained wholly indifferent to the danger that His teaching of it should be misunderstood. In this He was guided by Divine wisdom. Humanly speaking, we may say that He had some three years in which to make an adequate impression upon a thousand generations: He had no time for guarding Himself, for balancing His statements, for avoiding misconceptions: He had to make an impression which should go deep enough, and last long enough, for the immensity of His purposes.

This, however, although it explains much, does not explain all. It explains, e.g., why He allowed Himself (without protest) to be called an "austere man": it does not explain why He went on to justify the application of that title—or even of a worse one—to Himself. It had been a mild use of words to call Archelaus an "austere man": and the nobleman who begins (as it were) by being Christ, ends flatly by being Archelaus. We are thrown back, therefore, on our Lord's own words, so strong and yet so unregarded, when He first began to teach in parables. In these memorable words, reported at considerable length in the two first Gospels, it is impossible not to recognise a large element of paradox. It could not really have been our Lord's object to prevent men from being converted and healed. But neither can it have been wholly paradox: we must allow that our Lord deliberately adopted this

method of teaching because it would to a great extent obscure the truth He had to teach. A true statement may be thrown into a paradoxical form, but it remains substantially true. It is evident that the third Evangelist perceived this element of paradox, and wished to get rid of it : yet he had to admit the crucial words " to the rest in parables, that seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not understand." That is the irreducible minimum with which we have to deal. Apply it therefore to the parable of the pounds. That parable was intended to meet the requirements of a certain definite situation. It was spoken between Jericho and Jerusalem just before the last Passover : it was spoken, not specially to the disciples, but to the people who were going with Him : it was spoken to them because they supposed (very naturally) that the kingdom of God was immediately to appear. He had all along announced its approach, and latterly its swift approach. He had freely intimated that He Himself would be the King thereof, and many of them were eager to accept Him in that capacity. It was exactly these ardent souls who must have been baffled and bewildered by the parable, because it depicted the Lord of the Kingdom as another Archelaus, an austere man, callous, cruel, odious. Whereas all men knew well enough that the Prophet of Nazareth was just the opposite of this. The story could have had no other effect than to damp the enthusiasm and to baffle the faith of all that wished to find in Him the promised Messiah, the Saviour of the world. The same thing is true of the great majority of the parables. They are, for the most part, concerned with the Kingdom—that Kingdom for which all the faithful in Israel were hoping and looking—that Kingdom over which so many of them believed that our Lord was to reign. Yet they habitually, and of set purpose, drew a most disagreeable picture of the Lord of the Kingdom.

In one He appears as a ruthless tyrant, in another as a capricious employer who claims to observe the letter of fair dealing whilst outraging the spirit. Even in such a very simple and intimate illustration as that of the Master whose servant is come in from ploughing, our Lord seems bent on being unjust to Himself, for no one can doubt that He speaks of Himself and His own. "Doth he thank the servant because he did the things that were commanded?" The answer implied (not, in the true text, expressed) is of course "no." But we cannot possibly accept it. If the Master be anything of a gentleman—in whatsoever position in life—he *does* thank him. And so he would have done then, even if the servant were a slave. As to our Lord Himself, it is precisely because all service will be so kindly received and acknowledged by the Master, that He finds such whole-hearted and devoted servants to do His work at all times. "Doth He thank the servant?" Let that other "well done, good and faithful servant—enter thou into the joy of thy Lord" answer, if answer be needed. One is driven to the conclusion that the parables do in general grievously misrepresent our Lord's character. Recalling His own words, one perceives (with astonishment may be) that this was done intentionally "that seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not understand."

Now whatever may have been our Lord's ultimate purpose in choosing a method of self-manifestation which was to a great extent misleading, it seems impossible to deny that such was in fact its character—even as He Himself said. But it will be our own fault if we allow ourselves or others to be misled, beause we do not choose to remember His warning. The conduct, e.g., of the "austere man" who orders a massacre of his citizens because they had opposed his claims, is the conduct of Archelaus, not of Christ. It has simply nothing to say to us about Christ, because

He is not like that at all. There cannot be anything in the Kingdom of God which really resembles that massacre in the least, because everything in the Kingdom depends upon and is determined by the character of the King—and the character of the King is known to us from other (and better) sources to be inconsistent with any such orders being given. It is therefore worse than futile to found any Christian exhortation or warning upon this incident. It belongs to that element in the parable which has no object except to fill up the outlines of a story which would be all the more interesting to its hearers because it recalled certain horrible incidents in their own recent history: in doing this—in being true to "life" as they knew it by a bitter experience—it had the effect, and (in some sense) the purpose, of misrepresenting Christ, so "that seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not understand." Now if our Saviour chooses to set before our eyes an ugly picture of Himself which does Him serious injustice, we have no right to be displeased, because He told us beforehand that He was going to do so: but still less have we the right to pretend that (with due allowance) the picture *does* resemble Him—we *are* to think of Him as being like that. Does not a very large part of the Christian teaching habitually given on the basis of our Lord's parables fall under this condemnation?

The truth seems to be that our Lord's parables about Himself stand halfway between what we may call the Old Testment and the New Testament presentations of Him and of His work. Our fathers delighted greatly in such foreshadows as the story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis xxii., or the vision of the blood-stained conqueror from Edom in Isaiah lxiii. We ourselves acknowledge with gratitude that they bear a partial, though often illusive, likeness to Him: but we are even more conscious that they combine with this likeness many features which are altogether odious.

We have therefore to a great extent, if not entirely, ceased to use them for teaching purposes. If we use them, it is with great caution, among such as are already instructed. The parables stand, no doubt, on a higher level : they illustrate in a hundred ways, with singular effectiveness, the very complex relationship in which our Saviour stands to us and we to Him. But they too combine many odious traits with their presentment of Christ—traits which belong not to Him, but to the wicked or worldly people whom He chose as the characters in His stories. In the face of this we shall assuredly abandon the notion of basing upon a parable any religious teaching which is not authenticated by the testimony of the New Testament in general, which is not sanctioned by what we believe concerning the real character of " Him with whom we have to do."

If this be accepted, we shall understand at once why the fourth Evangelist ignored altogether the parables of our Lord. Doubtless he set himself consciously and deliberately to draw such a picture of Christ as should do Him justice, and lay deep the necessary foundations for religious faith in the ages to come. For this purpose he realised that our Lord's parables, confusing and baffling as they are, were quite unsuitable : so he set them wholly on one side. We shall also understand why it is that in the Synoptic Gospels, side by side with a multitude of parables, we find an even greater multitude of miracles. No one can doubt that the miracles raise very considerable difficulties and seem (on the face of them) singularly useless. Unquestionably, regarded as forming part of an historical narrative, they are formidable hindrances to faith. But if one takes them in close connexion with the parables—as they stand in the narrative—their true value becomes evident at once. The parables, as we have seen, do grievous injustice to the character of Christ : above all, they represent Him as hard,

"austere," pitiless. The miracles with one voice proclaim that such an impression would be utterly false—that He was in truth the very opposite of this. Even those who cannot believe in the Gospel miracles as facts will agree that they represent the impression made upon the people by our Lord's personal ministry among them; that He must have had singular gifts, and must have used them in the way indicated. That is to say, He possessed gifts and powers which would have secured Him a great following in any age or land: but He used them so exclusively for the good of others and for the relief of suffering, and with such a rigid disregard of His own interests, that His enemies were never afraid of His hurting them. The whole and sole use of the miracles, we may say, is to infuse into the reader's mind an overwhelming conviction that Jesus Christ was (and therefore is) the most compassionate, the most friendly, the most pitiful, of all the Beings who have ever come in contact with the infinite sorrows and sufferings of mankind. And this conviction is immensely strengthened when we learn—what the narrative not obscurely intimates—that He never wrought "a miracle" except at the cost to Himself of exhaustion and (may be) suffering (Matt. viii. 17; compare Mark v. 30; vii. 34; John xi. 38).

Should we then ask "which of these two methods of self-manifestation gives us the real clue to His character?" the answer can only be, "facta non verba." It is a cynical saying that language was given unto man in order to conceal his meaning; but it is true, even of our Lord, in part. He manifested Himself in word, and the parables which He habitually used, and almost exclusively used with the common people, did grievous and manifold injustice to His character. He manifested Himself in deed, and He appeared to all men more loving and more lovable than any other ever was.

When we come to think of it, we perceive that what a man *says* in the way of self-explanation is limited, is coloured, by a thousand difficulties: what he *does*, in any sphere of action wherein he is free, declares the man. And it was precisely in this peculiar region of supernatural healing that our Lord found Himself practically alone, unhindered by the difficulties which beset ordinary mortals, untrammelled by the prejudices of other people, unmoved by anything but the impulses of a heart divinely pitiful and generous.

RAYNER WINTERBOTHAM.

ST. PAUL AND EPIMENIDES.

In the Expositor for October 1906 I published an article dealing with the supposed habitual inveracity of the Cretans as affirmed by a prophet of their own, who is quoted in the Epistle to Titus; and I endeavoured to show in the first instance that it was not general nor habitual lying that was laid at the door of the Cretans, but rather it was a special, particular lie, from which the enlightened Greek conscience had revolted, the belief, in fact, that Zeus, the father of gods and men, was mortal, and that his tomb could be seen in Crete: a thing which no one could believe who had right thoughts in theology, and a sufficient faith in a non-transient God.

Having established the grounds upon which the Cretans had lost their character and not found themselves in religion, it was natural to suspect that, if we could recover some more of the lost text of Epimenides from which Paul was quoting, we should find the particular lie denounced in the context.

At this point I was able to quote from a rare manuscript of commentary upon the lectionary in the Nestorian Church known as the Gannat Busamē, or Garden of Delights, a book which was especially valuable because it contained an immense quantity of extracts (in Syriac) from the lost writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, quoted either anonymously (for purposes of self-defence on the part of the Nestorian against their orthodox persecutors), or under the disguise (transparent to the initiated) of the Interpreter. In this valuable book I found under Acts xvii. 18 the following sentences:

"*In Him we live and move and have our being.*" The Cretans used to say of Zeus, that he was a prince and was

ripped up by a wild boar, and he was buried ; and lo ! his grave is with us. Accordingly Minos, the son of Zeus, made over him a panegyric, and in it he said :

"A grave have fash oned for thee, O Holy and High One,
The lying Cretans, who are all the time liars, evil beasts, idle bellies
But thou diest not, for to eternity thou livest and standest,
For in thee we live and move and have our being."

It was easy to see that we had here, in a translation, some Greek verses ; for one of the sentences is, almost exactly, the hexameter from Epimenides in the Epistle to Titus ; but what surprises us is that the famous sentence " in Him we live and move and have our being " is in the same sequence, and must itself be an Epimenidean hexameter. Now this had never been suspected ; commentators on the text of Acts xvii. 18, 19 had been careful to mark parallels to Aratus and Callimachus for the half-verse

τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν,

but they did not suppose Paul's poetry went further than the half-line of his Cilician compatriot ; in Westcott and Hort's text the fragment of Aratus is printed as verse ; we must now employ another spacing for the words—

ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν,

even though they do not, as they stand, make an exact hexameter.

From this point I went on to suggest that we had really recovered four verses of Epimenides, and to restore them to their primitive form ; and at the same time to conjecture that, since the verses in the Gannat were said to come from a panegyric which Minos made on Zeus, that the reference to Minos should lead us to identify the poem from which the lines were taken with the lost work of Epimenides, whose title was Minos, of which Diogenes Laertius says that it contained a thousand lines. If the rest of the poem

was as lofty as the four lines which we have found, our opinion of Epimenides will coincide with that of the Epistle to Titus, that he was a prophet as well as a poet.

The rest of the article related to the curious parallel made between the Cretan religion and the Adonis and Attis cults of Asia Minor in the matter of the god slain by a wild boar ; it was natural to make the modern anthropological interpretations that the god was originally the boar, and that the same reasons for pig-taboo would be found underlying the Cretan and the Asia-Minor and Syrian cults.

In April 1907 I returned to the subject in a second paper, whose title was *A Further Note on the Cretans :* in this the restoration of the verses was completed in the following form :

> τύμβον ἐτεκτῆναντο σέθεν, κύδιστε, μέγιστε
> Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί.
> Ἀλλὰ σύ γ' οὐ θνήσκεις, ἔστηκας γὰρ ζοὸς αἰεί,
> ἐν γὰρ σοὶ ζῶμεν καὶ κινύμεθ' ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσμέν.

A further attempt was made to show that the whole of the vituperation of the Cretans in the second line is due to a single cause, the death and burial of Zeus, and that the comparison with the beast and the glutton was due to the fact that, as in similar cults, they ate their god in the form of the sacred animal and ate him raw.

My reason for making a further reference to the matter at the present time lies in a fresh discovery of Theodorean matter which I have recently made, which confirms the position taken up in the previous articles.

I have recently been reading for Mrs. Gibson a text and translation which she is preparing for the press of the commentary of Isho'dad, the Nestorian Church-father, upon the Acts of the Apostles, which is to form a sequel and continuation of the work of the same father upon the

Gospels, which Mrs. Gibson has recently published. Isho'-dad's work is a mine of quotations from known and unknown fathers, such as would naturally be cited by a Nestorian author; and, in particular, as in the case of the Gannat Busamē, the pièce de resistance of the banquet is the works of the proscribed Theodore. It was, therefore, with some pleasure that I acceded to Mrs. Gibson's request that I would write a brief introduction to Isho'dad on the Acts, as I had done to Isho'dad on the Gospels. It was with great interest that I found in the comments on the seventeenth chapter of Acts the same matter from Epimenides which I had noticed in the Gannat, and, what was more to the purpose, the quotation was in a more extended form. For this reason I think it will be as well to put the passage on record, as it definitely confirms my conjecture that the verses of Epimenides are taken from the Minos. We will begin the quotation a little higher up, so as to mark the identification with Theodore, and we will continue it a little lower, so as to include what Theodore says about the quotation from Aratus. It will thus become clear that the whole of what we quote, with the exception, perhaps, of a single interpolated sentence, is from the hand of Theodore.

"The Interpreter says that the Athenians were once upon a time at war with their enemies, and the Athenians retreated from them in defeat; then a certain Daimon appeared and said unto them, I have never been honoured by you as I ought; and because I am angry with you, therefore you have a defeat from your enemies. Then the Athenians were afraid, and raised up to him the well-known altar; and because they dreaded lest this very thing should have happened to them, that they had secretly neglected one who was unknown to them, they erected this altar and also wrote upon it, *Of the Unknown and Hidden God:* wishing, in fact,

to say this, that though there is a God in whom we do not believe, we raise this altar to His honour that He may be reconciled to us, although He is not honoured as a known deity: therefore Paul did well to take a reason from this and to say before them, *This hidden God, to whom ye have raised an altar without knowing Him, I have come to declare unto you.* There is no God whom ye know not, except the true God, who hath appointed the times by His command, and hath put bounds, etc." [*He hath determined the times*, that is to say, the variations of summer and winter, spring and autumn.]

"*In Him we live and move and have our being:* and, *as certain also of your own sages have said, We are his offspring.*" Paul takes both of these quotations from certain heathen poets.

Now about this passage, "*In Him we live and move and have our being*": the Cretans said about Zeus, as if it were true, that he was a prince, and was lacerated by a wild boar, and was buried; and behold! his grave is known amongst us; so Minos, the son of Zeus, made a panegyric over his father, and in it he said:

> The Cretans have fashioned a tomb for thee, O Holy and High!
> Liars, evil beasts, idle bellies;
> For thou diest not: for ever thou livest and standest;
> For in thee we live and move and have our being.

So the blessed Paul took this sentence from Minos; and he took the quotation,

> "We are the offspring of God,"

from Aratus, a poet who wrote about God, and about the seven [planets] and the twelve [signs]; saying, "From God we begin, from the Lord of heaven, that is Zeus; for all markets, and seas, and havens are filled with His name; and also in every place, all men are in want of Him, because we are His offspring; and He out of His goodness giveth

good signs to us and to all men. He moves us to come forward to work; and He ordains all that is visible and invisible; and because of this we all worship Him, and say, 'Hail to thee, our Father, wonderful and great!'"

"Plato also and others say that souls are by nature from God."

It will be seen that this is a much more extended quotation than we found in the Gannat. It may be suspected that the Gannat has reduced matter which was before it in Isho'dad: it introduces the reference to the Interpreter at the same point, for it also has, though not completely, the extract about the Athenians and the Unknown God. The Gannat neglects, however, the reference to Aratus, and omits the statement that Paul is quoting from the Minos of Epimenides, which was the point in our first investigation that was waiting for confirmation.

The passages from Aratus, which the Syriac has translated (from Theodore) can be recognised in the following, where a comparison will show how far the translator has understood his author:

Arati Phaenomena.

Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτ' ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν
Ἄρρητον· μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί,
Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί· μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα,
Καὶ λιμένες· πάντη δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες·
Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν· ὁ δ' ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισι
Δέξια σημαίνει· λαοὺς δ' ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγειρει,
Μιμνήσκων βιότοιο.

. . . .

Τῷ μεν ἀεὶ πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον ἱλάσκονται.
Χαῖρε πάτερ, μέγα θαῦμα, μέγ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ.

Rendel Harris.

PERSONALITY AND GRACE.

X. Reconciliation.

But if grace solves the problem of the forgiveness of sins by taking us out of the circle of a legal morality, what is its practical result? A justification which assured us of escape from the punishment of sin on some future day when God comes to judge us, after all did something. That day might seem a long way off and we might not be very sure of what it would mean, but sin has a way of springing its consequences upon us at unexpected places and unexpected moments. A day, therefore, when it will spring all its consequences upon us may not be an unreasonable expectation. At least, if there is absolute justice, while a day of judgment may only be a metaphor, the final equivalence of sin and suffering must be a reality. To have a well-grounded assurance that all such consequences were provided against would be a genuine comfort to an anxious person, and, indeed, without it, what could he understand by peace? Nor ought we to blame his anxiety and dispose of it by calling it self-regard, for even self-regard has its due place. And if anything could justify grave concern about oneself, would it not be this danger looming so vast and threatening through the haze of eternity?

Manifestly we have no right to peace unless the consequences of sin no longer remain as they were. But that ought to apply to all its consequences, in this life as well as in the next, in the present as well as in the future. Nay, our more urgent need is the present, for a succour wholly postponed to some remote unknown day of judgment would be an ill-tested security even against that day; whereas, if we could only live down our past now, we might be con-

fident of not finding it an enemy in our path at any later time.

Once again the Divine method is an antinomy of grace. Grace deals with all consequences of sin—the whole form of grace as we know it being determined by its task of dealing with our whole sinful state—yet it does not deal with the consequences of sin directly. It only deals with them indirectly by reconciling us to God. To understand that truth is to solve for ourselves, practically as well as theoretically, the problem of the right relations of morality and religion.

But what is the actual working significance of being reconciled to God? Are we not doing the very thing we have pretended to avoid? Are we not setting God on one side and reality on the other, so that, while we pretend to be reconciled to some shadow, the substance of life remains precisely as it was? What in plain untheological language does being reconciled to God mean for our working lives? If that cannot be answered, religion may still be a desirable luxury but it is not part of life's immediate business.

We may better understand what is meant by being reconciled to God, if we begin by asking what practical significance we attach to being at enmity against God.

The very suggestion that a practical situation is involved may seem strange. To most people the expression "enmity against God" conveys a vague idea of a quarrel with some Person so utterly unconnected with all our doings that it is difficult to see how we ever could come into conflict with Him, unless somehow we have offended Him by a merely abstract independence. For that the only remedy seems to be some kind of abstract submission. What it includes or how it is to mollify Him is hard to tell, unless perhaps comprehensive confessions and submissions in our prayers

may touch Him. Hence the acknowledgment of being at enmity with God usually issues in those spacious superlatives about a guilty and sinful state which deal with no reality that would be admitted if clothed in concrete language and illustrated by examples.

But reality is not one thing and God another. God is reality, and reality is God, and what we are at enmity with is reality. To be at enmity against God is neither more nor less than the bitter feeling that reality is against us. We think reality should go one way and it goes in fact another. The result is not merely that reality appears to be our enemy, but in the rebellion and hostility of our hearts it is our enemy. Moreover, it is an enmity which cannot but cause fierce antagonism, for in a quarrel between us and reality the strife is unequal, and we cannot help feeling ourselves, to use a vulgar expression, the under dog.

The resentment is not always merely personal. In addition to one's own grievance, it may include a generous wrath against a life which outrages all mankind. The world is denounced as the work of a tyrant, not for ourselves alone but for every creature that can feel its cruelty. Manifestly our feeling is all the more enmity against God, that we regard our own experience as universal.

Nor need enmity against God be impious, hurling defiance at heaven, offering to curse God and die. It is possible to be quite piously at enmity with God. Men have even professed loudly to be reconciled to God and yet, in the concrete facts of life, have bitterly resented everything He appointed for them. But, in that case, the God of their profession was one thing and the God of their life was another, and it is our relation to the God of our life, not to the God of our profession, that counts.

Here, however, it is necessary to distinguish between being burdened by life and being embittered by it. The

deepest sense of the difficulty and stress of life is not enmity against God. If that sense of burden spring from a sense of life's overwhelming significance, it would be the sincerest of all recognitions of God. Even faith in the Divine succour of our lives as well as the Divine purpose with them, while it would keep us from complaining, would not necessarily keep us from being burdened. Not the feeling that life has so large a purpose that we are forced to stagger under its load, but only the feeling that life has no purpose except to crush us, is enmity against God.

To be at enmity with God, therefore, has the practical meaning of being at enmity with the lives He appoints for us. It means carrying life's burden, simply because we do not know how to make it lighter, and without being sustained by a sense of its purpose. In practice, it is just the spirit which resents trial and evades duty. Even if it is angry with the world on account of others, the reason is the same as makes it angry on its own account. Life, it insists, should serve self-love and self-will, and on that interpretation life refuses to yield up any blessed meaning. On that interpretation, it not only appears to be, but is, as much against us as we can possibly be against it.

As enmity against God is enmity against our lives, so to be reconciled to God is to be reconciled to our lives. Reconciliation is a new relation to this life, not, in the first instance at least, to another. It is not the promise of sitting in a remote heaven in a passionless eternity, but of sitting in the heavenly places amid the tumult of the present hour. In short, it is reconciliation to the discipline God appoints and the duty He demands. A spirit reconciled to God is one which resents no trial and evades no duty. In that the whole issue of reconciliation is comprehended.

But that issue is only made possible by putting into our hands the right key to life's meaning. Nothing can deliver

us from the desire to soften our discipline or get out of the way of our duty, except to see that there never is a trial love has not appointed nor a duty love has not demanded. Then and then only, we can lay ourselves open to the whole impact of reality precisely as God appoints it.

This blessedness of the acceptance of God's will of love in all our life is the essential teaching of the Beatitudes. God's kingdom belongs to the poor in spirit. Upon that everything else depends. To be poor in spirit is to accept life's discipline and duty as God's rule of love. From that all true blessedness springs. That rule of love, however, we can only discover by hungering and thirsting after righteousness and by seeing God in a pure heart, and we can only retain it as an abiding reality by pursuing peace at all costs and against all opponents.

There is the true practical issue of being reconciled to God. It means being called according to God's purpose; it means the reflection of that purpose in our hearts so that there cannot but be some response to God's love in them; it means finding that purpose the key to life so that, to be in accord with it, is to find all things work together for good.

In one sense all the change is in ourselves. It is we who are besought to be reconciled to God and not God who is besought to be reconciled to us. And it is God who beseeches. The very sternest things in life, suffering and death and corruption, are only to be understood as God's pleading. But God is reality, and reality is against every one who would interpret life by self-love and self-will. To deny that is vapid sentimentality. To attempt to get out of life what God has not put there for us is to enter on a hopeless and calamitous warfare in which the blows are not light and the falls not soft. Everything, however prosperous it may seem, works for our harm, not our good.

That is the experience which makes men feel that God as much needs to be reconciled to them as they to God. Yet it is only the shadow of their own misunderstanding as if, flying from a friend in the dark, they met disaster as much as if it had been an enemy. But as we only need our friend truly to show his face, so we only need that God should truly show His to enable us to meet all evil, moral as well as natural, in the confidence of final victory over it and in the blessed assurance that every appointment of our life is the Divine succour to that end.

But how does this help us to understand the place of the forgiveness of sins? If faith has any glimpse of the might of love, it may well believe that all God appoints even of service and suffering works for good. But our sins are not appointed by God, and were not designed by us or any one else to work in God's wise plan. Wherefore, we might, through accepting God's purpose, be reconciled to what God Himself appoints for us, without being able to include in that reconciliation any of the consequences of our own ill-doing.

In one sense no kind of forgiveness ever can make the past as if it had never been. Even if the past never would remind us of its existence again, we could not be true to our own moral personality and take advantage of the oblivion to rid ourselves of responsibility for it.

For two reasons our responsibility must remain bound up with our past. The first is the obvious one that so long as our evil is working harm in the lives of others, it has no right to cease to trouble our lives. The second is almost equally obvious. As long as habit is the means whereby character is fixed, it must mean persistence in evil as well as good. Wherefore, we may not, so long as any moral sensitiveness or any sense of our moral continuity remains, wash our hands of the consequences of evil we have done

as it works either without us or within. Nor can we suppose that a deeper sense of God will make us see less clearly the evil we have wrought or make us suffer less at the sight.

Penitence, in the deepest sense of the word, is only possible in that new world, where, bearing with Christ the sins of others, we are laid by Christ's sacrifice on the bosom of a love which bears our own. The immediate effect of a true forgiveness, therefore, is certain to be a new sensitiveness to the evil we have done in the world and to the might of evil in our own hearts. To expect to escape the moral distress accompanying an evil past, is no proof that God's pardon has touched our hearts, but the opposite. Is it the consequences of our sins working still in the world that we expect to be able to ignore ? Then we have merely in a legal and selfish spirit accepted legal condonation for a Father's pardon. Is it the consequences of sins working still in ourselves we would overlook ? Then we have merely put the succour of power which ignores our personality in place of the succour of love which considers nothing else.

In that case the heritage of sin cannot be obliterated forthwith either by God's pardon or by any other succour of love our highest faith might assure to us, not even if the sense of pardon stirred every chord in the soul and the faith sprang from the holiest vision of life's blessedness.

Nevertheless, the practical effect of being justified by grace is precisely that God takes up these evil doings of ours and all their evil consequences and puts them also among the things which work together for our good. Instead of making the heart bitter, as if we ought to have been allowed to sin and not suffer, so that we cannot see His love in any discipline He appoints for us or any duty He demands from us, our sorrow for sin speaks to us of God's holiest, wisest, tenderest care for our good.

The sorrow may be deeper, but it is to another purpose,

To come back from a watery grave is more painful than to perish in it. The difference is in its issue and in the spirit in which in consequence it can be borne. And so with the distress which follows sin. When the sin is forgiven, the distress is no longer resented as punishment. With all else that belongs to us, it is taken up into the love of God, which alone endures and prevails and in the end triumphs over all evil.

We are now in a position to see the vital connexion between the forgiveness of sins and reconciliation to God. So long as sin is unacknowledged and unpardoned, it is the most formidable of all the causes which determine both our discipline and our duty, yet it is the last explanation of them we would admit. Wherefore, we cannot but err in all our attempts to understand our life, and cannot avoid being at enmity with it. But when sin and all its consequences are taken up into a world where love suffers and atones, we see that our life is what it is just because the consequences of sin both without us and within us must be overcome. The discipline and duty of life are, we see, the way in which God overcomes them for us, the only way in which, having regard to the moral personality, they ever can be overcome. Precisely because sin and its consequences must be transmuted, not ignored, our discipline and duty are what they are. All life is thereby turned into a sacrament of pardoning and redeeming love, the one supreme Divine sacrament, of which all other sacraments are only symbols to help us to interpret.

Why the sacrament of all sacraments, the crown of all God's interpretation of all life's trials and life's tasks is found in the symbols of the broken body and shed blood of One who was meek and lowly in heart is not hard to see. The crucifixion is the utmost shame and suffering life can bring and the utmost obedience and service life can demand,

and it was met in no stoic spirit of resignation but in simple surrender to the will of God. In it love made its highest claim and also accomplished its highest triumph. To believe in the cross, therefore, is truly to believe that love is power, and that there cannot be anything in the life it demands which does not share in its power and so work for good to those who, in the practical moral sense of accepting His will of love, love God.

Here is the inmost sanctuary of pardon and reconciliation where we can take up all our discipline and all our duty, assured that they are the way of victory because we know the mind and heart of Him who appoints them and because we also would be partakers in the sacrifice and service by which sin must be overcome. To require us to be fellow-workers with Him in that task will then be the crowning evidence that God is true to our moral personality and never deals with us on any lower platform than as His children. Our discipline and duty will at once be changed from being trials and tasks into the most gracious of all manifestations of His wise and holy love.

To be justified, therefore, is not to know that the consequences of sin are obliterated or even condoned, but that, in spite of sin, we are so reconciled to God that we can face all evil, assured of final victory over it, whether the evil be natural or moral, the direct appointment of God's love or the direct outcome of our own sins.

JOHN OMAN.

SPITTA ON JOHN XXI.

I.

VERY great importance must be attached to Spitta's theory of the composition of the Fourth Gospel, elaborated in his work of two years ago, *Das Johannes-Evangelium als Quelle der Geschichte Jesu*. It embodies a serious and scholarly attempt to deal with the question of historicity. Bernard Weiss's newly-published *Das Johannes-Evangelium als einheitliches Werk* (1912) is in its form an answer to Spitta's and other allied partitionist theories, but the two works have much more in common than obviously appears. Weiss is a champion of the essential unity of the Gospel, while Spitta recognises three lines of cleavage; but they are at one in their opposition to those critics who would reduce the Gospel to the level of a dogmatic treatise, dominated by Hellenic thought, thus making it impossible to use it as a trustworthy source for the Life and Teaching of Jesus.

Spitta fully acknowledges his debt to Wellhausen and Schwarz. Wendt's work is hardly mentioned, and indeed it proceeds on different lines. His line of cleavage between the Discourses and the Narrative portions in the Gospel, of which the former are the earlier and more authentic, cannot be carried through consistently, and his reiteration of the theory in the recently published *Die Schichten des Vierten Evangeliums* can hardly be said to be more convincing. Spitta's work, however, cannot be so readily disposed of, and it may be of interest to examine more closely the main lines on which he proceeds. Evidently he has defined the field on which will be fought for some time to come the question of the historicity of the Gospel.

Briefly stated, Spitta's view is that the author of chapter

xxi., writing subsequent to the death of the Apostle, and not long after it, has composed the Gospel, making use of a Johannine *Grundschrift*, which is dated very early as belonging to "die älteste Zeit des Urchristentums," and another document closely allied to the Synoptic tradition. The author of chapter xxi. (B), has woven these together into the Gospel as we have it, making connexions of thought and of event where formerly none existed; fitting the course of events into a chronological scheme of three Passovers; and adding from time to time his own reflections. His work is therefore much more than merely editorial. Practically he is responsible for the form, both of thought and of structure, in which the Gospel has come to us. He is a "Bearbeiter," and not only a "Redactor." Spitta concedes that the *Grundschrift* (A) is genuinely the work of an eyewitness, in all probability John, son of Zebedee, and of great historical value. He regards B as confirming this in xxi. 24. Spitta has no place for John the Presbyter (p. 458) in connexion with the Gospel. He also rejects the theory of the early death of John (p. 460).

This conception of the Gospel's composition stands or falls with his interpretation of chapter xxi. Here, according to Spitta, B has made use of his second source (B) alone, and the *Grundschrift* (A) does not appear. It is, therefore, of great importance to examine Spitta's interpretation of the Appendix to the Gospel. In the concluding chapter B, he holds, is not seeking to supplement the Resurrection appearances. In this connexion the words in xxi. 14, *τοῦτο ἤδη, τρίτον ἐφανερώθη Ἰησοῦς τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν*, are of crucial interest. As against the traditional view that the reference of *τρίτον* is to chapter xx., he finds serious difficulty in the use of *μαθηταῖς*, inasmuch as it would seem to exclude the appearance to Mary Magdalene recorded in chapter xx., and *τρίτον* would imply only two

previous appearances to "disciples." It is incontestable, he holds, that Mary and the other women would naturally be present at the appearances recorded in xx. 19 and xx. 26 cf. Luke xxiv. 22; Acts i. 14. Again, xx. 30, ἐνώπιον τῶν μαθητῶν cannot exclude the appearance to Mary Magdalene, and μαθηταῖς must be used in the same sense as in xxi. 14. Hence Spitta concludes that chapter xxi. does not refer to chapter xx. at all, but is simply B.'s version of certain Pre-Resurrection incidents, which he found in his second source. As always, so here, this source displays affinity with the Synoptic account in the close resemblance between Luke v. 1–11 and the story of xxi. 1–14. Again, xx. 15 ff. are another version of the call of Peter derived from B, and the threefold question has nothing to do with Peter's denial. How then does he dispose of the words in verse 14, ἐγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν ? They are a later gloss, and not the utterance of B at all.

Spitta's literary analysis of chapter xxi. is very important and on the whole very convincing, but it is open to grave doubt whether it will bear the weight of the conclusion he bases upon it, that by means of it he has discovered the Evangelist and his method. The object of the present paper is to show that quite another kind of mind is apparent in xxi. compared with i.–xx. At the outset, it requires some explanation why B, who is the real author of the Gospel, should be found writing an appendix to his own work. If B is not intending to supplement the Resurrection accounts of chapter xx., why add this chapter to a Gospel whose form and structure he controlled at every point ? On Spitta's theory, chapter xxi. simply contains some fresh material, which might easily have been incorporated in the Gospel itself. Why was it not used before ? The reason given is an ingenious one. B had evidently been deeply impressed with the amount of material he had at

his disposal, and the limits of the space afforded by his parchment or "*Buchrolle.*" Fortunately for Spitta's theory, B has included among the many lofty reflections attributed to him one at least of a more mundane character. It is found in xxi. 25: [1] "And there are many other things which Jesus did, which, if they were written one by one, I suppose that not even the world itself would contain the books that should be written." He discovered that after finishing twenty chapters, there was still a vacant space at the end of the roll. This he resolved to employ, in order to do, what he had for some reason or other omitted to do before, namely, to indicate the real author of the *Grundschrift* which he had used and enlarged (*Das Joh. Ev.* p. 16). In that case, it is written really in the interest of John, son of Zebedee, and no doubt the part that Peter plays in these stories, interesting as it is, is more or less accidental.

The connexion between xxi. and the rest of the Gospel has, of course, always presented great difficulty, and the way in which the scene changes from Jerusalem to Galilee, and the natural ending in xx. 30–31, have inevitably suggested that the chapter is an appendix by another hand. It is, however, Spitta's distinction to suggest a line of connexion unlike any that have gone before. He finds it in xxi. 14. *τρίτον* has no reference to the Resurrection appearances, but to two other passages in the Gospel, that narrate portions of a Galilean ministry. These are ii. 11, *ταύτην ἐποίησεν ἀρχὴν τῶν σημείων ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐν Κανᾷ τῆς Γαλιλαίας, καὶ ἐφανέρωσε τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ*; and iv. 54, *τοῦτο πάλιν δεύτερον σημεῖον ἐποίησεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐλθὼν ἐκ τῆς Ἰουδαίας εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν.* Hence, Spitta concludes, originally the miraculous draught belonged to the beginning of the Galilean ministry, and stood in close connexion with the miracles performed in Cana and Capernaum.

[1] Provided, as Spitta thinks, it is a genuine part of the Gospel.

He further concludes that both these narratives of the Marriage at Cana, and the Healing of the Nobleman's Son, as well as the narratives in chapter xxi., are taken from an older document, which is no other than the source used by B in chapter xxi. This document, as we have already seen, has strong affinities with the Synoptic Gospels, and especially with the Lucan Gospel.

In this fashion Spitta suggests the lines of cleavage in the Gospel. He distinguishes a *Grundschrift* (A), and the work of the " Bearbeiter " (B). His work may be divided according as it consists of matter from his second source (B^1), or his own reflections (B^2).

One cannot but feel that his interpretation of chapter xxi. is a somewhat flimsy foundation on which to rear such a weighty superstructure as the composition of the Fourth Gospel. Is he justified in the connexion he discovers between xxi. 14, and ii. 11, iv. 54? Surely B is demanding a good deal of imagination on the part of his readers when he interprets the τρίτον in xxi. 14 as indicating that the miraculous draught of fishes is the third in a series of Galilean miracles of which the Marriage at Cana, in chapter ii., and the Healing of the Nobleman's Son in chapter iv., are the first and second members respectively. The two miracles of the Feeding of the Five Thousand and the Walking on the Sea are also Galilean miracles, and, according to Spitta, belong to B^1. Does not their introduction cause an extraordinary arithmetical confusion if τρίτον in xxi. 14 is really related to ἀρχήν and δεύτερον in ii. 11, and iv. 54? No doubt Spitta would say that the numbers are simply taken over by B from his source, and that in the source the miraculous draught was recorded immediately after the healing of the nobleman's son. Such mechanical conduct hardly warrants that estimate of the intellect of B which Spitta evidently has. A compiler who deliberately confuses the

minds of his readers in this fashion can scarcely be regarded as possessing the powers of thought necessary to evolve many of the reflective passages of the Gospel attributed to him.

Not only is this interpretation of *τρίτον* open to grave suspicion, but a much simpler solution lies to our hand—the traditional one. Two appearances to the disciples are recorded in xx. 19, and xx. 26, and the difficulty raised by Spitta that *μαθηταῖς* in xxi. 14 cannot be meant to exclude an appearance to a woman is a purely artificial one. The ordinary reader would at once understand that the reference is to a third appearance to a *body* of disciples, including, it may be, women.[1] There is no real difficulty in supposing that the appearance to Mary is excluded. Again, Spitta takes *ἐφανερώθη* in the sense of "revealed Himself"; as Jesus is said to reveal His glory through the miracle of the water turned into wine—His Person revealed in acts of supernatural Power. The only other uses of *φανερόω*, in connexion with miracles, in the Gospel are found in ii. 11 and vii. 4. In ii. 11 Jesus is said to "manifest His glory"; and in vii. 4 His brethren demand a public manifestation of Himself as Messiah in Jerusalem, which evidently means not a revelation of His Person in the Johannine sense, but the use of some supernatural means—a sign from heaven, in short, in order to satisfy the crowd of His Messiahship. Neither of these is a use parallel to *ἐφανερώθη* in xxi. 14, although Spitta regards the words *εἰ ταῦτα ποιεῖς, φανέρωσον σεαυτὸν τῷ κόσμῳ· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπίστευον εἰς αὐτόν*, as one of B's own reflections. The truth is that the use of *ἐφανερώθη* applied to a Resurrection appearance is peculiar to this chapter, and can only be regarded as one of the linguistic peculiarities marking it off from the rest of the

[1] One is, however, inclined to conclude from the list in xxi. 2 that *μαθητ*$^{\text{ῶ}}$ does *not* include women.

Gospel as an appendix by another hand. There can, of course be little doubt that the narrative of the miraculous draught of fishes is another version of Luke v. 1–11. It is, however, not necessary to suppose that the writer of the appendix derives his narrative directly from St. Luke's Gospel, but only that both had access to the same source containing the narrative. In this respect the judgment of Weiss agrees with Spitta's (*Die Einheitlichkeit des V. Ev.* p. 358). It may at once be conceded that the basis of the narrative in chapter xxi. is originally a document containing pre-Resurrection incidents; and it is practically certain that the author of the appendix has either manipulated it so as to make it post-Resurrection in character, or derived it from a source that has already done so. The same thing has, no doubt, happened in the case of the narrative of the Restoration of Peter. Spitta's excision of ἐγερθείς ἐκ νεκρῶν as a gloss, and his blunt rejection of any reference to the denial of Peter in xx. 15 ff. are quite unwarranted, except to support his theory of xxi. 14. In order to prove that the writer of the appendix did not really mean to narrate a post-resurrection incident in xx. 1–14, it would be necessary to excise both verse 1 and at least verse 12b also. Consequently chapter xxi. must in its present form be treated as post-Resurrection. In a subsequent paper an attempt will be made to show that the kind of mind revealed as belonging to the author of chapter xxi. cannot possibly be attributed to the author of the rest of the Gospel.

R. H. Strachan.

(*To be concluded.*)

THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY.

XXXI. Knowledge and Love.

Paul in the "Hymn of Heavenly Love" (1 Cor. xiii.) draws a pointed contrast between partial or present knowledge and perfect (absolute) or future knowledge. As the mind and character of the Christian develops, his partial knowledge is put aside, and done away: that partial knowledge sees only obscurely, for it sees only the reflection of the reality (as in a mirror), and cannot gaze directly on the reality. I cannot but feel, however, that Dr. Harnack, in the striking article in the Expositor, June, 1912, p. 493 f., over-emphasises the irreconcilability of the one kind of knowledge with the other, just as he also seems to over-emphasise the separation between knowledge and love.[1] These two topics, which are in reality correlated, must be considered together.

According to the exposition of Dr. Harnack, the perfect knowledge for which Paul's soul longs has nothing to do with love, though it is the best thing in the world and the best in this temporal life (p. 494). But if it has nothing to do with love, why is so much stress laid on it in this "Hymn of Love," whose object is to emphasise the power and value of love? Dr. Harnack acknowledges that "it is a point of some importance that Paul is led to this knowledge when he is thinking of love; and in another passage of the same letter (viii. 3) he goes yet a step further: 'If any man love God, he is known of Him.' Here, also, he does not indeed

[1] His words are, "in this hymn love and knowledge have nothing to do with one another. Neither does love lead to knowledge, nor knowledge to love." There is a sense in which this is true; but it needs to be guarded against too wide application.

say 'he knoweth God,' but still it is the preparatory step to that combination."

According to our view "to be known of God" is in Paul's thought a correlative expression to the other, "to know God." He that is known of God knows God: the two acts are different sides of one process: the Divine within man reaches forth to the Divine outside of man, striving to be united to it, in proportion as the Divine outside of and above man lays hold of him and takes possession. God knows man by taking man for His own. And so the Apostle says in the same passage, "I shall know even as I am known." Dr. Harnack himself interprets this to mean, "as God knows me, so I shall know Him (and His ways)"; and he goes on to say, "How much Paul lives in the problem that is presented by the relation of our knowledge of God to God's knowledge of us is shown by several places in his letters." In illustration he quotes Galatians iv. 8: "Now knowing God, or rather being known by Him." To know God is here practically synonymous with being known by Him.

Now compare this verse with 1 Corinthians viii. 1–3: "'We know that we all have knowledge.'[1] Knowledge puffeth up, but love edifieth. If any man thinketh that he knoweth anything, he knoweth not yet as he ought to know; but, if any man loveth God, the same is known of Him." The line of progress is here through love: as a man grows in love of God, he becomes better known of God. The natural inference towards which viii. 1–2a points is that this progress is towards increase in knowledge of God; but forthwith in viii. 2b Paul turns the statement to the other side, and says that the issue of this progress is that the man is known of God. Then we may compare this

[1] Probably the words "we know that we all have knowledge" are a quotation from the letter sent to Paul by the Corinthian Church.

Corinthian statement with Galatians iv. 8 (as just quoted) and Ephesians iii. 17 f., " that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be strong to apprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ . . . that ye may be filled unto all the fulness of God." It has been doubted what it is that the Ephesians are to be strong to apprehend, whether " the mystery " (iii. 4) or the love of Christ (iii. 18). For our purpose this is immaterial. He who knows the love of God, or the love of Christ, knows God, for goodness is the essence of God and His love is the expression of His goodness. The passage implies beyond all doubt that through increase in love comes increase in the knowledge of God. Therefore in the " Hymn of Love," which glorifies the power and Divine character of love, the stress in the latter part is laid on knowledge, because through growth in love comes growth also in knowledge, the best thing in the world. Such is the teaching of Paul : love is the quality through which man most nearly approaches the nature of God, and to grow in love is to grow towards God. " I shall see face to face " shows that the perception will be mutual, i.e., that to be known will imply to know.

XXXII. Partial and Complete Knowledge.

Now, as to perfect knowledge and partial knowledge, how are they related to one another in the mind of Paul ? It is true that he expresses a very low opinion of partial knowledge : it has to be eliminated and done away with : it must be replaced by another quite different kind of knowledge. This partial knowledge feeds the vanity of man (1 Corinthians viii. 2) : it tends to make him proud and conceited, and is therefore an extremely dangerous quality. There is nothing Paul dreads more in the nature of man than his tendency to think too much of himself and to put

himself in the place of God instead of giving God the glory,[1] in other words to make himself the centre of his universe instead of regarding God as at once the centre of his being and the goal of his development. The result of this is that he loses his perception of the nature of God and his love of God, whom he misrepresents more and more completely in his own imagination.[2]

In the Corinthian congregation Paul recognised that there existed a certain tendency towards self-complacency, and especially towards an over-estimation of their knowledge. This tendency to self-confidence is deep-seated in the Greek character: it has often led to bold action and success, but far more frequently it is the cause of failure. The Christians in Corinth were very conscious of, and confident in, their knowledge, whereas they had as yet not acquired any true and real knowledge. Paul has in his mind as one of the guiding purposes of the first Corinthian Epistle the desire to reveal to his readers the difference between the lower and the higher knowledge, and to make them look on towards the higher and never rest contented with the lower.

Yet even in the same Epistle where he warns his readers so often and so emphatically of the danger of partial know-

[1] Romans i. 21 f.

[2] Modern experience confirms the judgment of Paul that great danger lies in over-estimation of oneself. It is well known that an exaggerated estimate of one's skill and power proves in many cases to be a sign of incipient insanity. In an asylum for lunatics there is no symptom so widespread as the preoccupation with oneself, one's powers, one's rights and one's wrongs. The patient lives in a world of his own, created by his individual fancy. In the thought and view of Paul, to mistake one's true relation to the world involves a misapprehension of the nature and the purpose of God. If the mistake and misapprehension goes too far in a certain direction, it takes a form which we now label by the title insanity. I knew of one case in which a lunatic believed himself to be God, and wrote out his edicts in that character and with that signature, and an experienced physician told me that this same delusion was far from being unparalleled in asylums.

ledge, it is characteristic of Paul that he pictures true and perfect knowledge in the most entrancing fashion. As Professor Harnack says, "he contemplates it in trembling emotion and in ardent impulse" . . . as "the absolutely best." He does not warn the Corinthians against knowledge, but only against a danger that is connected with knowledge. He lauds it as "the absolutely best," provided that the true knowledge, perfect and face to face with God, is understood as the object of his panegyric.

According to Professor Harnack's interpretation, "this perfect knowledge is not to be expected till that which is perfect has come, that is when (through the second appearance of Christ) this temporal life suddenly comes to an end." Hence he finds that Paul draws an absolute line of separation between the partial knowledge and the perfect knowledge. The "perfect will suddenly appear" through "a future event," viz., "the second appearance of Christ."[1] The present partial knowledge can never grow into the perfect: "no bridge leads from the partial to the whole." The imperfect must be cast aside before the perfect knowledge can come.

This interpretation of Paul's doctrine is out of harmony with the view which we take of his attitude towards the problems of life. It regards Paul's doctrine as static and unphilosophic; whereas in our view the world is to Paul always changing, and the purpose of God rules the world towards development or growth. All that we have just quoted from Professor Harnack is said quite truly; but it states only one side of the truth, and it requires to be completed. There are two sides to the phenomenon of growth; there is always a past and a future, but the present is only an abstraction; the present has no sooner been observed than it has disappeared and become a thing

[1] Expositor, June, 1912, p. 493.

of the past, while a new stage, which was previously in the future, has taken its place, destined in its turn to pass away forthwith.

It is quite true that perfect knowledge is a thing of the future. But Paul can always say the same about all perfecting, all attaining, and all Salvation: they are in the future. Yet he can say equally emphatically (and even more frequently so far as Salvation is concerned) that they are in the present; they are here and now. The whole of life is a process of attaining, of reaching forward to that which is beyond, of constantly apprehending and then of finding that the Divine towards which one strives is still beyond and must be striven towards by a fresh effort. Paul fully recognises that on the one hand Christ is in him, and that his life has been merged in Christ and therefore has been perfected; but on the other hand he equally and even more emphatically recognises that his life is a struggle against the evil which constantly besets him; "I myself with the mind serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin"; and therefore he longs and prays to be "delivered out of the body of this death." [1] He is made perfect, and he is not yet made perfect: he is saved, and yet he is only in process of being saved, and is working out his own salvation with the whole energy of mind and will and effort.

Perfect knowledge, then, is a thing of the future: it lies ever before us; but I cannot persuade myself that Professor Harnack is right in positing as the Pauline doctrine that this knowledge is irreconcilable with our progress in this life, and is attained only in the final cataclysm by a stroke from without at the second coming of Christ. Are we not (according to Paul) attaining towards it in this life? Is not the knowledge of God something towards which we

[1] Romans vii. 25, 24.

are growing? Is it not implied in Salvation? Can man be saved except through knowing God? Is not the whole of life either, on the one hand, a process of losing right conception of God, and passing through stage after stage of idolatry and falsehood towards utter separation from Him and ignorance of Him, or on the other hand a process of learning to know God as He is? Paul prays "that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give unto you a spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Him; having the eyes of your heart enlightened that ye may know" the hope, the will and the power of God.[1] In these words the Apostle evidently is picturing a process of gradual enlightenment, i.e., of partial knowledge growing towards perfect knowledge. This par ial knowledge does not require to be cast aside before the perfect can come: it is antiquated and set aside through growing into the perfect. Borrowing the words of Dr. Harnack, we believe that "a bridge leads from the partial to the whole."

It is true that this quotation is from Ephesians, which (if I remember rightly) Professor Harnack hesitates to accept as fully Pauline [2]; but to the judgment of the present writer it expresses plainly and characteristically the law of right life as a development towards wisdom through revelation, the end of the development being the perfect knowledge of God, attained finally only in the coming of Christ, but yet in process of being acquired in every step of right knowing. In 1 Corinthians ii. 9 f. the same truth is expressed emphatically, for it lies at the basis of Paul's thought: "Whatsoever things God prepared for them that love Him: unto us God revealed them through the Spirit: for the

[1] Ephesians i. 18 f.

[2] The above was written far from books in dim recollection of his *Chronologie der altchr. Litt.* i. p. 239. I think that he feels now less hesitation,

Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God . . . we received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God ; that we might know the things which are freely given us of God." Paul here speaks in the first person ; but all that he says is fully applicable to all the saints. The life of the saint is a gradual process of attaining, through the continuous steps of revelation, unto the knowledge of God and the deep things of God.

It is true that Paul might differ from some modern opinion, perhaps from modern views generally, as to what knowledge is worth attaining, and what knowledge leads on towards a right conception of God. The purely verbal and worthless speculation to which the age was given seemed to him, beyond doubt, to be empty, useless, false and bad, because it did not clarify men's minds about God. But was he wrong in that ? He condemned, as one cannot doubt, all the science of the time ; but that pseudo-science was false in method and devoid of results. It only spread idle fancies through the " educated " world of that time : the more men learned about nature from the popular teaching of the time, the less they knew. No condemnation can be too strong for the current methods of substituting knowledge of words for the study of things. In this judgment Paul was not wrong.

It would, of course, be absurd to say that Paul would have distinguished between right and false scientific method in the study of nature, if the question had been put to him. He knew and condemned the false : he did not know or dream about the true. He would save his own people from empty and foolish speculation. It was not his province, nor within his power, to teach true method in science. He would turn men from idle talk to study the nature of God in the love of God : he knew nothing else worthy of attention in the world.

It would, however, be equally absurd to argue that, because Paul condemned all the scientific speculation of his time, and because he did not make any exception in favour of the right study of nature, about which he knew nothing, therefore he condemned all that he did not know. There can be little doubt that Paul accepted the principle that he who learns to know the works of God, is learning to know partially the nature of God ;[1] but, for himself, he had never come into contact with any formal scientific study conceived in the spirit of truth ; and probably he may have disbelieved in the possibility of right method in such study. We must not, however, transform a negative into a positive prohibition, when we try to state fairly and understand rightly the teaching of Paul. In our modern application of the teaching of Paul we have to ask whether or not any modern institution is in accordance with the essential spirit of his thought, and not whether he condemned a contemporary institution which was lacking in all the quality that makes the modern thing worth having.

Paul had a right conception of the growth of knowledge. He did not think that it consisted in adding part to part, and unit to unit. It was, in his view, not a process of simple addition but a process of creation. The whole is more than the collocation of the parts ; there is something vital and spiritual imparted to it beyond the sum of the parts, which makes it a new creature. At every step in the path of knowledge, one eliminates and does away the old, and re-makes one's vision of the world : one learns and knows that the old vision was inadequate and there-

[1] That is implied in repeated statements of his : God has in His works shown His nature and His goodness. Through them the pagan world had the opportunity of learning something about Him in the simple contemplation of his good gifts to men ; and some pagans had made good use of this opportunity.

fore false : one sees facts in a new correlation : something of what had been dark in the world around becomes illuminated and clear. This is not a mere addition of a new element : it is the introduction of a transforming element. In Pauline language, it comes, not in word, but in power ; and " out of three sounds one makes, not a fourth sound, but a star."

This principle Paul applied only to moral and religious growth in knowledge, for there was in the world of contemporary thought no other department in which it could be applied.[1] In the progress of thought the same principle is now employed far more widely than Paul dreamed of ; but such wider application of Pauline principle is not un-Pauline ; it is simply outside of his range and his interest.

But an objection may be brought against the view which we have stated : is it not an essential condition of the perfect knowledge that it comes through revelation ? Does not this make an impassable division between the perfect and the partial ? The perfect knowledge is the intuition of God : the partial knowledge is a study of details in nature.

One may define revelation too narrowly. Revelation is proportioned and suited to the character of different men. God speaks in many voices. The act whereby the human mind, after combining detail with detail, adds to the parts that indescribable element which vitalises the whole into a new creation and a new stage in knowledge, is essentially creative and spiritual. Does it come wholly from within the man ? Is it not the result of the firm grasp of the Divine unity and plan in the world, and therefore in a sense given by a power without, which seizes and holds the mind of the

[1] An exception should perhaps in some small degree be made in regard to medicine, which, however, though growing, was purely empirical and not scientific in its method.

discoverer? It may be said that the process and growth of the partial knowledge is essentially different from the gift of the perfect knowledge, which is recognised intuitively by the Divine spirit within the man. But does not the Divine plan of the universe, as comprehended to some degree in the process of partial knowledge, place some knowledge of God within the mind? It is true that some have refused to see this, and have denied the existence of God, while they study nature. They deny they know not what. It may be said, also, that the process of acquiring partial knowledge is different, not in degree, but in kind from the process of perfect knowledge. But one may well be doubtful about the distinction. We know too little to justify us in distinguishing degree from kind in such process; and it is always uncertain whether difference of degree may not be intensified until it becomes difference in kind. This all hangs on the meaning and nature of development.

One thing seems certain, that it was impossible at that time to apprehend the scientific spirit in knowledge. The world of the Mediterranean lands had entered on a period of deterioration in the realm of thought. The great period of Greek progress had passed away, and centuries had to elapse before a new time of progressive thought was to begin. In a time of such deterioration, the spirit of progress seemed to have disappeared. This spirit is hostile to the selfishness and the arrogant conceit which Paul dreaded so much in the nature of men. In the ardour of discovery all thought of self perishes; and there remains only the eagerness of the search for truth. The happiness of discovery contains an element of the Divine quality: in its highest manifestation it is unselfish and wholly directed to the unseen, the eternal, and the law of the universe: it does not conduce to self-glorification and self-congratulation, but rather to the recognition of the infinite external power that

moves through the processes of nature: it strengthens the love of truth and the zeal for truth within its own range: it makes the discoverer of knowledge set truth above self: it raises man above the sordid glories of international strife and the vulgar struggles of political contention, and places him in the serener atmosphere of eternal truth and the laws of nature.

We cannot for a moment suppose that Paul was aware of this side of knowledge; but we do maintain that he stated principles which are applicable forthwith to this and every other new aspect of a life wider than that which Paul knew. The development of modern study has widened our knowledge of the works of God, and shown sides of the Divine action and purpose which formerly were not dreamed of. Yet the principles laid down by Paul, when rightly understood, remain as true about the new as they were about the old.

XXXIII. The Rights of Man.

The glorious and happy lot which has been set before man as the end of his being in the purpose of God [1] has not been attained by man. Paul charges the whole blame upon man, who has deliberately gone wrong, preferred self to God, and as far as possible wrecked for himself and those who came under his influence the Divine plan and intention. Man could not wholly ruin the purpose and thwart the will of God; but he has done all in his power to attain this result; and his best endeavours are often mistaken and injurious.

In one respect the Apostle runs contrary to the general course of European thought and feeling and history. The development of European history is almost always explained by philosophic historians as the result of a struggle for

[1] See Section xxviii., p. 280 ff.

rights or of a passionate revolt on the part of the oppressed against injustice and wrongs. St. Paul would reply that man has no rights except the right of helping to realise the purpose of God : he would assert that no man can honestly dare to ask for justice, and that men are deceiving themselves when they speak about their wrongs. He would certainly not regard the revolt against Charles I. or any other of the violent actions through which the "freedom" of modern Britain has been attained, as specially honourable episodes in the history of the country, or as even consistent with true Christianity ; and he would perhaps declare that the price for all this error had to be paid by the children and children's children of the original actors in those great scenes. They were responsible for beginning, or for fomenting, a wrong spirit, and turning the people to a wrong method.

The kind of resistance to oppression which was commended both by Paul and by John was endurance ; and the victory over tyranny and compulsion was gained through death. But in Paul there appears little or no sympathy with the tendency to resist the minor injustices and inequalities of an unfair social organisation, and to devote to the task of protesting and to the meaner business of political conflict the time and energy which ought to be spent in seeking the true object of life.

Even in the case of slavery the Apostle has been sharply criticised by many for acquiescing in it as a social institution. That he did think the slave wrong who ran away from his master, that he did think the right conduct for a slave was to perform as well as possible the work that was imposed on him by the custom of society and of the law, that he directed the runaway slave to return to a Christian master—all that is quite true. Whether he would have directed the Christian slave to return to a master who had

announced that he would not permit his slaves to practise the duties of the Christian religion is perhaps doubtful; but it seems to be in keeping with his doctrine that he would have bidden the runaway slave go back and endure bonds and stripes. Whether he would have directed the slave to return to a master that constrained his slaves to minister to vice and to give up their children to vice—all which was sanctioned by law—remains more doubtful. The evidence does not prove it; the case did not present itself; nor do we know anything that can fairly be construed as evidence of Paul's judgment in regard to such a case. We do know that, if a master had ordered his slave to offer sacrifice to the gods and to curse Christ, Paul would not have permitted the slave to obey the command. There was a point at which, in Paul's judgment, the right of the master to command was forfeited and the duty of the slave to obey ceased.

One thing we can say with confidence as we look back over nearly nineteen centuries of history. If Christian doctrine had made it a prime object to redress, either by active refusal or by passive resistance, the superficial evils and the graver social injustices of Roman law and rule, then Christianity would long ago have passed away or sunk to the level of the dead religions that still cumber the world, while slavery would remain the rule of the whole earth. It was by disregarding all merely superficial and unimportant facts in society and by concentrating the efforts of all on the great and real things of life, that the Christian faith succeeded in keeping its place above the level of common life, as a power and an inextinguishable fire to quicken the minds and fire the best emotions of men. Paul did not approve of the Roman social system and the Roman government. It was evil, and it must pass away. But it had its purpose in the Divine plan. It was granted a time in which to work. The Christians must acquiesce in it, and

must obey its laws so far as these did not order them to curse God or to do evil to man.

The European idea that the man who rebels against what he considers to be the unfairness of established society is the man to be praised and admired as a hero has not yet justified itself by its results. That the world is better than it was, that progress has been achieved, is true; but the proof or the probability that the tendency to complaint against injustice in trifling matters and to the claiming of so-called rights has played a beneficial part in forwarding this progress has not yet been furnished, and the teaching of Paul even in this respect has not been disproved.

Paul taught in great principles, and does not descend to legislation about details. Even the veiling of women he attempts to enforce on grounds as wide as the universe and as high as the angels; but in this perhaps for once he may have descended to legislation about a detail.

His guiding principle, however, always is that man must seek first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness; and all the details will gradually be moulded into conformity with that Kingdom. What we call the growth of true education and the raising of public opinion and social judgment to a higher level are simply the slow, gradual approach of the Kingdom of Heaven, which, as it approaches, remakes human life. But the attempt to re-make human life except through the Kingdom of God must fail. The violence, the vulgarity and the sham of much that has masqueraded under the show of resistance to wrongs and demand for justice did not raise the social standard, or promote the kingdom of Heaven; and it is a false judgment that sees in things like this the cause of human improvement. The true cause lay deeper, and was sometimes concealed and impeded by the noise and the ostentation of those who stood prominent in the public eye. W. M. Ramsay.

LUKE'S NARRATIVE OF THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.

THE controversy regarding the trustworthiness of Luke's account (ii. 1–3) of the historical circumstances that preceded and accompanied the birth of Jesus at Bethlehem, has been much advanced by discoveries which have been made since the present writer's book, *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* was published. The evidence bears mainly on two details: (1) the connexion of Quirinius with the first census in 8 B.C.; we can now prove by indisputable contemporary evidence that Quirinius was governing Syria about the time of this first census; (2) the order that all should return to their own home for the purpose of the census. Some of the results reached in that book are now firmly established, viz., that there was a system of periodical enrolments in the Roman Empire, at least in the Eastern provinces, the first of which took place in 9–8 B.C., and that the intention of Augustus in instituting this system must have been to make it applicable to the whole Empire and not merely to those provinces in which its existence is proved. We have no writers who describe such institutions in the Roman Empire, and evidence about the periodic census is scanty and, so to say, accidental. Only the chance that in the dry soil of Egypt some of the actual census papers have been preserved here and there has shown what the system was, and how it was arranged.

On the other hand, the hypothesis which was advanced to account for the order that people should return to their own original home, or place of origin, in order to be counted there, proves to be wrong. That regulation, which for-

merly seemed to be so extraordinary and so unlike the Roman custom, now turns out really to have been customary in the Roman East.

It will therefore be advisable, in the interest of clearness, to put in their proper form the questions which are under discussion. Their real nature is not always rightly understood ; and hence the discussion has sometimes been conducted on wrong principles. The character of Luke's narrative, as one may now say, has not been properly estimated by historical criticism ; and an attempt will be made to put it in its true light.

The date 6 B.C., which has in its favour no positive evidence, and only very slight general presumptions, was a part of the above-mentioned hypothesis ; and now it must be set aside. The evidence, scanty indeed, but coherent and unequivocal, is that 8 B.C. was the year in which Luke's account places the birth of Jesus.

That the time of the year was autumn, towards October, as maintained in my book, remains highly probable. Any other time of year seems definitely excluded ; and Colonel Mackinlay has with great plausibility suggested that the movement of the people towards Jerusalem for the Feast of Tabernacles was utilised for the return to their own home. The movement to the place of origin would generally be towards the south, and largely towards the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, for the dispersion had been mainly from Jerusalem and the immediately adjoining parts of Palestine. Hence a very large number of Jews, in going to Jerusalem, would be brought close to their original domicile ; and there were few who would not at least be brought nearer. As to exceptions, it must be remembered that the census was not made on the same day for the whole population (as in modern census-taking) ; and that the enrolment might be made for the individual householder rather earlier or later. Joseph

and Mary, going to Bethlehem, naturally conjoined this journey with one to Jerusalem for the Feast; and we may assume that in general this season was found to be convenient.

The latter part of the reign of Augustus, in fact, the whole period from about 15 B.C. to the beginning of the reign of Tiberius in 14 A.D., is almost completely hidden from our knowledge.[1] No historian illumines it. Suetonius and Velleius hardly mention anything in it except some dynastic matters. There was nothing else, from their point of view, worthy of mention; there reigned an almost unbroken peace except for some frontier wars, and the bureaucratic system of Augustus worked so efficiently, on the whole, that there was nothing striking to record except the German war and the tragic defeat of Varus. Had a formal history of Augustus's reign been preserved by a writer like Tacitus, he would probably have lamented the want of great events, and would have mentioned little except dynastic gossip during that period. It did not occur to the ancient historians that it was a worthy task to record—what we in modern times most desire—an account of the bureaucracy, a study of the provinces, details about the improvements whereby Augustus made the provinces contented and happy, and through which he deserved—if man could deserve—to be idolised by the nations whom he had found in slavery and misery and had made, to a certain degree, free and progressive.

A glance into any account of the history of Augustus,

[1] As an illustration of its obscurity take the following. A certain Favonius is known, from an inscription found last year, to have held the very highest offices of state in the last years of the reign of Augustus; but except from that single stone found in Phrygia, he seems to be utterly unknown, unless the conjecture be admitted that Favonius is an otherwise unrecorded cognomen, attached to the name of some known historical figure.

written according to the old-fashioned type usual forty years ago, will show the obscurity of this period. Take Smith's *Dictionary of Ancient Biography*. To Augustus are given fourteen columns and a half, of which eight or ten short sentences exhaust this period, and these are dynastic or touch on German frontier wars. One would not say that this is good history or right method; but it is the old-fashioned style of history, and it is the sort of knowledge by whose standard the New Testament has been judged too often in the past fifty years and at the present day.

The extract from Luke ii. 1–3 plunges us right into the midst of provincial administration with its minute details, the "enrolment" of the provinces, the first enrolment of a series [1] implying that there followed systematic enrolments at intervals, the action of a member of the bureaucracy, the implication that many other members of the bureaucracy must have co-operated in such a vast administrative work, which was begun by an order of the governor calling back every individual to his own city.

This gives a very striking picture of a splendid piece of governmental work. It tells of a bold law for the whole Empire, instituting a series of enrolments, a regular census-system. Taking into account what machinery is required to take a census, to tabulate and use its results, to make this a universal system for the Empire, and to take the Imperial census at intervals, the historian is struck with admiration of the Augustan idea. The statesman who thought of making such a system universal knew that wise government depended on the collection, classification and

[1] I have been criticised for maintaining that Luke distinguished in meaning πρῶτος from πρότερος; but now at least it is difficult to deny that here πρῶτος must mean "the first of many"; and I have nothing to retract.

registration of details ; and he must have expected that his bureaucracy would prove equal to the work. If he thought of a system, he must have determined his system by regular recurrence at regular intervals : no other way need or can be thought of. If Augustus could plan out such schemes as this, it is no wonder that his great Imperial foundation lasted so long, and that his bureaucratic system of administration fixed the general type for all modern methods of government. Any one who has a true feeling for history must be thankful to the great historian who has sketched for us in such brief and masterly fashion by a few pregnant words such a skilful picture. He has lit up the obscurity of this dark period, and given us a specimen of Imperial administrative method. The historians of the century that follows the age of Augustus were so occupied with the " great events of history " that they would not mention such humble matters as enrolment and its methods ; and Luke was left to tell the tale alone. Such very slight corroboration as has been recorded by Tacitus intervenes incidentally, and is alluded to in such slight and contemptuous fashion that it gives only the minimum of information, and was not even recognised as corroborative until the whole census-system was cleared up in the gradual progress of research.

Most recent writers on the New Testament, however, have stood placidly and contentedly apart from the modern developments of Roman Imperial history, and have evolved the theory that Luke had invented this incident " all out of his own head " (in the children's phrase),[1] to explain how Jesus could be born in Bethlehem of parents who lived in Nazareth.

[1] His starting-point (as it is supposed) lay in a blunder about Quirinius, who did actually take another census in Judæa (the second of the series). According to this fashionable theory, Luke misplaced the census of 7 A.D. to a date in the reign of Herod who died B.C. 4.

Assume for the moment that this is so. What genius for historical fiction is implied in the invention! Luke had no foundation in fact to go upon; his starting-point was only his blunder about the date of a totally different kind of enrolment made by Quirinius in Palestine in 7 A.D.,[1] when that governor conducted the survey and valuation of the country which was now for the first time being constituted as a province of the Empire. All the rest of his story is, according to the fashionable theory, pure fiction. How comes it that Luke could imagine all that is implied in his picture? How could he invent a vast process which hangs together so well in itself and which puts before us a quite wonderful piece of bureaucratic administration, extremely complicated, requiring the collaboration of a great many officials, and yet all purely fictitious? Still more wonderful is this when we find from recent discovery that every detail in Luke's picture can be paralleled from administrative practice in the Empire at a later period. The historian was not merely a genius, but also a prophet. He foresaw what the subsequent Emperors were going to do; and he imagines Augustus doing it all before the death of Herod in 4 B.C. The scholar who now says that Luke invented the picture which is drawn in ii. 1–3 has to face these alternatives: either he must glorify Luke as a genius in fiction and a prophet in history, or he must confess that his own theory is wrong.

[1] It must be remembered that, if Quirinius in 7 A.D. was not making a periodic census, his enrolment would not be a model from which Luke could draw the picture given in ii. 1–3. On our view there were combined in the enrolment of that year the valuation and inquisition which were required for Roman administrative purposes in a new province, along with the counting by household (ἀπογραφὴ κατ' οἰκίαν) of the periodic census. It was probably the former part that provoked the great disturbances among the Jews as recorded by Josephus. The counting by households necessitated an inquiry into home life that was offensive to the Asiatic mind and society; but inquisition into property with a view to taxation is even more unpopular and detested.

Let us, however, investigate more strictly what is implied in the theory of false invention. The whole procedure, according to the writers of this class, was a fiction: Jesus was born in Nazareth (only a very few go so far as to deny that He was ever born or had any historical existence); and after a legend connecting Him with Bethlehem had grown up, Luke set about inventing historical circumstances and conditions to explain and give plausibility and historical background to the legend. But observe how much this theory implies: it may be doubted whether those who hold it have ever put clearly to themselves or their readers all that they really are contending for. They are really maintaining—

1. That Luke, without possessing any true historical instinct (such as was the heritage of the Greeks, making them seek after and value for its own sake historical truth), yet had a certain morbid craving for a historical setting to his story, and that he invented a historical background after casting about in the past, to search for something suitable; and that finding a census recorded as occurring in A.D. 6–7, he took this and transferred it to a different time. It is not made quite clear whether the contention is that Luke committed this blunder from pure inability and ignorance, fancying that it afforded some explanation, or that he deliberately transferred the census to a wrong time; the commoner view seems to be that he acted through ignorance and incapacity.

2. That Luke invented without any authority the statement that Augustus ordered a census or enrolment of the whole Empire to be made; there could (as these writers assume) be no record of such an impossible act, but Luke supposed that the order of Augustus [1] regarding the Pales-

[1] The instructions (*mandata*) given by the Emperor to his *legatus*, whom he sent to Syria in A.D., 6 would of course contain a provision for making the usual valuation, etc., required in constituting the new province. No special edict was needed for this action in a single new province. Out

tinian census (which he misplaced) was likely to have been general. The contention here is that Luke, without any need or any authority, invented the statement. In the former point he is supposed to have been tempted into error by his desire to place the legend in a historical frame, and to have made bad use of a real recorded fact,—the Quirinian census of A.D. 6. That census, of course, was taken on the order of Augustus in his instructions to the Governor of Syria; but to invent unnecessarily a general edict of Augustus, and thus transform a local process at the organisation of a new Province into an Imperial regulation for the Empire, shows either the grossest ignorance about facts and methods of government, or a calculated and deliberate forgery of historical testimony performed for the purpose of imparting a false air of historicity to a legend. Carelessness in a historian is bad, but such calculated falsehood is much worse.

3. The fashionable theory implies further that Luke invented, not merely one world-wide Augustan census under Herod, but also the idea of a series of enrolments, of which this was the first. Now, why should he do this? His other inventions were hid in the far-away times of King Herod and might deceive the unwary; but a series of enrolments was a thing that could be tested by every reader from his own experience.

One feels that this part of the accusation overtaxes one's power of belief. No rational writer could or would go to such an extreme of needless and useless invention. If this is all false it adds nothing to the verisimilitude of the narrative; and it must have forthwith betrayed its falseness to every reader at the time when Luke's Gospel was written. We cannot admit such an incredible accusation. The theory destroys itself.

of this *mandatum* Luke, according to the fashionable theory, has evolved an edict issued to the whole Empire.

4. The fashionable theory, further, maintained that the idea of every person going to his own home to be enrolled was a pure fiction, and could not possibly have been true: it was a mere device to explain how Jesus could be born in Bethlehem of parents who lived in Nazareth: it was a false explanation of an invented occurrence: Jesus, if born at all, was born in the home of his parents. In my book on this subject I regarded it as certain that this enforced return to the place of origin for the census was non-Roman, but suggested an hypothesis to explain how it came to be a feature of the Palestinian census. My hypothesis was incorrect, for it now appears that the order to return to the original home, though in a sense non-Roman, was really the regular feature of the census in the Eastern provinces, as will be shown in the sequel of this article.

I. The Year of the First Enrolment (under Quirinius.)

Towards the end of the second century, Clement of Alexandria, who was familiar with the facts of Roman administration in the Eastern provinces, speaks as if he had no doubt what Luke meant by the words "first enrolment." He explains them "when first they ordered enrolments to be made."[1] He evidently thought of a system of enrolments, which began in a particular year under Augustus. This general system he knew to exist in his own time; and he takes it on Luke's authority that Jesus was born while the first of the series of enrolments was being made. This must have been in a year, which could be determined by arithmetical computation and by consulting Roman records. Tertullian, as we shall see, went a step further: he consulted the records, and stated the result. These two mutually confirmatory testimonies, which were independent of Luke

[1] *Strom.* i., 21, 147: quoted in *Was Christ Born?* p. 128.

and founded on personal knowledge of Roman facts, have been set aside as groundless and valueless by the adherents of the fashionable theory.

On a fair estimation of Clement's statement, no reasonable scholar can doubt his meaning : Clement was familiar with the census system as it was performed periodically around him throughout his life in Egypt ; he had filled up his own census paper, and had seen his parents and friends do the same ; and he believed that the same periodic system of census was practised in Palestine and had begun, like the Egyptian census, under Augustus and by order of Augustus in 9–8 B.C.

Yet so absurd did the idea of a series of enrolments, of which this was the first, appear to modern scholars, that no one seems to have thought of even mentioning it as a possible interpretation of the words of Luke. Various impossible and ungrammatical translations of the Greek, or equally impossible " corrections " of the text, were proposed ; but the simple and necessary meaning is " this was the first census in the year when Quirinius was governor of Syria," which can be understood better if we put it in current English form (assuming for the moment the date) : " this was the first census (8 B.C.)." That is the simple and full meaning. Here modern discovery comes to our aid. It was undreamed of and unimagined twenty years ago, but it is now an established and well-known fact, that a series of periodic enrolments took place in the province of Egypt. We cannot prove that they were world-wide except from Luke ; but we find incidental references to one here and another there, which are most easily and naturally explicable, if all belong to one universal series. We have the practical certainty that Augustus instituted them, and we have specimens of the actual census-papers in Egypt extending from the third (A.D. 20) for more than two centuries. We know also that Au-

gustus imitated and modified to suit his own purposes an institution of old standing in Egypt, and that he arranged it according to a cycle of 15 years (ancient way of computing: 14 years in modern fashion), reckoned from the first year of his fully organised principate 23 B.C. The actual enrolment was intended to include all who were born before the last day of the year; therefore, it was made in the following year. As 9 B.C. was the cycle-year, the counting took place in 8. All that Luke describes in Palestine took place regularly in Egypt certainly, and in other provinces probably or possibly.

But was Quirinius governor of Syria in that year? Tertullian says [1] that Jesus was born when Sentius Saturninus was governor; and we have good evidence that Sentius Saturninius governed Syria in the three years 9–6 B.C. Formerly Tertullian's statement was set aside as absurd and valueless, because no one put the birth of Jesus so early as 8 B.C.; but as soon as Luke's first enrolment of the series is found to coincide with the government of Sentius, Tertullian's statement acquires unsuspected weight. He corroborates Luke as regards the time of the census during Herod's life, but not as regards the name of the governor. He must, therefore, derive from a different source of information independent of Luke, because on one essential point he diverges from him; and, at the very least, his statement proves that there existed different sources of information, which is a very important fact for the historical critic. If he had only the authority of Luke to rest on, it is inconceivable that he could have named Sentius as governor; and it is evident that, if this event had been a mere fiction invented by Luke, there could not be other sources of knowledge about it. There must lie behind these two statements, partly harmonious, partly diverse, some historical reality and some inde-

[1] *Adv. Marc.* iv. 19.

pendent tradition. A historical process that is mentioned by only one witness might be an invention ; but a process that is attested by two totally independent authorities cannot be set down by sane criticism as a pure invention.

We must therefore accept what Tertullian says as giving a fixed point in this investigation. He had access to trustworthy records showing that the first Enrolment or Census took place in 8 B.C., and that Saturninus governed Syria in that year. It is not necessary to understand that he got both facts from the same source. Probably he knew from one authority[1] the nature and times of the periodic Enrolments; and he consulted another source for the governor's name. Finally, he depended on Luke's authority alone (or on others who in their turn had learned from Luke) for the fact that Jesus was born at this first census. He doubtless knew that he was differing from Luke regarding the governor's name ; but he would not regard the descrepancy as being a matter of any consequence. He stated the facts as he had them ; and probably he did not trouble to find a way of reconciling the diverse authorities.

Simply from the severe but intelligent study of the two most definite ancient authorities, any truly rational criticism must infer that the statement of Luke ii. 1–3 is not an invention of his own, concocted stupidly from half-knowledge and from misuse of the fact that Quirinius was connected with another provincial census in A.D. 6–7. Luke must have had from some source or other information about events of that period, and this information was in most respects at least trustworthy and of inestimable value, for it gives a picture of the beginning of that most remarkable institution, the periodical census of the East. This critical

[1] This authority would naturally be the actual system, as Tertullian knew it in his own experience. Clemens Alex. knew it, and speaks of it as a familiar fact in ordinary life.

study of the authorities, however, has not as yet sufficed to explain the divergence between our two authorities regarding the governor of Syria at the time.

As we may reasonably suppose, Tertullian had some strong ground to stand on, when he corrected the record of Luke regarding the governor's name.[1] In all probability his reason was this : he had quite trustworthy Roman record about the year when the first census was taken, 8 B.C., and about the fact that Saturninus was governor of Syria in that year. The record to which Tertullian had access must be accepted as correct for two reasons : (1) We know from Josephus that Saturninus was governor of Syria in 7 B.C., in which year he acted as one of the Roman judges when Herod prosecuted his two sons.[2] The ordinary period of rule in Syria was three years ; and, although it cannot be assumed as certain that Saturninus administered the province for the whole three, yet this must be taken as probable. His successor, Quintilius Varus, governed for at least three years ; the proof is that coins with his name were struck at Antioch, the Syrian seat of government, in the years 25–27 of the Actian era ; the year 25 of that era began at the autumn equinox B.C. 7, and Varus must have come to Syria about July, 6 B.C.[3] He was in power during the disturbances that ensued on the death of Herod (spring of 4 B.C.). Saturninus's rule, therefore, ended about the middle of 6 B.C., when Varus's term of office began.

The idea might suggest itself that both Quirinius and Satur-

[1] The supposition that Tertullian knew a different text of Luke, in which Saturninus, not Quirinius, was named, may in the present state of the evidence be dismissed as contrary to the principles of right criticism.

[2] *Bell. Jud.* I. 27, 2, *Ant.* XVI. ii. 3 (compare XVI. 9, 1 and 10, 8).

[3] The note in my book on the subject, p. 247, must be corrected. The suggestion there made that the Antiochian New Year was in spring cannot be justified. Now as year 26 of this era was running in January 5 B.C. (coins of year 26 mention Augustus as Cos XII B.C. 5), 25 of the era ran from 23 September 7 to 22 September 6 B.C. It must, of course, be assumed that the governor entered on office about midsummer.

ninus governed Syria in the year 8, because the change of governor took place during that year. Thus it might in a sense be said with equal truth "in the year that Saturninus was governor," and "in the year that Quirinius was governor." The evidence known is not sufficient to disprove this; it might be true; but we prefer the third hypothesis, which has been advanced already by the present writer: viz., that there were two Augustan *legati* of Syria at the same time during the year 8 B.C., with different spheres of action, Saturninus and Quirinius.[1]

There is another suggestion which might be put forward, that Luke was right in the rest (in which he is confirmed by the authorities that Tertullian used and by the results of modern investigation), but that he was wrong as regards the governor's name, mixing up the famous census by Quirinius in 6–7 A.D.[2] with the first census. This theory I confess that I cannot accept, because the otherwise unnecessary addition "first" shows that the historian is carefully distinguishing that particular census from any later census. Moreover here comes in to our aid the newly discovered monument, which has suggested the present article. We now know that Quirinius was governor of Syria about this time.

In order to understand the import and the value of the evidence to be drawn from the newly-discovered monument, we must look at the career of Quirinius. His career is described by Tacitus, *Annals*, iii., on the occasion of his death, and the brief description is invaluable, because it is given in

[1] It has been suggested by Monsieur R. S. Bour that Quirinius's sphere of duty was specially to conduct the census in Syria with the title *legatus Augusti*, while the other *legatus Augusti* conducted the government of Syria in ordinary matters; but this suggestion is disproved by the fact that Quirinius as governor conducted the war against the Homonades. See *Was Christ Born*, p. 248.

[2] Because (as stated in a previous note) the second census was conjoined with the first valuation of property in the new province, it became more famous and more unpopular than the first.

chronological order, although, as is usual with Tacitus, without statement of actual dates. After his consulship in 12 B.C. Quirinius held the command in the war against the Homonades[1] (who had slain Amyntas, king of the Galatae, in 25 B.C., and thus brought about the formation of his kingdom into the province Galatia). Afterwards he was proconsul of Asia. The next point mentioned in his career is that he accompanied Gaius Cæsar to the East as tutor and adviser to the young prince in 4 A.D. There are thus sixteen years during which fall the war against the Homonades and the proconsulship of Asia. The war against the Homonades was evidently regarded as a serious one, and lasted a considerable time, for the conqueror was rewarded with the triumphal ornaments. The enterprise was regarded as so serious, that, though the offence took place in 25 B.C., the punitive expedition was postponed until some year (not precisely fixed) after 12 B.C. In the years following 25 there was much work of a more urgent kind for the Imperial government; but about 12 B.C. the pressure was relaxed; and attention could be given to the Homonades. The conduct of this difficult campaign was entrusted to Quirinius, who had previously distinguished himself by subduing the Garamantes. The conquest of those desert tribesmen must have been hard, as we may see from the difficulties which have attended the Italian operations in 1911–2 on the outskirts of the Garamantian country. The army at his disposal certainly consisted of the Syrian legions, for there were no others in the East; and therefore Mommsen, Rohden and Dessau are all agreed that the conduct of the war must have been associated with the government of the province Syria.[2]

[1] Mommsen places it in 3–2 B.C. In my book on the subject it is placed in 7–6 B.C.; but even that is a little too late. The expedition was not likely to be delayed long after 12 B.C.

[2] That office was consular, and Tacitus says that the Homonadensian war was after Quirinius's consulship (12 B.C.). The government of Syria carried with it the command. See *Prosopographia J.R.*, *s.v.*

The famous Tiburtine fragment offers its evidence at this point. It records part of the career of a high official in the Augustan period, whose name has been lost ; and it was composed after the death of Augustus. The person who is meant conquered some foreign people, and after some interval (during which he was proconsul of Asia), he governed Syria for the second time. This war was a very serious one, for it was marked by two *supplicationes*, implying two distinct victories, and the victorious general was rewarded with the triumphal ornaments ; moreover, the war was in some way associated with the name of a king, if the restoration [re]gem is correct. All this corresponds excellently with the Homonadensian war, in which punishment was inflicted for the death of Amyntas, a client-king ; and in general the fragmentary career suits no known person except Quirinius.[1] Still amid the obscurity that envelops the later part of Augustus's reign, confirmation from local epigraphy is very welcome. We wanted some memorial of Quirinius's presence in the East ; and this has now been found. It is the more useful, because it gives material to determine more exactly the date of the war.

Mommsen placed the first government of Syria by Quirinius in 3–2 B.C., leaving an inexplicably long interval between the offence and the punishment of the Homonades. Moreover every consideration points to the probability that the consulship of Quirinius was the prelude to his command of the Syrian legions for the war.

If Mommsen's date were right, Quirinius's first governorship would not suit Luke any better than his second, for Luke's narrative makes it clear that Quirinius governed Syria before the death of Herod in 4 B.C. For reasons stated in my book on the subject I placed the first government of

[1] Mommsen and (I think) all good modern authorities accept the assignment to Quirinius as certain.

Quirinius in 7–5 B.C., and connected it with the foundation of the five Pisidian colonies and the building of the military road connecting them all with the military centre at Antioch, the Imperial Way (Via Sebaste), about 6 B.C.[1] This connexion may now be accepted as certain.

The new evidence is contained in the following inscription, copied at Antioch in 1912 by Mr. J. G. C. Anderson, of Christ Church, Oxford, and myself :

C. Carista[nio	To Gaius Caristanius
C. F. Ser. Front[oni	(Son of Gaius, of Sergian tribe) Fronto
Caesiano Iuli[o,	Caesianus Juli[us,
praef(ecto) fabr(um), pon[tif(ici),	chief of engineers, pontifex,
sacerdoti, praefecto	priest, prefect of
P. Sulpici Quirini duumviri,	P. Sulpicius Quirinius duumvir,
praefecto M Servili.	prefect of M. Servilius.
Huic primo omnium	To him first of all men
publice d(ecurionum) d(ecreto) statua posita est	at state expense by decree of the decuriones, a statue was erected.

I have had the great advantage of stating my views to Professor H. Dessau, of Berlin, who since Mommsen's death stands in the foremost rank as an authority on such matters as are involved in this inscription. I owe to him the restoration *Iulio* in line 3 (which, as he points out, makes the arrangement more symmetrical and the reading more normal than any of my suggestions), and also the identification of Servilius (line 7). In regard to the date between 10 and 7 B.C. and the general bearing of the inscription, he confirms the views which are here stated.[2] Since receiving his letter

[1] The date is given in a milestone which I found in 1886 on the site of Colonia Comama, *C.I.L.* iii., No. 6974 : it was afterwards copied by M. Bérard, who completed my text CORN by adding VTO.

[2] I am permitted to quote the words of his letter : *mit der Erklärung und zeitlicher Ansetzung der Inschrift des Caristanius Fronto Caesianus haben Sie zweifellos recht. Nur in ein paar Einzelheiten möchte ich mir erlauben von Ihnen abzuweichen.* Then follow the remarks (which I have adopted) about Julius and Servilius. The three *cognomina* and the use of Julius as degraded to a *cognomen* already at this early period, he defends by quot-

I have tried to fix the date more precisely than I did when writing to him.

Gaius Caristanius Fronto was probably one of the original colonists of Antioch, where, as other inscriptions show, his family played a leading part for more than a century : his grandson or great-grandson rose to senatorial rank, and attained the consulship and perhaps also the proconsulate of Asia. The first statue which was erected in the colony at the expense of the colonial government in accordance with a decree of the decuriones, stood on the basis which bore this inscription. The rest of the career of Caristanius, interesting as it is, need not be discussed here : we notice only the part which brought him in contact with Quirinius.

Quirinius was elected chief magistrate (*duumvir*) of the colony Antioch ; and he nominated Caristanius as his *praefectus* to act for him. This sort of honorary magistracy was often offered to the reigning Emperor by *coloniae* ; but in such cases the Emperor was elected alone without a colleague. Under the earlier emperors, and especially under Augustus, the same compliment was sometimes paid to other distinguished Romans, chiefly members of the Imperial family. Exceptional cases occur in which the field of choice was wider.[1] This inscription is the most complete example of the wider choice : it mentions two such cases : both Quirinius and Servilius were elected in this way.

There must have been some special reason in these two cases. Quirinius was not a man of any special distinction. He was of humble origin,[2] and his career, as sketched by Tacitus,[3] is a good example of the Roman system. No bar impeded the advancement to the highest position in the

ing *C.I.L.*, III. 551, XIV. 3,606 (Inscr. Sel. 921), *C.I.L.* VI. 1,403 (Inscr. Sel. 966), IX. 4,197, and later VIII. 12,442 and III. 15,208 (Inscr, Sel. 1110).

[1] Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, ii. 814,828.

[2] *Obscurissima domus*, Tacitus, *Ann.* III. 23.

[3] *Ann.* III, 48.

state of this low-born soldier from the small Latin town Lanuvium. He is a type of the Latin character, able and energetic, hard and unlovable. But why should he be elected a magistrate of this remote colony in south-eastern Phrygia, or southern Galatia? He had neither Imperial connexion nor outstanding reputation to commend him to the Antiochian *coloni*. But everything is clear when we remember that he conducted the war against the Homonades. Antioch was a fortress intended to restrain the depredations of the mountain tribes; and the Homonades must have been a constant danger to the country which it was Antioch's duty to protect. It was at that time that they elected Quirinius a *duumvir*.

It is not at first sight obvious why M. Servilius was elected to the chief magistracy. He was indeed a noble;[1] but of his career nothing creditable is known, except that he was consul in A.D. 3; he was, however, a favourite of Tiberius. He also must have been in some way brought into relation with the colony; and the obvious probability is that he was governor of Galatia. This would fully account for the compliment. On this view it is tempting and plausible to suppose that he was *duumvir* along with or immediately after Quirinius,[2] and that they had co-operated as governors of the two Eastern provinces Syria and Galatia in the Homonadensian war. He was succeeded by Cornutus Aquila, who still held office 6 B.C., when the construction of the Via Sebaste and the foundation of the Pisidian colonies was going on. Both of them named the same *praefectus*, a proof that Caristanius was regarded as the most suitable man in Antioch for the position at this dangerous time.

[1] Tacitus, *Ann.* III. 48. I follow Professor Dessau's identification. I had thought of an older M. Servilius, legate of Brutus and Cassius in Asia in 43 B.C.

[2] When the Emperor was elected to an honorary duumvirate, he had no colleague. When any other person was thus elected, he had a colleague in the ordinary fashion, as Mommsen thinks (*Staatsrecht*, ii. 828).

While the exact form of the hypothesis about Servilius might be modified by better knowledge, it may be regarded as certain that the inscription is a memorial of the Homonadensian war and the Syrian governorship of Quirinius.

That some personal friendship existed between Servilius and Quirinius is proved by the record of Tacitus, *Ann.* iii. 22. In A.D. 20, when Quirinius brought a charge against his high-born wife Aemilia Lepida [1] after divorcing her, Servilius gave evidence against her. The nature of the accusations show that the witnesses must have been either associates of Lepida, who knew her well (in which case they would not have testified against her),[2] or friends of Quirinius, who had access to his house. Both prosecutor and witness must have been old men at this time.

Now as to the date. It is probable that Quirinius came to Syria in the summer of 11 B.C., immediately after his consulship. He had to prepare for the war, which could not well begin before June in the following year. The mountain country of the Homonades is rugged and lofty, nowhere under 3,500 ft. above the sea, and in great part very much higher.[3] The war was slow, because the tribesmen dwelt in fortified villages (*castella*), and these had to be captured one after another (as Tacitus implies). The campaigns necessarily were short, as winter begins early and lasts late in the Taurus mountains, and snow lies very deep and long. At least two summers must have been spent in this way, and perhaps each was marked with a *supplicatio*. A third year may have been spent in reorganising the conquered country and planning the series of Pisidian colonies.

[1] By a slip her name is given Domitia Lepida in my book on the subject, p. 230, etc.

[2] It was regarded as disgraceful for free citizens to bear witness against a friend, even though he was guilty. Slaves were tortured to make them reveal the secrets of the household to which they belonged.

[3] From 4,000 to 7,000 feet is a fair estimate.

The fact mentioned about the statue of Caristanius, that it was the first erected at state cost in the colony, would in itself suggest an early date. Not many years are likely to have elapsed after the foundation of the colony, before a statue was erected in the city. The connexion of Caristanius with the glorious events of the Homonadensian war gives a good reason for the honour of a statue which the colony paid. Statues at private expense were allowed to be erected more freely.

It is generally assumed that Colonia Caesarea Antiochia was founded immediately after the organisation of the province Galatia ; [1] and this may be regarded as in the highest degree probable. But the five Pisidian colonies were founded together, and at a different time from Antioch, as appears from the names :—

Julia Augusta Prima Fida Comamenorum
Julia Augusta Felix Cremnensium
Julia Augusta Olbasena
Julia Augusta Felix Gemina Lustra[2]
Julia Augusta colonia Parlais.[3]

If, as Mr. Calder [4] thinks, C.I.L., iii. 6843 refers to Drusus who died B.C. 9, this would prove that Antioch was older than the Pisidian colonies.

As Quirinius was much occupied *per Ciliciam*,[5] Saturninus

[1] *Cities of St. Paul*, p. 268.

[2] Lustra in Latin on coins and inscriptions (evidently under the influence of popular etymology) ; Lystra in Greek.

[3] The names of Parlais and Olbasa may probably have been lengthened by other titles. We possess only late coins, in which the titles of these *coloniae* are usually cut short (e.g., at Lystra).

[4] Drusus, who is there mentioned in his second year of office, is probably the stepson of Augustus, who died 9 B.C. He must have been elected to the duumvirate at 11 B.C. or earlier, and held office for two years. But it is equally probable that Drusus was the son of Tiberius and heir to the principate. In *Journal of Roman Studies*, 1912 (not yet paged).

[5] Cilicia was at that time attached to the province of Syria : Rohden and Dessau say that in the war Quirinius was *legatus sine dubio pro pr. Syriae, ad quam Cilicia tum pertinebat* (*Prosop.*, iii. p. 288) : so also Mommsen, etc.

was sent to administer the domestic affairs of Syria and Palestine, as Josephus shows. The enrolment must have been to some extent under his charge (and so Tertullian is justified); but Quirinius was in military command, and household enrolments had to the Romans rather a military connexion (and so Luke also is justified).

Thus the command of Quirinius lasted from 11 to 8 B.C., possibly even a year longer; and that of Saturninus from 9 to 6 B.C. Any year about 9 to 7 would be suitable for the duumvirate of Quirinius; the earlier date would imply desire to co-operate by putting the colony under charge of a man chosen by Quirinius; the later date would imply gratitude on the part of Antioch. The former supposition seems perhaps more probable, and the purpose would be most completely attained if Servilius was the second *duumvir*, and both nominated the same *praefectus*, thus placing the whole resources of the colony under a single head for effective co-operation in the war.

Thus we find, comparing contemporary documents found in two Roman colonies which were most concerned, indubitable evidence that Quirinius was governing Syria about 10–7 B.C., and probably in the exact years 9–8 B.C., the time of the first enrolment.

That Quirinius in one of his governments of Syria made the census of that province is proved by a famous inscription at Venice, which recorded that Aemilius Secundus, by order of P. Sulpicius Quirinius, governor of Syria, held the census of Apamea, and counted in it a population of 117,000 citizens, also that he was sent by Quirinius to conduct a war against the Ituraei and captured one of their fortified villages. This shows one bond of connexion between military matters and the enumeration of citizens in the census. Another connexion was that to the Romans a leading object in counting the citizens was to calculate future

military strength. It seems now impossible to determine whether Aemilius performed these duties in the first or the second governorship of Quirinius. He does not mention a number, which was usually added when a person was governor for the second time, and the omission might suggest the first governorship; but in this case the context does not call for the specification even if the second administration be meant.

This important inscription was formerly condemned as a forgery, apparently for no other reason than that it mentioned the census of Quirinius and supported Luke; but the discovery not long ago of one half of the long-lost stone proved that the document is genuine.

W. M. Ramsay.

REMINISCENCES OF THE PARABLE OF THE SOWER CONTAINED IN THE EPISTLE OF ST. JAMES.

In p. lxii. of my edition of this Epistle I have pointed out the close connexion between it and the Sermon on the Mount, and in pp. lxxxv., to xc. and cci. to cciii., I have touched on the resemblances between the Epistle and the Gospels generally, including that of St. John. In p. lxii. I also said that these resemblances had the appearance of thoughts frequently uttered by the original speaker, and sinking into the mind of an attentive hearer, who afterwards reproduces them in his own manner, along with further developments. This has been shown in a very interesting way with reference to the earliest and best known of the Parables, that of the Sower, by the Rev. A. S. W. Young in a sermon which he has kindly allowed me to make use of. He points out first the thoughts which St. James

has borrowed directly from the Parable, and then the further reflections to which they gave rise in his own mind.

We will consider (1) the outer form and the inner meaning of the Parable, as it is given in the Gospels, and (2) the embodiment of these in the Epistle, and the higher truths which are there associated with them.

The Parable turns upon the natural image for teaching, which is also used in the Parable of the Tares, and in that of the Seed growing secretly. "The sower went forth to sow his seed." In the Parable of the Tares (Matt. xiii. 37) the Sower is said to be the Son of Man, who is the supreme Teacher: but it would seem more natural to understand the word "sower," in the earlier parable, to refer to teachers generally, showing the various difficulties which are sure to present themselves according to the various temperaments and histories of the hearers of the word. This is not so in the case of St. James, who asserts distinctly that "it is God, the Father of lights, who of His own will begot us by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first-fruits of His creatures." The seed is the word, which is further defined as the Word of God (Luke viii. 11) or the Word of the Kingdom (Matt. xiii. 19). It fulfils its purpose when it falls into good ground, and brings forth fruit an hundred-fold; by which is signified, as we are told, those that, in an honest and good heart, hold fast the seed, and bring forth fruit with patience (Luke viii. 15).

But there are many dangers and hindrances which interfere with the right growth of the seed. Sometimes it falls on the hard wayside, and the birds of the air devour it, which is explained (in Matt. xiii. 19, Luke viii. 12) of them that have heard the word without understanding it (i.e. those on whom the word makes no impression); then cometh the devil and taketh away the word from their heart, lest they should believe and be saved. Sometimes

the seed falls on rocky ground, where it quickly springs up in the thin, shallow soil, and, as quickly, withers away under the hot sun, because it has no root (" no moisture " which might be gathered up by the root, Luke viii. 6). These are they which receive the word with joy, but in time of temptation fall away. Other seed falls among thorns, which grow up with it and choke it ; by which is signified those who are choked with the cares and riches and pleasures of life (" the care of the world and the deceitfulness of riches," Matt. xiii. 22), and bring forth no fruit to perfection.

It will be noticed that this parable (as contrasted, for instance, with that of the Barren Fig-tree or the Rich Fool) is mainly descriptive of a fixed state of things, while the language of St. James and that of the Old Testament is mainly hortative and admonitory, demanding a change in the adverse circumstances. Compare Jeremiah iv. 3, " Thus saith the Lord to Jerusalem, Break up your fallow ground and sow not among thorns " ; Isaiah v. 1 foll., " My well-beloved had a vineyard on a very fruitful hill, and he made a trench about it, and gathered the stones out of it, and planted it with the choicest vine . . . and it brought forth wild grapes . . . I will tell you what I will do to my vineyard . . . I will break down the fence thereof, and I will lay it waste ; it shall not be pruned nor hoed ; but there shall come up briers and thorns." And St. James is not less stern in denouncing double-mindedness, bare profession, talking instead of listening, hearing without doing, the love of pleasure and of the world instead of the love of God.

In St. Luke (viii. 18) the section which contains the Parable ends with the warning, " Take heed therefore how ye hear ; for, whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even

that which he seemeth to have" (cf. also Matt. xiii. 9, "He that hath ears, let him hear")—a warning which frequently reappears in St. James. Thus we read (in i. 19), "Let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak"; (in ver. 21), "Receive with meekness the implanted word, which is able to save your souls; but be ye doers, and not hearers only, deceiving your own selves;" (vers. 23–25), "Such an one is like a man who beholdeth his face in a mirror . . . and straightway forgetteth what manner of man he was. But he that looketh into the perfect law of liberty, and continueth therein, he, being not a forgetful hearer, but an active doer (lit. 'hearer of forgetfulness,' 'doer of work'), this man shall be blessed in his doing"; (ver. 26), "If any man seemeth to be religious, while he bridleth not his tongue, but deceiveth his heart, this man's religion is vain." We shall have occasion to return to some of these warnings hereafter in treating of the dangers which beset the sowing of the seed.

I go on now to inquire whether St. James has any parallel to what we read in the Gospels of the act of sowing; the nature of the seed; the nature of the ground or soil which is required in order that the seed may grow and flourish; the fruit which it bears; and the personality of the sower. In iii. 18, St. James teaches us that the wisdom which is from above is first pure, then peaceable . . . full of mercy and good fruits; and that the fruit of righteousness is sown in peace for the peace-makers. Hort's note on this passage is as follows: "St James cannot too often reiterate his warning, founded on our Lord's, against anything that bears no fruit,—an unfruitful religion, an unfruitful faith, and now an unfruitful wisdom." For there is an opposite to this heavenly wisdom: there is a wisdom, as we are taught in the parable of the Tares, as well as in St. James, which is earthly, sensual, and devilish; the tongue of the

human teacher may be set on fire of hell ; it may be tainted with the poison of falsehood and bitterness. In the Parable of the Sower the activity of the devil is negative, confined to the removal of the good seed : in the Parable of the Tares and in the Epistle it is positive, replacing the good seed by the bad, the wheat by the tares. In St. James' time there were some who imputed the growth of evil in the heart to the action of God Himself, but it is good only that comes from Him. " Of His own will He begot us by the word of truth that we might be a kind of firstfruits of his creatures." Such a declaration goes far beyond the teaching of the earliest of the parables, approaching closely to the teaching of St. Peter (1 Pet. i. 23, " having been begotten again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, through the word of God "), and of St. John in his Gospel (i. 13 foll.), " To as many as received Him, to them gave He power (ἐξουσίαν) to become children of God, even to them that believe on His name ; which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God " ; and also in his first Epistle (i. 9), " Whosoever is begotten of God doeth no sin, because his seed abideth in him." We need not, of course, suppose that St. James lived long enough to read either St. Peter's or St. John's writings, but only that he was one of those who, after the Resurrection, learnt from his Master, as He spoke the things concerning the Kingdom of God (Acts i. 3), and also had all things brought to his remembrance by the Holy Ghost.

We turn now to see what is said of the seed, which is explained to be the word, and is then further particularised as the word of God, the word of the kingdom, described by St. James as the word of truth, the implanted word which can save your souls, the perfect law of liberty. By the word of the kingdom we are probably to understand the Gospel, i.e., the good news of the kingdom, which Christ

came to establish ; the implanted word is that word of God, whose nature it is to root itself in the heart, as seed does in the ground, and so to save the soul (see Luke viii. 12). The word of truth is the declaration of the truth, as the " word of God " is the utterance or manifestation of God ; and St. John can therefore say, *Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος*, and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews can speak of the Son as the *ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως* of God. Lastly, the perfect law of liberty is the law written in the heart, the ideal of humanity, as shown in the life of Christ, and accepted by His followers, not from fear, but from love.

The next point is the nature of the ground. In Luke viii. 15 the good ground is explained to be the honest and good heart, which, having received the word, holds it fast, and brings forth fruit with patience. The explanation of the seed which falls on the wayside, and is snapt up by the birds, is that the devil cometh and taketh away the seed from the heart. So in James i. 26 we are told that, if any one seemeth to be religious, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain ; while on the other hand we are bidden to stablish our hearts. The main division, however, in St. James, depends upon the spiritual influence to which we submit ourselves. Each man is tempted, when he is drawn away by his own lust (i. 14) ; God tempteth none, resisting the proud, and giving grace to the humble. Be subject, therefore, to God ; but resist the devil (iv. 6, 7).

Lastly, who, and what, is the Sower ? In i. 18 we have seen that, to St. James, the Teacher or Sower in the highest sense is God ; but he has much to tell us of human teachers, and warns men most seriously against taking up this profession without a sense of its difficulty and responsibility (i. 19 foll., iii.). In the parable the main object is to point out the difficulties which beset the path of the sower, even

though he may sow only the good seed, following therein the example of his divine Master.

In conclusion, I will call attention to some further agreements in points of detail, which are to be found in the Parable and the Epistle. The characteristic of the good ground in Luke is that it is both receptive and retentive. So in the Epistle (i. 21), he that would be blessed in his doing must receive with meekness the implanted word, which can save his soul. He must gaze steadily into the law of liberty and hold fast to it. The seed which falls on the rocky ground represents those who receive the word with joy, but believe only for a time, and fall away under temptation (Luke viii. 13). So the double-minded man (in James i. 6) quickly loses faith and is unstable in all his ways. "Blessed is he who endureth temptation, for he shall receive the crown of life. The sun ariseth with the scorching wind and withers the grass . . . so also will the rich man wither away in his goings" (James i. 11).

The seed which fell among thorns is used to symbolise those who are choked with the cares and riches and pleasures of life; with which we may compare St. James' repeated warnings to the rich, and against the pleasures which war in our members (iv. 1). So the version in Matthew, which speaks of the cares of the world and the deceitfulness of riches, reappears in James i. 27, "Pure religion is to keep oneself unspotted from the world," and (iv. 4) "The friendship of the world is enmity against God; again the deceitfulness of riches is shown in i. 11, while other kinds of self-deception are mentioned in i. 22 and 26. The difficult verse (i. 21), "putting away all filthiness and overflowing of wickedness" has been explained by some good scholars of the thorns and weeds which interfere with the growth of the seed. This would make very good sense, but I am not aware of any instance in which *περισσεία* bears this precise

meaning. I have myself taken it of the "defilement caused by the overflowing malice of the heart," referring to the preceding "wrath of man, which worketh not the righteousness of God." The A.V. rendering "superfluity of wickedness" is undoubtedly wrong.

J. B. Mayor.

PERSONALITY AND GRACE.

XI. Eternal Life.

A life every event of which is directed towards the realisation of its chief good would be a blessed life on the one condition that it could not be cut off before its good were realised. But it is blessed only in hope, and hope, even as faith, is illusion except in so far as it is based on reality.

To the world as it is, not faith but worldliness reconciles us. Thoughtlessness is only too easily reconciled to it, and such contentment is not divine, but is selfish and sensual. No man with large sympathies and spiritual aspirations can be reconciled to this life as it is, for the simple reason that it is not good. To be reconciled to anything is just to find it good, a thing impossible with respect to this present life, unless it has destroyed every fragment of a soul. Nay, its gifts are so qualified by the shadow of death, even if failure and struggle and sickness could be escaped, that the absence of soul itself will not shield any one to the close. The sunniest worldly face always ends in being a clouded, peevish one: worldliness under no condition being long justified in her children.

Ought we not, therefore, to have begun with this question of a future life? Unless we know whether our present life is the whole edifice or only the portico, how are we to judge it? Would not the whole business of faith be changed if we had some clear demonstration of another life? Suppose

we had it in one incontrovertible argument for the immortality of the soul, such as the indissoluble unity of the spirit, or better still in some indisputable fact, as the return of a traveller from the unseen or intercourse with the spirits of the departed, would not religion have something much surer to go upon ?

But neither would afford us religious assurance. If the arguments are valid, let them be weighed ; if the facts are genuine, let them be investigated ; but neither, nor both together, can give us a genuinely religious hope. Nay, if the grim silence of the grave has a religious meaning, it must be that our interests do not lie beyond it in that external way, but that the immediate business of religion is with this life and not with another. As a child should attend to the tasks of childhood and be cut off by not understanding them from the tasks of manhood, so should we give ourselves to the tasks of this life and be grateful that a thick veil prevents us from being distracted by the more glorious activities of another, even while we may be encouraged and sobered by the sense of it, as the child by the dim foreshadowing of the responsibilities of maturity.

As, by our father's wisdom and foresight, not our own, the tasks of childhood were the best preparation for manhood, so, by God's wisdom and foresight, to live well in the present is the best preparation for all futures. Wherefore, we here meet another antinomy of grace. Grace is concerned with another life. Eternal life is its business. But, for that very reason, another life is not our business. Our concern is the present scene and the present hour.

To make eternal life our aim and business is not to succour morality by religion, but to corrupt both morality and religion by the notion that men are to do good because religion is the external guarantee of heaven and hell.

A right life even here is a life blessed in hope, and that

requires a life which will fulfil that hope. The victory which overcomes the world is not through a love which some day will know us no more, but requires a love from which neither life nor death can separate us. God is not the God of the dead but of the living, precisely because He is love. Yet that would be the very assurance we should miss, if we accepted a future life of reward and punishment on the sole ground of an incontrovertible argument or of an indisputable fact, and made it our direct aim as we do other things we prove or see. It would at once become a selfish end, and we should have lost our lot in it as the expression of an endless love.

Morals, with that sanction, forthwith becomes utilitarian, distinguished only from the non-religious type by having a longer arm to reward and punish; and religion a kind of police magistrate who would fall into desuetude if people could learn to behave themselves without needing to have the fear of him before their eyes. Utilitarian morality so guaranteed has even been regarded as the foundation stone of religion and the attempt to show that goodness has its own law and its own motive has been denounced as the most subtle of all attempts to prove religion unnecessary and baseless. How, it is asked, with a selfish creature like man, can there be an absolute distinction between right and wrong, unless it be enforced by the infinite awards of heaven and hell? To seek the sanctions of morality in its own nature must surely be to ignore the importance of religion for making men moral. Then, the whole significance of this way of making men moral by religion appears in its nakedness when some bluff, worldly person, infinitely more interested in the rates than either in religion or morality or both together, defends religion as a cheaper way than prisons and workhouses of keeping men honest, law-abiding and industrious.

Thus conceived, heaven and hell are pure appeals to a selfish self-regard, and as it is precisely material consideration by which that is most swayed, heaven is apt to be a place of very material bliss and hell of very material misery. Nor would a more spiritual conception of its rewards afford much deliverance, for they are still sought in the same self-regarding way as material blessings. The practical effect is that a life, even of ascetic devotion, lived for another life, is not so unworldly as its outward form might lead us to suppose. An unworldly life is not a life for our own benefit either here or hereafter, but for God's purposes now.

That is an urgent practical truth. The reason why religion fails to touch the most genuinely religious souls, and that too at the very time of life when they most willingly respond to generous impulses, is just the absence of this truth from the common religious teaching. That failure is ill compensated for by success with the prudent worldly people who, having made a competence for this life, are warned by declining years of the advantage of securing a further competence in the world to come.

Young and generous souls are intensely conscious of life. Nothing could convince them that life is not their immediate and urgent business. When people who, in spite of their chilled blood, do not themselves believe what they urge, exhort persons standing on life's threshold, with all life's glorious possibilities before them, to say with an aged, sick, imprisoned saint, It is better to depart and to be with Christ, the result is disastrous. The impression left is that religion, finding no meaning of any sort in this life, has, in desperation, to fling itself upon another. Weakness, captivity and old age have a right to be weary of life ; youth has not. And even in Paul that desire is only of nature, not grace. The true religious note is his triumph over

that natural impulse. It is the glorious assurance that his life to its last days will have meaning and value. That is the note of eternal youth. When we hear it, we know that religion can rescue our moral personalities from the abject fear of poverty, from warping cares, from small cramping personal ambitions, from the paralysing sense of failing strength and of life's narrowing opportunities, and enable us, in quiet possession of our own souls, to tread God's own high road, which, just because it carries us over time's crude material dominion, gives us an outlook upon eternity not at the end only, but all the way.

We are not to live for the life to come. We are to have eternal life. We are not to be miserable here to be happy hereafter. On the contrary, we should have a blessedness of such a quality now that we know it cannot end. Only by having in it already victory over many terrors, have we a right to depend on it for victory over the last enemy, death.

For that reason the first object of religion is not to demonstrate the reality of another life. It is to reconcile us to God in this. And reconciliation does not mean that this life, though evil in itself, can be tolerated without being angry with God because of the compensation waiting for us in another life. We should not be reconciled to God because we believe in another life; but we should believe in another life because we are reconciled to God. Reconciliation to God depends on seeing something in this life, not something quite different from it in another life. It is faith in the order of love as the real meaning of life, and, by acceptance of that order as God's purpose for our lives, finding that it is an eternal purpose for which every event in them works for our good.

Such a life is necessarily blessed. If all things work together for our true good, we could not have a more blessed life except by a nearer approach to that good itself. But

that is the very goal of which every appointment for us of discipline or duty, being of God's love, gives us assurance. As it is no less than the infinite goal of holy love, it can give us nothing less than the assurance of eternal approximation to it. To have that blessedness is, in spite of every present failure, to have eternal life. It is a life blessed in a hope which is eternally fulfilling itself. We only rightly and religiously believe in another life because we already serve a purpose of love for which this life is too small.

Arguments may help to meet objections to our hope, but they can do no more. Only when we find an endless purpose of God in this life have we any right to believe our hope larger than this life can contain. The hope of another life connected with this, at most by some link of responsibility, a link which must not be too firmly rivetted if that future life is not to be as miserable as this appears to be, can never be more than a dubious hypothesis, and it can never act upon us except as a consideration of prudence. Even as such, we must ever be exposed to the fear that a blank cheque upon the future, upon which nothing can be raised for our present necessities, may never at any time be honoured. To many souls in poverty and distress, their present unsuccoured evil state affords no encouraging prospect of being compensated for their miseries in a world to come, the transference of all good to another life sounding like an empty promise to silence their immediate, just demands.

Such a hope is not the power of an endless life working in the life because God is in it. It acts as an ulterior reward, which, by making us serve God only because He has heaven to bestow, corrupts the very assurance of love by which all hope lives. Not till we already knew that the perfect rule of love would be the only heaven in which our souls could ever be perfectly blessed, can the hope of heaven be

at once a glorious personal hope and deliverance from the dominion of selfish desires.

That hope succours and emancipates, and does not corrupt and enslave the moral personality, because it provides morality with the three things it most needs but cannot provide for itself. They are an adequate moral subject, an adequate moral sphere, and an adequate moral order. By considering them for a moment, we may more clearly understand the true dependence of morals on religion and escape from the pernicious desire to make morals wrongly and selfishly dependent on religious motive, or from the equally pernicious desire to make religion a mere appendage to morality, or from what is little better, the determination to keep religion and morality in separate compartments.

Let us proceed in order. First, grace, by reconciling us to this life in such a way as to show us in it the issues of another, provides an adequate moral subject, and what is more, can provide it in any human personality, as it cannot without that reconciliation be found in the highest and holiest.

Without that succour of religion morality ends in what is for it unaided a sheer insoluble perplexity which refuses to remove from its path. It is this. A moral subject must be an end in itself. On that ground alone has it moral laws to announce. Moreover, the reverence by which it obeys these laws is reverence for its own personality as an end in itself. Both would cease if the moral subject could be regarded merely as a means to an end, even were that end the race or the kingdom of God itself.

Yet, on the other hand, self-realisation is not the moral end. Except for the higher service we can thereby render, it is not even a moral end. A true morality does not keep its eye on beautiful motives or a beautiful character, but

simply on doing right. Morality is thus faced by a problem it cannot solve—the eternal and infinite significance of the moral personality along with its perpetual subordination to its moral task, the fact that the moral person is the only final end, and yet that the supreme victory of the moral will is to be free from all self-regard.

Without a hope beyond the grave it is difficult to see that there would be a moral subject at all. We are rather things than persons, with the odd addition that we resent our real end which is corruption. The issue is obscured by a perversion of the argument that a moral person does not live to himself. He cannot, however, even not live to himself, if he cease to live at all. Self-denial is not consent to self-annihilation. Nor is self-denial a moral end in itself. It is only a necessary means to a moral end.

But, on the other hand, a mere hope of immortality would bring us back to the immoral position that the moral end is the perfection of the moral person. Only when the moral subject has already the power of an endless life in a world which serves His eternal good because law and love are one, can he be a true moral subject, the more loyal to himself the more utterly he forgets himself.

Second, the succour of grace above spoken of provides an adequate moral sphere. As Kant says, the essence of morality is to treat every man as an end in himself. That is the ethical meaning of love. But in that case we reverence man for what he ought to become, for what, if at the grave he is only "dust and ashes, dead and done with," he will never be. It is true that our tenderest associations are nourished by the sense that we are mortal creatures, but that is because there is behind, not the thought of total evanescence, but the sense that the frail vessel of our mortality has an immortal content.

But again, on the other hand we could not find our true

moral sphere in the mere expectation that another life would be linked to this by the tie of merit and reward. As a matter of fact that sense of a legal justice by which every man at some time or another must meet the reward of his deeds, can cherish the hardest indifference to sin and suffering. Only the sense that in every soul there is the eternal working of the eternal Father making its true good His end can cherish in us that love which reverences man for the possibilities of the image of God in him and make us more ready to succour than to condemn—a reverence and a sympathy surely essential to anything having a right to be called a moral sphere.

Lastly, grace by so reconciling us to this life as to show us in it the issues of another, provides an adequate moral order.

Because the moral order is not yet realised, it is sometimes made to appear that it would still be valid if it were never to be realised. But morality is not a castle in the air. It is life's ultimate meaning, or it is nothing. If the final moral order is love, it is absurd to say that it is valid though the final actual order were death.

The response to love is not self-regard, but self-abnegation. It is not, however, self-destruction or self-disregard. Only the assurance that it is itself our best self-realisation can confer on it the right to avert our gaze from ourselves. To be saved is just to be delivered from self, but to be delivered from self is also to be saved.

Here we find the distinction between utilitarianism and a right moral self-love. Utilitarianism says, conscience is only self-love carried to its final issue. What a true morality asserts is, that a right self-love is only conscience carried to its final issue.

That moral order, a mere belief in another life, on the grounds of moral retribution alone, cannot provide. Such

a belief is rather a confession of the bankruptcy of a moral order, a confession that it will only work with motives which are not moral at all but material, because, however they be spiritualised, they still work upon the self in the same way as material advantage.

Only an order of love which is at once self-sacrifice and self-realisation, which does not work by promises but is full of promise in all its working, which has, as it were, not a foot of earth in it which has not the whole infinite heaven above it, will avail. It can say, For great is your reward in heaven, only because its heaven will be nothing but its own perfect rule.

Here we see the true succour of morality by religion. "Nothing," as has been said, "should be done for religion, but everything with religion." It is a succour in which mere morality should rejoice to lose itself, because it has found the love which is more than the fulfilling of its law.

When that is seen again, religion may once more become, not what it is for many even professedly religious people, a part of life's play, but what it ought to be, the heart of life's business. Then the lives which without it are both self-indulgent and miserable, would at once become both austere and blessed.

JOHN OMAN.

IS THE TEACHING OF JESUS AN INTERIMSETHIK ? [1]

THE strict eschatologist holds that the form and the contents of the teaching of Jesus were determined by a belief in the imminent passing away of the world-order, which was to give place immediately to the apocalyptic Kingdom of

[1] A paper read at Leiden, at the Fourth International Congress for the History of Religions.

God. This view is defined in the convenient phrase *Interimsethik*. It is well to remind ourselves what it implies. In a certain sense the ethics of every religious teacher are eschatological, i.e., they assume that man has a spiritual nature, the full possibilities of which will only be realised in some future sphere and in some other life. They recognise that man is mortal, and that he is being tested and trained during the comparatively brief period of his earthly life in order that he may grow fit for his place in a future Kingdom of God.[1] The parable of the Rich Fool is strongly eschatological in this wider sense. But normally such a view, though it does not regard the world as eternal, does look upon it as being for practical purposes the more or less abiding home of the human race. The sphere of the individual's training is found in a social environment which is expected to remain substantially the same from age to age, though it varies within certain fixed limits and is capable of improvement. This environment brings with it responsibilities to our fellow-men, and to the future of the race, which are an essential factor in every ethical problem.

Now on the *Interimsethik* theory not only is the period of probation shortened for the individual, but also for the race as a whole, with the result that family and social responsibilities are eliminated, since the race under its present conditions has no future. A very clear statement of the implications of this view is given by Felix d'Alviella in his recently published *Évolution du Dogme Catholique*. "The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand. What then is the object of preoccupation with the future, of exposing oneself constantly to sin by having anything to do with the desires and

[1] In view of the somewhat shameless persistency with which the eschatologist commends his hypothesis as emphasising the "otherworldliness" of Christianity, it may be pointed out that this feature is dependent, not on any expectation of the immediate "end of the world," but on a belief in the immortality of the individual.

outlook of the world ? " [1] The teaching of Jesus is " anti-famiale et anti-sociale," [2] because it supposes the uselessness of the family and society on account of the imminent transformation of the world by the act of God. " The religious moral teaching of Paul is as little practical, and takes as little account of the necessities of life, as that of Jesus and the Twelve," because the Kingdom is at hand. " There is no place to reorganise society, or to issue a religious code, moral or political ; in this order of ideas Paul goes even further than Jesus and the Twelve ; he does not wish existing laws to be maintained ; since they have not made men better, they are superfluous, even a danger and a hindrance to the work of salvation." [3]

That is to say, when we call the teaching of Jesus an *Interimsethik*, we imply that either the principles of that teaching, or its application, or both, would have been quite other than they are, had He not believed in the immediate end of the existing world-order. It is not merely a question of the length of the interval ; a new factor of fundamental importance has been introduced, leading to a radically different view of human life, its meaning and relationships and responsibilities.

Now one of the grounds on which this theory is recommended is somewhat paradoxical. We are told that in this way the teaching of Jesus acquires an absolute validity. " That which is eternal in the words of Jesus is due to the very fact that they are based on an eschatological world-view, and contain the expression of a mind for which the contemporary world with its historical and social circumstances no longer had any existence. They are appropriate, therefore, to any world, for in every world they raise the man who dares to meet their challenge, and does not turn and twist them into meaninglessness, above his world and

[1] P. 32. [2] P. 33. [3] P. 202.

his time, making him inwardly free, so that he is fitted to be, in his own world and in his own time, a simple channel of the power of Jesus."[1]

In the same way Dr. Lake [2] suggests that such a system, by placing ethical problems in isolation—even unnatural isolation,—will be an absolute system, independent of circumstances. Now what do we mean by " absolute ethics " ? We may mean general, broad principles, abstracted from the concrete details of their application—" Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,"—but the moment you come to close quarters with details " absolute ethics " becomes an impossibility. For ethics is concerned with character as manifested in conduct, and the fitness of conduct is relative to circumstances. Martineau, in the opening paragraphs of his *Types of Ethical Theory*, emphasises this point. " The fitness [of actions] must depend not simply on the internal springs whence they issue, but also on external application to the sphere of their display. The feeling suitable to a certain imaginary universe may be quite out of place in this." Conditions of life affect duties ; perfect character depends on man's position in the scheme of things, his possibilities and end.

Now you can regard man as a social animal, endued with an inheritance from the past, and having responsibilities to the future, mediated through family and social relationships, or you may regard him, as *Interimsethik* would do, as divested of all these, and as an individual with a few months to secure his own salvation. But I see no reason for labelling this latter view " absolute," with the implication that it is eternal and capable of application in every age. On the contrary, it is *relative* to a supposed situation, as for example St. Paul's command, in 1 Corinthians vii. 25 ff., not to marry, so

[1] Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*. p. 400.
[2] *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 443.

far from being absolute, is entirely dependent on his view of the future. The fact that the situation is admittedly misconceived seems an inadequate reason for regarding the teaching based on it as bearing the stamp of universal validity. If it be true that the teaching of Jesus arose from a false view of the future, enabling Him to eliminate all those responsibilities which constitute the real core of ethical problems, the conclusion surely is that it ceases to be applicable, except to the minority which, from time to time, is able to persuade itself that the Kingdom is at hand in the apocalyptic sense. It would be the ethics of an " imaginary universe," and we could find little use for it in the world as it is.

We must now ask how far the teaching of Jesus does, in fact, bear the marks of an *Interimsethik*. The curious thing is that in the whole of the New Testament there seems to be only one avowed and unambiguous example of such teaching, and even that is disputed by some. I refer once more to 1 Corinthians vii. There St. Paul does base his view of marriage and of the Christian's relation to worldly affairs on the shortness of the time, and the passing away of the fashion of the world.[1] But he expressly excludes the idea that he is here dependent on the teaching of Christ,[2] and nowhere in the Gospels do we find a real parallel. " Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand." Waiving the question whether the Kingdom is in fact here used in its strictly apocalyptic sense, we cannot quote this as a true example of *Interimsethik*, because the contents of the command are in no way determined by the belief in the shortness of the interval. It may be that this supplies the motive, but the injunction itself, " Repent," might come equally well from the mouth of a teacher who expected the continuance of the world-order. The same is true of the preaching of the

[1] See especially *vv.* 26, 29–31. [2] *v.* 25.

Baptist. There the apocalyptic motive is quite clear, but the contents of his ethical teaching are commonplace, " be charitable," " do your duty in your state of life."

Once more, there is of course much that is eschatological in the wider, ambiguous sense, already referred to, e.g., sayings such as " Lay not up for yourselves treasure upon earth," the ethical injunctions based on the need of watchfulness, the parables of the Talents and the Pounds. These are quite compatible with a long perspective for the race ; they need only imply that the individual has not here an abiding city, and that some day he must give an account for his actions. And what is required in most of these cases is the conscientious performance of the ordinary duties of life as it is, not some special behaviour dictated by the needs of a unique situation.

It is, however, from the Sermon on the Mount that the examples of *Interimsethik* are usually drawn.[1] Here we are met with a somewhat curious feature. It is true that there are certain references to the eschatological motive ; it appears in the Beatitudes ; it is assumed that the disciples wish to enter into the Kingdom ; and we hear of the thought of reward and punishment " in that day." But nowhere is there any stress laid on the shortness of the time. Jesus Himself never suggests that the basis of His startling commands or of His reinterpretation of the old law is to be found in the immediate passing away of the world, and the consequent elimination of the ordinary responsibilities of life. He gives no hint that the turning of the other cheek is a principle applicable only to a passing temporary crisis. This supposed motive is not stated where we might most expect to find it. He does not say " Take no thought for the morrow, for no morrow with earthly needs and responsibilities will ever come " ; nor does He say " Give away your money, or

[1] Schweitzer, *The Quest*, p. 352.

your coat, because you will have no further use for them." In the same way in a different context, He does not suggest, as He might well have done on the eschatological theory, that the question of paying tribute to Caesar has lost its importance, since all earthly kingdoms are shortly to vanish away.

The conclusion which follows is interesting. Where the eschatological motive, with its stress on the shortness of the time, is prominent, the contents of the teaching are commonplace, and in no way affected by this idea. On the other hand, where the contents of the teaching might be regarded as determined by the eschatological outlook the eschatological motive is conspicuously absent. Never do we find both the motive and the contents avowedly eschatological, as they are in 1 Corinthians vii. And surely, if the teaching of Jesus were essentially an *Interimsethik*, we should expect to find at least two or three quite unambiguous examples in which the contents and the motive were brought together.

It will, however, be replied that whether the eschatological motive is clearly stated or not, the contents of the teaching do, in fact, imply quite unmistakably that the ordinary conditions of life are regarded as no longer holding good. Johannes Weiss [1] has, of course, expanded this view at some length, and he has been followed by Schweitzer and others. It is urged that only on this supposition can we explain Christ's attitude towards wealth, family and social life, His commands to give to all, to resist not evil, to forgive enemies, together with the ignoring of political and aesthetic interests. The ulterior effects of the conduct He requires may be put aside ; the teaching is not meant for men living under normal conditions. It is for a temporary crisis, where,

[1] *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes* (2nd edition) : see especially pp. 134–154.

as in war, the considerations which hold good in ordinary life are suspended.[1] The supreme need is that the disciple, by obedience to these otherwise extravagant and impossible demands, shall secure his place in the coming Kingdom. Compared with this, nothing else now counts, and here is the sole motive for obedience. According to Weiss, just as in the case of Jesus Himself, His readiness to love His enemies was mainly a proof of His detachment from the world, so the commands to the disciples to do the same are addressed to men who have here no abiding city, but seek the Kingdom of God.[2] "We are to do good to those who hate us, not so much in order to help them, but much more in order to prove that we ourselves are free from enmity and selfishness. Certainly prayer for enemies may benefit them, but in the foreground stands simply care for our own soul, which shows by such prayers that it bears a charm against hatred and bitterness."[3] So with regard to the command to resist not evil, "there is no suggestion that the enemy is to be shamed and reformed by patient long-suffering; that idea is quite alien. The whole stress lies on the readiness to suffer wrong." It is true that he admits[4] that at other times Jesus does speak more as a preacher and reformer than as the herald of the Kingdom, and that He sometimes attempts to improve and help the world, as though it might be expected to continue. But with regard to this admission, as with regard to all others which he is forced to make of the existence of other moods in the thought of Jesus, he urges that it does not represent His real mind. This is to be found rather in despair of the world and in an insistent constraining of the individual to secure his own salvation while he may.

It has, of course, often been urged (e.g., by Lecky) against Christian philanthropy as actually practised, that it is utilised simply and solely for the giver's own spiritual benefit;

[1] P. 139. [2] P. 149. [3] P. 150. [4] P. 137.

but it is surprising to find the claim that this represents the mind of Christ. Love, patience, and forgiveness become simply an enlightened form of selfishness. It happens to be, as it were, one of the rules of the game for saving one's soul that these things must be done ; they are commanded, not because they are good in themselves, or because they make the world a better place to live in, but because they represent the escape-ladder by which the individual may save himself from the impending conflagration.

Can it be seriously urged that this represents the teaching of Christ ? Reward is prominent in the Parable of the Sheep and Goats, but it comes as a complete surprise to the recipients, who have performed their acts of love simply from the inner promptings of their heart, not in order to secure their salvation before the brief time of trial is ended. So in the parables of the Pounds and Talents the final recompense is an *ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι* for duty done for duty's sake. The law that only in losing life do we find it excludes the idea that good things can be done consciously and primarily from an enlightened selfishness. The motive for acts of love is " for my sake and the Gospel's." Or again, in the Sermon on the Mount itself, the central motive is the desire to become perfect, to be true children of the Heavenly Father. It may be said that this is only another way of describing entrance into the Kingdom, since it is the sons of God, the perfect, who alone will share in it. True, but in this case we are a long way from an apocalyptic view of the Kingdom. It has become something inward and spiritual, a state of character and a relationship to God, which is quite independent of outward conditions and miraculous manifestations of the divine sovereignty. The reward is to be, not to have.

It is further implied by Christ that the object of the Christian's acts of love is to make the world better. For that is

clearly the purpose of the Father to Whom he is to be like ; He wills the happiness of His creatures here and now, making His sun to shine on them, feeding them and caring for their present needs. The characteristic description of Christ Himself is that He had compassion on the multitudes ; He wished to make them happier, and He certainly commanded His followers to love and forgive their enemies because such conduct was better for the enemies,[1] and made the world a better place to live in. Nowhere does He share the despair of the world, and of the possibility of saving the mass of mankind, which is an integral element of apocalyptic teaching ; and in the command to pray for one's oppressors He sets Himself in direct opposition to the eschatological temper which gloated over their coming destruction. There is, in fact, nothing in this class of sayings which can be regarded as essentially eschatological.

Nor, again, do the hard sayings which deal with family ties or riches demand such an interpretation, though they might perhaps admit it. They may well be eschatological only in the wider sense, as setting up a new standard of values and putting worldly interests and ties in their proper relation to the spiritual and eternal. Taking the teaching as a whole, there is nothing to show that Christ intended to eliminate these subordinate interests altogether, or implied their immediate disappearance. As we have already pointed out, there is no hint that the forsaking of family or the hating of father is based on the view that there will be no further call for family ties. When the young ruler is bidden to sell all that he has, he is not told that the reason is that in a few

[1] See Matt. xviii. 15, "thou hast gained thy brother." As Schweitzer (*o.c.* p. 369 n. 1) defends the authenticity of the passage, the eschatologists can hardly object to our appeal to it. In the remarkable section on forgiveness in the *Testaments of the xii. Patriarchs* (Gad vi.), Dr. Charles finds the object of forgiveness, both there and in the Gospel parallels, to be "the restoring of the offender to communion with us."

weeks his riches will in any case be useless. Indeed, such an idea waters down the demand for self-sacrifice. It is not difficult for one under sentence of death to be very generous in the disposal of his property. A command such as " let the dead bury their dead," or a warning such as that given to those who look back after putting their hand to the plough, is not referred to any temporary necessity, but is the vivid expression of principles applicable to the world as we know it. It may be old-fashioned, but I venture to submit that the true key to the paradoxes of the Gospel is to be found in the one-sided emphasis and the bold vividness of metaphor which are characteristic of oriental forms of speech.

To sum up : we have said nothing of the considerable mass of teaching, found especially in the Lucan parables, which is quite clearly non-eschatological, but have confined our attention to the typical passages which are claimed as representing an *Interimsethik*. We have tried to show that the whole theory misconceives the sphere of ethical conduct. The formation of character is not something which can be worked out in the abstract, but takes place within the limits and under the conditions of God-given relationships and responsibilities. To eliminate these by supposing that the world is to disappear immediately would be to alter the whole problem of ethics, and to introduce a wrong factor, which would vitiate any teaching based on it. We have no right to label such teaching as absolute and of universal validity.

Further, there is no real evidence in the Gospels for the theory in question. Where the eschatological motive is emphasised, the contents of the teaching are colourless ; where, on the other hand, the teaching is paradoxical, and is supposed to be determined by the eschatological standpoint, that standpoint is in fact in no way prominent in

the sayings themselves, but has to be read into them from other passages.

Lastly, the theory gives a low and unworthy colouring to the teaching of Jesus, since it represents Him as laying the whole stress on the self-centred desire of the individual for his own salvation, and as caring little or nothing for the effect of good actions on others and the world as a whole. We cannot indeed exclude from ethics the thought of reward, but it is psychologically false to regard it as the primary and consciously-realised motive of the life of self-sacrifice. If for no other reason, we should be bound to reject the *Interimsethik* theory on account of its essential selfishness, and we may fairly appeal to the impression made by the life and teaching of Jesus as a whole as a proof that self-interest, however enlightened and far-seeing, is not the true expression of His inmost mind.

No one will deny that there is much in the teaching of Jesus which is neither easily understood nor lightly put into practice. But we do not make such passages more intelligible by referring them to doubtful motives which are not expressed in the context, nor shall we encourage mankind to apply them to life as we know it by basing them on an admittedly mistaken view of the world and its future.

C. W. Emmet.

ST. PAUL AND THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.

VI. St. Paul and the Central Conceptions of the Mystery-Religions.

In the light of the evidence we have tried to exhibit in the preceding articles, it is not difficult to make a rough statement of the chief aims of the Mystery-Religions. They may be said to offer salvation (*σωτηρία*) to those who have

been duly initiated. And salvation means primarily deliverance from the tyranny of an omnipotent Fate, which may crush a human life at any moment. Death, with its unknown terrors, will be Fate's most appalling visitation. Hence the element prized above all others in *σωτηρία* is the assurance of a life which death cannot quench, a victorious immortality. This boon is reached by the process of regeneration (*ἀναγεννᾶσθαι* : *παλιγγενεσία*). A genuinely Divine life is imparted to the initiate in a transformation of essence, which in many, if not in all, instances is conceived more or less physically, although occasionally, at least, a psychical element is quite manifest. The full significance of the process becomes clear from its being frequently described as deification (*θεωθῆναι*, *ἀποθεωθῆναι*). And it seems always to depend on some kind of contact with Deity. In order to reach a standpoint from which a comparison with St. Paul's conceptions can be profitably made, we must examine with some care the most prominent notions of communion with the god, through which, for the Mystery-Religions, the process of regeneration or deification becomes possible.

The first thing that strikes us about these notions is that they reflect the various phases of primitive belief which emerge in the Mystery-cults, from the crudest up to those which have become spiritualised in the course of a gradual development. We touch a very ancient stratum of thought in the idea that communion with a deity can be gained through partaking of him. This conception is found in early Egyptian texts, and seems to be involved in the rites which circled round the mystic figure of Dionysus-Zagreus, in which the bull, representing the god himself, is torn asunder and devoured. His life passes into his votaries.[1] The more

[1] See Dieterich, *Eine Mithras-liturgie*[2], pp. 105, 106 ; Rohde, *Psyche* [3], II. pp. 15, 117, 118. The scholion on Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* I. p. 433, qu. by Dieterich, is specially significant.

refined form of this idea, which meets us in the usage of sacramental meals, must be discussed in a later article in connexion with Paul's view of the Lord's Supper. Less crass in its associations, but perhaps scarcely less corporeal in its implications is that contact with deity described in Greek religion as *ἐνθουσιασμός*. This condition was induced by all manner of sensuous stimuli. It might mean the entrance of the god into the human personality as it was. A remarkable instance, belonging somewhat incongruously to an elevated plane of mysticism, occurs in a prayer to Hermes : [1] " Come to me, O Lord Hermes, *ὡς τὰ βρέφη εἰς τὰς κοιλίας τῶν γυναικῶν*." Here the corporeal background is evident enough. Closely akin, although nearer the sphere of the spiritual, is the prayer of the Mithras-Liturgy : " that I may be initiated and that the holy spirit may blow within me." [2] But *ἐνθουσιασμός* was often virtually synonymous with *ἔκστασις*. Here the soul is regarded as leaving the body and becoming one with the deity. In many mystic cults, such as that of Dionysus and the Great Mother, a state of wild delirium is produced, and the subject of it becomes conscious of impressions and powers completely alien to his normal experience.[3] As Proclus expresses it : " Going out of themselves, they are wholly established with the gods and possessed by them." [4] But ecstasy is found in a large variety of phases. It has no necessary connexion with frenzy. The ascent of the soul into the sphere of the Divine is often conceived of, apart from all sensuous excitements. We have seen, e.g., how the condition of *γνῶσις*, or the vision of deity, transforms the soul, which has left

[1] Qu. by Dieterich from Kenyon, Greek Papp., 1893, p. 116.

[2] *Mithras-liturgie*[2], 4. 14.

[3] Cf. Plato, *Ion*, 534 B : *ἔνθεός τε γίγνεται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς οὐκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἔνεστιν*.

[4] On *Republ.*, p. 59, 19. See Rohde's important discussion, *Psyche*[3], II. pp. 18–21.

behind the hampering associations of the body, into *οὐσία*, the Divine essence. The astral mysticism, so dear to Posidonius, employs the method of absorbing contemplation. By its means, communion with the divinity is possible of attainment. Belonging to the same sphere of more "spiritual" modes of achieving union with the god is that described in the Hermetic literature, in which external ritual plays a very subordinate part. There the communication of a revelation produces the mysterious change. The revelation regenerates. The soul is enabled to pass upwards into the Divine abode, and to become one with deity as having received the 10 powers (*δυνάμεις*) of God. A close kinship may be traced between this representation and the *ἀπαθανατισμός* or process of deification which appears in the Mithras-Liturgy. Only, that is accompanied by a variety of ritual postures and gestures. A still more spiritual foundation for the *unio mystica* is traceable in that pantheistic Element-mysticism, resulting partly from ancient physico-religious speculations, partly from Pythagorean and Stoic modifications of these, which teaches that men reach the vision of God which deifies by means of the "elements" in them, whose first principles exist in the Deity.[1] Nothing could more strikingly reveal the continuity of mystic thought than a comparison of this element-mysticism with the words of Ruysbroek: "All men who are exalted above their creatureliness into a contemplative life are one with this Divine glory —yea, *are* that glory, and they see and feel and find in themselves, by means of this Divine light, that they are the same Ground as to their uncreated nature . . . Wherefore contemplative men should rise above reason and distinction . . . and gaze perpetually by the aid of their inborn light, and so they become transformed, and one with the same light by means of which they see, and which they are."[2]

[1] See Dieterich, *Abraxas*, pp. 58, 59.

[2] Qu. by Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 189.

Some further ideas of a more or less primitive character must be noted. Traces exist in obscure mystical formulæ of the conception of union with the god under the guise of the marriage relationship. The terms employed disclose the grossly sensuous nature of the early forms of the notion.[1] While hints of a survival of the ceremonial of the ἱερὸς γάμος appear here and there, it is probable that fairly early the conception came to be little more than a metaphor. The symbol was one which must inevitably take its place in all mystical self-expression.[2] In our last article it was pointed out that regeneration in the Mithras-Liturgy is compared to dying: "Born again I depart, being exalted [i.e., into the Divine sphere), and having been exalted I die: born through that birth which gives life, dissolved into death, I go the way which thou hast appointed" (14. 26 ff.). Brückner remarks that this prayer might just as appropriately come from the lips of a worshipper of Attis or of Serapis.[3] For one of the most arresting aspects of the idea of regeneration in the Mystery-Religions is that which is associated with the death and restoration to life of a Divine Personage, a process through which, by a mystic sympathy, the initiate obtains the guarantee of undying life for himself. It is of supreme importance for our purpose to notice that the central deities in this sphere of religion, Osiris (-Serapis), Attis, and perhaps we might venture to say, Dionysus, are intimately connected with the growth and decay of vegetation. Isis and Cybele are each represented as mourning her beloved, just as Demeter at Eleusis mourns for her daughter Kore,

[1] E.g., the description of the sacred snake (associated with the Dionysus-Sabazius mysticism) as ὁ διὰ κόλπου θεός. The mystic drama corresponded to the designation. See Dieterich, *Mithras-liturgie*[2], pp. 123, 124.

[2] Cf. E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 496: "The mystic for whom intimate and personal communion has been the mode under which he best apprehended Reality, speaks of the consummation of this communion, its perfect and permanent form, as the *Spiritual Marriage* of the soul with God."

[3] *Der sterbende und auferstehende Gottheiland*, p. 11.

with whom at a later period Dionysus (Iacchus) was brought into close affinity. The real significance of the myths becomes clear when it is observed that the festivals of these deities were held either in early spring, when the blackness of winter began to give place to a luxuriant life, or in autumn, after the fruits of the earth had been gathered in, and when the corn-seed (e.g., in Egypt) was buried in the soil. In the case both of Attis and Osiris the mourning and the rejoicing were celebrated at the same festival. The ancient formula of the Attis-ritual, quoted in our third article, reveals the significance for the initiates of the god's restoration to life: "Be of good cheer, initiates, the god has been saved: thus for you also shall there be salvation from your troubles." It is difficult to determine on what actual basis the votaries of Attis were made sure of their immortality. Another early formula, quoted as above, suggests a sacred meal in which the participant entered into communion with the living deity. But this is no more than hypothesis.[1] We have also seen that in the Osiris-cult, the worshipper, as becoming one with the god who lives, must share eternally in his divine life. Of the mystic ritual by which this process was symbolised we know little beyond some obscure indications which may be gathered from Apuleius.

Some remarkable hints, however, have been handed down to us of a death issuing in life through which the initiated have to pass. These have often been exaggerated, and treated as full-fledged doctrines. But we must beware of going beyond our data. The clearest evidence of the conception is found in Apuleius' description of the initiation of Lucius into the Isis-Mysteries, which was succeeded after an interval by that into the rites of Osiris. There the initiation is described by the high priest as "the symbol of a

[1] Dieterich makes assertions on this question which go beyond the data, e.g., *Mithras-liturgie*[2], p. 174.

voluntary death" (*voluntariae mortis*) which is followed by a new birth (*quodam modo renatos*). Probably this explains Lucius' narrative of what befel him in the innermost shrine: "I penetrated to the boundaries of death." How much of a genuinely religious experience was involved, and what precisely it meant, it is hard to determine. Of course, there was an impressive sensuous ritual. Perhaps we ought to interpret in the light of this passage the designation by Firmicus Maternus of an initiate of Attis as *moriturus*, "about to die." And Dieterich would assign to the same group of ideas a reference of Proclus, in his work on the theology of Plato, to "priests who in the most mysterious of all initiations give orders to bury the body as far up as the head." Dieterich regards this as a symbolic burial, and believes it to belong to Dionysiac-Orphic ritual.[1] There is a further description by Sallustius, in his treatise *Concerning the gods and the world*, of Attis-initiates as "cut off from the further progress of their natural life." With this scanty evidence must be grouped the passage from the Mithras-Liturgy quoted above. The extract which Reitzenstein makes from *Corp. Hermet.* xiii. 3, and supports from the visions of Zosimus, as representing regeneration as an experience of death and burial, apart altogether from its relevance, depends far too much upon conjectural emendation to be used as valid testimony.[2] One or two survivals of mystic ritual seem to bear upon the conception before us. Sallustius speaks of those newly initiated into the Attis-mysteries as receiving the nourishment of milk, "as born anew" (ὥσπερ ἀναγεννωμένων). With this Dieterich would compare the Dionysiac-Orphic formula found in Southern Italy: "a kid I lighted upon the milk," ἔριφος denoting the "newly-born" in the mystic sense.[3] But the formula is so obscure

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 163. [2] See *Poimandres*, pp. 368–370.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

that it is precarious to make it the basis of an argument. Nor is it legitimate to adduce the barbarous ceremony of the *taurobolium*, the bath of bull's blood, associated with the ritual of the Great Mother, in which the descent into the pit seems to have symbolised the burial of the old life, and the votary, coming up from his bloody baptism, was feasted as a god, and described as "born again for eternity." For Cumont has shown that this was a comparatively late development of that cult.[1]

We have dwelt on these meagre data because they have been made the foundation of extraordinarily bold assertions. Thus Loisy, e.g., gives the following summary of St. Paul's conception of Jesus Christ: "He was a saviour-god, after the manner of an Osiris, an Attis, a Mithra. Like them, he belonged by his origin to the celestial world; like them, he had made his appearance on the earth: like them, he had accomplished a work of universal redemption, efficacious and typical: like Adonis, Osiris, and Attis he had died a violent death, and like them he had been restored to life; like them, he had prefigured in his lot that of the human beings who should take part in his worship, and commemorate his mystic enterprise: like them, he had predestined, prepared, and assured the salvation of those who became partners in his passion."[2] This paragraph implies that Paul's whole conception of salvation through Christ is directly parallel to the central ideas of the Mystery-Religions. Before we examine the question more closely, we would suggest as a preliminary caution that nothing is more misleading than an inaccurate use of terminology.[3] Paul never speaks of Jesus as a "sa-

[1] *Les Religions Orientales*, pp. 98–105.

[2] *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1911, p. 51. Cf. Brückner, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 36; Dieterich, *op. cit.*, p. 176 ff.; Lake, *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, pp. 233, 234.

[3] "We may speak of 'the vespers of Isis' or of a 'Last Supper of Mithra and his companions,' but only in the sense in which one talks of . . . 'the socialism of Diocletian.' . . . A word is not a demonstration" (Cumont,

viour-god." For him there is one God, "the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." In Jesus the redeeming love of God is brought near to men (Gal. ii. 20 ; iv. 4, 5). Nor is it legitimate to call Osiris or Attis "saviour-gods" in the sense in which "Saviour" was applied by Paul to Jesus. Paul knew Jesus as an historical Person who, as the result of his boundless devotion to the good of his brethren, suffered a shameful death, from which he did not flinch, in loyalty to his Father's purpose, so that this death became to men the very pledge of the unspeakable love of God and the forgiveness of sins. Osiris and Attis were originally mythological personifications of the processes of vegetation. The legends of their deaths have nothing to do with a purpose of redemption. There is no parallel between the New Testament story of the Incarnation, which meant so much for Paul, and the myths which recount their history. It is a caricature to compare the story of the murder of Osiris or the self-destruction of Attis with the self-sacrificing death of Jesus. Nor is any real comparison possible between the New Testament view of the resurrection of Jesus and the restoration to life of these mythical divine personages. In the one case, the disciples of Jesus were raised from despair to a victorious joy, a few days after the crucifixion which had blighted all their hopes, by an experience of their risen Lord which, however much it may elude attempts at explanation, can never be resolved into a subjective fancy of Peter's, gradually kindling the hearts of his companions, and finally constituting the basis of the Christian Church. The world-transforming effect demands a more elemental cause. And such a cause alone is congruous with the Jesus of the Gospels. The coming to life of Osiris and Attis is embodied in grotesque myths, and these become the centre of an artificial ritual,

op. cit., p. xiii.). See also some forcible paragraphs in Schweitzer, *Gesch. d. Paulin. Forschung*, pp. 151, 152.

through which there is conveyed to their votaries the hope of immortality. There is no true analogy, moreover, between the New Testament idea of a fellowship in the sufferings of Christ, and that ritual sympathy with the goddesses who mourned the loss of Osiris and Attis or with the woes of these deified beings themselves. In the former, self-sacrificing devotion which shrinks from no hardship is the core of the experience. The latter is the result of sensuous impressions more or less artificially produced. Hence a foundation is lacking for Loisy's conclusion: "These are analogous conceptions, dreams of one family, built on the same theme with similar imagery." [1]

But we must now attempt to discover what relationship, if any, exists between Paul's standpoint and the central Mystery-doctrine of regeneration (involving salvation, or deification) through communion with deity. To begin with, we are not at liberty to identify their respective conceptions of salvation. For the Mystery-Religions *σωτηρία* has primarily in view the pressure of those burdens (such as fate, necessity, etc.) which are involved in the limitations of earthly life, and especially the dark shadow of death. In the Osiris-cult, at least, the immortal life beyond the grave is pictured in the precise form of the bodily life,[2] as was that of Osiris himself. What the conception of the eternal future meant for the Cybele-Attis cult it is impossible to determine. The deification which was the goal in the Hermetic doctrine seems certainly to have been clothed in a more spiritual guise. But it is important to note that *σωτηρία* was invariably assured "by the exact performance of sacred ceremonies." [3] Hence, inevitably, it was conceived as a *character indelibilis*.[4] Above all, it did not necessarily involve a new

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 52. [2] See, e.g., Brückner, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
[3] Cumont, *op. cit.*, p. xxii.
[4] Cf. Anrich, *Das antike Mysterienwesen*, p. 54.

moral ideal. "We have no reason to think," says Professor Percy Gardner, "that those who claimed salvation through Isis or Mithras were much better than their neighbours. They felt secure of the help of their patron-deity in the affairs of life and in the future world; but they did not therefore live at a higher level." [1]

Paul's conception of σωτηρία is many-sided. Like all his regulative ideas it has direct connexions with the Old Testament, and denotes that Messianic salvation which is the consummation of God's redeeming purpose for His people. Again and again in the LXX. σωτηρία is the translation of יְשׁוּעָה or תְּשׁוּעָה, which was a current Messianic idea. The term includes deliverance both from material and spiritual ills. In Paul, along with its cognate verb σώζω (which he uses far more frequently than the noun), it is always spiritual,[2] and associated with the good news of God in Christ. But as the Apostle made no distinction between physical and spiritual in his conception of death as the consequence of sin, σωτηρία involves immortal life in the profoundest sense of the phrase, an ethical quite as distinctly as a metaphysical magnitude, a sharing in the Divine Life which for him is primarily love and holiness. The best illustration of the meaning of the conception for Paul occurs in Romans v. 8–10: "God proves his own love toward us because while we were still sinners Christ died for us. Much more, therefore, having been justified now by his blood, we shall be saved from the wrath [the final reaction of the Divine nature against sin] through him. For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, having been reconciled, we shall be saved by his life." The atmosphere of σωτηρία in Paul is the love of God revealed to

[1] *Religious Experience of St. Paul*, p. 87.

[2] Probably Phil. i. 19 means acquittal for Paul in his trial, but he looks upon that also as ultimately the working of God.

men in the Cross of Jesus Christ. Everything in it goes back to that. And this background reveals the essential difference between it and the *σωτηρία* of the Mystery-Religions. Further, *σωτηρία*, in Paul's usage, is, from the very nature of the case, charged with moral implications. The mercy of God in Christ lays claims upon men. They are under obligations (*ὀφειλέται*) "not to live according to the flesh" (Romans viii. 12). "The love of Christ constrains us . . . that they who live should live no longer to themselves, but to him who died for them and was raised" (2 Cor. v. 14, 15). Here again we move among a different group of ideas from those of the Mystery-Religions. We are far from denying any moral influence to initiation. There is some evidence at least to the contrary. But there was no necessary connexion between the mystical experiences and a changed ethical standard. An additional point must be emphasised. In Romans i. 16 Paul declares that his Gospel, the good news of God's forgiveness in Christ the crucified, is "the power of God resulting in salvation for every one that believes." Salvation is given to faith. And faith for Paul means personal surrender to the "Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me" (Gal. ii. 20).

How, then, does Paul conceive this salvation to be mediated to the believer? His utterance in Romans v. 5 is decisive: "Our hope [i.e., of the final salvation, which he has described as *ἡ δόξα τ. θεοῦ*] cannot put us to shame, because the love of God has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us." Another way of expressing the same fact occurs in Romans viii. 16: "The Spirit himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God." The gift of the Spirit is the Divine response to faith."[1]

[1] Cf. Weinel, *Biblische Theologie d. N. T.*, p. 318: "We can see clearly that this doctrine of the Spirit and of Christ in the believer is not mere

Here we are brought into the heart of Paul's conception of the New Life. For him, as for the Mystery-Religions, regeneration is intimately associated with communion with the Divine. He does not happen to use the term ἀναγεννᾶσθαι (or cognates). But there is scarcely even a difference of metaphor in his affirmation : " If any one is in Christ, he is a new creation (καινὴ κτίσις) : old things have passed away, behold, new things have come into being " (2 Cor. v. 17 : similarly, Gal. vi. 15). But before we briefly look at Paul's idea of communion with Christ, it must be noted that that, like everything else in the sphere of salvation, stands out against the background of the Cross. The words we have just quoted rest on the judgment that " one died for all " (ver. 14). And the very next statement declares : " Now all this comes from God who reconciled us to Himself through Christ " (ver. 18). So that we dare not isolate the thought of communion with Christ in Paul from the demonstration of the Divine Love in the Crucified. The significance of the living Lord for the Apostle lies in the fact that this is He who loved men and gave Himself for them. Dr. Denney is in strict accord with Paul's standpoint when he says that for him, Christianity " consists, first and last, of experiences generated in the believer by the Cross. . . . Whatever it may be proper to say of the Holy Spirit, or of union to Christ, or incorporation in Him, must be said on the basis of such experiences and within their limits." [1] That consideration discloses at a glance the impassable cleft between Paul and the Mystery-Religions in their central experiences.

It is almost needless to say that Paul's most characteristic description of the believer's relation to Christ is ἐν Χριστῷ εἶναι. It is really only a variation of expression when he

theory, not an imitation of Mystery-doctrine, but inmost personal experience metaphysically interpreted after the manner of his time."

[1] Expositor, vi. 4, pp. 310, 311

speaks of *Χριστὸς ἐν ἡμῖν*. And often a distinction can scarcely be drawn between this and *τὸ πνεῦμα ἐν ἡμῖν*. The phrase is sufficiently indefinite to admit of a large freedom of interpretation. Not to speak of the purely sensuous explanation of Dieterich,[1] or Heitmüller's elusive designation of the relationship as "physical-hyperphysical,"[2] it seems to us precarious to go even as far as Deissmann does in emphasising the "local" element in the conception.[3] The Apostle is surely using that language dear to mystics of all ages, which transcends spatial categories. The key to the meaning of the phrase is found in some of Paul's most famous utterances, e.g., Galatians ii. 20: "No longer do I live, but Christ lives in me: as for the life I now live in the flesh, I live by faith, faith in the Son of God who loved me"; and Philippians iii. 8 f.: "Christ Jesus my Lord, for whom I suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but refuse that I may win Christ and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own, that which is from the law, but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is from God on the ground of faith." These passages, and many others which might be adduced, make it clear that Faith, in Paul's far-reaching sense of a personal surrender of the life, constitutes the basis of this unspeakably intimate relation of the soul to Christ.[4] There is no conception which can be compared with this in the Mystery-Religions.[5] Moreover, it reminds us of the thoroughly ethical character of Paul's mysticism. This is no vague absorption in the

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 109, 110.

[2] *Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus*, p. 20.

[3] "Dwelling in a pneuma-element which may be compared to the air" (*Die neutestamentliche Formel "in Christo Jesu,"* p. 98.)

[4] So also Pfleiderer, in the *first* ed. of his *Paulinism*, E. Tr. I. p. 199. In our judgment, Pfleiderer shows a much surer insight into Paul's thought in this early work (1877) than in any of his later writings.

[5] Reitzenstein's brief note on the Hellenistic conception of *πίστις* (*H. M. R.*, p. 85) does little more than reveal its meagreness.

supra-sensible Reality. It is a personal relationship established by adoring trust in and devotion to Him in whom Paul has reached the possibility of a life which shall be "right" with God. The passage we have just quoted from Philippians is a striking testimony to that aspect of his religion.[1]

We do not require to dwell on the fact, often emphasised, that Paul's is a Christ-mysticism rather than a God-mysticism. The distinction must count for little in view of a statement like Colossians iii. 3: "Your life is hid with Christ in God." Of more importance is the relation of the Spirit to this experience. As we have seen, the Apostle seems here and there at least to use Christ and the Spirit synonymously. Most notable is 2 Corinthians iii. 17: "Now the Lord is the Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." Perhaps the most direct application of this conception to our subject is 1 Corinthians vi. 17: "He that is joined (κολλώμενος) to the Lord is one spirit." But under this aspect also, the moral implications of the mystic fellowship are made prominent: the "life" and "power" which are the tokens of the Spirit's presence are essentially ethical. Possession of the Spirit means the free, unhampered relation of the child to the Father, e.g., Romans viii. 15; Galatians iv. 6; 2 Corinthians iii. 17. That relationship from its very *raison d'être* forbids any compromise with evil: see the decisive passage, Galatians v. 16–24. In this connexion, Paul lets us see clearly what he means by "life"; e.g., Romans viii. 13: "If ye by the Spirit put to death the deeds of the body (= "works of the flesh," Gal. v. 19), ye shall live." These positions once more reveal the difference of atmosphere between Paul and the Mystery-cults.

[1] But Paul's mysticism means something more than "a relation of ethical harmony," in which Prof. Pringle-Pattison finds the real truth of the mystical experience (Art. *Mysticism*, Encyc. Brit. ed. 9).

It is in the light of them that we must briefly examine his statements regarding death and resurrection with Christ, on which so much stress has been laid by those who find in Paul the direct influence of Mystery-conceptions. The passages usually selected to establish this influence are those which speak of "being baptized into the death of Christ," or, "being buried with him in baptism." There are, however, only two which are really relevant, Romans vi. 3, 4, and Colossians ii. 12. We must consider these, along with 1 Corinthians xii. 13, and Galatians iii. 27, which are cognate to them, in our next article, on Baptism in Paul and the Mystery-Religions. But the large majority of Paul's utterances concerning death with Christ have no reference whatever to baptism. Thoroughly typical is Galatians ii. 19: "I through the law died to the law that I might live to God. I have been crucified with Christ." The same conception appears in Romans vii. 4: "Ye also were made dead to the law through the body of Christ." So also Romans vi. 6: "Knowing this, that our old man was crucified with him that the body of sin might be done away, that so we should no longer be in bondage to sin"; [1] and Galatians vi. 14: "God forbid that I should glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which (or, whom) the world has been crucified unto me, and I unto the world." The thought occurs with different expression in Colossians i. 21, 22: "You, being in time past alienated and enemies in your mind in your evil works yet now hath he reconciled in the body of his flesh through death, to present you holy and without blemish." Important also is Colossians ii. 20: "If ye died with Christ from the elements (στοιχεῖα) of the world, why, as though living in the world, do ye subject yourselves to ordinances?" We do not, of course, deny the connexion between

[1] This passage is quite independent of the reference to baptism, which comes in earlier in the chapter.

this passage and the reference to baptism in ii. 12. But its true explanation is found in ii. 14, 15 : " Having blotted out the bond written in ordinances that was against us . . . and he hath taken it out of the way, nailing it to the cross, having despoiled (or, stripped off himself) the principalities and the powers." Whatever be the significance for Paul of baptism, the conspectus of passages before us plainly shows that when he speaks of the believer as " dying with Christ," he has the quite definite idea of identification with the relation toward sin of the crucified Redeemer, the identification which he sums up in the memorable words of Philippians iii. 10, *συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ*. There is not a suggestion of baptism in the whole context of the passage. The correlative to this idea is, of course, living with Christ, rising with Christ, or (as in Philippians iii. 10), " knowing the power of his resurrection."

Now, so far as we can judge, the central Pauline conception which we have been considering has no real equivalent in the Mystery-Religions. Even if we were bold enough to assert, with some scholars, on the basis of the very meagre extant evidence, that the initiates in the mystic cults regarded themselves as having died with the Divine personages whose restoration to life they celebrated, it is perfectly obvious that the death of which Paul speaks is something wholly different. It is exclusively a death to sin, and its correlative is a life to holiness in the most ethical sense conceivable. The ceremonial dedication to a deity whose ritual, based on the revival of life in the world of nature, suggests the soul-kindling prospect of a life beyond the grave, could very naturally be described as a dying to the ignorant past, and the entrance on a new life of hope. But it requires an unusually daring imagination to fill these terms in the Mystery-cults with the profound ethical content which they held for St. Paul. We admit a certain kinship in the imagery, but

this imagery has been the common property of mystics and philosophers and preachers throughout the ages.

H. A. A. KENNEDY.

A CONSIDERATION OF THE HISTORY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL.[1]

THE main difference between the religions of Asia and of Europe appears to be that whereas those of the West are abandoned by their votaries for something which satisfies their adherents better, those of the East are not completely deserted, but something further is evolved out of them. Our ancestors, even though they retained many superstitions, at least professedly forsook their old beliefs when they accepted Christianity; but in India Brahminism was the parent of Buddhism, in Persia Zoroastrianism was the outcome of an older faith, the ancient religion of the Hebrews gave birth to Judaism, Judaism to Christianity, Judaism, Oriental Christianity and the faiths of early Arabia to Mohammedanism. It is not the religion of a Western nation which survives in Christianity, but rather its philosophy, as in the case of Hellas, its law in that of Rome, its political ideas as among the Teutonic races. Herein seems to be the fundamental difference between East and West. In the one religion is everything, in the other its influence has been subordinated to or shared by other interests. Our Christianity has hitherto been exempted from this rule, and has proved itself capable of infinite development, sometimes legitimate, at others deplorable; but this, to my mind, tends to prove its inherently oriental character.

But my purpose is not to dwell on this point, but to submit to the consideration of the Congress the importance of

[1] A paper read at the Fourth Congress of the History of Religions at Leiden.

investigating the character of the religion of the Hebrews which preceded that faith which is known to us as Judaism.

Thanks to the critical labours of scholars since the days of Astruc, in which Holland has taken a very prominent part, we are able now to say almost definitely when Judaism began. No one can now seriously maintain that the Law in its present form, which is the basis of Judaism, existed from the days of Moses or that before the captivity the Israelites could be called, as they actually were in popular language, "Jews." This is what the great scholars of the past have triumphantly proved beyond all reasonable doubt; but in so doing, I venture to suggest, they were scarcely able to do full justice to the religious conceptions of the early Israelites. The opposition which encountered them at every step laboured to shew that the present Pentateuch lay at the base and was the clue to all the history of ancient Israel, and in combatting this they emphasised, as I think unduly, the resemblance of the sons of Israel to the surrounding nations and the essentially "pagan" character of their cultus and morality. This tendency was perhaps inevitable. It was in accordance with the spirit of the age to subject everything to the laws of evolution and to trace growth, that of religion included, from a lower to a higher form of life. It was accepted, almost as a canon of criticism, that the religion of an ancient people should be judged by those records which were most to its discredit. And above all things it was deemed necessary to shew the erroneous nature of the old theory that the foundation of the religion of Israel was the Pentateuchal code. Thus consciously or not the enormities of ancient Israel were so exaggerated that in religion, ethics and in general conception of life they were made to appear on even a lower plane than the surrounding nations.

The object of this paper is to plead for a reconsideration

of Israelite history from the establishment of the nation in Palestine to the fall of Samaria in B.C. 721. In so doing I desire to acknowledge in the fullest degree the debt due to the great critics of the nineteenth century. I am one of those who believe that all criticism based on scholarship and a sincere desire for truth is, despite appearances, of inestimable value to religion; and I hold firmly to the hope that we are arriving at a knowledge of the true meaning of the Old and New Testament which will give them a more practical effect on our lives than they have had hitherto. And further, I have on this occasion no desire to appear as an apologist with an *arrière pensée* that I am defending a cause instead of stating my personal opinion on a difficult and intricate subject.

The movement which culminated in the production of our Old Testament as the sacred scriptures of the Jews may be, I think, said to have commenced with the promulgation of the Deuteronomic law. It is seen at its height in the career of those typical Jews, Ezra and Nehemiah, in the fifth century B.C. The ideal was throughout that of the Puritan Judaism which finally found its expression in Talmudic Rabbinism. This, be it always remembered, was only one aspect even of Judaism, and the attention now paid to the subject of eschatology is making it increasingly plain that most of the poetry, imaginative literature and philosophy of the Jews down to the Bar-cochba rebellion lay outside its pale.

Legal Judaism, with its exclusiveness, its particularism and its pedantry, regarded antiquity with no friendly eye. It looked on the past as a gigantic mistake, and attributed all its disasters to the disregard of the legal requirements of a modernised religion. It was still further prejudiced against the Northern Kingdom by the heretical tenets of the Samaritans and their claim to represent the ancient

nation of Israel. Consequently there is manifested in the books of Kings a strong bias against all the kings of Israel, who are contrasted unfavourably with their rivals in Judah.

Fortunately, however, many early records have been preserved either as traditions or in the form of a literature which has otherwise disappeared, and from them I venture to submit to you a few considerations.

The Elohistic literature in the Hexateuch, the greater part of the book of Judges, the north Israelite narratives in the book of Kings, the prophecies of Amos, delivered by a Judaean in the northern kingdom, and of Hosea, and the story of Jonah, which, whatever the date of the book, relates the adventures or visions of an Israelite prophet, are all marked by a liberality of tone towards the Gentiles which is clearly non-Judaic, though found at times in the southern prophets. This would seem to indicate that the particularism of the northern kingdom was much less than that which we are accustomed to connect with post-exilic Judah.

In vividness of description and in the power of delineating character the narrators of events in Northern Israel are simply unequalled in the Bible. It is to me inconceivable that they should have been the invention of Jewish legalisers, for they are redolent of the soil, and at times are scarcely edifying enough to have been composed to point a moral or adorn a tale. The prophecies of Amos and Hosea are arranged with surprising literary skill, and, as critics declare that the insertions relating to Judah are often clumsy and irrelevant, they may be accepted as containing much genuinely ancient work. A literary tradition must therefore have existed in the northern kingdom of considerable antiquity, of which that which the Bible has conserved is probably but a small part of its ripened fruits.

The information which we have concerning the religion of the northern tribes in the Bible undoubtedly comes

through men strongly prejudiced against it. Once Jerusalem was recognised as the lawful national sanctuary all other places of worship began to be regarded as schismatical, and those who conserved the ancient records were doubtless further prejudiced by the close proximity of the hated Samaritans, "the foolish people who dwell in Sichem." But two facts are apparent, the high-place worship was confessedly that of the ancient heroes of the nation, and the calves of Bethel and Dan were erected in honour of Jahveh.

Will you allow me to remind you of a suggestion already made by Professor Kennett, of Cambridge, as to how the problem in regard to these latter should be regarded ?[1] It is a difficult one because it is complicated by the story of the Golden Calf in the Wilderness. The part which Aaron plays in this curious tale is, to my mind at least, sufficient to render it impossible for us to regard it as an idle legend. Aaron is, I confess, to me a very dim and shadowy figure ; but he surely cannot have been invented to account for the post-exilic priesthood, and at the same time be represented as acting so unheroic a part in a very discreditable story. How was it, then, that the making of the "calf" was attributed to Aaron ? I cannot but fancy that it was to justify this form of worship by attributing its origin to an honoured name. You will observe that Jeroboam in 1 Kings uses the very words attributed to Aaron, "These be thy gods (i.e., is thy God), O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt," when he proclaimed a feast to Jahveh. Notice also the hint in 1 Kings that Jeroboam could not get Levites to officiate at Bethel, expanded in 2 Chronicles into a statement that the Levites deserted the northern tribes and settled in Judah. The older commentators were

[1] See the *Journal of Theological Studies*, July, 1905. In adopting Dr. Kennett's suggestions it will be seen that I differ entirely as to his conclusions regarding the historicity of Aaron.

of opinion that the calf-worship in the wilderness was derived from Egypt, but this view is generally abandoned, and it is now commonly agreed that Israel followed the Canaanites in adoring their God under the form of a bull. We must bear in mind that Jeroboam was no innovator, but that his rebellion, promoted by the prophet Ahijah of Shiloh, was in favour of the ancient sanctuaries. Consequently the calf worship must have been in existence before his time, at any rate among the northern tribes, though possibly unknown in Judah. We may, therefore, reasonably conjecture that the narrative in Exodus xxxii. is twofold, and that the story of Aaron making the calf stood alone originally and was used to justify the practice of Israel. The indignation of Moses and the vengeance taken by the Levites on the people was perhaps the explanation given by the southern prophets of the illegality of the worship and its rejection by the authorised priesthood. Be this as it may, I am convinced that in setting up the calf worship at Bethel Jeroboam was not only seeking popularity, but satisfying the religious needs of his subjects, and was persuaded that he was doing special honour to Jahveh. It is true that Hosea denounces the calf worship, but this prophet lived about two hundred and fifty years after Jeroboam.

Time will not allow me to develop this subject as I would fain do, and I must ask your indulgence if I now deal in assertions of my opinion rather than in attempting to demonstrate it.

In the first place I consider that one of the most serious drawbacks to our obtaining a right view of the history of Israel is that we have been led, partly by the exaggerated figures we find in a late book like Chronicles, but mainly by coloured maps shewing Palestine apportioned among the tribes, to imagine that the Israelites were very numerous, whereas a closer study seems to me to shew that there were only a few of them scattered throughout the country. In

the days of Solomon and for about two centuries the Israelites were the dominant race, but their numbers were never large.

Further, I consider that it is highly probable that throughout this period Israel was under the influence of a monotheistic movement traceable to the days of the monarchy and fanatically devoted to Jahveh. The sanguinary civil war under Jehu which annihilated the house of Omri shews that the attempt to introduce the Baal worship of Phœnicia proved the intensity of the devotion to the God of Israel.

In the third place the religion of North Israel was utterly unlike Judaism. Zealous as the people were for Jahveh, they were accustomed to a cheerful and natural worship, and were not distinguished by a savage hatred of other nations. Despite their many failings, many social virtues, as we may see from stories like that of Joseph, were admired and cultivated.

Lastly, in the stories which have been preserved to us the heroes of the northern kingdom were distinguished by a certain rude chivalry and generosity which wins our admiration. Cruel they undoubtedly were, perhaps inevitably, but time after time we meet with, in ever unexpected places, signs that they understood how to act fairly even towards implacable enemies.

My general contention, therefore, is this, that in the Old Testament we have accustomed ourselves to look for a single aspect of Judaism, namely, that which took colour from the Priestly code, and this has caused the study of it to fall into unmerited disrepute. But the severe criticism to which it has been subjected ought at least to remove this prejudice and to render us more alive to the value of the lessons which the ancient story of the people of Jahveh, and especially of Northern Israel, have for our own days. Inadequate as my paper is, may it be regarded as a small tribute to the work which Kuenen sent forth from the University of Leiden.

For as St. Paul ages ago perceived, the Torah and all its fruits, its stiff legalism, its pedantry, its exclusiveness is not the essence of the revelation of the chosen people nor is the average Jew the true representative of the Israelite of the north or of the great prophets and psalmists of the southern kingdom. Chamberlain in his *Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, vigorously Anti-Semite as he is, rises to eloquence when he speaks of the genuine Sephardim as the true representatives of ancient Israel. "It is only when one sees these men and has intercourse with them that one begins to comprehend the significance of Judaism in the history of the world. Beautiful figures, noble heads, dignity in speech and bearing. The type is Semitic in the same sense as that of certain noble Syrians and Arabs. That out of the midst of such people prophets and psalmists should arise—that I understood at the first glance. . . ." And again: "Now whoever wishes to see with his own eyes what a noble race is should send for the poorest of the Sephardim from Salonici or Sarajevo (great wealth is very rare among them, for they are men of stainless honour) . . . and he will perceive the nobility which race bestows." And such we may believe were the great Israelites of whom we read in the book of Kings: that splendid minority which fought so brave a battle against national degeneracy.

Under the circumstances the rise of legalism may have been, and I believe was, necessary and inevitable, but its results were not altogether healthy. Cornhill in his *Einleitung in das Alte Testament* truly says: "It is one of those strange ironies of fate that this legislation, whose aim was to spiritualise as far as possible the religion of Israel, harked back to just the most pagan elements in it: circumcision, dietary laws, etc. . . together with a mystical and mechanical conception of sin—the legislation of P is therefore a reversion to an older stage of religious development which

Prophetism had already surpassed." If this is the case, the legitimate development of the religion of Israel cannot be found in the Judaism which opposed the teaching of the Christ.

F. J. Foakes Jackson.

FURTHER LIGHT ON THE ODES OF SOLOMON.

The difficult problem of the origin of the Odes may be furthered by the following parallels, which would seem to have escaped observation hitherto, but are surely close enough to suggest literary dependence on one side or the other :—

Apoc. Baruch xxi. 23.

23 Reprove therefore the angel of death, and let thy glory appear, and let the might of thy beauty be known, and let Sheol be sealed so that from this time forward it may not receive the dead, and let the treasuries of souls restore those which are enclosed in them.

Odes of Solomon. Ode xxiv. 3–5.

3 And the abysses were opened which had been hidden; and they cried to the Lord like women in travail, 4 and no food was given them because it did not belong to them. 5 And they sealed up the abysses with the seal of the Lord.

Ibid. xli. 7 f.

7 For corruption will take those that belong to it, and life those that belong to it. 8 And the dust will be called, and there will be said to it: "Give back that which is not thine, and raise up all that thou hast kept until its time." [a]

Cf. Isaiah v. 14.

14 Therefore Sheol hath enlarged her desire, and opened her mouth without measure: and their glory and their multitude and their pomp, and he that rejoiceth among them descend into it.

[a] The translations as given above are those of R. H. Charles (*Apoc. of Baruch*, 1896), and Rendel Harris (*Odes of Solomon*, 1910) respectively. We subjoin the Syriac.

ܐܦܬܚ ܫܐܠ ܘܐܬܦܬܚ ܗܘ ܕܟܡܝܪ ܐܒܗ̈ܬ ܕܐܬܟܣܝ ܘܐܙܥܩ ܐܢܐ ܟܐܝܠܬܐ ܠܡܪܝܐ ܘܐܡܪ ܠܗ ܠܡܐ ܐܬܝܗܒ ܠܢ ܘܠܐ ܐܫܬܩܝ ܠܢ ܘܐܬܟܣܝ ܐܢܐ ܘܐܬܟܣܝ ܒܚܬܡܗ ܕܡܪܝܐ ܐܒܗ̈ܬ ܕܐܬܟܣܝ ܘܐܙܥܩ ܐܢܐ ܘܐܬܟܣܝ ܒܚܬܡܗ ܕܡܪܝܐ

The conception of the sealing up of Sheol is by no means common. Volz [b] gives no other reference to it than our passage *Apoc. Bar.* xxi. 23. It is a corollary of the doctrine enunciated (apparently as a new message) in the companion apocalypses of *Baruch* and II. Esdras, that the "Consummation" (Daniel: *συντέλεια τῶν αἰώνων*) is delayed only till the completion of the number who are to be born and die, the "treasuries of souls" being now nearly full.

The conception of the insatiable maw of Sheol is of course not a new one. The Ode is clearly dependent here (as so often) on Isaiah. But besides Isaiah v. 14 (above cited), Proverbs xv. 22, xxvii. 16, 20, and Habakkuk ii. 5 should be compared. Sheol and Abaddon ("Hell" and "Destruction") are voracious monsters "hidden" from men, but not from God. Their appetite is insatiable. The new thought is their "sealing up" with "the seal of the Lord." As the Ode begins with a reference to the baptism of Jesus ("The dove fluttered down upon the Messiah because he was her head"), there may be here a point of connexion; for in second-century literature baptism is referred to as "the seal of the Lord." But if there be literary dependence between *Apoc. Bar.* and Ode xxiv., the dependence can only be on the side of the latter. For Baruch is introducing the rebuke (i.e. deposition) of the angel of death (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 26) and the sealing up of Sheol as a message of his own, whereas the Odist merely rejoices in the thought as one of the data of his eschatology.

It does not follow that the Odes were necessarily Christian in their original form. The unmistakably Christian elements still appear to lie upon the surface without affecting the substance. The date, however, will be brought well within the Christian period. In fact, up to, if not beyond, the threshold of the second century. Indirectly this will

[b] *Jüdische Eschatologie*, 1903.

reinforce the argument against a Jewish origin; for the Jewish writings of this disastrous period have not the tone of exultant realisation of the promises in mystical fellowship with God which characterises the Odes. Men of Jewish faith in 70–140 A.D. were absorbed either in apocalyptic dreams of judgment reversing the disasters of Zion, or in a growing enslavement to the minutiae of legalism.

Another parallel which I cannot recall having been mentioned is found in two fragments of Hippolytus' commentary on the Song of Solomon. I subjoin Harris' translation of the passage from the *Odes* side by side with Achelis' from Hippolytus :—

Odes of Solomon viii. xix.

viii. [14] Love me with affection, ye who love: [15] for I do not turn away my face from them that are mine. . . . [17] I fashioned their members: my own breasts I prepared for them, that they might drink my holy milk and live thereby.

xix. [1] A cup of milk was offered me: and I drank it in the sweetness of the delight of the Lord. [2] The Son is the cup, and he who was milked is the Father: [3] and the Holy Spirit milked Him because His breasts were full, and it was necessary for Him that His milk should be sufficiently released; [4] and the Holy Spirit opened His bosom and mingled the milk from the two breasts of the Father; and gave the mixture to the world without their knowing: [5] and they who receive in its fulness are the ones on the right hand.

Hippolytus on *Song* i. 2, 4.

Frgt. II. As the heart is rejoiced with wine, so do the testaments of Christ give joy. For like as infants suck milk from the breasts, so every one that sucks from the law of the commandments of the gospel obtains eternal food. But the "breasts" of Christ are naught else save the two testaments, and the milk is their commandments. In thy preaching, therefore, suck milk from the breasts, that thou mayst become a perfect disciple.

Frgt. III. . . . Taking up the time of repentance she (the Church) says: "We love thy breasts more than wine." The two testaments we say . . . But the breasts of Christ are the two testaments which give simplicity to those who believe.[c]

[c] *Hippolytus* ed. Bonwetsch-Achelis, p. 344.

I venture to think this parallel from Hippolytus in itself a sufficient justification of Harris' interpretation of xix. 4 f. as referring to the two testaments, as against Harnack's (see EXPOSITOR VIII. 9, September 1911, p. 249 f.). It is indeed quite as easy to apply the implied reference to those on the left hand who do not receive the milk "in its fulness" to Jews who reject the New Testament as to Marcionites who reject the Old. In either case we have relatively late Christian (interpolated) material. Hitherto, so far as I am aware, the earliest date to which this material (referred to by Harris as the "latest" in the *Odes*, and as "at the earliest a product of the second century") could be certainly carried back by external evidence was the beginning of the fourth century, when Lactantius quotes this ode by name and number. If Hippolytus be really employing it the date of Lactantius (c. 311) will be carried back almost a century. But it is far from improbable that the dependence is on the other side. The passage from Clement of Alexandria (*Paed.* i. 6) quoted by Harris (p. 115) might be suggested by Ode viii. 17, and the application made by Hippolytus to the two testaments of Scripture might rest on one or both. But Ode xix. 2–5 seems more likely to have been suggested by Hippolytus than conversely. If so, this relatively late addition may be dated c. 250 A.D. BENJ. W. BACON.

THE DATE OF HEROD'S MARRIAGE WITH HERODIAS AND THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE GOSPELS.

THE purpose of this article is to draw attention to a problem in criticism and chronology which seems to deserve more attention than it has lately received.

The question is the bearing of the story of Herod, Herodias and John the Baptist, on the one hand on the criticism of

the Gospels, especially of Mark, and on the other hand on the chronology of the life of Christ; while the criticism of the writings of Josephus plays an important part in the view which has to be taken of the whole complex of facts.

According to Mark, whose account is followed in the main by Matthew, John the Baptist owed his imprisonment and ultimately his death to the hostility of Herod and Herodias, against whose marriage he had protested. It is also stated that the death of John the Baptist preceded that of Jesus. "But when Herod heard of it (i.e. the ministry of Jesus) he said, 'John, whom I beheaded, is risen again.' For Herod himself had sent and arrested John and bound him in prison on account of Herodias, the wife of Philip his brother: because he had married her. For John said to Herod, 'It is not right for you to take your brother's wife.'"

If this story stood alone we should have no hesitation in saying that it dates the marriage of Herod and Herodias in the years of the public ministry of Jesus; or, if we look at the facts the other way round, that it dates the public ministry of Jesus as contemporary with the marriage of Herod and Herodias.

Now if we start by accepting the usual chronology of the life of Christ we have to say that this was 29 A.D. This date rests, of course, primarily on the theory, derived from Luke iii. 1, that the baptism of Jesus was in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, who succeeded Augustus in 14 A.D. But if we turn round, and start with the chronology implied by what Josephus tells us as to the history of Herod, we find that any natural interpretation of his statements points to the probability that the marriage of Herod and Herodias took place 35 A.D.

It is clear that the discrepancy between these results points to a problem which can be solved in three ways. In the first place we can reject the obvious implication of the

story of Josephus, introduce an interpretation of his statements which is not the most natural, and in this way rescue the generally-received chronology of the life of Christ. Or, in the second place, we may revise our critical judgment as to the value of the Gospel of Mark, and by treating some of his statements as unhistorical get rid of the supposed synchronism between the ministry of Jesus and the marriage of Herod and Herodias. Or, in the third place, we may revise the usual chronloogy of the life of Christ in such a way as to enable us to accept a date more in accordance with the statements of Josephus as to the life of Herod.

Probably the clearest manner of approaching the question is to state at once the evidence of Josephus in his own words. In his *Antiquities of the Jews*, xviii. 4, 6, he relates the death of Herod the Tetrarch of Trachonitis, in the twentieth year[1] of Tiberius, that is, either in 33 or 35 A.D. He then goes on to say that "At this time strife arose between Aretas, the king of Petrea, and Herod, for the following reason: Herod the tetrarch had married the daughter of Aretas, and had lived with her for a long time; but when he was setting out for Rome he stayed in the house of his half-brother Herod, the son of Herod by the daughter of Simon the high priest. Now, he fell in love with Herodias, his host's wife, who was the daughter of Aristobulus, the brother of the Herods, and the sister of Agrippa the Great, and ventured to suggest marriage to her. She listened, and an agreement was made that she would come to his home on his return from Rome. It was also part of the agreement that he would send away the daughter of Aretas. So he sailed to Rome with this agreement, but when he returned after accomplishing his object his wife, having heard of the agreement as to Herodias before her husband knew that she had done so,

[1] Or possibly the twenty-second, according to the Latin version of Josephus.

asked him to send her to Machaerus, which is on the frontier of the domains of Aretas and Herod, without letting her plan become known. So Herod let her go, not thinking that she had any perception of the state of affairs, but she had sent instructions in advance to Machaerus, which paid tribute to her father, and everything had been made ready for her by the representative of Aretas, so that on her arrival she set out for Arabia and, under the care of successive representatives, reached her father in haste and explained to him Herod's attitude. This he made the beginning of hostility, in addition to a boundary dispute in the district of Gamala. The armies of both sides were mobilised : they sent away the representatives of each other, and began a war. In the battle which ensued the whole army of Herod was destroyed, and he was deserted by the refugees from the tetrarchy of Philip who were serving under Herod. Herod wrote a report of these events to Tiberius, and he was enraged at Aretas's action and wrote to Vitellius to take up the war and either to capture him alive and send him home as a prisoner or to kill him and send his head to the emperor. So Tiberius entrusted the execution of these orders to the Praetor in Syria. But some of the Jews thought that Herod's army had been destroyed by God and that he was paying a very just penalty for the death of John the Baptist."

Then follows an account of John the Baptist, explaining that Herod had been afraid that his teaching would lead to political trouble, and had sent him as a prisoner to Machaerus and had put him to death there. Finally, Josephus ends by repeating :

" But the Jews thought that the destruction wrought on his army was the act of God, who willed that Herod should suffer this punishment for his treatment of John."

It is clear from these statements of Josephus that he

regards the marriage of Herod and Herodias, and the war between Aretas and Herod, as closely connected events belonging to the same period as the death of Herod of Trachonitis, which he dates in the twentieth or twenty-second year of Tiberius. As he relates these events after mentioning the death of Herod of Trachonitis it is *prima facie* probable that he regards them as slightly later; but too much must not be made of this argument, as Josephus often turns back and relates incidents in one part of the country after he has completed the narrative of events of a later date which had taken place in another district. More important for fixing the chronology is what follows. Vitellius endeavoured to carry out the command of the emperor and to punish Aretas. For this purpose he collected a number of troops and made preparations for an expedition. But before the expedition could get further than Jerusalem news reached him that Tiberius was dead, and all preparations were postponed until the will of the new emperor could be ascertained. Now, Tiberius died in March, 37 A.D. It is thus practically certain that the war in which Herod was defeated took place in the year 36 A.D., and the suggestion is certainly very strong that the marriage of Herod and Herodias which occasioned this war had not taken place more than a year or two before the outbreak of hostilities; so that the year 35 A.D. is the most probable for the marriage of Herod and Herodias, although a few months earlier is not entirely inconceivable. If, then, we had only the evidence of Josephus to enable us to date the chronology of the Gospel we should certainly say that it is clear from Mark that the ministry of Jesus was contemporary with the death of John the Baptist, that His death was later than the death of John the Baptist, that the death of John the Baptist was contemporary, or nearly so, with the marriage of Herod and Herodias, and that therefore the death of Jesus could not

but be later than the marriage of Herod and Herodias in the year 34–35. Thus, we should say, the year 35 is the earliest possible date for the crucifixion; and the question arises, how much later than this it can possibly be placed, according to the combined evidence of the Gospels and of Josephus.

Probably the clearest way of dealing with this question is to set out fairly fully the arguments which fix the possible limit before which the crucifixion must be placed.

The main fact, which alone is quite clearly attested, is that the crucifixion took place when Pontius Pilate was Procurator of Judaea. To fix the date at which his procuratorship began is not possible, except in dependence on the date on which it ended, and the fact that Josephus says that he was Procurator for ten years. The date of his departure can be fixed more satisfactorily. There was a disturbance in Samaria, which Pilate construed as an insurrection and put down with great severity: the Samaritans complained to Vitellius, the Emperor's Legate in Syria, and he, after holding an inquiry while he was in Jerusalem, sent Pilate to Rome to answer to the emperor. But while he was still on his way, Tiberius died, or, at all events, the news of Tiberius's death reached him. Tiberius died a few days before March 18, 37 A.D., on which date his successor Gaius was proclaimed emperor, so that we can safely put the end of Pilate's rule somewhere after the Passover of 36 and before that of 37. The Passover of 36 is therefore the latest possible date for the crucifixion.

Subsidiary to the fact that Pilate was Procurator at the time of the crucifixion is the probability that Caiaphas was high priest. This is, of course, much less certain. Caiaphas is not mentioned by Mark, nor in connexion with the crucifixion by Luke. That he was high priest at that time is stated by John and by the redactor who worked over the

Marcan narrative in Matthew. But, so far as Josephus takes us, 36 is also probably the date of the last Passover during which Caiaphas was high priest. He was appointed high priest by Valerius Gratus, Pilate's predecessor, and was removed by Vitellius in favour of Jonathan, the son of Annas, at the time of a visit which he paid to Jerusalem at the Passover, and this Jonathan was again removed in favour of his brother Theophilus. Now, Theophilus was appointed just after the Passover of 37. Jonathan was therefore high priest for this year, and the date of his appointment cannot well be earlier than just after the Passover of 36, which would in this case be the last passover at which Caiaphas was high priest. I take it that Josephus means in each case that Vitellius went up at the feast, and after the feast considered complaints and made rearrangements.[1]

Thus 36 A.D. seems to be the latest possible date for the crucifixion, and, as has been shown already, dates earlier than 35 become increasingly less and less probable as they go further and further back.

Nevertheless there is an imposing consensus of authority among New Testament scholars that the years 35–36 are improbable for the Crucifixion, and it is therefore desirable to note the facts on which they build, and the manner in which they circumvent the evidence of Josephus and St. Mark.

The general starting point for any discussion of the chronology is as a rule St. Luke's statement that John the Baptist began to preach in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, i.e. 28–29

[1] It is interesting to note in passing that Josephus does not testify to the smallest opposition from the Jews to this appointment of high priests by the Roman Legates—the idea that the high priest's was an hereditary life office seems to have become obsolete—and the title of "high priest" is applied to previous as well as to actual holders of the office. It is also interesting, especially in connexion with the God-fearers and the question of Jewish exclusiveness, that Josephus represents Vitellius as going to Jerusalem in 37 to sacrifice (*θύσων*) with the Jews.

A.D. This is then equated with the Baptism of Jesus, one or three years (according to the view adopted as to the length of the ministry) are added on, and the crucifixion is placed in 30 A.D. or thereabouts. It then becomes necessary to explain away the evidence of Josephus as to Herod's marriage, or in the alternative to get rid of Mark's allusion to that event.

The more popular method is the former: it has the authority of the late Professor Schürer. It is suggested that there was an interval of many years between the marriage of Herod and Herodias and the war undertaken by Aretas in the interests of his insulted daughter. The dominant view, though it could scarcely have been that of Schürer himself, seems to be that Aretas required a long time to make his preparations and to assemble his troops. This is quite contrary to the facts as we know them with regard to the respective strength of Herod and Aretas. Herod was a comparatively insignificant prince under the protection of the Romans. Aretas, on the other hand, was one of the most powerful of the independent rulers of the East, and probably regarded himself as by no means incapable of holding out for a long time even against the power of Rome itself. Thus political or strategical reason for a long delay on the part of Aretas cannot possibly be found. I would also suggest that it is psychologically extremely improbable that an outraged and insulted father who had the power to act immediately would have waited eight years, the period suggested, before taking active measures against Herod. Politically and psychologically, therefore, this suggestion as to the interpretation of Josephus is untenable. That it is also exegetically untenable, or at least extremely improbable, seems to me to be self-evident if the words of Josephus as given above are taken in their plain sense. It is, of course, possible that Josephus made a mistake, but it seems to me

extremely improbable that he really intended to suggest that there was any serious interval between the marriage of Herod and Herodias and the war between Herod and Aretas. For these reasons I regard this line of dealing with the difficulty as open to grave objections, and I am inclined to believe that those who have accepted it, as I have always done myself up to the present, have only done so because they have paid insufficient attention to the actual words of Josephus.

The other line of treatment has been adopted by Professor Wellhausen in his recent work on the synoptic Gospels. He accepts Josephus in the natural sense of his narrative, but is inclined to think that Mark is here an untrustworthy source of evidence. He thinks that the whole account of the connexion between John the Baptist and Herod, and especially the account of his death at the request of the dancing daughter [1] of Herodias, is entirely untrustworthy. He therefore cuts out all this passage from Mark as a legendary interpolation, and thinks that the death of the Baptist took place long before Herod's marriage. Now it is quite true that there are various other details besides the chronology which are very difficult to accept in the Markan narrative. If, for instance, Josephus is correct in thinking that John was sent to Machaerus it is not easy to see how it was possible so speedily to obtain his head for the satisfaction of Herodias, as it is extremely improbable that Herod was holding great festivities in a distant frontier town

[1] It no doubt adds picturesqueness to the narrative to call her Salome. Perhaps she was Salome, though this seems to me to be wildly improbable; but in the view of the sudden growth of a tradition which is artistic rather than historical it is perhaps well to point out (1) that the text of Mark is very obscure, and that the oldest witnesses, ℵBD, etc., describe the dancer as Herod's daughter; (2) the theory that she was called Salome is merely a deduction from the fact that Josephus says that Herodias had a daughter named Salome who married Philip, who died in 32. Of course it is possible that the young wife or the widow of Philip may have danced at the court of Antipas, but is it likely?

partly tributary to his outraged father-in-law. Nor is the episode of the dancer quite intelligible in other respects. It seems quite incredible that a princess should dance before the court if we consider the position of dancing girls in the ancient world. It seems even more incredible if we consider that, according to the chronology of Josephus, Salome was by this time either a wife or a widow. It is, however, true that the point is cleared up if we suppose that there has been some slight confusion in the tradition between a daughter of Herodias or of Herod and one of her or his slaves.[1] At the same time, it is one thing to admit that the details of the story concerning the death of John the Baptist may be inaccurate, and another thing to say that it took place long before Herod's marriage, as Wellhausen does. Here it seems to me that Josephus really supports Mark. He says that the people connected Herod's defeat by Aretas with the execution of John the Baptist. Does not this imply that John was put to death more or less at the time of the war with Aretas ? Just as Josephus implies that Herod's marriage took place just before the war, so he also seems to imply that the execution of John belongs to the same series of more or less synchronous events. But if this be so, it fixes the date of John's death, independently of the Gospels, at a time much later than chronologists have hitherto accepted, and I can hardly think that Wellhausen is justified in completely throwing over the authority of Mark, supported as it is by Josephus, in order to avoid the chronological difficulty, any more than Schürer was justified in throwing over the plain meaning of Josephus in order to avoid the same difficulty and at the same time to rescue the trustworthiness of Mark.

The preceding paragraphs seem to show that the result

[1] The antiquity of the Greek word παῖς naturally suggests itself as in some way a possible factor in such a confusion.

of a comparison between Mark and Josephus raises the question whether we ought not to revise our whole conception of the chronology of early Christianity. This is such a complicated question that it is very difficult to avoid being overwhelmed in detail. I shall endeavour in a few paragraphs to concentrate attention upon the main points on which the edifice raised by the chronologists really rests. There are, it is true, other points, but they are not really fundamental. But I would wish to emphasise that I am not so much advocating any one line of interpretation as trying to call attention to the necessity of really considering this problem.

The chronology of early Christianity, so far as its beginning is concerned, rests on two points, quite intelligible without any special knowledge, though there is a subsidiary but extremely complicated problem dealing in the main with astronomical questions which few of us can hope more than vaguely to understand. The first deals with the chronology of St. Paul's life, and the second with Luke iii. 1.

Turning to the chronology of the life of St. Paul, we find that the fixed point on which all must now agree with at least relative certainty, is that he was in Corinth in the year 50 A.D. The most recent and clearest treatment of this point will be found in Professor Deissmann's *Paulus*. Reckoning backwards from this, we obtain as the shortest conceivable chronology the result that the apostolic council of Acts xv. was in 48 A.D., and if we assume (though I believe that this is erroneous) that Acts xv. refers to the same events as those dealt with in Galatians ii. we can fix the conversion as thirteen or sixteen years previously, according to our exegesis of various passages. Even when we take into consideration all the possibilities of reckoning parts of years as the equivalent of whole years, this does not give us a later date for the conversion of St. Paul than 35 A.D., and

33 is on the whole far more probable. Any other system of reckoning the dates in the earlier part of St. Paul's life makes his conversion still earlier. This has seemed to force us to place the crucifixion not later than 32 A.D., and as a matter of fact 29 A.D. is at present probably the more popular date. If so, there is no escape from the conclusion that the crucifixion, and therefore also the death of John the Baptist, preceded the marriage of Herod and Herodias, unless we fall back on the position of Schürer. But one observation remains. All this argument depends on a single iota, and I submit that the question deserves consideration whether it is easier to sacrifice one iota in the text of Galatians or the obvious meaning of Josephus and Mark. The iota in question is in the text (Gal. ii. 1), in which St. Paul says that he went up to Jerusalem "after fourteen years." Write it in Greek with the usual method of writing numbers which St. Paul no doubt adopted, and the text is this :—

ΔΙΑΙΔΕΤΩΝ=διὰ ι̅δ̅ ἐτῶν.

If you leave out one iota, assuming that it has crept in as a primitive corruption in the text, you obtain the following :—

ΔΙΑΔΕΤΩΝ=διὰ δ̅ ἐτῶν.

That is to say that St. Paul went up to Jerusalem, not after *fourteen* years but after *four* years, and therefore the whole chronology of St. Paul can be put ten years later than it usually is so far as the conversion and his history up to the time of his second visit to Jerusalem is concerned. That means that the conversion was about 43 A.D., and if so, we shall have no difficulty in accepting 36 as the year of the crucifixion, and thus satisfactorily accepting the obvious and natural meaning both of Josephus and of Mark.

Of course, there is always an objection to "playing tricks" with the text in the interests of interpretation, but the point here is that we are forced to "play tricks" with something ; either the plain meaning of Josephus or the narrative of

Mark or the text of Galatians has to be sacrificed. The question is, which is the most desirable victim. Schürer says Josephus; Wellhausen says Mark: I suggest one iota in the text of Galatians. Moreover, there are certain subsidiary advantages in the suggestion that Paul went up to Jerusalem after four years instead of after fourteen. The fourteen years of the ordinary text have always been a puzzle to commentators upon St. Paul. What did he do in those fourteen years? No one has any answer to make. They are an almost blank space in the history of St. Paul, and without suggesting that this is a sufficient reason for emending the text it is at least a point to be noticed that if the text be emended for other reasons we do obtain the advantage of only having four years to deal with instead of fourteen, in which, so far as we can see, history stood almost still, although it moved with extreme rapidity before those fourteen years and after them.

Besides the chronology of St. Paul there is the direct statement in Luke iii. 1 that John the Baptist began to preach in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, i.e. in 28–29 A.D. This is generally taken to mean that Jesus was baptized in that year. But St. Luke does not say this; what he says is that John the Baptist began to preach in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, and that he continued to do so until Herod, whom he had rebuked for marrying Herodias, put him in prison. He then says that Jesus was baptized by John, and that he, after the temptation, began to preach in Galilee. He does not say, but I think that he implies—in any case Mark states expressly—that this preaching began after the imprisonment of John. The natural interpretation of these statements is that John the Baptist preached from the fifteenth year of Tiberius to the time when Herod married Herodias, i.e. 34–35, and that the baptism of Jesus was one of his last acts. This view

has not only the advantage of being quite unforced, but it enables us to suppose that St. Luke knew when the census of Quirinus had been held. In spite of many ingenious efforts to prove the contrary, it remains an unassailable fact that the only known census of Quirinus was in A.D. 6, and that at an early time, when Quirinus may perhaps have been in Syria, Bethlehem was in the control of Herod Archelaus, a "protected" but independent ruler, and not under the government of Augustus or of the Legate in Syria. But if we suppose for one moment that St. Luke really did mean the famous census of A.D. 6—a view strongly supported by his reference to it as the "the census" in Acts—and that he supposed that Jesus was in His thirtieth year at the time of the baptism, we obtain a result agreeing exactly with the evidence of Mark and Josephus that the baptism was probably in the year 35.

It is interesting to ask why this result, inevitable if St. Luke's statement about Quirinus had been accepted at its face-value, has been so little noticed. It is partly due to the desire to harmonise Luke with Matthew, which of course undoubtedly places the nativity in the time of Herod the Great, but it is also, I believe, partly due to the influence of Eusebius, who was not unnaturally puzzled by the statement that Annas and Caiaphas were high priests. It is unfortunately quite clear that St. Luke means that Annas and Caiaphas were simultaneously high priests, in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, or that the one succeeded the other in that year: the former is apparently incredible and the latter impossible. Eusebius knew this quite as well as we do, and he invented the theory that St. Luke meant that the ministry of Jesus fell within the period covered by the high priesthoods of Annas and Caiaphas and the three intervening high priests. That forced him to choose a very early chronology, and put the crucifixion early instead of late in the time of Pilate. Nevertheless his treatment

of the double priesthood of Annas and Caiaphas cannot be regarded as possible; St. Luke's statement remains as permanently in conflict with the custom of the Jews as revealed by Josephus,[1] as his statement about Lysanias is in conflict with the known facts of history.

It is also worth noticing that there is no real difficulty in St. Luke's statement that John the Baptist was born in the days of "Herod the king." This title would apply to Archelaus as well as to Herod the Great. Indeed, even on the popular hypothesis of a census by Quirinus c. B.C. 3, Archelaus, not his father, was king. It is not impossible that John the Baptist was born in the last days of Archelaus, and that the birth of Jesus was in the first days of Quirinus.

All this argument is of course largely hypothetic: I should be sorry to build on it. My only desire has been to show that St. Luke's statement about the fifteenth year of Tiberius is by no means a clear answer to the theory that the crucifixion was in 36 or, at latest, in 35. I would also urge that as a rule the implicit evidence of facts which we can synchronise with events as to the date of which there is no possible doubt, is worth more than unsupported direct statements. I should, for instance, be far more certain that a document of the present day was not earlier than 1887 if it referred to the Jubilee, than if it merely bore the date of that year; and if it was dated 1877 I should have no hesitation in rejecting the date in favour of the internal evidence. In the same way the implicit evidence of the Gospels combined with Josephus seems to be worth more than any direct and unsupported chronological statement.

One point remains, which I am unfortunately not able

[1] The repeated statements of Josephus show plainly that the high priesthood was not a life office, and that the Roman claim to dismiss and appoint the high priest was acquiesced in by the Jews. There is no trace of a double priesthood; but it is possible that the title of high priest was kept, as a matter of courtesy, after dismissal, and possibly, given in general to all who belonged to the class from which the official high priest was appointed.

to discuss fully. The fact that the crucifixion was on a Friday seems to be undoubtedly part of the earliest tradition, nor can it fairly be claimed that any other tradition ever existed. It is also apparently plain that it was either on the 14th or 15th Nisan, the former being on the whole more probable. In what years is it possible that the 14th (or 15th) Nisan fell on a Friday? If I understand the problem correctly, the facts relating to the year 36 A.D. are that the moon of Nisan was new on Friday, March 16. If so, the arguments used by Mr. C. H. Turner as to the day of the week in connexion with the chronology of the Passion in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* seem to apply to 36 A.D. with even more force than they apply to 29 A.D., the year which he prefers. But the question is complicated by considerations as to the possibility of observing the new moon, and the doubt whether the Jews employed a calendar in the first century instead of observation. Perhaps some astronomically gifted theologian will consider the case for the year 36 (and 35) from this point of view. The questions which require to be faced by him are:—(1) In 35 or 36 was Nisan 14 on a Friday? (2) Was Nisan 15 on a Friday? (3) How far is the answer to either question affected (*α*) if the New Moon was fixed by observation, (*β*) if it was fixed by a calendar?

KIRSOPP LAKE.

OPERA FORIS.

MATERIALS FOR THE PREACHER.

ACTS xvii. 17–18:—*So he reasoned . . . every day with them that met with him. And certain also of . . . the Stoic philosophers encountered him.* Encountered him at a task and in possession of a conviction which were strange to their philosophy. "The Stoics looked on the mass of men as ignorant and wicked, and it never occurred to them that it was a duty of the Good Man to teach and redeem them—to

sacrifice his life, if need be, in the work of enlightenment. . . . The active enthusiasm of a real religion—the *effective* desire to be in right relation with the Power—was strange to Stoicism. In one way or another, it had many excellent results ; it cleared the ground, for example, for a new and universal religion by putting into the shade, if not altogether out of the way, the old local cults with their narrow and limited civic force ; it glorified the idea of law and order in an age when the Roman world seemed to be forgetting what these sacred words meant ; *but a real active enthusiasm of humanity was wanting in it*" (W. Warde Fowler : *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, pp. 374–375).

* * * * *

1 Corinthians ix. 16–17 :—*Woe is unto me, if I preach not the gospel. For if I do this of mine own will I have a reward.*

Two illustrations of this text. One from Walton's *Life of Donne*, where Donne's prostration and melancholy after his wife's death is described. "Thus he continued until a consideration of his new engagements to God, and St. Paul's 'Woe is me, if I preach not the Gospel !' dispersed those sad clouds that had then benighted his hopes, and now forced him to behold the light." The other from Canon Horsley's recent book of reminiscences, in which he quotes a remark made to him in Clerkenwell prison by Charles Peace, the murderer : 'If a minister really believed in his work, it would pay him not merely to go a Sabbath day's journey to preach, but to go there on his hands and knees over broken bottles."

* * * * *

Galatians iv. 16 :—*So then am I become your enemy, because I tell you the truth ?*

There is a good parallel to this ironical query in the third Olynthiac oration (§ 32), where Demosthenes tells the Athenians that he would not be astonished if they made *him* suffer for mentioning their troubles more than the very people who had caused them (*ταῦτα μὰ τὴν Δήμητρα οὐκ ἂν*

θαυμάσαιμι, εἰ μείζων εἰπόντι ἐμοὶ γένοιτο παρ' ὑμῶν βλάβη τῶν πεποιηκότων αὐτὰ γενέσθαι).

* * * * *

Titus ii. 10 :—*That they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things.*

The primary claim is that household slaves who had become Christians were to be a credit and ornament to their religion. *Bid slaves be subject to their masters* (instead of bringing the church into disrepute and suspicion by insubordination), and give *entire satisfaction in every respect, not answering back* (even when sorely provoked by cruelty and displays of bad temper), *not pilfering, but showing the utmost trustworthiness and honesty, that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in every respect.* The reason for this moral counsel lies in their spiritual position. *For the grace of God has appeared, teaching us to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world.* Christianity is represented as a disciplining power or force, which is beautiful as it comes into action, and Christians, even in obscure and trying circumstances, are called upon to grace it by making it live in their conduct, instead of disgracing it by inconsistent behaviour. (i.) The first[1] method is the consecration of duty. No line of conduct can set off the doctrine of Christianity if it is indifferent to the plain instincts of morality. There is nothing beautiful in a life which attempts to excuse itself for ethical defects and failures by pointing to right views about God or warm feelings or ecclesiastical strictness. Any type of Christianity, evangelical or ritualistic, liberal or narrow, which relaxes the conscience is a discredit to the religion of Him who *gave himself for us that He might purify for Him-*

[1] The significance of the precept for Roman slaves is suggested by Dr. Bigg's remark (*The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*, p. 114): "As for sexual morality, what can it have been when the mass of the people were slaves, when slaves were incapable of marriage, and the number of men greatly preponderated over that of women, when women and boys had no protection at all against their masters ?"

only a purple cushion to prof words [illegible] Then, Christianity being more than a moral force, men and women can be an ornament to it by exhibiting the special law of love in forbearance, charity, brotherly kindness, and the enthusiasm of social service. Sincere people often make their doctrine positively odious by the temper in which they treat those who may differ from them. The Christian graces are essential if the Christian doctrine is to shine in its true lustre, and these graces include courage and intelligence as well as kindness. [illegible] Finally, Christianity is rendered attractive by the gracious spirit of its adherents. Love teaches even the bluntest and the awkward to practise tact and courtesy instinctively. There is generally a gracious and an ungracious way of doing a deed or saying a word, or giving a gift. And the gracious method is more than a pretty, nice manner which some natures find it easy to assume; it is not an external, but an expression of inward thoughtfulness and self-effacement (as the very sense of grace suggests). The jewel of the Christian principle is in its proper setting wherever kindness is unostentatious, and charity free from patronising, and help devoid of a secret desire to display one's own strength or wealth or superior goodness.

The thought of these words practically resolves itself therefore into this: that Christianity is beautiful as it is real, that it is beautiful as a doctrine it becomes more beautiful as a life, in which outsiders learn to love it by seeing its embodiment in our personal characters. George Herbert applied this thought specifically to servants:—

> "A servant with this clause [i.e. 'for Thy sake']
> Makes drudgery divine;
> Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws
> Makes that and the action fine."

But the sweep of the text covers all lives and levels with its demand for this fine art of Christian faithfulness.

James Moffatt.

LUKE'S NARRATIVE OF THE BIRTH OF JESUS.

In the former part of this article the proof has been published, definite and conclusive, that Quirinius must have been governing the Syrian province and commanding the Syrian legions for part, at least, of the time between 10 and 7 B.C.; and a probability has been established that he was in Syria and in close relations with Pisidian Antioch in the year 9–8 B.C. This results purely from contemporary epigraphic evidence compared with the account given by Tacitus of the career of Quirinius. The evidence of Luke plays no part in the proof of date, except in one respect, which must be clearly distinguished.

If we had only the non-Christian evidence to go upon, no one would for a moment hesitate to assert that Quirinius governed Syria from 11 to 9 or 8 B.C., and that he was succeeded by Sentius Saturninus 9 or 8 to 6 B.C. Adding the testimony of Luke ii. 1–3, I have argued that, probably but not necessarily, Saturninus during the first year of his government was charged with part of the Syrian administration alongside of Quirinius, who was still commanding the Syrian legions.[1]

The combined evidence of Tertullian and Josephus proves that Saturninus was actually governing Syria during 8 B.C., when the first census was held. Taking the extra-Lucan

[1] We must assume that the governor's term of office began about July 1: that is attested as regards the proconsuls who governed senatorial provinces, and is natural and probable for imperatorial *legati*. The journey to and from the province would then fall in the summer; it is unthinkable that the journey, often very long and slow, should have been fixed for the season of storm and cold.

evidence alone, we should then have to infer that Quirinius was no longer governor of Syria at the actual time when Jesus was born, although he had been governor until a few weeks or months before that event.

Even this result places Luke's narrative on a very different level of credibility from that on which it is estimated by the fashionable theory. It would leave no room for the assertion that he confounded the census and valuation of Palestine by Quirinius in A.D. 6–7 with an event that happened under Herod. At the worst any possible error on his part would amount only to the moderate extent that he supposed Quirinius to have governed a few weeks or months longer than the actual term of his office. But there is no need to conclude that Luke was guilty of any error, even if we make Saturninus the successor of Quirinius. What is it exactly that Luke says? Let us be sure that we have this exactly and clearly in our minds when we are considering whether he is right or wrong. Let us not say that he is wrong in making a statement, if he does not make that statement.

Luke does not say that Quirinius was governor at the time when Jesus was born, i.e., in the latter part of the year. He only mentions, in a sort of historical footnote, as it were: "this was the first census, when Quirinius was governing Syria." The census was intended to include all who were born before the end of 9 B.C., and could not, therefore, take place until the year was finished; but it was the census for 9 B.C., and, if Quirinius governed till midsummer 8 B.C., Luke's words are justified completely, while the authority from whom Tertullian derived his statement is also in another view correct. The one is speaking in general terms of the census as an incident of Roman rule, the other speaks of the actual birthday of the Saviour. We must observe precisely what it is that each writer states, and not blame Luke

for inexactitude without need or justification. Above all we must not be misled by modern analogy. We in modern time make the census for one fixed and universal moment, catching our migratory population at the given instant, as if by an instantaneous photograph. The Romans tried to cope in another way with the difficulty of numbering people who might be far from home, viz., by bringing them at some time during the enrolment-year to their proper and original home; and they permitted them to come for enrolment at any time during the year.[1] On this rule there is much more to say in Section II. below.

Now that Luke's accuracy in every other detail has been so triumphantly vindicated, and that in this one detail the extent of possible error is so small, surely it would be right to take the most favourable view. If, on the one hand, Quirinius was followed as governor by Saturninus, then we must infer (as is perfectly easy and permissible) that Quirinius governed Syria during part of the enrolment-year, 8 B.C., that then his term of office came to an end about 1 July, and that Saturninus governed during the rest. That supposition agrees with all the testimony, and brings to a focus all the best evidence. If, on the other hand, Quirinius for a special purpose retained his duties on the Syrian frontier after Saturninus came about July 1 in 9 B.C., then the discrepancy between Tertullian and Luke presents no difficulty: there were two governors sharing the duties during the enrolment-year.

II. The Order to Return to the Original Home.

We come now to the second of the two details in Luke's narrative, which were indicated at the outset as the special

[1] According to Professor Milligan, *Selections from the Greek Papyri* 17, p. 44, the census-papers "were sent in during, and generally towards the end of, the first year of the new census-period," i.e. the papers for A.D. 48 were sent in A.D. 49.

subject of this paper—" All went to enrol themselves, every one to his own city." This universal action must, of course, have been ordered by the Roman government ; and Luke must be understood as declaring that such an order was issued in connexion with the first census, in some year earlier than 4 B.C. (when Herod died). The return to the home is a vital point in the narrative. It is on account of this that the census plays any part in Luke's history. This was the reason why the son of parents who resided at Nazareth was born at Bethlehem. Inaccuracy or imagination or fiction in this detail would make the whole story valueless and impertinent as part of the Gospel. This detail, however, has been ridiculed as altogether impossible. It is said to be contrary to Roman method and irreconcilable with a Roman census.

There are not many cases in which a definite fact, recorded by an ancient author professing to write history, has been regarded with such almost universal incredulity among modern scholars as this statement of Luke's. For my own part, I must plead guilty to having shared to some extent the same error as others in regard to it. Even while defending the historical character and perfect trustworthiness of Luke's narrative, I admitted that this detail was not in keeping with Roman method, which was " to count the population according to their actual residence," and which would be rendered useless by " any disturbance of the existing distribution of population." [1] I sought to explain the return to the original home as an example of the influence of native Oriental custom on the practical administration of the Roman rule in the East. This was the right direction in which to look ; but I was unconsciously touching a far bigger and more important subject than I thought. I supposed that in this case the influence of native custom was an excep-

[1] *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem ?* p. 106.

tional thing, due to some peculiar features of the case; I looked for these features in the strained relations of King Herod to the Imperial government on the one hand and to his Jewish subjects on the other; and I conjectured that he tried to make the unpleasant necessity of the census less offensive to the Jews by giving it a Hebrew appearance, as if it were a tribal and antique national business.

As is now clear, this hypothesis, although correct so far as the general principle was concerned, was wholly wrong in the way that it applied the principle to this particular case. The right method is marked out along the line which Mitteis first opened up in his epoch-making work on "Imperial Law and National Law,"[1] though he does not, so far as I recollect, make the application to the facts recorded here by Luke. The Roman rule was in practice conducted very differently in the East and in the West. In the West it had to do with barbarous tribes, among whom there existed little positive law: and the western law, when put in force among western peoples, needed comparatively little adaptation to the special character of a western people. In Greece and the East the Roman rule was applied to people with a very ancient civilisation, with national customs and elaborate legal forms fixed by the usage of countless generations; and, above all, the Romans were here in contact with peoples so proud as the Greeks and so antagonistic in spirit as the Semites and other Orientals. Government could not safely be carried on in such countries without very careful adaptation to the character of the people. The Romans never intentionally destroyed an existing civilisation within the Empire (perhaps with the solitary exception of the Carthaginian): they used it, and built upon and around it.

[1] Mitteis' *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, 1891, which I did not see until my book had been published. It disclosed for the first time a new point of view, from which all matters in the Eastern provinces ought to be always contemplated.

Even in the barbarian West there can be no doubt that, while Rome imposed her own law and custom upon those provinces, she was not wholly unmindful of native custom and character. In the Three Gauls she adapted her rule to the tribal system. In southern Britain and in Narbonensian Gaul the tribal system was destroyed. This difference of treatment, due to difference in native character and circumstances, was probably accompanied by difference in the degree to which pure Roman law was administered in these neighbouring yet diverse countries.

Thus, for example, if I may diverge for the moment to a side illustration, it is quite false method to assume (as many recent writers in Germany and England have done) that St. Paul and his correspondents were familiar with the pure Roman law. The Apostle could never have seen this administered, either in Tarsus or in Palestine: Tarsus and Antioch were free cities, in which the Roman law was not applied, and Palestine was governed according to Jewish law. Even in ordinary provincial cities, like Iconium or Derbe or Perga, the Roman law was (as Mitteis has shown) strongly affected by the hereditary law and custom of the Greek East. Paul in his letters was not writing to people who knew the pure Roman law; and in his legal figures he has in mind the law that was familiar to his correspondents. In Pisidian Antioch the colonists were Roman citizens, and here Paul, perhaps for the first time, experienced the strictly Roman law in a city of the East. Paul's legal references are usually to facts and ideas, such as adoption and will-making, that were common to the Graeco-Asiatic and the Roman custom; but he has a few which are not expressed in harmony with pure Roman law; [1] and it is as a whole unjustifiable to illustrate his legal allusions by quoting from the pure

[1] Examples are given in *Historical Commentary on Galatians*, pp. 349–374 and 385–391.

Roman law of the Republican period. Illustrations from Imperial rescripts, even of later time, are much more pertinent, because, although issued later, the rescripts usually were to a great extent a systematising and authorising of current administrative custom in the East.

In the East, therefore, we have always to think more about Graeco-Asiatic law as developed by Imperial policy than about the strict Roman law. It was the former that the readers and hearers of Paul or of Luke knew ; and to that law Paul went for his illustrations and his metaphors.

If that was the case with the general rules of law, much more must it have been true that Roman practical administrative devices were suited to the Eastern peoples, and were as a rule only the modifications of pre-Roman local custom. The Roman census system was simply an adaptation of earlier Ptolemaic custom in Egypt ; and it was not justifiable to expect (as we did) that it should be purely Western in character and method.

No evidence has survived about the method of the census in Augustan times ; but in the second century the Prefect of Egypt issued an edict, evidently as a regular custom at the approach of the census, ordering every one to return to his own home in anticipation of the enrolment.[1] Similarly the magistrates of Mesembria in Thrace summoned the whole population to come into the town to be enrolled according to the law of the city and according to the custom.[2]

These are examples, the only two attested by the scanty evidence, of what must have been a general custom in the East. The administrative order was issued by the proper authority, viz., by the elected magistrates in a free European

[1] *Papyri Brit. Museum*, III., no. 904; also Milligan, *Selections*, no 28, p. 72 f. The edict is of A.D. 104.

[2] Cagnat, *Inscr. Graec. ad res. R. pertinentes*, i. 769, from Dumont and Homolle, p. 460, No. 111[e]. Quoted by Rostowzew, *Stud. z. Gesch. d. röm. Kolonats*, p. 305.

city, in subject Egypt by the Prefect, who was viceroy and lord over a population of servants; but the authority for this method comes from the Emperor, Augustus or his successor for the time being.

Such was the custom of the census at a later period after Luke was dead. It is clear that, if he was inventing this general order, he like a prophet described exactly what was going to be the method at a later time. Such an idea is absurd! It is beyond doubt or dispute that he was describing the method of the periodic census, as he knew it in regular practice.

In the Ptolemaic period similar papers, couched in remarkably similar terms, used to be issued for the census in Egypt. There can be no doubt that Augustus maintained the old custom of the country and extended it generally over the East. Probably the return to the home was a device older than Augustus.

Joseph and Mary obeyed the administrative order, and went to their own proper home at Bethlehem: in Nazareth they were only resident aliens and could not be counted there.

Accordingly Rostowzew [1] infers without any hesitation from Luke that "already in the beginning of the Imperial period all people, whether inhabitants of cities or of villages, were summoned to return to their proper domicile (ἰδία) for the census exactly as was customary in Egypt." He considers Luke's words a sufficient proof that this was the universal Augustan rule.

Now, what is the character and the meaning of this regulation about holding the census only at the home? It is diametrically opposed to our modern ideas of a census (as has been stated above). It is destructive of many of the purposes for which a census is valued in modern administra-

[1] *Studien z. Gesch. d. röm. Kolonats*, p. 305.

tion. It tends to prevent free settlement, to impede trade, and to put fetters on intercourse through the country. Why should Rome impose such a condition in the East ? For the strengthening of the Empire it was urgently required that national distinctions should be obliterated in the wider patriotism of the universal citizenship ; and many of Augustus's measures show that he was aiming at a progressive unification of the whole Roman world through the weakening of the merely national or tribal unions and the encouragement of oecumenical patriotism and sense of common and universal brotherhood. Yet here the Augustan census is, according to Luke, accompanied by a thoroughly retrogressive regulation which seems to mean that every one ought to stay at home, that no one can acquire the right to be away from home for more than a few years, and that all must be counted at their own proper home at every census, as if they were bound to that home and could only be temporary sojourners everywhere else.

Such a regulation was opposed to the general tendency and to the best side of the Augustan system ; and we all had some apparent ground to rest on, when we pronounced the regulation to be non-Roman. But we wrongly assumed that the Augustan system was completed, and that all parts of it carried out the same general principles. On the contrary, the Imperial system was incomplete, hesitating, often partaking of the nature of compromise ; and so far from rejecting as non-Roman the bond of attachment to the original domicile, both Augustus and his successors seem to have used this principle wherever it seemed convenient for them.

Mr. Zulueta, in a remarkable essay, published in Vinogradoff's *Oxford Studies*, 1909, p. 42,[1] states well the purpose and nature of this principle (*die Lehre von der ἰδία*, as it is

[1] Zulueta, *De Patrociniis Vicorum*. Each of the two Essays in the volume has its separate paging.

called in German); and I quote his words, which seem almost like a commentary on Luke, though it may be taken as certain that the learned writer of this Essay on the later Roman law had in his mind no thought of explaining or defending St. Luke.

He points out that, while the Imperial policy rarely, and only in critical times, made any use of the old Oriental principle of the *corvée*, according to which the population might be called upon to perform forced labour for the public service, yet

> "The government held in reserve a more far-reaching principle, which was asserted whenever political or economic troubles threatened to bring the industry of the country to a standstill. This was the principle that every man had a [personal attachment to the home and soil of his birth] (*ἰδία*), a place of origin in which he had his proper sphere of activity and to which he could be held in the public interest. [There is] a remarkable series of texts testifying to the operation of the rule of *ἰδία* from the Plotemaic period onwards.[1] We may quote as typical the edict of the prefect of A.D. 154 (B.G.U. 372), which concludes with the following threat": 'if any person . . . is found straying on alien land, he shall be arrested and brought before me as no longer merely suspect but actually a confessed malefactor'; and the "general duty is to devote oneself to agriculture on one's proper soil. Precisely similar terms are found in the royal ordinance of 118 B.C. . . . In A.D. 415 a new idea was added, viz., the

[1] He quotes in illustration: OGIS 90, 19 f.; P Taur. VIII. 13 f., 19 f.; P. Tebt. I. 5, 7 (118 B.C.). P. Oxy. II. 251–3; OGIS 669, 34; P. Lond. II. 260, 120 (all cent. I.); BGU 372 (A.D. 154), 15 I. 475, 902, 903; P. Fröhner (W. in *Festchrift Hirschfeld*); P. Gen. 19; P. Tebt. II. 327, 439 (all cent. II.); BGU 159; P. Gen. 16.

protection of the interest of a *dominus* in his tenants or labourers by means of local servitude."

In the census there was a special need, and the taking of the census had to encounter many difficulties. To make a census accurate enough to serve as a basis of administration is no easy matter ; a successful census is a triumph of skilful government and good method. It was an accepted Roman principle to permit, and even to encourage, free intercourse through the Empire, and thus to foster a feeling of Imperial unity. Yet the existence of a floating population and of many travellers made the census difficult. How and where should the migratory population be counted ? These immigrants and travellers could not be numbered as they stood at any single moment, which is the modern way. The staff of administration was totally inadequate in Roman time for such a vast undertaking : even the most elementary acquaintance with Roman Imperial facts teaches any student that government was carried on with an extremely small staff, and as a matter of fact we know well that the staff was hardly capable of coping with the ordinary duties of government. For example, the maintenance of public order and security and the suppression of brigandage on the public roads were far from thorough and satisfactory. For an extraordinary effort like the census the Imperial civil service was quite ineffective ; the census (like the guarding of public security) had to be largely carried out as a branch of military duty ; and the only possibility of doing the work at all was to distribute it over the whole year, and to order the household returns to be sent in by each householder at some time during the year.

To meet this difficulty the government, in Mr. Zulueta's words, asserted the far-reaching principle of the proper home or ἰδία, an old Oriental fact. Every man must return to his proper home or ἰδία for the census. This we see in Egypt,

in Thrace, and in Palestine (according to Luke), as appears from the references quoted above. To judge from Luke it was perhaps not only the householder but also his family, that must return to the ἰδία, though one cannot from the single case confidently presume the universal rule. There may have been particular and private reasons operative in that case : as a matter of fact, Luke asserts in i. 39 that Mary maintained close relations with her home in the hill-country of Judaea, at or not far from Bethlehem. We have not, so far as I can see, enough of evidence at present to judge ; but on the whole the probability is that *all* were ordered to return to the proper home, not merely the male householder, but the family, so that the enumeration should be really a Household-enrolment.

The principle of the ἰδία is based deep in human nature, not merely in the East, but also in the West. There is a tendency to distrust the stranger and the wanderer. Experience shows that only too often he has emancipated himself from the controlling power of his original surroundings and society, without substituting any other sufficient guidance in his life. Such is the danger. The overcoming of the danger produces a higher standard of thought and morality ; but that is not the invariable result, and least commonly so in stagnant and backward society.

It is too much to expect that the Imperial government should have refused to descend to the employment of such a principle. Even in modern life, and in the most progressive societies, this tendency manifests itself in various ways, often disguised. In the great international railway-station of Buda-Pesth it refuses to recognize any international language, and orders that every inscription on every door and office shall be in Magyar alone. It makes the English disbelieve every German official utterance, and the German distrust every English official statement, as devices of an enemy.

In the unprogressive countries, such as Turkey, the tendency rules supreme. The stranger is disliked as a danger: a partial exception is made in favour of Europeans as being different in nature, but they are only tolerated, not liked. Other strangers are probably hostile. One frequently hears the principle invoked. You pass on the road in Turkey two or three Circassians, and you know that there is no Circassian village within twenty hours' distance. The inference is at once drawn that these strangers can be after no good so far from home. The police arrest them, if they dare. The traveller flees from them, if he can. The principle justifies itself in most cases, because the reasoning founded on it proves true. Only if the stranger goes direct to a guest-house or a khan, is it admitted that he may perhaps be honest, although appearances are rather against him.

Education overcomes this tendency; and through the growing power of education dislike and distrust of the stranger grows rarer and weaker, and disguises itself under the form of patriotism or otherwise. But in countries which, like the Roman Empire, are degenerating from a higher plane of civilisation, the operation of the tendency grows wider and deeper as the years pass. It had been always strong in the Eastern provinces. Its history can be studied in them for centuries before Roman legions had been seen there. It was connected with the story of conquest and the domination of victorious races in the regions which they subdued. The land was treated as estates, of which the conquerors were lords, and which the older population tilled as subjects of the new masters. The presence of the old population was necessary. They had the agricultural tradition, and without them the land would have relapsed into desert, as the water which generally had to be artificially supplied ceased to flow through channels which were not properly maintained, and as other subsidiary operations were neg-

lected. The new lords were soldiers and not agriculturists.

There was, however, at first only a tendency to remain, and not a tie to bind the cultivator to the soil. Neither custom nor positive law had at that time transformed the tendency into a thoroughly binding tie. The convenience of government and the advantage of the landlord gradually strengthened the tie.[1]

The tie to the soil was created and strengthened by the needs of the case and by the custom of the country. Under the legal-minded Romans the tie was stereotyped, and afterwards became a matter of formal law. The lord of the estate established a legal right to have the benefit of the work of the cultivators on his hand. If the cultivators left the estate and went elsewhere, the landlord suffered financial loss. When there were abundant cultivators, the loss caused by the departure of some was little felt ; but when cultivators were few, as was in later times the case, agriculture suffered, the loss was serious, and attempts were made by law to guard the interest of the landlords in the labour of the people on his land.

In A.D. 415 Imperial law recognised formally this right of the landowner to the work of his cultivators.[2] They must remain on the soil to cultivate it, lest the owner should lose the value of his property. That is the earliest and as yet hardly complete recognition in express legal enactment of what had long existed in embryo, viz., the bond of custom that fastened the cultivator to the soil and deprived him of his natural freedom to leave his home. The cultivator, once nominally free, who had been in a sense joint owner of the land, degenerated gradually into a serf bound to the soil (*adscriptus glebae*), and the bond was rivetted by the enact-

[1] On this gradual growth of the tie, see Mr. Zulueta's paper, already quoted. Fustel de Coulanges and Mommsen were the pioneers in the study of this rapidly growing branch of history.

[2] Zulueta, *loc. cit.*, p. 42 f.

ment which recognised the claim of the landlord to the agricultural service of the cultivators.

Here we have a historical and social force running through the centuries. Luke is perhaps the earliest historian who takes notice of it as a factor in human history. The significance of the tendency had not been observed when he wrote. Administrators used it, but did not discuss its nature. No one knew what it would become, and probably no one thought of it as a power that was remaking human society for the worse in the Mediterranean world. Luke notices it only because it produced the regulation that led Joseph and Mary to Bethlehem in order to facilitate the taking of an imperial census.

A feature like this cannot be invented. How should a mere inventor divine the future law of history, and attach to it the fate of the puppets whose motions he was devising? A true and great historian may have the divine gift of insight into the laws that govern human history; but this gift belongs only to those who love and study the truth, and not to inventors of airy fiction.[1]

III. Some Objections to the Narrative of Luke.

In a very judicious and impartial article in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* on *Quirinius*, Professor P. Gardner points out some difficulties that remain unexplained, even if the correctness of the general view taken in my book on the subject be admitted.

> (I) "Why should a census in Judaea be dated by the irrelevant fact of a campaign being fought by Quirinius in Cilicia? (II) Even if an enrolment by tribes was carried out, would this be likely to involve a journey of

[1] The subject is treated from a different side in a paper by the present writer on the *Method of Research in Ancient History*, in the *Contemporary Review*, March 1912.

all Jews to the native town of their family? (III) How could the presence of Mary be required at Bethlehem, when it was a settled principle in all ancient law to treat the male head of a family as responsible for all its members? In Palestine especially it is difficult to imagine such a proceeding as the summoning of women to appear before an officer for enrolment.[1] (IV) Josephus tells us that the census of Quirinius in 6–7 A.D. was a great innovation causing alarm and revolt: it is therefore not easy to think that a similar census can have been held twelve or fourteen years earlier and passed off with so little friction that Josephus does not mention it. It is true that Professor Ramsay discriminates in character the earlier census which he supposes from the Roman census of Quirinius of 6 A.D.; but it is doubtful how far this view is maintainable, especially as Luke uses the same word (ἀπογραφή) to designate the known census of Quirinius (Acts v. 37, 6 A.D.) from the supposed earlier census.

"Thus there can be no doubt that the supposition of errors of fact in Luke would from the purely historical point of view remove very great difficulties."

A candid and dispassionate criticism such as Professor Gardner gives is always useful and welcome. In considering and meeting the arguments which are thus stated, we understand more clearly the bearings of the position which we are maintaining. A brief reply to each of his arguments will suffice.

(I) It is a misunderstanding to say that on our hypothesis Luke would be dating the census in Judaea by the

[1] I omit at this point an objection, as it relates to the text of Luke, and to the relation of Mary to Joseph as being (according to the received text) not the wife of Joseph but only betrothed to him. This objection raises a side of the question with which it is not my purpose to deal.

campaign in Cilicia. Quirinius must have had a *provincia* or sphere of duty, and the best Roman authorities are agreed, as already mentioned,[1] that Quirinius in the Cilician war was necessarily acting as viceroy (*legatus*) of the Emperor in the province *Syria et Cilicia* and commander of the Syrian armies. There were no other Roman legions in the continent of Asia except the Syrian. In the fullest and strictest sense Quirinius was ἡγεμών of Syria during the Homonadensian war. Professor Gardner is inclined to think that ἡγεμονεύοντος is not quite the exact term; but it is the strict and correct term for the power exercised by the representative of the Emperor, whether viceroy or merely procurator. He suggests ἀνθυπατεύοντος as an alternative; but that term, if applied to Syria, where no proconsul ever ruled in Imperial time, would have been one of those inaccuracies in detail which stamp a document as untrustworthy and unhistorical.

In passing, we may observe that, on the hypothesis of two simultaneous legates in Syria, Quirinius and Saturninus, the dating by the latter (followed by Tertullian) suggests a Palestinian or Syrian source: on the other hand, the dating by Quirinius suggests a western authority, familiar with the aspect which the farther East wore to a Greek of the Aegean world.[2]

(II) Professor Gardner's second argument refers to the first form of my hypothesis, which is confessedly inadequate. As the hypothesis has now been developed into an admitted universal rule, of which we possess contemporary and original evidence, the argument ceases to have any force or relevance. People were summoned to return to their proper domicile; and the Oriental point of view was to consider that a

[1] See Expositor, November, p. 399.

[2] The mention of Quirinius rather than Saturninus would be very natura on Dr Rendall's theory that Luke was a native of Pisidian Antioch, where Quirinius was familiar and his colleague was wholly unimportant.

person who departed from his domicile to an alien town was a suspicious and probably ill-doing character.

(III) Suspicion of this kind would be at least as strong in the case of a woman as of a man ; and at least as strong in Semitic as in western lands. It is not within our scope to discuss the special features of this case and the unusual relationship between Joseph and Mary (on which Professor Gardner bases in part his argument). We are treating only of the general principles and broader facts. There is, moreover, no need to think that the wife must necessarily " appear before an officer for enrolment." We know too little about details to speak on such a point. The head of the household made the return for the household ; but the household was perhaps in his company and not far distant.

(IV) It is certain that much disorder was caused at the second census (A.D. 6–7), but we have explained this as due in part to the valuation of property in the land which was now being formally taken over as part of the province Syria. It is further not certain that the census of B.C. 9–8 was unaccompanied by disorder, even although Josephus mentions none. It is not a sound argument that Josephus must have mentioned every riot and every sedition that occurred in Palestine under Roman rule; in fact it is practically certain that he omitted some or many disturbances. Both the first and every census was an *ἀπογραφή*. Luke calls the first *πρώτη ἀπογραφή*, and the second *ἡ ἀ.*, " the (great) enrolment " (which was true).

The final criticism, however, remains. The truth of the historical surroundings in which Luke's narrative places the birth of Jesus does not prove that the supreme facts, which give human and divine value to the birth, are true. It may be,—in fact it must be—admitted as true that " the first enrolment " took place in 8 B.C., that Quirinius was governing Syria during at least the first half of the year,

and that the general order was issued in Syria for all to return to their own homes in preparation for the enrolment. Yet this does not prove that Mary was the mother of Christ, as Luke describes Him, and as John and Paul saw Him and believed in Him.

The surrounding facts are matter of history, and can be discussed and proved by historical evidence. The essential facts of the narrative are not susceptible of discussion on historical principles, and do not condescend to be tested by historical evidence. That truth exists and moves on a higher plane of insight. It is known through the absolute insight into the heart of human life and divine nature. It comes to, or is granted to, or is forced upon, a man as the completion of his experience and the crown of his life and the remaking of his nature. It proves itself to the soul of man. When he sees it, he knows that it is the one truth—the one ultimate truth,—of the world of half-truths, a world of preparation by which he is being moulded and fashioned and hammered into a condition in which he can receive the truth. This knowledge cannot be proved by word and argument. It is not in word, but in power. It does not spring from any more fundamental principle. It is the fountain from which all other so-called principles flow. It is the guarantee of all other truth. There is nothing true without God, and there is nothing true except the Divine in the infinite variety of His manifestation.

This, however, is not the question which was put to me, and which it has been my object to answer. The question was put to me in the course of criticism and controversy. A distinguished and esteemed scholar, who has now passed from among us, in a brief criticism of my book *St. Paul the Traveller*, referred with some scorn to the belief which I have there stated and defended, that Luke was

a great and trustworthy historian, possessed of the true historical insight, which enabled him to recognise the important facts and to exhibit them in proper perspective. He considered that he gave a sufficient and complete refutation of my position by asking what I would make of the historical assertions contained in Luke's Gospel ii. 1–3. This argument seemed to him final : no word further was needed : no self-respecting scholar could for a moment maintain that this little narrative was credible.

Seventeen years have elapsed since I read the challenge. It has taken all that time to complete the answer. The progress of discovery has given the answer ; and I have no share in it except that I recognised the soul of a real historian in the two books of Luke's history, and was on the outlook for the unifying principle which should give life to the isolated and apparently unconnected historical details as they were discovered. They all bear upon the supreme fact of the coming of Christ into His world.

At first I could not see how to begin to answer the question and the problem placed before me. Then after three years I read the proof given almost simultaneously by three scholars, two German and one English,[1] that there existed in Egypt during the second century after Christ a system of periodic "Enrolments by Household," and that the period was fourteen years. I perceived at once that such a system in the Roman province must proceed from the great originator of Roman method in Egypt, the true founder of bureaucratic government, viz., Augustus. I counted the years and found that the cycle was counted from B.C. 23, the date in which the fabric of the Imperial constitution was completed, and the year one of Augustus'

[1] Dr. Kenyon had the precedence, I think, by a few days or weeks ; but the work of all three was independent. The Germans were Wilcken and Viereck.

reign was placed by himself. The first census-year on that system was 9 B.C.; all children born during that year had to be reckoned in the census, therefore the actual counting took place during the following year 8 B.C. This, then, was the year of Luke's "first enrolment"; and the meaning of the word "first" in Luke now became clear. The edict of Augustus established the census-system not merely for Egypt, but for the whole Empire: it was a decree that all the Roman world should be subjected to enrolment. No one can imagine that the mere issue of the decree was sufficient to ensure that the census-system was henceforth carried out regularly and permanently through all the Roman provinces. The resources and the organisation of the Imperial bureaucracy were insufficient for such a gigantic task: and Luke does not say that the decree was universally effective. All that he says or implies is only that the decree was issued, and that it was put into force in Palestine, which carries with it the Syrian province as a whole.[1] There are, also, traces of its execution in some other Eastern provinces, where systematic method in administration had been practised before Roman time, and when the census could be more easily made.

As soon as the article by Wilcken came before my eyes, I saw that my critic was delivered into my hands; and while my reply to the criticism was in process of being printed, a succession of discoveries showed that the periodic enrolments were made in Egypt as early as 20–21 A.D.: this was evidently the third enrolment. Since then it has been proved that Augustus was only remodelling a much older Egyptian form of census.

In applying this discovery to Luke I made at first some mistakes, on which I need not waste further time except

[1] A Syrian census is proved by the already quoted inscription: it was perhaps the first census, more probably the second.

to confess them once more. Further discovery has shown the right way.

To Mitteis, Rostowzew, and Zulueta I am indebted for teaching me the importance of the other principle, which elucidates and justifies the narrative of Luke, viz., the attachment to the original home and the use made of this force in the Imperial administration. Rostowzew alone recognised the bearing of this principle on Luke; but Mr. Zulueta has stated it in words that are an unconscious commentary on Luke. It is the merit of Colonel Mackinlay[1] to have first held firmly to the date 8 B.C. for the birth of Jesus, and to have shown how this date clears up the chronology of the life of Christ.

These acknowledgments finish my task.

IV. The Name of Luke.

The origin of the name Loukas has always presented difficulty and has roused a good deal of discussion. The name belongs to the class of familiar or pet names (in German *Kosenamen*) which are usually shortened from a longer original form. Loukas, however, is a Greek and not a Latin name. In Latin the praenomen Lucius could not produce a *Kosenamen* Loukas; and those scholars who are thinking of the Latin name Lucius cannot recognise any connexion between it and this Greek name Loukas. The difficulty presented itself at quite an early time; and already in the fifth century, as Professor A. Souter says, there is Latin manuscript authority for Lucanus as the full name of the Evangelist, equivalent to the familiar Loukas (after the analogy of Silvanus and Silas).

The right question, however, is not whether the Latin Lucius could be familiarised as Loukas, but whether the Greek Loukios, borrowed from Latin and treated according

[1] *The Magi: how they recognised Christ's Star*: Hodder & Stoughton.

to Greek custom, had as a familiar by-form the dissyllabic Loukas. No proof that Loukas was equivalent to Loukios was known; and hence there came to be among modern scholars a growing strength of opinion that Lucanus was the proper Latin form of the name of the Evangelist.[1] No case was known in which any individual was called indifferently Loukios and Loukas; and without some proof of the equivalence it seemed unsafe to maintain that the fuller Loukios could degenerate into Loukas. But we have not a large store of evidence about the equivalence of full names and the corresponding familiar names among the Greek-speaking peoples. Accordingly, the recent discovery of a considerable number of inscriptions containing names of the *Kosenamen* type presents some interest.

Parts of the south-west and north-west walls of the peribolos, which surrounded the sanctuary of the god of Pisidian Antioch, Men Askaênos, one of the wealthiest and most powerful gods of Asia Minor, are covered with dedicatory inscriptions recording vows to the god. These all belong to the Roman period, and the vast majority of them are the work of Greek-speaking people, who bore Roman names. These dedications were therefore made, as a rule, not by the original Latin-speaking colonists of Antioch, a sort of aristocracy in the town, but by the Greek-speaking population, who sprang from the pre-Roman inhabitants of Antioch. These Greek-speaking inhabitants (*incolae*) were gradually elevated to the Roman citizenship; and it is proved in a paper by Miss Hardie, now Mrs. Hasluck (*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1912, pp. 144 f.), that there exists among the dedications an overwhelming majority of Roman names. Some are slave-names, others are the names of freedmen (*liberti*) or of

[1] I think that I have somewhere stated this opinion, which I held until June, 1912, when new evidence convinced me of my error.

incolae, and a few are probably names of descendants of the original Roman colonists. The dedications are often expressed in the familiar speech, and give some interesting evidence about the Greek usage in respect of Latin names.

Copied by Mr. J. G. C. Anderson, Mr. W. M. Calder and myself in 1912.

In very rough and rude lettering on the south-west wall of the sanctuary of Mên : letters small and hard to read :—

Λουκᾶς Νουμε-	Loukas Tillios
Τίλλιο- ρία Οὐε-	Kriton (and)
ς Κριτω- νοῦστ-	Noumeria Ve-
ν α	nusta
Μηνὶ	to Men
εὐχήν	a vow

This is a joint dedication by L. Tillius Crito and (his wife) Numeria Venusta to the god of the sanctuary. Both bear Latin names (except the Greek cognomen of the husband) : both are *cives*. Yet they are a Greek-speaking family to whom Greek comes more naturally than Latin.

There cannot be the slightest doubt that Loukas Tillios Kriton was a Roman citizen, whose name in Latin must have been Lucius Tillius Crito. In the Greek that was spoken at Antioch Loukios and Loukas were evidently felt to be equivalent ; and Crito writes himself in Greek as Loukas. His third name suggests that he was perhaps a freedman ; but it is (as Mrs. Hasluck says) [1] difficult or even impossible to distinguish the names of freedmen from the names of *incolae* who had received the Roman citizenship and had assumed the full name of the *civis Romanus*.

This single case is sufficient and conclusive. This equivalence was accepted at Antioch ; and there can be no

[1] *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1912, p. 145, note 67.

reason for thinking that Antiochian custom differed from that of other Greek-speaking towns of Asia Minor and the Roman East generally: Loukas was a Greek *Kosenamen* of Loukios.

This case does not stand alone. There are several examples among these Antiochian dedications, in which the same individual or family repeats the inscription, usually with some variations. In one of these pairs the same person is mentioned once as Loukios and once as Loukas. The two dedications, which are engraved very near one another, are as follows:

On the sixth buttress from west corner of S.W. wall:—

Μηνὶ	To Men
εὐχ[ήν	a vow
Γάμος Ἀβασκάν[τ-	Gamos (son) of Abas-
ου μὲ [γ]υν[αικός.	kantos with his wife.
Λούκιος υἱός.	Lucius son.
Πουμπούλιος υἱός	Pompilius son.

On the wall close to the buttress:—

Μηνὶ εὐχήν	To Men a vow
Γάμος Ἀβάσκάντου	Gamos son of Abas-
ὑός, καὶ Λουκᾶς καὶ	kantos, and Loukas, and
Πουμπούμλιος (sic!)	Pompilius
καὶ Εὔδοξος.	and Eudoxos.

The second of this pair of dedications was correctly read by our party in 1911, and published by Mrs. Hasluck in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1912, p. 130.[1]

The first we failed to read completely in 1911: part of it is published by Mrs. Hasluck on p. 127.[2] In 1912 we

[1] She gives the name as Gallos, not Gamos; but states in her commentary that Gamos is quite possible. I appended in a footnote to her paper that my reading was unhesitatingly Gamos, and quoted a Bithynian example of this name.

[2] We must all three share the blame for failure, and not Mrs. Hasluck alone. When we first uncovered them in 1911, the letters were filled with

deciphered it entirely, and then found that it is almost a duplicate of the other.

In the second, which is perhaps later than the first, Eudoxos is mentioned, and in the first the wife of the dedicant Gamos. In these dedications the wife is often omitted, and when mentioned is very rarely named.[1] Apart from these differences, the two mention the same family, and exemplify the custom of doublets which was common at this sanctuary. Loukios in the first is the same as Loukas in the second : he was the elder son of the dedicant.

Two witnesses suffice. An accumulation of other examples would not really strengthen the argument. Loukios and Loukas were felt as equivalent names by the Greeks, one familiar and the other formal. It has been pointed out that the two names, the polite and the familiar, are known in the case of several persons mentioned in the New Testament, Apollôs and Apollônios, Priscilla and Prisca, Silas and Silvanus. Of these Apollônios is found only in the Bezan Codex ; but its presence there is a sufficient proof. By its form Apollôs is proved to be a *Kosenamen* ; and Apollônios is the full name. The same man was called Apollônios in formal and polite speech, Apollôs in familiar usage. It happens that the form Loukios is not attested in any document as the formal name of the Evangelist ; but we now have the proof that in Antioch and therefore generally Loukas was known to be the familiar form of Loukios.

There are two possibilities open. On the one hand

soil, of the same colour as the stone, being decomposed from it. The stones were washed clean by rain during the winter of 1911–12 : but even in 1912 this and many others of the dedications were extremely difficult, and several of them baffled the oft repeated efforts of Mr. J. G. C. Anderson, Mr. Calder and myself.

[1] The mother is named, when she survives her husband or for some other reason is head of the family. She is rarely named by her husband.

Lucius may have been the *praenomen* of a Roman citizen; and in that case we may regard it as almost certain that the physician Loukios was a freedman, who acquired the full Roman name when he was set free; for the custom of society would make it probable that this physician, who led the life of a companion of Paul, was not born a Roman citizen (as perhaps Silvanus was). Physicians were often freedmen; and freedmen were frequently addressed by their *praenomen*, which marked their rank.[1]

On the other hand the Latin Lucius was often adopted in Greek as an individual name. A Greek might then be called Loukios simply, just as he might be called Demetrios simply. Loukios was in such cases not a *praenomen*, and did not imply Roman citizenship; in fact this usage was a complete proof that the man who was named in full simply Loukios, without *nomen* or *cognomen*,[2] was not a Roman. We may also infer with equal certainty that a person named Loukios simply was not a slave: the Roman name could not be degraded to a slave name in that age. Such a Loukios would be an ordinary Hellene.

No evidence is known sufficient to prove which of these alternatives applied to the Evangelist Luke. The former would suit specially well with the profession of a doctor; but a *libertus* usually remained in some close relationship to his former master, who continued to be his *patronus*. Luke was perfectly free to go about the world in Paul's company, and has no appearance of being in connexion with a patron. Exceptional cases might however occur. Perhaps some unnoticed detail may yet furnish a decisive argument.

W. M. Ramsay.

[1] See Horace, *Satires*, II. 5, 32: and the commentators thereon; "*Quinte*," *puta, aut "Publi": gaudent praenomine molles auriculae.*

[2] This does not apply to cases where in casual mention a man is spoken of by his *praenomen* alone. I refer only to cases where the full legal name was Loukios.

RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

II. The Period of the Pre-Exilic Prophets.

Our previous lecture discussed the attitude to be taken to the various parties who figure in the religious controversies in the Old Testament. We agreed that the prophets and other inspired writers were in the right in their main contentions, that their work and their teaching were in the line of the progressive development of Revealed Religion. We also agreed that, in spite of this, we are not justified in taking up a partisan attitude and wholly condemning the other side. Men might be on the wrong side, we said, and might still be good and holy; they might even make some contribution to ultimate and permanent truth.

I wish to illustrate these principles further in a discussion of the work of the great pre-exilic prophets.

We may briefly review the leading features of the closing period of the Monarchy. About 750 the great series of canonical prophets began with Amos. That date falls towards the end of the reigns of Uzziah of Judah and Jeroboam II. of Israel. These reigns were long and prosperous; both the states enjoyed material wealth and political power and independence. These brought with them certain social and economic changes. The older Israel was largely a nation of yeoman farmers, each family farming its own land; great wealth and extreme poverty were equally rare. The changes of the eighth century led to the formation of great estates; in the process many of the farmers were ousted from their land, and they and their families became landless paupers. There was an increase of culture, luxury and the ostentatious display of

wealth. At the same time there was much external devotion to Yahweh, a profusion of elaborate ritual at many sanctuaries, supported by munificent offerings. But this external devotion was not accompanied by justice and benevolence; and the ritual itself was often superstitious and perhaps even immoral.

These evils were denounced by the prophets of the eighth century, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah. Meanwhile Assyria again asserted its supremacy over Palestine. The Northern Kingdom was overthrown in 721; Judah had a narrow escape in 701, but survived for more than a century. There was no real reformation of social evils or religious corruption; and in the last days of Judah, Jeremiah at Jerusalem and Ezekiel in Chaldea prophesied in much the same strain as Amos and Isaiah.

Hezekiah seems to have been under the influence of Isaiah at certain periods of his reign, and Josiah seems to have favoured the teaching of the canonical prophets; otherwise these prophets were for the most part in opposition to the authorities both in Church and State, kings, priests, and even to the general body of professional prophets.

The teaching of these prophets, therefore, was highly controversial and their ministry was fiercely contentious. They attacked popular religious teaching and worship, current social principles and practice, and necessarily also the influential classes of their day, men of wealth, rank and power, both lay and clerical.

I wish to devote this lecture to a brief study of these great controversies.

This period also has been very commonly treated on the principle that one party was wholly right and the other quite wrong. Even in homiletical works of the critical school the tendency is not altogether outgrown; as I said in my previous lecture, it has a certain justification in

sermons where individuals are treated as symbols of good and evil and not as ordinary historical personages.

Take for instance Professor G. A. Smith's great work on *Isaiah*. I trust it will be understood that my reference is not an adverse criticism ; I do not deny that in popular exposition, for the sake of immediate effect, by way of edification, such treatment is justifiable or even necessary. But very sweeping statements are often made by others as serious history ; and their presence in a popular exposition by so distinguished a scholar as G. A. Smith helps us to understand how they must dominate much traditional literature and preaching. Take then G. A. Smith's treatment of Ahaz : we are told that, " religion to Ahaz was only another kind of diplomacy " ; in another place, " if Ahaz had any conscience left " ; and again, " Ahaz is thus the Judas of the Old Testament." It is however only fair to say that Ahaz is Judas on the understanding that Judas betrayed Jesus through a " wilful desire to bring about the kingdom of God in his own violent fashion."

Now it is quite true that the religious policy of Ahaz was wrong ; but I see no justification for saying that with him religion was mere diplomacy, or for doubting that he had a conscience, or even for comparing him with Judas. He was probably devout, with a gloomy, superstitious devotion ; and not more worldly than most kings.

A Romanist divine of the sixteenth century might have written in the same way about Queen Elizabeth ; I should not like to say that there was any general resemblance between Ahaz and Elizabeth ; but I am not sure that we have evidence that Ahaz was conspicuously inferior in religion and morality, judged by the standard of his times.

Or again, remember that Jehoiakim and Jeremiah were deadly enemies, therefore, for instance, Dr. Streane (C.B.S. xviii.) is full of unmeasured condemnation of Jehoiakim

and his followers, we read "the disregard of religion on the part of the king was thus the means of effecting a speedy separation between the true servants of God and the empty professors. The latter fall back into idolatry and wickedness; the former are refined by the adversity and their faithfulness shines the more brightly." I think it quite likely that Jehoiakim was harsh and selfish; but I see no evidence that he disregarded religion, I am afraid that many harsh and selfish people are to be found amongst the regular attendants at Christian churches. Doubtless Jeremiah and his friends were true servants of God, but it does not follow that those who differed from them were empty professors.

As I have said, I do not quarrel with these statements as an emphatic and impressive way of saying that, judged by the ultimate issues, and speaking generally, Isaiah and Jeremiah were right, their ministries were links in the chain of progressive Revelation; while their opponents were wrong, and their work had little permanent value.

It is urgently necessary nowadays to do away with the common idea that we have a right to judge a man's moral and spiritual character by the extent to which he holds our theological views and shares our religious observances. A little charity towards the opponents of the prophets might help to discredit this popular fallacy.

Let us then briefly consider these great controversies in a more impartial spirit. We need not be less friendly to Isaiah and Jeremiah; we need not fear that scientific study will detract from the spiritual grandeur of these noble figures; but we may perhaps venture to remember that history cannot be written as a series of dramatic contrasts between good and evil; we may be a little less hostile to the unfortunate kings and priests and prophets who differed from Isaiah and Jeremiah; especially as

almost all we know about them comes from their enemies and opponents.

Let us notice to begin with that religious antagonisms were complicated by personal, social, and political differences. I suppose we might assume this from our knowledge of human nature and of general history. Take any great religious struggle of which we have full information; whether between the Arians and the Catholics; between Rome and the Reformers; between Laud and the Puritans —such conflicts are never wholly confined to religious matters; they are also affected by the likes and dislikes of princes, prelates and statesmen, by the clashing interests of different classes; and by the political disputes of the period. There is no reason to suppose that controversies in ancient Israel were less involved or less complicated. Indeed we have direct evidence that the prophets were concerned with personal, social and political matters.

A. *Foreign Policy.*

In their days foreign policy was a burning question as it is in ours. For instance, in Hezekiah's time the supreme power in Western Asia was Assyria, and in Jeremiah's time the supreme power was Babylon; in both periods Egypt was perpetually instigating Judah to revolt against the dominant power; there was an Egyptian party and an anti-Egyptian party at Jerusalem; Isaiah and Jeremiah associated themselves with the anti-Egyptian party. It has been usual to maintain that these prophets were right, either by political insight or as a matter of special inspiration. They may have been; I am not prepared to discuss the matter now; but their opponents, the Egyptian party, were not necessarily lost to all sense of decency, honesty and godliness, because they took a different view.

International politics were as tangled and obscure then

as they are now, and it was as possible for sincere, straightforward, devout men to be found on opposite sides then as it is to-day. I do not think that I should be branded as a sinner above all men, if my views on the *Entente Cordiale* or the rapprochement with Germany do not happen to agree with those of the Archbishop of Canterbury or of Dr. Clifford, as the case may be.

B. *Differences on Personal Questions.*

Naturally our very meagre data tell us little about the personal relationships of the prophets. Their extant works are mere pamphlets, selections containing what was felt to be most inspired, or most valuable, or most important, either by the prophets themselves or by their disciples or by the devout scholars of later times.

Such a principle of selection would include few traces of any personal feeling which entered into the struggles of the prophets with their opponents; but I do not know that there is any creed or confession which requires us to believe that Isaiah and Jeremiah were more Christ-like in this respect than Savonarola, Luther or Calvin, Wesley or Whitefield.

Our evidence on such points is, as I have said, most meagre. We may perhaps fancy that we discern a personal note in the attitude of Isaiah to Ahaz or of Jeremiah to Jehoiakim. We might perhaps—I daresay we ought not, but we might be somewhat suspicious when we find Isaiah demanding (xxii. 15) the dismissal of one royal treasurer after another, first Shebna, then Eliakim. We might wonder whether this activity in domestic politics was wholly free from personal or party feeling. But we can hardly maintain that we have proof of such feeling, and we put the most favourable construction on what we are told. Possibly a similar charity is due to the other side.

Perhaps, too, some allowance should be made for the fact that, even on the showing of the prophets themselves, there seems sometimes to have been little that was winning or conciliating in the prophetic method.

C. *Social Ethics, Religion and Morality.*

We may turn now to a subject on which we have much fuller information, the prophetic attitude towards troubles between class and class. We have seen that the prophets of the eighth century lived in a period of social and economic change ; in earlier times Israel was largely a nation of small landholders ; in Isaiah's time there was a tendency to form large estates and thus create a class of landless paupers. The prophets protested strongly against this tendency ; they clung to the old ideal according to which an Israelite family held its land as a sacred and inalienable inheritance. They denounced the wealthy nobles who added house to house and field to field.

In this and other matters, notably the pure administration of justice, the prophets upheld a high standard of social righteousness. This, however, was only one application of a fundamental feature of their teaching, namely, the essential bond between religion and morality. God demands not sacrifice but benevolence and beneficence ; what He requires is not sacrifice but that His people should do justice and love mercy and walk humbly with their God. Therefore it is commonly said that one chief characteristic of the teaching of the canonical prophets was their insistence on the necessary connexion between morality and religion. No doubt this is substantially true.

But if this was, as it undoubtedly was, the teaching of the prophets, what was the attitude of their opponents, and of the persons and classes whom they denounced ? Did the latter teach that there was no connexion between

religion and ethics ; that Yahweh was indifferent to moral character and conduct ? It hardly seems probable.

I am doubtful whether as a matter of express theory or doctrine there was any avowed difference on this point between, say, Jeremiah and his unfortunate antagonist Hananiah. I don't suppose the latter preached the independence or the divorce of religion and morality. I am not sure that any sane person ever did. Of course practice and theory are quite different ; but theoretical antinomianism is the hallucination of religious lunatics, and the latter sometimes occur in groups.

In *practice*, of course, religion and morality may be kept in separate water-tight compartments, especially among primitive peoples ; but when once the connexion of the two has been made clear, it is obvious and commends itself, so that it would seldom be denied.

Probably as a matter of formal theory all the prominent religious teachers of our period were agreed that Yahweh was a righteous God and required that His people should be righteous. Such teaching was no novelty in the time of Amos.

The avowed issue is hardly ever between morality and immorality ; the real question is what constitutes morality. Most people use the word "ought," there are things which *ought* to be done and things that *ought* not to be done. Controversy arises as to what these things are.

Let us illustrate from modern analogies. Supposing a High Church clergyman encourages his choir-boys to play cricket on Sundays ; a Sabbatarian accuses him of being immoral. A Labour Leader talks about the wickedness of a Christian employer who does not pay Trades Union wages. The employer thinks that a Methodist Labour Leader who makes his workmen dissatisfied is a pestilent hypocrite. But neither the clergyman nor the employer nor the labour

leader professes to advocate what is ethically wrong ; none of them intend to separate their religion from their morality.

Isaiah and his supporters denounced the governing classes for violating the principles of social righteousness, and condemned the clergy, the priests and prophets for abetting them ; but it is quite possible that amongst those who were denounced were honest and devout men, with a clear conscience, who felt that Isaiah and Amos were mischievous demagogues.

The prophets, as we have said more than once, protested against the formation of large estates. They apparently considered it wrong in their time that large districts should be owned by individuals, and that the people in general should have no opportunity of owning their farms and homesteads.

One principle underlying this position might be stated thus. No one is free, no one is a true citizen able to enjoy the rights and fulfil the duties of a citizen unless he is assured of a home and of the opportunity of earning a livelihood for himself and his family. If a man can be turned out of his home and deprived of his livelihood at a week's notice through the needs, the avarice, the caprice, or the ill-will of landlords and employers, such a man is not really a free citizen. Many slaves have had a more assured, a more honourable status. In Isaiah's time the ownership of land was the natural way in which a man could be assured of a home and a livelihood. Hence his teaching.

But to-day, after nineteen centuries of Christianity, we are by no means agreed about such a principle and still less as to its application. There is room for sincere Christians to take different views ; and so there was in the time of Isaiah. Assuming that every one ought to be sure of a home and a livelihood, it may have been open

to debate even in Isaiah's time whether making every head of a family a landowner was the way to get this principle applied to the furthest possible extent.

But Isaiah's teaching in this matter may also be regarded as an application of a broader principle. We have seen that Israel had reached a well-known stage in national development. As far as the community as a whole was concerned, there was a great advance in material wealth and prosperity, from which, however, the people generally derived little advantage. The increased wealth mainly went to provide large fortunes for a small class of great landowners, the millionaires, and multi-millionaires of their time ; on the other hand there arose a pauper class, more wretched and degraded than any that existed in primitive times. Such at any rate was what the prophets feared ; this seemed to them the tendency of the changes that were taking place.

Their protest involved a general principle which might be formulated thus : That the advantages of material progress should be fairly distributed amongst the community, and should not be exploited in the interests of a limited class.

But here again, what was the issue between Isaiah and those whom he attacked ?

I doubt whether the principle I have formulated would have been seriously challenged, as a principle, even in Isaiah's time. In practice the issue is usually as to facts and as to how principles are to be applied to existing circumstances.

May I again illustrate by modern analogies ? We have many social controversies now ; but the burning questions are not so much as to the theoretical principles of social righteousness, but as to how they are to be applied. Nobody, for instance, would publicly deny that the

worker is entitled to a living wage. But what is a living wage? Dukes, for instance, are as a rule, I believe, hard workers; and I understand, from statements as to recent financial measures, that their incomes are only barely sufficient, they cannot stand the strain of any additional taxation; they have just a living wage. Then, again, to take another class of workers, the artisans—what is a living wage for them? How much beer and tobacco, how many music-halls and football matches does it include? Are three weeks at Blackpool or Yarmouth necessary, or would a fortnight be enough? Surely here the point at issue is not the principle but how it is to be applied.

Again, we should all agree that an employer should treat his workpeople fairly, and if possible generously. But even an outsider, with the most slight and superficial acquaintance with business, knows how difficult it is to settle what is fair and possible. If the employer is to keep in business, he must make some profits, he must compensate for the losses of a bad year by extra profits in good years; he must have a reserve fund. It is not easy to say what wages he can afford to give.

To state the matter in the most simple fashion, there are three parties concerned, and each should deal fairly by the other two; the employer should be fair to the workmen and to the consumer; the workmen should be fair to the employer and the consumer; and the consumer should be fair to the workmen and the employer. It is very easy to lay this down as a general moral principle; it is difficult to apply it to any actual case.

Any one who reads the organs of different political parties, including those of capital and labour, knows how easy it is for honest men to differ as to what is right, and how easy it is for such men to be led to opposite conclusions by varieties of interest, temperament, intellectual bias, and

sympathy, and how readily they denounce their opponents as unprincipled scoundrels.

Probably the controversies of Isaiah's time were carried on under somewhat similar conditions. Some of the men whom he denounced were obviously guilty of cruelty and injustice; but Isaiah would not be alone in condemning them; all decent people would sympathise with him. It was merely his courage, eloquence, and inspiration that made him conspicuous as the spokesman of justice. Where he would provoke opposition would be in his attitude towards the social and economic changes of his day, the particular remedies he advocated. He would be obnoxious not by his sympathy with the poor, but through his hostility to the rich.

There was, after all, a case for the other side, even on general principles of social righteousness. We may neglect, as I have said, gross cases of cruelty and injustice. But apart from such, there may have been people who differed from Amos and Isaiah, and yet had good reasons—I do not say *sufficient* reasons but *good* reasons—for thinking that they were justified in following and taking advantage of the social and economic tendencies of their time.

Here again the points at issue were not formal and avowed differences of ethical principles personal or social. They were twofold. First, there would be controversy as to what admitted principles required under existing circumstances. And secondly, you have on the one hand the enthusiasm of the prophet for all that is true and fair and generous, and on the other hand the anxiety of the average man to safeguard his own interests.

D. *Theology.*

Let us now consider how far there may have been antagonism between Isaiah and other religious teachers and leaders

on the score of conscious and formal differences in theology. We may use theology in an elastic sense for expressions of religious opinion.

The history of Christianity shows that the real issue between churches and faiths does not generally lie in differences of theology. Such differences are often the ostensible occasion or cause of division, and theology is useful in furnishing watchwords and shibboleths. But churches and faiths are really divided by conflicting claims to authority, personal and official; by varieties of race, of ritual or external observances, and of ecclesiastical organisation. A church with any vitality finds room within itself for a wide range of theological opinion. There are great varieties of belief in the Church of England, amongst Presbyterians, amongst Congregationalists, amongst Baptists, and within other denominations. The theology of an Anglican clergyman may be much closer to that of a Presbyterian minister than to that of some of his brethren in his own church.

Possibly there were theological differences amongst the followers of Isaiah; while in some cases the chief difference between a devout Israelite and an equally devout Moabite was that one called God Yahweh and the other called Him Chemosh. And in Judah, take even Isaiah's great watchword *Qᵉdhôsh Yisrāel*, the Holy One of Israel; Isaiah's opponents would have shouted "Holy, holy, holy is Yahweh, the God of Israel" with as much enthusiasm as Isaiah himself. I doubt whether Isaiah's opponents would have found much fault with his theological propositions; only they might not have understood them in the sense that he intended.

We must not, of course, forget the theory I mentioned in my previous lecture, that from the time of Moses onward there was what we may call an orthodox party in Israel

which handed down a tradition of something like an ethical monotheism and maintained this faith as against the corruption and superstition of the rest of the people. If that were so, the prophets of the eighth century would stand in the line of this tradition. I think that somewhere I have seen a similar view with regard to "the pure Protestant faith," viz., that throughout the Christian centuries, amongst all the corruptions of Romanism, the Protestant faith has always been held by an elect remnant; that it is a continuous tradition from Christ and His Apostles. The parallel may suggest something as to the probabilities with regard to the religion of Israel.

But the canonical prophets do not seem to be defending an ancient tradition of ethical monotheism against a corrupt theology. There is no appeal to ancient tradition or to the authority of Moses; they and their hearers seem to have a common ground in the faith in a special bond between Yahweh and Israel, which involved mutual claims, duties and obligations. So far as abstract theory was concerned, their teaching as to the righteousness, power, and majesty of Yahweh was welcome and popular. Here again controversy arose out of the practical application of these principles. For instance, the popular view was that the righteousness and power of Yahweh were shown in giving victory to His Chosen People, whereas according to the prophets these attributes were manifested in punishment inflicted on the sin of Israel.

The objection to eclecticism, syncretism, Baal-worship and so on has nothing to do with theoretical monotheism, it is a purely practical matter—the patriotic Israelite should be devoted to the national God. Thus it was, once more, a question of the application of a principle that the Israelite should be devoted to Yahweh. But how should he show his devotion? what did Yahweh want? The

answer may imply theology, but these prophets were above all things practical. G. A. Smith [1] speaks of Amos as "destitute of dogma." Take, for instance, the great prophetic doctrines that Yahweh was not the Champion, but the Judge of Israel; and that His judgments would bring ruin on the nation—this also is chiefly practical.

As to the principle involved, every one knew that Yahweh was the Judge of Israel—even Chemosh could be angry with Moab. The points at issue were the kind of conduct which He approved or condemned; the form of the punishment which He inflicted and the measure of its severity.

All this seems to show that the prophets were not at variance with other religious teachers on questions of pure doctrine.

E. *Ritual.*

Let us turn next to the attitude of the prophets to ritual, or external religious observances. What was their controversy with their opponents on such matters?

The characteristic teaching of the prophets was as follows. They depreciated external religious observances and treated them as of small importance compared with justice and benevolence between man and man. They attacked the worship, the sanctuaries and the clergy of their time, including the Temple, the priests and the prophets. Incidentally they denounced idols and other items of Temple furniture, and condemned any worship of gods other than Yahweh.

Here at any rate are clear issues, but they are largely personal; it is the worshippers, both lay and clerical, who are wrong. The worship is unsatisfactory because the worshippers have failed in justice, duty and kindliness to their fellow-men. It is a matter of emphasis; most men

[1] *Twelve*, i. 86.

laid the greater stress on external observances, on sacrifice, on sacred days and things, places and persons. The prophets were chiefly concerned with character and conduct. It is probable that they attached little importance to forms and furniture, and in view of this we must not lay too much stress upon their denunciation of idols; they also denounced sanctuaries, sacrifices and priests; and it is not clear, at any rate in the case of Hosea, that they regarded idols as more objectionable than sacrifices.

It is not, as I have said, absolutely clear; but I am inclined to think that Isaiah and other prophets came to object to idols and other features of popular worship because these were common to the worship of Yahweh and that of foreign gods; and the prophets were anxious to make the religion of Israel conspicuously different from foreign religions, so that there might be no confusion and no connexion between Yahweh and other gods. Such confusion and connexion were common in those days; there were many who worshipped other gods *as well as* Yahweh; it is even possible that there were some Israelites who worshipped other gods *instead* of Yahweh. But it is not certain that even in this matter there was any formal opposition to the teaching of the prophets. Were there really religious teachers of any standing or authority who maintained that true religion consisted in supplementing the worship of Yahweh by that of the Tyrian Baal or Astarte? Would priests or prophets of Yahweh encourage men to worship Astarte? Or, on the other hand, would the priests of a sanctuary of the Tyrian Baal be anxious for their clients to worship Yahweh?

There are in these days many religious vagrants, who drift about to different places of worship, like tramps to various casual wards, but I don't think that either clergymen or ministers encourage the practice. There are also

Summer Schools where you may hear speakers of a dozen denominations.

In Israel the worshipping of various gods might often be encouraged from interested motives. The authorities of a sanctuary might multiply shrines of deities and demons in order to attract as many as possible to their festivals.

Then, again, considerations of politics, especially foreign politics, might lead the government to tolerate or even encourage a variety of cults. Eclecticism might be winked at as a practical necessity, but hardly justified as a formal doctrine. Most serious, earnest men would agree that an Israelite should confine his worship to Yahweh, as far as possible.

Summary and Conclusion.

We have thus made a brief survey of the period from Amos to the Captivity. This survey does not suggest that the antagonism of the prophets and their opponents was that of two organised religious parties, opposed to each other by formal statements of doctrine; or by avowed differences as to the standard of ethics; or by marked varieties of ritual.

The opposition might rather be stated thus:

On the one side were the prophets, men with a living enthusiasm for God and man, eagerly desiring that nation and individual alike should be truly devoted to God. They were convinced that such devotion would find expression in social righteousness, in mutual helpfulness and benevolence amongst men, and especially in care for the poor and weak. They were indignant that the moral and spiritual energies of the people should be dissipated in external observances. Ritual should be subordinate. Because they were good Israelites, their profound experiences and lofty ideals were associated with Yahweh, the God of Israel,

and they were intolerant of foreign cults which divided and distracted the religious forces of the nation.

Then, on the other side, there would be the usual mass of indifferent, conventional people, with a high standard of morals and religion as a matter of formal profession, but also with the tacit understanding that their professions were not to be taken too seriously in practical matters. Such people would not be enthusiastic supporters of the prophets, neither would they be active opponents; but they would probably consider that the zeal of such men as Isaiah was troublesome, inconvenient and uncalled for.

Then there would be earnest, devout, old-fashioned people who would be shocked at the prophets' language as to sacred institutions like sacrifices, Sabbaths and the Temple, and as to established authorities like the priests.

Then, on the other hand, there would be men of liberal culture, who saw a distinct gain to Israel in the development of a wealthy class, and in friendly relations with foreigners. These would object to the teaching of the prophets on social matters and to their denunciation of all foreign elements in religion. There would also be the priests of foreign cults and of local deities and demons, together with the whole tribe of witches, magicians and soothsayers. There would be kings and their ministers, whose domestic and foreign policy was interfered with by the uncompromising Puritanism of the prophets. And, finally, there would be all those who found their account in lust, cruelty and oppression.

W. H. Bennett.

PERSONALITY AND GRACE.

XII. The Will of God.

For two causes the deepest moral needs of the moral personality cannot be met by any moral law. Whether the law be formulated as a decalogue or be the momentary imperative of conscience, the result is the same. First, the attention of the moral personality is directed to itself, and, second, it is made to judge itself by a negative standard. To understand the failure of all moral law to turn our attention from ourselves and to provide a positive and inspiring ideal, is to realise that righteousness cannot be by the law, and that, not as an antiquated theological notion, but as an urgent and ever present practical situation.

First, action on a moral law necessarily directs attention to our moral personality, nor can any kind of moral imperative set us free from that dangerous moral attitude. This arises from the necessity of the case. A moral law is the law of our moral personality. It exists precisely because the moral personality is an end and may not be treated merely as a means. We ought to do right purely out of reverence for what we ought to be. Nevertheless, it is not moral to live under the idea of ourselves as a moral end and to make even our moral good the object of our striving. Of that difficulty no merely ethical theory ever disposes. Moreover, the difficulty is practical as well as theoretical. Mere moral effort always leaves us in the end with our eyes directed to ourselves in self-satisfaction at our virtue, yet creates along with that a distressing consciousness that our eye should be on our duty in forgetfulness of the whole question of our merit or our perfection. Only that conflicting state prevents a consciously moral person from being

self-righteous, and, as it is an unhappy state to cherish, the protection is of the slenderest.

Second, no moral law can ever set up anything more than a negative moral ideal. From that fact indeed the danger of being a consciously moral person chiefly arises. Complacency due to the contemplation of our merit could not exist, were it not measured by a negative standard. Self-righteousness can only be fed by thinking of the things we have not done.

Here lies the deepest moral failure of mere morality. It can be put on as blinkers to make us walk in our narrow beaten round, with the whole vast horizon of life's possibilities hidden from our eyes. It is enough that we do not actively commit transgression, and we fail to recognise that the supreme sin is to be deaf to life's calls and blind to its opportunities. We recognise no suffering which does not cry in our ears, we see no duty which does not point along the accepted, formulated track. A dull and prudent common-sense, so long as it finds in us neither self-indulgence nor sophistry, may approve, but we see no visions and dream no dreams of life's real possibilities.

But the spirit, like a harp with many strings, ought to respond to life's many moods. Life is full of joy and sadness, tenderness and pathos, admiration and just anger. It can be ludicrous, and, to him who can see it, it hardly ever fails to be sublime. But string after string breaks as interest after interest dies. The saddest of all life's failures is to be left with one wailing note of peevish anxiety. From that any kind of moral purpose in life should save us. Yet, if the only note which drowns it is from the hard chord of formal conscientiousness, it also makes no divine music. The aspirations of the childlike soul are not heard in it, and it speaks to no heart of the beauty of goodness and the Divine joy of living. But the formulation of goodness is

nothing, and the beauty of goodness and the self-forgetfulness of childlike souls in the pursuit of it is everything.

A righteousness, therefore, which is by any law cannot escape being both negative and self-righteous, and so cannot enable the moral personality either to find itself or to lose itself in the right way.

The final triumph of grace and the final justification of its indirect method is to be seen in the way it delivers us from these difficulties in which a legal morality necessarily leaves us.

First, it deals with the danger of self-righteousness which springs from a morality which makes our own moral personality the standard of moral good, yet denies that it should be our moral object.

Once more grace becomes an antinomy, a thing of seeming opposites, which may be thus expressed. Grace is concerned altogether with the worth of the moral self, but its whole working is to direct attention from self to the will of God.

Grace is wholly occupied with the salvation of the moral personality. To deliver it from the sin which is its ruin and give it the holiness which is its health and peace are the end of all God's gracious dealings with us. Upon that view of grace all religious faith rests. Our Lord's whole teaching about the infinity of God's love means simply that God sets an infinite value on every moral personality, not that He will spare it any difficulty of the road by which it must attain. Because God would realise all its vast possibilities, He can be relied on to have a wise and gracious purpose even in life's most trivial events. Our Lord's teaching about the kingdom of God rests on the assurance that every moral personality means more to God than to itself. The kingdom of God is a kingdom of perfect blessedness in the perfect rule of love, where no soul can ever be the plaything of force, or be used merely as a means towards another end. God's rule is

precisely the rule of love in freedom. It is a kingdom no one ever enters except by realising his own true kingdom in its rule. Nor do we ever help another towards it by overriding even his evil will, but only by aiding him, through showing him the spirit of the kingdom, to discover for himself his own kingdom in it. Wherefore, if any one could be used as a mere means even for the kingdom of God, there would be no kingdom of God at all.

But the fact that our salvation is so exclusively God's aim does not mean that it should also be ours. Paul could desire to be anathema for his brethren's sake, so little did he consider his own salvation the end of his striving. We are to seek the kingdom of God and its righteousness and leave all the rest to be added. Our salvation is precisely the thing which is most surely added, but for that reason it should no more be an object of anxiety than our clothes. Nay, to have our attention withdrawn from ourselves, even from absorption in the pulse of our spiritual health, is salvation, because we are saved in exact proportion as self loses its dominion and love rules.

The solution of all the apparent contradictions of grace is here. It is to be found in the nature of the righteousness of the kingdom of God. One word expresses it all. It is a righteousness of God.

What, then, is a righteousness of God ? It has been taken to mean a righteousness God demands, a righteousness of larger moral requirements than any other. It is such a righteousness, as we should ever more fully realise, a righteousness beyond that of the scribes, beyond the austerest human prescription, a righteousness not finite at all, but infinite. Yet if our own righteousness is a great deal more than we can fulfil, and there is nothing to help in the fulfilling, what gain could come to us by finding one larger still ? On another interpretation, a righteousness of God is a

righteousness God gives. We have seen how in a new world, where love bears as well as forbears, it is also a righteousness God gives. But if we are already only too willing to appropriate any kind of righteousness which does not belong to us, how can that by itself help the moral personality in anything that truly belongs to itself? Both a righteousness God demands and a righteousness He grants might still be perfectly consistent with self-righteousness. To persuade ourselves that we are righteous, either because we have managed to satisfy God ourselves or because He has somehow managed to satisfy Himself, would still leave us ourselves as objects of self-complacency.

A righteousness of God is also a righteousness God looks after. It is a righteousness every discipline He appoints and every duty He demands are designed to forward. For it all things work together for good. Our whole life in all its most casual relationships, in all its most trivial happenings, in all its joy and all its sorrow, in the triumph of successful enterprise and the pain of broken endeavour, is one, infinitely varied, uninterrupted means of grace.

All real faith in God ought to teach us that no one can look after our righteousness except God. God's righteousness for us must be too far above our knowing to be our aim, and too wide-reaching in all its applications to be our task. It can only be God's work not ours, the object of His care not our own.

In that case, all ways of salvation by personally appointed discipline and still more by publicly arranged rule, by contract with ourselves or with others, spring from lack of faith to commit our salvation to Him alone who can know what it really is and who alone can appoint the right means for its advancement. Even when we make use of what we call the means of grace, it should not be with the direct object of forwarding our salvation. They are only means for en-

lightening us regarding the true means of grace which is life, and for enabling us to make a diviner use of it in humbler service. The public use of such means of interpreting and using life above all is not to be overlooked, because no one can understand God's meaning in life in isolation, but only in the fellowship of the saints; yet no use of them is in itself religion.

No room is left for us to act upon the idea of ourselves at all, not even upon the idea of ourselves as examples. However frequently that motive is urged in the name of religion, it is not a religious motive. True, we may not cause our brother to offend, but that should be done because it is our own task of loving service which it would not be anything but right for us to do on its own account, and not as a work of consciously shining example. Action for the mere purpose of example, moreover, is both morally futile and morally dangerous. It is futile, because, were its motive recognised, no one would be influenced, at least for good, and the externality and formality of the action very readily betray its source. Then it is dangerous because, seeing we must propose to ourselves as our object the figure we shall make in the action, we cannot help sunning ourselves in our own approval, which all the more certainly involves us in self-righteousness that we seem to be doing something more than the immediate requirement of our duty.

One object, and one object alone, remains for us. It is the will of God. Because it is the will of God for our salvation, our salvation ceases to be an object for our own wills. Our sole object ought to be that Will which by caring for our salvation proves itself the will of love. Just because our highest good is so secure in it, we can forget ourselves altogether and set before ourselves one sole question, What will God have us do? Then, and then only, the insistent problem of self-love and self-forgetfulness is solved for us, and our moral

personalities are saved in the only way they can be saved, by being delivered from self-regard.

It ought now, in the second place, to be possible to see how grace delivers us from the other danger of a legal morality—a narrow and negative ideal. By taking us away from all kinds of self-regard, even regard for our own salvation, it lays us open to every appeal of love. When God's love so encircles our whole personality that we shall never lack a heart to feel or a hand to succour, we shall never soften life's discipline or evade its duty.

The real misuse of life is to shut our ears to the calls of love, so that the most blessed trials cannot touch us and the holiest duties never rise above our horizon. Then we can live unscathed except by personal loss and uninspired except by negative ideals. Every one comes short who does not make it his supreme desire to hear what God the Lord will speak, and he has certainly not heard unless the claims of love upon his sympathy and service are becoming for him larger, more constant, more positive.

The limits of our moral imperatives all disappear. When love calls to us, we hear infinity. We shall never come to an end of what it appoints for us. And stranger still, we shall never wish to come to an end. Then we shall understand how small a mistake everything else, even vice and crime, may be, compared with shutting our ears to the only voice which can call us to the true feast of life and save us from missing all life's divine uses.

God's will of love is, as it always must be, love to others. God will not be served except through our fellows. But in that service truth grows clear and our practical difficulties are solved. "He that loveth his brother abideth in light, and there is none occasion of stumbling in him." To love our brother, however, is not a sentiment. It is a sense of what he means to himself and his heavenly Father. It is

never to look upon him as one of the masses, never to wish that he be wise only with our wisdom and ruled only by our conscience, but always to realise that he can be conscious of God's own reality, feel in his heart God's own ideal and have in his keeping the eternal choice of good. It means to reverence the moral personality simply because consciousness of truth, conscience of right and consecration of will are the true objects of esteem, though no robe of office adorn their possessor, no station set him on a pedestal, no wealth clothe him, no learning add to his merit. To love our brother is to see in him a dignity which ennobles the humblest toil, nay, to realise that working with the hands may bring men most directly face to face with life's realities—its plainest discipline, its simplest human relationship. Above all, it is to see that in any position humble toil is essential for the victory over life without which no moral personality is truly worthy of reverence.

That is the love to our brother whereby in the midst of all mental perplexity we continue to walk in the light, never failing to discern the real meaning and issues of life for all that concerns our true faith ; and also to have our true guidance, so that we are never the occasion of stumbling either to ourselves or to any one whom God has made our neighbour. What no might of reasoning, no practical ability, no foresight or precaution can do for us is made sure by this reverence for man as man.

Here we touch the ultimate thing in religion, and when we have a religion the truth of which can only be guarded by the scholar and the guidance of which must be in the hands of the ecclesiastic, we have manifestly missed the way. When our religion further becomes an appanage of the well-to-do, it is still more clearly no genuine religion deep based on reality, but has become a convention to hide from us reality and shelter us from its rude assaults. Only by showing that

the richest are poor without it and that with it the poorest are rich, can it prove that it succours the moral personality itself and is not merely another of its wrappings designed to hide the strange, disturbing, far-reaching fact that we stand each alone in the world yet united to God and man by consciousness of truth, conscience of right and choice of good, and that that relation to our own souls and the souls of others alone matters and in the end nothing else does.

Most clearly of all it is no religion of Jesus Christ. Perhaps no fact is more certain about His ministry than His repudiation of a religion which only the learned could practise, and only its professional representatives maintain, and His demand from the fisher-folk and the day-labourers of a better righteousness. We have already seen how He requires us to find Him in His brethren. To love our brother means, perhaps, first of all our Christian brother, but it means reverencing him under all conditions. Only then is it the assurance of walking in the light and being a cause of offence to none because in him we love Christ under all conditions. And more still is required of us than to esteem good men in independence of their trappings, for to love Christ is to be enabled to reverence man as man, man as God yearns over him and has hope of him in his worst estate.

Grace, we have said, does not work with love directly at all, yet its purpose is to bring us to that love which being in utter accord with God's will is the only perfect fulfilment of the law. The value of Jesus Christ for that final and adequate response to God's gracious relationship to us is seldom denied, but it is too frequently made of no effect by being united in a quite external way to His example. In Him the whole appeal of love can touch us. To-day, as in the past, no one comes near Him without having new depths of sympathy and humility stirred so that he cannot shun life's real suffering and service. It is thereupon concluded that

the practical problems of life can all be solved by asking the simple question, What would Jesus do ?

But in that external way His example might only be another formal substitute for our own insight. The failure of the method appears in the very fact that it is only employed for immense problems and striking situations. But the most amazing thing in our Lord's life is the way the greatest issues arose out of meeting ordinary people in every-day circumstances. What He said and did followed quite naturally from understanding people's needs and from seeing the possibilities of their situations. Though He never said or did anything except what every one should have said and done in the circumstances, even in the same circumstances the exactest imitation would be lifeless, unedifying mimicry. Everything He said and did sprang immediately from the amazing insight which was just perfect love, so that if we could echo it to the letter, the soul of it would still be wanting.

What we say and do should also follow from our own insight. As Christ's understanding of God's love was the fulfilment of His law, so our understanding of it should be the fulfilment of ours. The influence, therefore, of His example is not directly to be our pattern, but to succour the faith which sees love to be life's final meaning and power, and so to enable us to discern its illumination and guidance for our lives. Thus even with Jesus Christ we can only be religiously dependent through moral independence. He is not an external authority. On the contrary, His unique religious position is His immediate relevancy to our moral independence.

To depend on Jesus as an external authority for the will of God is not a right conclusion, as is so often argued, from the belief that He is pre-eminently the Word of God. On the contrary, to remain merely an authority would mark His failure to establish the true relation of God's children to

their Father. The very reason for the belief that God was in Him perfectly, that the Spirit was not given by measure to Him, is precisely that we find in Him our true liberty. Did He rule from without, He would immediately fall into the rank of mere human teachers whose authority fades as they vanish into the past. He lives eternally in the present precisely because God's will of love is so perfectly manifested in Him that it needs no appeal except to hearts willing to lay themselves open to be convinced. Wherefore, He never needs to ask from us faith in any truth except by showing us how to look at it that we may see it to be true, or obedience to any command except for the reason that, if we will face it in His spirit, we shall discern it to be our duty. Only what thus speaks to the image of God in us has any right to be called a word of God, and only what speaks to the image of God alone and has no need of extraneous aid, has any right to be thought His absolute Word.

But, it may be asked, is not all this humility of appeal altered by the resurrection ? He who humbled Himself was exalted. From that point He rules not in meekness but in power. His symbol is the Son of Man coming with great glory on the clouds of Heaven. And no doubt the resurrection does mean, and the joyous spirit of His followers shows that it was taken to mean, that all power was given to Him in heaven and earth. But it does not mean what it is so often taken to mean, that the method of force was substituted for the method of love, that after a short and fruitless attempt at saving men by service and sacrifice, God will again use domination and compulsion ; that, if He cannot persuade our moral personality, He will override it ; that, if He cannot have sons, He will not fail to have subjects. Not merely in theory but in men's practical relation to Christianity that is constantly the unchristian interpretation of the resurrection.

But if the expectation of the kingdom of God was simply

the expectation of a perfect rule of love, a rule of blessedness in holiness, why did the belief in the resurrection so quickly fall in with it and so speedily take its place ?

In one of his early speeches Peter gives us the answer. The significance of the resurrection, he says, is that it shows Jesus to be a man approved of God. His method of suffering and sacrifice is proved to be the way of power. The same thought we have in Paul's words. Jesus is declared to be the Son of God with power, according to a spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead. God, that is, does not substitute force for love, but shows His power behind love. Thus the hope of the Kingdom of God and the resurrection of Jesus brought the same message, that the moral order of love is in the last, the Divine issue, the natural, the all-prevailing order.

To have found God in that way is to have found an order of love which is so entirely our succour that we need have no concern except to make it our service. That is the true practical harmony of morality and religion whereby we are enabled to be absolutely, not partially, dependent upon God in such a way as to be absolutely, not partially, independent in our own souls, so that we cannot have true piety without freedom or true freedom without piety. A saved soul is a soul wholly true to itself. But no one was ever true to himself through self-regard, the mother of all base compliances. He can only be true to himself through realising that God is his real world and love its supreme law. Then with his mind no more on himself but on God's will of love, he can stand on his own feet unbribable and undismayed.

In the last issue that independence is the sole proof of utter dependence upon God. There is no more religious than moral worth in any conviction which is not the result of our own faith, that is to say, which is not something we have veritably ourselves seen. Just as little is there either

religious or moral worth in any judgment of right which, to use Kant's phrase, is heteronymous, that is to say, other than the verdict of our own conscience. Nor is there religious or moral worth in a service which is less than the purpose of our own wills. No man can serve God, any more than he can be true to his own soul, with less than his own consciousness of truth, his own moral ideal, his own personal resolve and consecration.

A saved soul is a soul delivered from every tie which would hinder it from serving God. Wherefore, the idea of being saved in spite of ourselves is a contradiction in terms, even as the idea of being saved by ourselves. The tie that binds us is self and no man can deliver himself from it by aiming at its well-being either in time or eternity; but also no one can deliver himself from it except by finding himself in something which by saving his true self has a right to ask him to deny the self which opposes it. Our succour is God's will of love, and that, just because it is love, can only mean by ourselves, by our own truth, our own ideal, our own choice.

Grace is just the working of that will of love to enable us to find in God's will our will. Wherefore, it cannot override our moral personality, passing through it as a direct line of force, but must always encircle it with that curve which has its convex side of dependence and its concave side of independence, embracing us the more perfectly for maintaining that distance which is ever necessary in the fellowship of persons, because it enables us to find ourselves by denying the self that opposes its appeal, and to find our lives by losing them in its service.

JOHN OMAN.

ST. PAUL AND THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.

VII Baptismal Rites

Rites of purification were common to all ancient religions. One of the best-known features in the Eleusinian Mysteries was the bath of cleansing in the sea (ἄλαδε μύσται.) In the account of the initiation of Lucius into the Mysteries of Isis (Apul. *Metamorph.* xi. 20), an ablution precedes the central rites. Part of this ceremony consisted in sprinkling the neophyte. The ritual of sprinkling was apparently current in Egypt. A similar ceremonial is mentioned in Livy's description of the Bacchanalia. No doubt the idea of regeneration was associated with these lustrations, as, indeed, Tertullian (*De Bapt.* 5) deliberately affirms. But our knowledge of the baptismal rites of the Mystery-Religions is meagre in the extreme. One or two significant facts may be noted. No trace remains of the baptism of the initiated "into the name" of any of the Mystery-deities, although the cult-action may have formed part of a definite acknowledgment of the deity in question. Nor is there any hint that the influence of the Divine πνεῦμα, a feature which we have seen to be current in mystic doctrine, was ever connected with the ritual of lustration. Lietzmann, Heitmüller, and others have laid strong emphasis on the fact that Paul links the rite of Baptism to the experience of death and resurrection with Christ, and would refer the connexion to the hints of a dying to live which they profess to find in the Mystery-cults.[1] We have already examined the evidence in detail, and have noted its scantiness. And we have endeavoured to show that the background and atmosphere of the Pauline conceptions of death and resurrection wth Christ are so incongruous with the Mystery-

[1] See Lietzmann's excursus, *Römerbrief*, pp. 30, 31.

ritual as to rob any parallels which may be adduced of their validity. The ceremony of the *taurobolium*, by far the most striking analogy that can be cited, we found, on the authority of so eminent an expert as Cumont, to be inadmissible as evidence for our period. We must deal with Paul's view of Baptism in detail. It may be noted in passing that one remarkable passage has been found in a Paris Papyrus (No. 47), in which it is possible to connect the phrase *οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀποθανεῖν* directly with the term *βαπτιζώμεθα*. But although Reitzenstein favours this interpretation, his discussion indicates how problematic it is.[1] It is interesting, however, to observe that here (apparently a case of initiation into the Mysteries of Serapis), Baptism takes the central place, and its ultimate aim is salvation (*σωθῆναι*).

Professor Lake, in his recent *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, holding that the average Gentile God-fearer regarded the Christianity which was presented to him by Paul and his fellow-workers as a Mystery-Religion, goes the length of attributing the antinomianism which the Apostle has to combat to the Gentile-Christian's view of Baptism "as an *opus operatum* which secured his admission into the Kingdom apart from the character of his future conduct," [2] and he credits Paul himself with a similar magical conception.[3] Now as to the nature of the antinomianism which caused the great missionary such sore anxiety, we have his own testimony, and it takes a wholly different direction from Professor Lake's hypothesis. Thus, in Romans iii. 5–8, the antinomian argues for his own unrighteousness that it "commends the righteousness of God": the truth of God, through his falsehood, redounds to the Divine glory. His watchword is: "Let us do evil that good may come," and his whole position is summed up in Romans vi. 1: "Shall

[1] See *H. M. R.*, pp. 76–79; *Zeitschr. f. N. T. Wissensch.*, 1912, i. p. 9.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 46. [3] *Ibid.* p. 385.

we remain in sin *in order that grace may abound?*" What Paul means by grace is perfectly clear from the discussion in chapter v. It is certainly not Baptism, but the forgiveness of sins through faith in Jesus Christ. And the danger of the antinomian is to take advantage of the mercy of God, because it is utterly inexhaustible. We believe that Professor Lake is equally wide of the mark in asserting that, for Paul, Baptism was "a mystery or sacrament which works *ex opere operato*." And we must now investigate the available data.

We venture to think that one of the chief impressions left upon the careful reader of the Epistles must be that of the Apostle's detachment from ritual in every shape and form. And if "sacramental teaching is central in the primitive Christianity to which the Roman Empire began to be converted," [1] it is certainly astonishing to find such scanty references to it in letters, some of the most important of which were addressed to Christian communities which Paul had never visited. It is absurd to suggest that the reason for this silence lies in the fact that "Baptism and its significance was common ground to him and all other Christians." [2] That does not accord with Paul's practice. His delight is to come back again and again upon all the crucial elements in his own religious experience, an experience which was fundamental in shaping his doctrine. Hence we are in no way surprised to find that in his first Epistle to the Christians at Corinth, a community whose "main feature," according to Professor Lake, was that "they all accepted Christianity as a Mystery-Religion," and regarded Jesus as "the Redeemer-God, who had passed through death to life, and offered participation in this new life to those who shared in the mysteries [Baptism and the Eucharist] which He offered," [3] Paul thanks God that he had only baptized a few of them. "For," he declares, "Christ sent me not to

[1] Lake, *op. cit.*, p. 385. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 384. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 233.

baptize, but to preach the Gospel, and that not with wisdom of words, so that the cross of Christ might not be annulled " (1 Cor. i. 14). It is " the word of the cross " which is " the power of God to those who are being saved " (1 Cor. i. 18), no " mystery " of Baptism or anything else. Professor Lake attaches high importance to 1 Cor. x. 1 ff. where Paul compares the experiences of Israel in the wilderness to Baptism and the Lord's Supper, as indicating their central importance for Christianity at Corinth.[1] We must examine the passage carefully in our next article on Sacramental Meals. We may remark, however, at this point, that the analogy chiefly reminds us of the allegorical fancies of Philo. It occurs in a context dealing with sacrificial meals, so that it lay ready to hand. It cannot certainly sustain the weight of the argument which Professor Lake has built upon it, that " it is a warning against the view that Christians are safe because they have been initiated into the Christian mysteries."[2] For it is a sheer begging of the question to assume that Paul associates with the actual food some supernatural nourishment. He merely interprets it, quasi-allegorically, as spiritual fare. The curious statement that " all were baptized into Moses " tells against the magical significance which Lake and others read into the Pauline idea of Baptism, for we cannot conceive the implication of some mystic relationship established between the people and Moses by these events in their history. " All that can properly be asserted is that, as the crossing of the Red Sea definitely committed the people to follow Moses as their Divinely appointed head, so baptism is a definite committal and consecration to the following of Christ."[3] And we agree with the writer just quoted that the whole point of Paul's argument lies in the uselessness of sacraments apart from that ethical obedience

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 233, note 1. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 177 f.
[3] Lambert, *The Sacraments in the New Testament*, p. 159.

to which believers have pledged themselves in these sacred ordinances.

Accordingly, it is a true instinct for facts which leads Weinel, in spite of his emphasis on the Mystery-element in Paul's religion, to the somewhat exaggerated assertion that "for Paul the sacrament was an alien body," and he very suggestively notes that in the entire Epistle to the Romans, "that document in which he sets forth and defends his own conception of Christianity, only once does baptism enter his mind (vi. 3 ff.), and the Lord's Supper not even once." [1] Similarly Holtzmann, from the same general standpoint, finds an irreducible contradiction between the mysterious virtue of the sacrament of Baptism in Paul and his conception of the life-giving Spirit with its free activities, bound to no action which can be assigned to a given point of time.[2] And Heitmüller can only account for the incongruity by explaining that Paul had not himself instituted the Sacrament of Baptism, but had found it already existing in the Christian society.[3] But while we are far from confining the outlook of any great thinker within the bounds of a rigid logic, this notion of glaring contradictions in his thought is always apt to make us suspect the legitimacy of crediting him with the positions on which the judgment is based. It is so easy to isolate a conception from the general context of his thought, and thus to lay the emphasis on the wrong elements. Let us attempt to estimate Baptism in its relations to those features which Paul seems to regard as fundamental in Christian experience.

It will be universally admitted that for the Apostle's thought, possession of the Spirit is the indispensable condition of the Christian life, e.g., Romans viii. 9: "If any one

[1] *Biblische Theologie d. N. T.*, p. 330.
[2] *N. T. Theologie*[2], ii. p. 198.
[3] *Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus*, 1903, p. 23.

have not the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to him." Again and again throughout the Epistles he refers to this experience as crucial. Now if, as Lake and Heitmüller suppose, he regarded the baptismal rite as the actual vehicle by which salvation was conveyed to the Christian, it would seem inevitable that it should be given a prominent place in his many references to the gift of the Spirit. As a matter of fact, there is only one passage in which they are brought into close connexion, 1 Cor. xii. 13, and it occurs quite incidentally in his discussion of diversities of spiritual gifts. "For as the body is one and has many members, but all the members of the body, although many, are one body, so also is Christ. For by (or, in) one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks. . . . And we were all made to drink of one Spirit." The emphasis here is placed on the one community into which they were admitted on being baptized. The unity of Christians is the idea which stands before his mind. Baptism is a visible pledge of this unity in Christ. It has for Paul, as Holtzmann says, "social significance." [1] It is, of course, as we shall presently see, something more than a mere symbol. And probably the difficult phrase, *πάντες ἓν πνεῦμα ἐποτίσθημεν*, does refer to the spiritual experiences associated with Baptism. If we interpret the vague expression, *ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι*, in the light of its context, it seems most natural to explain it by means of verse 11 : "all these [the various gifts] are wrought by one and the same Spirit, distributing to each separately according to his will." That is to say, the Spirit is regarded as active in the ordinance of Baptism. But there is no suggestion of the "unmediated and naked sacramental conception," which some scholars attribute to the Apostle.[2]

[1] *N. T. Theologie*[2], ii. p. 199.

[2] See a peculiarly crass statement in Schweitzer, *Geschichte d. Paulin. Forschung*, p. 166.

When Paul speaks of the reception of the Spirit, he is in the habit of connecting it with a quite definite group of experiences. Particularly instructive is Galatians iii. 2, where this is the very question at issue : " Did you receive the Spirit as the result of keeping the law, or was it the consequence of the hearing of faith ? " The compressed phrase is elaborated in Romans x. 17 : " So then faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ." Similar in tenor is Ephesians i. 13 : " in whom [Christ] ye also, having heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation,—in whom, having also believed, ye were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise." We doubt whether there is any reference to Baptism in the word ἐσφραγίσθητε. But if there were, it is obviously not the experience of regeneration which is referred to, but the joyful assurance of the new status in Christ Jesus. In 1 Corinthians ii. 4 he emphasises the manifestation of the power of the Spirit which accompanied his preaching, as contrasted with that lack of σοφία for which some of the Corinthians censured him, " that your faith might rest not on the wisdom of men but on the power of God." Again, in 1 Thessalonians ii. 13 he associates the Divine working in those that believe with their willing reception of his message. And in the remarkable utterance of 1 Corinthians iv. 15 he directly attributes their new life to the power of Christ operating in the Gospel.

If we turn to his profound conception of fellowship with Christ, we find ourselves in the same atmosphere. There are indeed one or two important passages in which Baptism appears as a primary element in the experience. These we shall examine immediately. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the clearest affirmation of communion with the risen Lord which has ever fallen from Paul's lips assigns the same prominence to *faith* as do his statements on the Spirit. " I through the law died to the law that I might live unto God. I have

been crucified with Christ, and no longer do I live, but Christ lives in me. And the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by faith, faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me " (Gal. ii. 19, 20). But this passage is also of importance as showing that death with Christ, which Lietzmann, Heitmüller and others identify with the baptismal experience, is something quite independent of that.

Here we enter the province of Paul's thought in which justification, forgiveness of sins, and the cross of Christ are the ruling ideas. And we venture to say, in flat contradiction of Heitmüller,[1] that these, and not " effects of a mystic-enthusiastic nature," are " the foci of Pauline piety." It seems needless to quote passages which prove that the new life, which means for Paul a right relation to God, is reached along the pathway of faith in Christ crucified and risen as the demonstration of the holy love of God in its bearing upon sinful men. Romans v. 1 is typical : " Therefore, having been justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom also we have obtained access into that grace in which we stand." Everything fundamental for salvation is to be found there. But Paul's conception of union with Christ, which is supposed by Heitmüller, for example, to belong to the " physical-hyperphysical " atmosphere of Baptism, is discovered to be embedded in the stratum of thought which we are examining : see, e.g., Philippians iii. 9 ff. : " that I may win Christ and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness which is of the law, but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is of God on account of (ἐπί) faith." To be in Christ, that is to say, is for Paul virtually identical with " having the righteousness of God," i.e., being justified, forgiven. Plainly, therefore, the central experiences of the Christian life are for the Apostle primarily associated with faith. Now the first of these

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

central experiences is the breaking off of relations with sin. Paul frequently connects it with fellowship with the death of Christ. "You died to the law [the régime in which sin is active] through the body of Christ" (Rom. vii. 4). This is expanded in Romans vi. 10 ff.: "in that he died, to sin he died once for all: but in that he lives, he lives unto God. So also do you reckon yourselves to be dead to sin but alive to God in Christ Jesus." And the meaning is elucidated by Colossians ii. 11: "In whom you also were circumcised with the circumcision not made with hands in the stripping off of the body of flesh, in the circumcision of Christ." This inward circumcision means union with Him who on the cross abjured the flesh and all its implications. Obviously the metaphor is the same as that in Romans ii. 29 (*περιτομὴ καρδίας*), and it is impossible to identify it with Baptism, because it is deliberately described as "not made with hands." But in this and in a few other places, Paul brings Baptism into connexion with this death to sin, the distinctly Christian attitude. What does the relationship mean?

Professor Lake has no difficulty in reaching a conclusion. "The Pauline doctrine of Baptism," he says, "is that on the positive side it gives the Christian union with Christ, which may also be described as inspiration with the Holy Spirit, while on the negative side it cleanses from sin. This is accomplished by the power of the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and by the sacramental effect of water, according to the well-known idea that results could be reached in the unseen spiritual world by the performance of analogous acts in the visible material world."[1] This explanation (which is also that of Heitmüller) stands in manifest antithesis to Paul's unvarying emphasis upon faith as the primary factor, on the human side, in salvation. Indeed Heitmüller asserts that it is not easy to see "that or how

[1] *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, vol. ii., p. 382.

far, faith can play a really essential part in the process," [1] an admission which, in the light of the Epistles, seems to us little less than a *reductio ad absurdum* of his hypothesis. Let us briefly examine the crucial passages.

Of fundamental importance is Romans vi. 1 ff. : "What shall we then say ? Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound ? God forbid. We who died to sin, how shall we continue to live in it ? Or are you ignorant that all we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death. We were buried, therefore, with him through our baptism into his death, that, as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life." The passage can only be rightly understood from the argument which leads up to it. In chapter v. Paul has shown that faith, as linking the believer to Christ, has brought him into the sphere of those high privileges which he enjoys, experience of the Divine grace, hope, the love of God, the gift of the Holy Spirit. Can a faith of this kind be accused of being a solvent of right conduct ? Nay, everything belonging to justification involves a break with sin. Hence he states in verse 2 the basal principle of the Christian life, " we who died to sin." And then he proceeds to show that entrance into the Christian society emphasises and embodies the same principle. Baptism, the deliberate, decisive step which a man takes when he has surrendered his life to Christ, is not something vague or nebulous. It realises the meaning of Christ for the soul. The Christ into whose name the believer is baptized, that is, whose possession he becomes, is the Christ who was crucified, and who, in dying, made an end of sin both for His own person and for all who are united to Him by faith. And the very symbolism of the rite is an impressive picture of the believer's experiences. His disappearance beneath the water is a

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

vivid illustration of his separation from the old life of sin. It is a burial of the old existence, just as Christ's burial was a palpable proof that He had left behind Him His earthly conditions. Emergence from the baptismal water typifies entrance into a new environment, the life of the Christian society which is the life of the living Lord Himself, mediated to His followers by their fellowship with Him.

The real significance of this new life in Christ is made clear by the remarkable words of Colossians ii. 13 (which belong to a baptismal context): "You who were dead by reason of your transgressions and the uncircumcision of your flesh He (i.e. God) made alive with him (i.e. Christ), having forgiven us all our transgressions." Forgiveness is the presupposition of newness of life. But the Romans-passage is evidence that there is something more than symbolism in the baptismal celebration. There is indeed no suggestion that the pronunciation of the "name" of the Lord Jesus Christ, "if properly used, could enable the user to enjoy the benefits of the attributes attached to the owner of the name." [1] Nor is there any indication whatever of "the sacramental effect of water." But a comparison with Baptism on the mission-field to-day helps us to realise the situation with which Paul the missionary was thoroughly familiar. Whether, in the early Church, as Lambert holds, "there was no such thing . . . as a prolonged probation of the convert . . . but faith and baptism were connected with each other immediately," [2] or whether, as we believe must frequently have happened, there intervened a period of instruction, Baptism must have meant a decision of momentous importance for the convert. Now, for the first time, he deliberately affirmed his allegiance to Christ before the world, and solemnly identified himself with the Christian brotherhood. This was the actual

[1] So Lake, *Dictionary of R. and E.*, p. 382.
[2] *The Sacraments in the N. T.*, p. 172.

spiritual crisis in which he turned his back upon his old associations, faced all manner of costly sacrifices, and committed himself, in utter dependence on the Divine grace and power, to a new manner of living. Rendtorff is fully justified in saying that an act which thus liberated the most powerful ethical motives "became a religious experience of the first rank." [1] In Baptism (of course, adult) something happened. Faith had been there before, receptiveness toward the good news of Christ. The Divine Spirit had been already present, taking of the things of Christ and showing them to the believer. But now, once for all, the convert makes his own the promptings of the Divine love in his heart. And thus there would come to him in his Baptism a wonderful spiritual quickening, a new enhancing of the power and grasp of faith, a fresh realisation of communion with the once crucified and now risen Lord. Hence there is good ground for the statement of Von Dobschütz that "according to the early-Christian view we may speak of real effects of Baptism in the sense that here the person does not give himself something by his activity, but God gives him what he has only to receive." [2]

What is true of the Romans-passage holds good also for the rest. "Ye are all sons of God," he declares in Galatians iii. 26, "through faith in Christ Jesus. For all of you who were baptized into Christ put on Christ." Does this mean that this faith is due to Baptism? Obviously not, for this Epistle is as forcible as Romans in its emphasis on faith as the first stage in the relation of the soul to Christ. The Apostle's words can only signify that in the solemn act of Baptism this faith is re-charged with spiritual energy and indeed reaches its crowning expression. In such a crisis, therefore, it may

[1] *Die Taufe im Urchristentum*, p. 32.

[2] See his very valuable article, *Sacrament und Symbol im Urchristentum*, in *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1905, i., p. 20.

be expected to achieve great things. And chief among its results will be an intensified consciousness of intimate fellowship with Christ, a fellowship which is here compared to the putting-on of a garment. Paul's special object on this occasion is to set forth the spiritual unity which springs from faith. And Baptism is the sacrament in which that unity becomes visible.[1]

A similar background appears in the difficult passage, Colossians ii. 11, 12: "in whom [Christ] you also were circumcised with a circumcision not made with hands in the stripping off of the body of flesh, in the circumcision of Christ, having been buried with him in baptism, in which (or, in whom) you were also raised up through faith in the working of God, who raised him from the dead." Here, as we have already noted, it is impossible to identify the "circumcision not made with hands" with the rite of Baptism. This is an inward experience, that profound fellowship with Christ crucified (Gal. ii. 19; Rom. vi. 6), that conformity to His death (Phil. iii. 10), which means the doing away with "the body of sin." The new life which it involves he associates directly, in verse 13, with the forgiveness of sins. But when he speaks of those who have undergone this change as "buried with Christ in baptism," he doubtless has in view, as in Romans vi. 1 ff., on the one hand the symbolism of the solemn rite as showing forth the completion of the process, and on the other the real recognition and assurance of the new life, which are quickened in the soul by the baptismal experience. It is highly significant that he immediately postulates the presence of faith as the psychological medium of the life of Christ in which they participate.[2]

[1] See a suggestive paragraph in Lambert, *op. cit.*, p. 153: and cf. the close parallel in Ephesians iv. 4–6.

[2] See Lueken's admirable notes *ad loc.* (in *Die Schriften d. N. T.*, ed. J. Weiss).

In Ephesians v. 26 Paul speaks of Christ as "having purified the Church by the bath of water with the word." The language used has an evident reference to the lustration of the bride before marriage.[1] The notion of a baptism of the ἐκκλησία is plainly metaphorical. The most notable feature in the passage is the phrase ἐν ῥήματι, which must no doubt be interpreted, as in Romans x. 8, 17, of the proclamation of the Gospel. This accords with the place given to faith in the other passages on Baptism which we have examined.

There remain for consideration two references in 1 Corinthians. In chapter vi. he has been upbraiding them for going to law with their brethren before courts presided over by unrighteous men, who can have no share in the Kingdom of God. After enumerating glaring forms of unrighteousness he bursts forth: "and such were some of you: but ye had yourselves cleansed, ye were sanctified, ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and by the Spirit of our God." Not much can be based on so incidental a reference. But probably Lambert is right in holding that the use of the middle here (ἀπελούσασθε) is intended "to remind them of the way in which at baptism they had consciously and deliberately separated themselves from the sinful world in which they previously lived, and joined themselves to that fellowship of the holy which was theirs by right, inasmuch as their baptism, precisely because they were believers, was the baptism of men . . . already sanctified in principle and justified in fact."[2]

Heitmüller and others have made much of 1 Corinthians xv. 29 as evidence for a crass form of sacramentalism approved by Paul. "Otherwise [i.e., if there be no resurrection] what shall they do who are baptized on behalf of the

[1] Note the technical experience παραστήσῃ (ver. 27), and see Von Soden *ad loc.* (in Holtzmann's *Hand-Commentar*).

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

dead ? " This curious reference occurs in a most varied series of arguments for the resurrection. Undoubtedly the practice must have existed in certain communities. No clear analogies have been detected in the Mystery-cults, although it is quite probable that in them it had its origin.[1] But it seems wholly illegitimate to suppose that because Paul pronounces no condemnation on a custom to which he refers, he must have given it his approval. This is surely a misapprehension of the very nature of the *argumentum ad hominem*. And there is force in Von Dobschütz's suggestion that the superstition belonged to the circle of the " sceptical " at Corinth, as " lack of faith and superstition come of the same lineage." [2]

We shall conclude with a brief summary. Our material for estimating the significance of baptismal rites in the Mystery-Religions is far too meagre to admit of dogmatic conclusions. But it is highly probable that they were conceived as working *ex opere operato*. An examination of Paul's utterances on Baptism does not suggest that in it we have a second principle of salvation, and that " the conceptions of justification and the forgiveness of sins are connected with Baptism only in a quite cursory fashion." [3] On the contrary, the faith which welcomes the Divine message of forgiveness and new life in Christ crucified and risen is invariably presupposed as the background of the solemn ritual. It is in virtue of their faith that converts proceed to Baptism. But the ordinance is far more than a symbol of spiritual processes. It is a sacrament, that is, as Professor Bartlet admirably defines it, " a symbol conditioning a present deeper and decisive experience of the Divine grace, already em-

[1] The parallels given by Rendtorff, *op. cit.*, p. 33, note 1, are far from convincing.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 37.

[3] So Heitmüller, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

braced by faith. But all is psychologically conditioned, being thereby raised above the level of the magical or quasi-physical conception of sacramental grace." [1]

H. A. A. Kennedy.

SPITTA ON JOHN XXI.

II

In a previous paper we examined Spitta's hypothesis that chapter xxi. is really pre-Resurrection in its character and intention. We found that this position can only be maintained by a theory of wholesale interpolation. Signs are not wanting in this chapter that the original document with which the writer works has affinities not only with Lucan, but also with Johannine thought; but we are driven to the conclusion, whether we believe in the essential unity of the Fourth Gospel or not, that it is a hopeless task to discover any real literary connexion between the author of chapter xxi. and the rest of the Gospel. It is much more natural to conclude that, whatever be the motive for adding this final chapter, the writer of it found in the Gospel such a unity of thought and form, as made it impossible for him to incorporate with it his fresh material. It remains to adduce one or two further considerations of a more or less linguistic character, to prove that here we have a different kind of mind to that which produced chapters i.–xx.

1. The anonymity of the Beloved Disciple is a prominent characteristic of the Gospel. Spitta holds that the principle object of B was, in writing xxi., to indicate the real author of his *Grundschrift* as John, son of Zebedee. He does so expressly in verse 24, not only as ὁ μαρτυρῶν περὶ τούτων, but also as ὁ γράψας ταῦτα. In the language of the *Grund-*

[1] *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, vol. ii., p. 377.

schrift, according to Spitta, the anonymous disciple is referred to as "one of the disciples," or "that other disciple." The addition of "whom Jesus loved" is attributed to B^2. In chapter xxi. this disciple is more than once referred to as "the disciple whom Jesus loved," and once further defined (*v.* 20) with reference to xiii. 25,[1] and it is asserted that he wrote *ταῦτα*. Yet *ταῦτα* might only mean the things recorded in chapter xxi. and the purpose attributed to B by Spitta, of indicating the author of the *Grundschrift*, would fall to the ground. But, granting that *ταῦτα* does refer to the Gospel, it is difficult to imagine why a compiler, who has been at pains throughout the rest of his work to describe the anonymous disciple as "the disciple whom Jesus loved," should take such a clumsy method of indicating in the end that he was the author of a very important part of the material out of which the Gospel was created. If B intended to shed any further light on the personality of this disciple, to clear his conscience, as it were, of a charge of plagiarism, why does he not do so at once in the Gospel by adding "John, son of Zebedee," to the anonymous notices in the *Grundschrift*, instead of the cryptic "whom Jesus loved"? So far from doing this in chapter xxi. he seems anxious to preserve the anonymity, and this can only be due to a desire to

[1] The supposition that xxi. 20b–21, *ὃς καὶ ἀνέπεσεν ἐν τῷ δείπνῳ ἐπὶ τὸ στῆθος αὐτου*, κ.τ.λ., is by the same pen which had already incorporated the account (belonging to *Grundschrift*) of the incident in xiii. 23–25 is impossible. On this hypothesis, *ἀνέπεσεν* (xxi. 20) evidently is meant to render *ἀνακείμενος* in verse 23, and ignores the vivid description of the action represented by *ἐπιπεσὼν* (v.l. *ἀναπεσὼν* W.H.) in xiii. 25 ("leaning back"). *ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ* (xiii. 23) means merely the position of the disciple at the table. *ἐπὶ τὸ στῆθος* (xiii. 25) is the position he subsequently adopted with reference to Jesus. Yet both positions are summed up in *ἀνέπεσεν . . . ἐπὶ τὸ στῆθος* in xxi. 20. This can scarcely be the writing of one who had examined the *Grundschrift* as carefully and minutely as the supposed B must have done. The whole action and attitude of the beloved disciple in xiii. 23 ff. are most carefully defined.

respect a form of personal allusion which he found already in the Gospel before him, or was already established in the community for which he wrote. Whatever view may be held of the Beloved Disciple as an ideal figure, "a typical Christian" in the Gospel, the consensus of opinion is that in chapter xxi. he is regarded as a reality, and as John, son of Zebedee. Spitta would, of course, regard him as a reality all through the Gospel, but it is indeed strange that, in carrying out his intention of indicating the real author, B should confine himself to a title which he himself had composed. The only possible conclusion is that he himself had not composed it, but that it was a well-known title of John in the Christian community, like "the Beloved Physician" applied to Luke. This is an additional indication that the writer of the appendix is conscious of dealing with a Gospel already complete in form, and with whose composition, he himself had nothing to do.

2. In Spitta's view the main aim of the appendix is to indicate the writer of the *Grundschrift*. Is this conceivable? It is surely a much less apt explanation of motive than the traditional one, that the beloved disciple had died before the Lord came, and the fact had caused much perplexity among those who shared the early Christian expectation of an imminent Parousia. It is a significant fact for the interpretation of the eschatology of the Gospel that apparently it contained nothing in its own teaching, in the mind of the writer of the appendix or in the minds of his readers, that would correct such an expectation of the Return of the Lord "before that generation had passed away." The writer has to fall back on a somewhat subtle emphasis of the *hypothetical* nature of the words of Jesus in verse 22, in order to explain that the evangelist was not meant to be one of those who would be alive at the coming of the Lord. Again, in the case of Simon Peter,

it seems to have been overlooked by most critics that a precisely similar difficulty may have occurred in his case, and that the whole narrative of his restoration to office, and the direct prophecy of his martyrdom (*v.* 18), would tend to remove it. The difficulty in Peter's case would be more complicated. He had denied his Lord, and there is no account in the Gospel of his forgiveness. Was it on this account that he was counted unworthy to live until the Lord came? In the view of the writer of xxi. he is restored to the same place in the church as John himself, and his death is a direct fulfilment of the Lord's own words. These are signs not of common authorship between the appendix and the main part of the Gospel, but rather that the author of xxi. is seeking to meet an erroneous impression as to two disciples, conveyed by a Gospel the composition of which he did not control.

3. An interesting question is raised both by Spitta and Wellhausen as to the place at present occupied by verse 9. The difficulty is thus expressed by Wellhausen (*Das Evangelium Joannis*, p. 97): "According to verses 5, 6, Jesus asks His disciples for something to eat, and points out to them a place where they would have a take. Accordingly He tells them, after the catch, to land some fish that they may eat. On the other hand, in verse 9, He Himself has already prepared beforehand a meal of roast fish and bread in addition, and in verse 13 the disciples eat of this meal previously prepared by Jesus for them, and not of the many fish they had themselves caught." Wellhausen solves the difficulty by supposing that two synoptic stories are here intermingled, and placed after the Resurrection, the one a variant of Luke v., and the other of Mark vi. Spitta's solution is, however, much more simple and convincing. He suggests placing verse 9 after verse 11. While accepting this suggestion, I think we are warranted in making use

of it in another direction than what he intends. Spitta thinks that accidentally verse 9 had been omitted by some scribe, and added subsequently in the margin. Later it was reinserted, but in the wrong place, and not, as originally, after verse 11. The situation would then be that Peter swam [1] (or waded) through the shallow water to the shore, and the others rowed, dragging their net. The request of Jesus in verse 10 comes to them before they have landed, and Peter answers it by going up out of the water first, and, no doubt, with the help of the others bringing the net to land. *ἀνέβη* cannot be used of Peter's going down again to the shore in order to land the net, presuming that he had already landed before the others. In that case, as Spitta suggests, *κατέβη* would be the proper word. Peter conveys some of the fish to Jesus, and when the other disciples arrive, they find a meal being got ready, a meal consisting of fish, laid on glowing embers, and bread. The bread was supplied by Jesus Himself. The question of verse 5 quite agrees with this. *προσφάγιον* means something eaten in addition to bread—"bread and something to it," to use a Scotticism.

Spitta is uncertain whether this transposition of verses is accidental or intentional (*op. cit.* p. 5). He rather inclines to the belief that it is accidental, and that *καὶ ἄρτον* in verse 9 and the whole of verse 13 are interpolations by B, with the object of transforming the meal into a Eucharist. One is inclined to think that it is an intentional alteration of order by the writer of xxi. in order to further this point of view. Spitta concludes that B is strongly influenced by Sacramentarian ideas, and that his hand is largely to be traced in the discourse of chapter vi. Certainly verse 13 is remarkable standing where it does. To myself, it becomes increasingly difficult to detect sacramentarianism

[1] Sin. Syr. Palimpsest has "swimming."

in chapter vi., and I would be more inclined to say that the writer of the appendix has read into chapter vi. a sacramentarianism that is not really there, and has allowed the notion to influence his use of the source he is employing in this chapter. He himself would seem to be responsible for the position given to verse 9, and verse 13 may easily be an imitation of vi. 11. Thus we have an additional example of his mental attitude, and it is not the attitude we find in the rest of the Gospel. Least of all is it a mind whose calibre is such as to evolve the mystical thought of vi. 35 or vi. 50, verses which Spitta attributes to B's own reflection. The alteration of verses is simply an attempt to illustrate literally by means of narrative the idea of "the bread that cometh down from heaven." Jesus, and not they, provides this meal for them.

4. There is the question of a supposed distinction between ἀγαπάω and φιλέω in verses 15–17. It seems impossible, in spite of the elaborate discussion by Abbott in his Johannine Vocabulary, to reach any intelligible distinction between the two words. Possibly the explanation of the double usage is to be sought in the fact that in the original Aramaic there were two words, really indistinguishable in meaning. These have been slavishly rendered by two Greek words. In this connexion it is interesting to note that the Syriac translators render the various uses of ἀγαπάω in John xiv. 21 by two Syriac words indiscriminately (cf. Rendel Harris, *Odes of Solomon*, p. 90, note). If a distinction really exists, there is no trace of it in the rest of the Gospel, and in all probability the writer of xxi. uses two words, just because he found two words in his Aramaic sources, and felt that he must retain a verbal distinction where there really is none.

5. Another linguistic difficulty is presented in verse 18, ὅτε ἦς νεώτερος. Originally, as Spitta suggests, the saying

no doubt ran, "So long as thou art young"; and ἐζώννυες would be the equivalent of "thou girdest thyself." It appears that here we have one of the strongest arguments for regarding the whole narrative as originally pre-Resurrection, and closely connected with the call of Peter to discipleship. It is well nigh impossible to translate verse 18 as it stands, unless νεώτερος implies that Peter is "older than he once was," i.e., in middle age. This is the impression, probably, that is meant to be conveyed, and it is awkwardly conveyed. The awkwardness is really due to the action in which the writer is at the moment engaged. He is attempting to transfer a saying of Jesus to Peter about his martyrdom, uttered in pre-Resurrection days, and no doubt referred to in 2 Peter i. 14, to a time immediately following the Resurrection. He is forgetful of the fact that in verse 7 Peter *had* girded himself, and shown considerable activity. No doubt the saying of Jesus in the original source was suggested by this very act of Peter's in springing from the boat as he did.

If we allow these phenomena of chapter xxi. to exercise a cumulative effect on our thought, we are driven to the conclusion that the type of mind displayed by the writer is hardly what we would expect from the author of the Fourth Gospel. Originality, mystical power, imagination are all absent, and instead we have a certain ingenuity, and faculty for adapting the narrative to preconceived notions, sacramentarian and otherwise. Almost certainly he holds strongly to the view that the Parousia will take place in that generation, a view certainly not emphasized in the thought of the Gospel. He is content to meet a deeply rooted perplexity of the early Church as to the death of one leader after another, in Peter's case by attempting to show that his death was actually a fulfilment of words of Jesus; and in John's by making a mere linguistic

point of the protasis in verse 23: *καὶ οὐκ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς, ὅτι οὐκ ἀποθνήσκει, ἀλλ', ἐὰν αὐτὸν θέλω μένειν ἕως ἔρχομαι.* To take only one instance from the Gospel, it may be suggested that in the use made of the story of the Raising of Lazarus in the Gospel we have the reflection of a nobler and more imaginative mind on the same kind of perplexity. Lazarus, too, died before Jesus came. On what different planes do the two incidents, in chapter xi. and chapter xxi., move! Notwithstanding it is to the author of xxi. that Spitta attributes the lofty conception of Jesus as the Lord of Life and Death, that is imposed on the original narrative in chapter xi.

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*LEXICAL NOTES FROM THE PAPYRI**

XXV.

τρίστεγος.—To the first century warrant for this word from OP 99 (A.D. 55), and 1105[9] A.D. 81-96, add from A.D. 212, BM III. p. 160[4] *οἰκίας τριστέγου.* The same papyrus shows the corresponding form *δίστεγος*, while *μονόστεγος* is found elsewhere.

τρίχινος σάκκος, as in Rev. vi. 12, is quotable from P. Hamb. 10[39] (ii/A.D.)—a list of property removed by a burglar.

τροπή occurs in the astronomical fragment, P. Rylands 27 (iii/A.D.) in its common meaning of *solstice*, *θερινή* and *χειμερινή*. So in *Syll.* 870[4].

τρόπος.—With the adverbial phrase *καθ' ὃν τρόπον* in Acts xv. 11, xxvii. 25, cf. the letter of the prodigal son, BU 846[12] (ii/A.D.), *πεπαίδευμαι καθ' ὃν δι τρόπον*, where if we

* For abbreviations see the February and March (1908) EXPOSITOR, pp. 170, 262.

understand δὶ as=δή, the meaning would be "perished I have been in any case." Wilcken and Hatch have, however, independently suggested δι=δεῖ, "punished I have been as I ought." A second century inscription from Phrygia, *Michel* 545[7], gives a good example of τρόπος="manner of life," as in Heb. xiii. 7, if we can trust the supplement, ζηλωτὴς δὲ γινόμενος τῶν ἀρίστων συνῳκείου τὸν μὲν [τρό]πον ἀρετῇ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ, τό τε ἦθος κοσμιότητι καὶ εὐσ[χη]μοσύνῃ.

τροφός.—This word, which St. Paul uses with such effect in 1 Thess. ii. 7, occurs in the *Pelagia Legenden* (ed. Usener), p. 23[18], ἡ δὲ Πελαγία κάτω κύψασα ἐχωρίσθη τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τροφοῦ, where the meaning must be simply "nurse" from the contrasted μήτηρ in the next line. Cf. also the late OP 1107[1] (v/vi A.D.) The Hellenistic verb τροφέω which Phrynichus (ed. Lobeck), p. 589, views with his usual suspicion, is found BU 859[4] (ii/A.D.) ἐ]τρόφησεν καὶ ἐτιθήνησεν ἡ τοῦ Ἀμμωνίου δούλη Δημητροῦς.

Τρύφαινα.—It may be worth noting that this proper name, which is of interest in the early history of the Christian Church (Rom. xvi. 12, *Acts of Paul and Thecla*; cf. Lightfoot, *Philippians*, p. 173 f.), is found in a first century list of names belonging apparently to Crocodilopolis, BM III. p. 84[257] (*c.* A.D. 47): it also occurs of three different persons in the Alexandrian papyri from the age of Augustus (BU 1105[2-5], 1119[7], 1162[16]). The corresponding masculine name Τρύφων also occurs e.g. OP 1132[4] (*c.* A.D. 162): it is interesting to observe that in BU 1098[7] and 1140[2] (Augustus) it is the name of a Jew, as in Justin's Dialogue. One Tryphon and one Tryphaena in these documents are Persians.

τρώγω.—For this word, which outside the Fourth Gospel is found in the N.T. only in Matt. xxiv. 38 (the Lukan parallel xvii. 27 here substitutes ἐσθίω), cf. *Syll.* 805[10] ἔδωκεν εὔζωμον νήστῃ τρώγειν. In one of the Klepht ballads edited by Abbott, *Songs of Modern Greece*, p. 22, it

is used along with *πίνω* to indicate security. The famous Andritsos besieged in the great Monastery *ἔτρωγε κ' ἔπινε*, while his enemies stormed at the gate. There seems no good reason for assuming the survival of any difference in meaning between the two verbs that supplied a present stem for *φαγεῖν*.

τυμπανίζω.—The perfective of this expressive word (Heb. xi. 35) occurs in Par P 11 *verso*,[5] *μὴ ἀποτυπανισθῶσιν* : cf Josephus *c. Apion.* i. 148.

τύπος.—See *Thess.* p. 11, and add TbP 342[25] (late ii/A.D.), *κοῦφα ἀρεστὰ τύπῳ τῷ προκ(ειμένῳ)*, "pots in good order of the aforesaid pattern" (Edd.). For the meaning "ordinance" or "decree" in late Greek, see OP 893[1] (late vi/vii A.D.), *τῷ τύπῳ τῶν ἀξιω[.]πίστων ἀνδρῶν κ.τ.λ.*, with the Editors' note, where they cite for the same sense BM I. p. 234[47] (viii/A.D.), *μηδὲ προσέλευσιν κατὰ σοῦ . . . ποιήσασθαι . . . μηδὲ αἰτῆσαι θεῖον καὶ πραγματικὸν τύπον πρὸς τήνδε τὴν διαθήκην*.

ὕβρις.—The sense of wanton insult underlying this word is well brought out by the marriage contract EP 1[8] (B.C. 311–10) (=Milligan *Selections*, p. 3), where it is provided that the husband shall not bring in another woman *ἐφ' ὕβρει* of his wife. Cf. also FP 12[17] (*c.* B.C. 103), *ἤγαγον μεθ' ὕβρεως καὶ πληγῶν*, "they dragged me away with insults and blows" (Edd.), and for the verb TbP 16[7] (B.C. 114), *ὡς ἦν ὑβρισμένος οὐ μετ[ρίως] ὑπὸ Ἀπολλοδώρου*, "how he was grossly insulted by A." (Edd.), and OP 1120[6] (early iii A.D.) a petition by a "feeble widow woman" (*γυνὴ χήρα καὶ ἀσθενής*) against a man who had committed an outrage on her son-in-law—*κατὰ τοῦ ὑβρίσαντος αὐτὸν Εὐδαίμονος*. A milder sense is found in BU 1141[14] (time of Augustus), *ὑβρίσαι με πρὸς γέλωτά μοι τοῦτο ἔγραψας*.

ὑγιής.—For *ὑ* applied to material objects cf. OP 278[18] (lease of a mill, A.D. 17), *τὸν μύλον ὑγιῆι καὶ ἀσινῆι*, "the

mill safe and uninjured"; *Syll.* 407 [πίθ]οι . . . ὑγιεῖς, "whole wine-jars"; PP III. p. 13716 of bricks, ὅση ἂν ᾖι ὑγιής, "all the sound ones. The metaphorical usage of the adverb is frequent, e.g. OP 102433 (A.D. 129), where with reference to a grant of seed-corn to a cultivator it is provided ἣν καταθήσεται εἰς τὴν γῆν ὑγιῶς ἐπακολουθούντων τῶν εἰωθότων, "he shall sow it on the land in good faith under the observance of the usual officers" (Ed.), *ibid.* 103118 (a similar document, A.D. 228), ὑγιῶς καὶ πιστῶς, and OP 111021 (a census-return, A.D. 188) ἐξ ὑειοῦς καὶ ἐπ' [ἀληθείας].

ὑδρία.—The extension of ὑδρία to mean not only a water-pot, but a wine-pot or even a pot for holding money (see Rutherford *New Phrynichus*, p. 23), may be illustrated from the inscriptions, *Michel* 833100 (B.C. 279) χαλκοῦ ἐπισήμου παντοδαποῦ ἐν ὑδρίαι, *Syll.* 30050 (ii/B.C.) ὑδρίας σὺν ἀργυρίω[ι].

ὑπαγορεύω.—OP 11025 (a report of legal proceedings, about A.D. 146) ὑπηγόρευσεν ἀπόφασιν, "dictated a judgment."

ὑπάρχω.—The idea of falling back upon a "basis," and hence of continuity with a previous state, which originally belonged to this verb, seems to have gradually faded in later Greek, as the following examples show—PP III. p. 18412 τοῦτο (sc. τὸ ὀψώνιον) ὑπάρξει ἡ τιμὴ τῶν εὑρε θέ[ντων] παρὰ Ταsύθει, "this will be made up by the price of the articles discovered in the possession of Tasuthis" (Edd.)., HbP 7218 (B.C. 241 (240) τὴμ μὲν σφραγῖδα ὡμολόγουν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῶι ἀδυτῶι, "confessed that the seal was in the sanctuary" (Edd.), OP 93317 (late ii/A.D.) πάντα αὐτῇ ὑπῆρκται, "everything was provided for her" (Edd.); TbP 4187 (iii/A.D.) εὐχόμενός σοι τὰ ἐν βίῳ κάλλιστα ὑπαρχθήσεσθαι, "praying that you may have life's greatest blessings" (Edd.) P. Rylands 2845 (iii/iv A.D.) ἐν δανίοις δὲ ὑπάρχων ἀποδώσει. Cf. Luke vii. 25, ἰδοὺ οἱ ἐν ἱματισμῷ

ἐνδόξῳ καὶ τρυφῇ ὑπάρχοντες ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις εἰσίν. It may be added that the new recension of Tobit ii. published in OP viii. no. 1076 inserts in v. 8 *καὶ ἀπώλεσεν πάντα τὰ ὑπάρχο[ν]τα αὐτοῦ*, which is reproduced in the Old Latin version with *et perdidit substantiam suam.*

ὑπεναντίος.—The strong sense which Lightfoot gives this word in Col. ii. 14, *ἐξαλείψας τὸ καθ' ἡμῶν χειρόγραφον τοῖς δόγμασιν, ὃ ἦν ὑπεναντίον ἡμῖν* may be illustrated from an early second century will, where it is enacted that no one shall be permitted to set aside any of the provisions or [*τι*] *ὑπεναντίως π̣[οιεῖν*), "to do anything opposed to them" (OP 493[10]). Cf. also PFi 19 (A.D. 153) *μηδ' ἄλλο τι περὶ αὐτῆς κακοτεχνεῖν ὑπεναντίον τούτοις τρόπῳ μηδενί*, and an inscription in Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics*, No. 651 (ii. 717) of iii/A.D., *εἰ δέ τις ὑπεναντίον ποιή[σει.* A very interesting Christian amulet designed to ward off fever and other ills ends with the words *ὅτι τὸ ὄνομά σου, κ(ύρι)ε ὁ θ(εό)ς, ἐπικαλεσά[μ]ην τὸ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ὑπερένδοξον καὶ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπεναντιο̣ῖς*, "upon thy name, O Lord God, have I called, the wonderful and exceeding glorious name, the terror of thy foes" (Ed.) (OP 1151 [51ff.] fifth century ?)

ὑπέρ.—We need not at present attempt any systematic illustration of the prepositions; but it may be worth while to quote an example of *ὑπέρ*=*in memoriam*: see *Michel* 1001[10] (the Will of Epicteta· 200 B.C.), *τοῦ καὶ κατασκευαξαμένου τὸ μουσεῖον ὑπὲρ τοῦ μετηλλαχότος ἀμῶν νἱοῦ.* Such a use might be quoted for 1 Cor. xv. 29. On *ὑπέρ* "as to," see Milligan on 2 Thess. ii. 1.

ὑπεραίρω.—In BU 1085[3] (ii/A.D.), an advocate's plea, we read that the plaintiff *οὐκ ὑπεραίρει τὴν συντείμησιν τῶν δύο ταλάντων*, "does press his claim beyond the two talents": the gen. here answers to the *ἐπὶ* c. acc. in 2 Thess. ii. 4, a stronger opposition.

ὑπερβαίνω.—BU 1007[10] (iii/B.C.) *ὑπερέβησαν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν μου.* In one of the interesting letters belonging to the Gemellus correspondence, Gemellus gives instructions that a deep trench be dug round the oil-press *ἵνα μὴ εὖ ὑπερβατὸν ᾖι τὸ ἐλαιουργῖον*, "so that it may not be easy to walk into the oil press" (FP 110[9] (A.D. 94)).

ὑποδέχομαι.—Hort's translation of *ὑποδεξαμένη*, "hospitably entertained," in Jas. ii. 25 is supported by the use of the word in *Michel* 159[6] (B.C. 127–126) where a Gymnasiarch is praised because *ὑπεδέξατο τοὺς ἀλειφομένους πάντας*, "he entertained all who were in training": cf. *ibid.* 1010[16, 28] (i/B.C.), *ὑπεδέξατο τὴν σύνοδον ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων.*

ὑπόδικος.—For the forensic *ὑ.*="answerable to' rather than "guilty before," as in Rom. iii. 19, cf. *Michel* 1009[86], 1357[39] (both iii/B.C.).

ὑπολαμπάς.—In Acts xx. 8 D substitutes for *λαμπάδες* the exceedingly rare word *ὑπολαμπάδες*, on which see a note by the Rev. Harold Smith in *Expos. Times*, xvi. 478. The story of Phylarchus (iii/B.C.—*ap.* Athenaeus, p. 536) of a gouty king who *κατεῖδε διά τινων ὑπολαμπάδων τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἀριστοποιουμένους*, and wished he were one of them, is the only authority in LS for the word. It may further be quoted from the immense inscription from Delos, *Syll.* 588[219] (ii/B.C.), where money is paid *ἐπισκευάσαντι τὸ κλεῖθρον τῆς ὑπολαμπάδος Εὐκράτει.* This is quite sistent with the meaning *window* which is obviously needed in Phylarchus. But we may doubt whether Mr. Smith is right in preferring the word. The fact that Eutychus had a choice of windows to fall out of does not seem very relevant; and those who have had to resist a tendency to Eutychianism under an evening sermon would generally agree that "many lamps" are as provocative of the heresy as "many windows" are of orthodox attentive hearing.

ὑπόστασις.—See *Notes* iii., where attention was called to a use of the word which encourages us to translate Heb. xi. 1, "Faith is the *title-deeds* of things hoped for." In TbP 61[194] (B.C. 118) the Editors give us by comparison with No. 64 in an unedited part) [*τῆς ἐν τῶι κγ* (*ἔτει*) *ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπολειπου*]*σῶν παρὰ τὰς ὑπ*[*οστάσεις τοῦ ιβ* (*ἔτους*)], and render "concerning the land which was returned in the twenty-third year as part of that which failed to come up to the *expectations* formed in the twelfth." The same phrase occurs in TbP 72[111] (B.C. 114), where Mayser 439 gives a mistaken reference. The uses seem at first sight very different, but in both cases there is the same central idea of something that *underlies* visible conditions and guarantees a future possession. And this of course is the essential meaning in Hebrews. In EP 15[3] (B.C. 223) *οἱ δ' ὑπογεγραμμένοι γεωργοὶ ἐπέδωκαν ἡμῖν ὑπόστασιν*, Rubensohn remarks that *ὑ.* is the substantive of *ὑφίστασθαι* in a corresponding sense: it seems to mean a written *undertaking*. TbP 336[7] (C. A.D. 190) *ἔστιν ὑποστάσεως τῆς κώ*(*μης*), "the amount *standing in the name of* the village is . . . (Edd.): this is of course the basis of the common meaning *property*. We may further quote *Syll.* 653[50] (the Audania Mysteries-inscr., B.C. 91), *καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν πρωτομυστᾶν τὸ ὑποστατικόν*, where Dittenberger notes "Ab *ὑποστῆναι subire, in se suscipere*. Pecunia est quam *πρωτομύσται* dare debent cum haec dignitas in eos confertur"—a fee on *undertaking* office. The quotations will illustrate the rather large range of use for a word which nevertheless keeps a common idea. They do not however help us much towards the use found in Heb. i. 3, which comes from the notion of *underlying* applied in a different way.

ὑποστέλλω.—In his farewell address to the elders of the Church in Ephesus, St. Paul twice lays stress on the fact that he had kept back nothing of the whole counsel of God,

using this verb (*οὐδὲν ὑπεστειλάμην*, Acts xx. 20, cf. v. 27): cf. OP 246[26] (A.D. 66), where the sender of a property return swears by the Emperor Nero *μὴ ὑπεστάλθαι*, "not to have prevaricated" or "kept back anything." The verb is used intransitively in OP 1102[14] (*c.* A.D. 146) *ἄρουραι . . . δοκοῦσιν τῇ συνγραφοδιαθήκῃ*, "arourae appear not to come under the testamentary covenant," where see the Editor's note.

JAMES HOPE MOULTON.
GEORGE MILLIGAN.

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